Wanda Harris v. Prime Recovery, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedFebruary 27, 2026
Docket2:25-cv-02207
StatusUnknown

This text of Wanda Harris v. Prime Recovery, LLC (Wanda Harris v. Prime Recovery, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wanda Harris v. Prime Recovery, LLC, (D. Kan. 2026).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

WANDA HARRIS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2:25-cv-2207-DDC-TJJ ) PRIME RECOVERY, LLC, ) ) Defendant. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 9). By minute order, District Judge Crabtree referred the Motion to the undersigned Magistrate Judge.1 For the reasons explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends District Judge Crabtree deny the motion without prejudice because the Court requires further clarification and additional information regarding the Court’s personal jurisdiction over Defendant. REPORT I. Procedural History On April 17, 2025, Plaintiff Wanda Harris filed her Complaint in this case against Defendant Prime Recovery, LLC, a New York limited liability company. Previously, on October 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the matter styled In re Harris, D. Kan. Bankr. No. 23-21262. Among the debts listed on Schedule E/F of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition was a delinquent consumer debt that she allegedly owed to Lend Nation. Plaintiff alleges in this case, that on February 17, 2025, Defendant sent Plaintiff a collection email demanding payment

1 See ECF No. 10. 1 of the Lend Nation debt, despite the debt being included in her bankruptcy. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant violated sections 1692e and 1692c(c) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) by demanding payment of, and failing to cease communications and collections regarding a debt subject to bankruptcy. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant engaged in abusive collection actions in violation of section 1692d of the FDCPA.

Plaintiff resides in the state of Kansas. Defendant is a New York limited liability company. Plaintiff alleges Defendant “operates a defaulted debt collection business and attempts to collect debts from consumers in many states, including consumers in the State of Kanas” and though “not authorized to do so, Defendant conducts business [in] Kansas.”2 On June 4, 2025, the Clerk of the District Court, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1), entered a Clerk’s Entry of Default3 against Defendant for failure to file an answer or other pleading responsive to Plaintiff’s Complaint. On July 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Motion for Default Judgment4 requesting that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), the Court enter default judgment against Defendant, and damages be resolved at a subsequent proceeding.

II. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides a two-step process for securing a default judgment. First, Rule 55(a) allows the Clerk to enter default against a party who “has failed to plead or otherwise defend” a lawsuit. Once default has been entered, the party may apply to the court for entry of a default judgment.5 Before the court can award a default judgment, it has an

2 Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1, p. 2. 3 ECF No. 8. 4 ECF No. 9. 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 2 affirmative duty to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the defendant.6 This requires a prima facie showing based on the written submissions.7 The Court then determines whether default judgment is proper, and evaluates whether there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment to be entered.8 III. Analysis

As noted above, the Court first has an affirmative duty to determine whether it has subject- matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. The subject-matter jurisdiction is easily made. The Court finds it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff brings her claims under the FDCPA.9 The personal jurisdiction determination is not so easily made. To establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant, a plaintiff must satisfy the state long-arm statute and constitutional due process.10 “The Kansas long-arm statute is liberally construed to assert personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the due process clause of the Constitution.”11 Due process requires there be minimum contacts between the forum state and nonresident defendant.12 A Court may

6 Stafford v. Jankowski, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1227 (D. Kan. 2004). 7 Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 773 (10th Cir. 1997) 8 Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Trotter’s on the River, LLC, No. 25-2105-DDC-TJJ, 2025 WL 3718338, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 2025). 9 Mantz v. Rapid Res., Inc., No. 22-CV-2484-HLT-ADM, 2022 WL 17716838, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 14, 2022). 10 Fears v. Medicredit, Inc., No. 18-cv-2473-JAR-TJJ, 2018 WL 6725378, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2018) (“[T]he FDCPA does not confer nationwide service of process in this case. Thus, personal jurisdiction must be established under the Kansas long-arm statute, K.S.A. 60-308(b).”). 11 Id. 12 Van Deelen v. City of Kansas City, Mo., No. CIV.A. 05-2028, 2006 WL 1301000, at *4 (D. Kan. May 9, 2006) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 3 “assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ its activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.”13 If the plaintiff’s cause of action does not arise from activities defendant has directed at the forum state, the court may still, nonetheless, maintain general personal jurisdiction over the defendant based on defendant’s contacts with the state.14

However, “[b]ecause general jurisdiction is not related to the events giving rise to the suit, courts impose a more stringent minimum contacts test, requiring plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant’s ‘continuous and systematic general business contacts.’”15 Once it is established a defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, the Court still must consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident Defendant would “offend traditional notions of ‘fair play and substantial justice.’”16 A. Specific Personal Jurisdiction Specific personal jurisdiction requires “(1) that the defendant has purposefully directed [its] activities at residents of the forum, and (2) that the suit arise out of or relate to those activities.”17 Whether a defendant “purposefully directed” activities at a forum’s residents turns

on whether there is “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its

13 Rainy Day Books, Inc. v. Rainy Day Books & Cafe, L.L.C., 186 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1161 (D. Kan. 2002) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). 14 Id. 15 Id. (quoting OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co.

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Wanda Harris v. Prime Recovery, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wanda-harris-v-prime-recovery-llc-ksd-2026.