UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
KELSEY WALLACE,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 - 2906 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
CHRIS WRIGHT, Secretary of Energy, 1
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kelsey Wallace is a former Foreign Affairs Specialist in the Department of Energy’s Office
of Nuclear Material Removal who was terminated in May 2023. She alleges that her termination
was unlawful and that it was the culmination of a pattern of discriminatory conduct she suffered
because of her disability. Ms. Wallace brings this suit alleging disability discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Secretary of Energy now moves to partially dismiss Ms. Wallace’s
Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons explained below, the
Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and
attachments. Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023).
Ms. Wallace began her employment at the Department of Energy (DOE) in June 2021 as
a Program Analyst. First Am. Compl. (Compl.) ¶ 12, ECF No. 16. In August 2022, she accepted a
1 The current Secretary is substituted for his predecessor pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). new position as a Foreign Affairs Specialist. Compl. ¶ 13. In that role, she was supervised by
Jessica Lillo and Tiffany Blanchard-Case. Compl. ¶¶ 27–28, 34–35.
For the first seven months of her new job, Ms. Wallace had no issues with management
and performed her duties “at or in excess of the DOE’s reasonable expectations.” Compl. ¶ 14. In
March 2023, however, she had to undergo neck surgery and the recovery “did not go as planned.”
Compl. ¶¶ 15–16. Shortly after the surgery, Ms. Wallace began to develop intense pain and
swelling at the surgical site. Compl. ¶ 17. She let Ms. Lillo and Ms. Blanchard-Case know that she
“temporarily needed to telework from home” and would keep them “apprised as to her status.”
Compl. ¶ 17.
Unfortunately, Ms. Wallace’s condition continued to worsen and on April 11, 2023, she
was diagnosed with a “septic medical abscess.” Compl. ¶ 19. She promptly began the “first of
many fluid removal procedures that she ultimately endured over the next few weeks.” Compl. ¶ 19.
While receiving this treatment, Ms. Wallace required “daily monitoring” from her treatment team
and was instructed by her surgeon to not go to the office or lift anything. Compl. ¶¶ 20–21.
Ms. Wallace continued to work remotely, to update her supervisors daily, and to schedule her
medical appointments during her lunch hour so they “would not interfere with her work.” Compl.
¶ 22.
Ms. Wallace continued to telework, at her surgeon’s direction, from April 17 until April
28, 2023, during which time she underwent an additional surgical procedure to remove the
“internal medical stitch that caused the abscess to form” and to implant a medical drain in her face.
Compl. ¶¶ 23–26. Ms. Wallace also continued to keep her supervisors apprised of her situation.
Compl. ¶ 23. As a result of her continued need to telework, Ms. Wallace informed Ms. Lillo that
she would not be able to travel with her for a previously planned work trip to South Carolina during
2 the week of April 24 to 28. Compl. ¶¶ 27–28. In response, “Ms. Lillo began making veiled threats
about how missing work trips can result in termination of employment.” Compl. ¶ 28.
Ms. Wallace had another work-trip scheduled during the week of May 8 to 12, 2023.
Compl. ¶ 29. Following Ms. Lillo’s comments about her missing the South Carolina trip,
Ms. Wallace “grew increasingly concerned” that if she missed a second work trip because of her
disability she would be terminated. Compl. ¶ 29. As a result, even though her health condition was
still tenuous and her surgeon was concerned about her traveling, Ms. Wallace felt she “had no
other choice than to attend the . . . trip.” Compl. ¶ 30–31.
On the second day of the trip, Ms. Wallace “began feeling immense swelling and pain
return to the surgical site.” Compl. ¶ 32. She scheduled an emergency appointment with her
treatment team when she returned to the D.C. area and had “additional drainage protocol and
compression of the abscess” from May 12 to 18, including having a “third medical drain implanted
into her face.” Compl. ¶¶ 32–33.
On May 16, 2023, while Ms. Wallace was in the midst of this treatment—and “under her
surgeon’s directive to remain home and continue working remotely”—Ms. Lillo and
Ms. Blanchard-Case “ordered” Ms. Wallace to come into the office or “she would be immediately
terminated.” Compl. ¶¶ 34–36. They issued this order despite being aware of Ms. Wallace’s
condition and of her surgeon’s directive that she work from home. Compl. ¶ 35.
Ms. Wallace complied with her supervisors’ order. When she came to DOE’s office the
following week to meet with Ms. Lillo, she was “told she was being fired” and that she had been
made to come “into the office in-person” so she could “sign termination paperwork.” Compl. ¶ 37.
Ms. Lillo informed Ms. Wallace that “she would[] not be permitted to leave Ms. Lillo’s office until
3 the paperwork was signed.” Comp. ¶ 38. DOE terminated Ms. Wallace on May 23, 2023. Compl.
¶ 11.
On July 6, 2023, Ms. Wallace contacted an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
Counselor. Compl. ¶ 7. On October 10, 2023, she filed a formal discrimination complaint with the
DOE’s EEO Office and with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Compl.
¶ 8. On July 16, 2024, the DOE’s EEO Office issued its “Final Agency Decision . . . advis[ing]
[Ms. Wallace] that she had 90 days to commence an action in federal court. Compl. ¶ 10.
B. Procedural Background
Ms. Wallace filed this lawsuit on October 14, 2024. ECF No. 1. On June 19, 2025, she filed
an Amended Complaint, alleging that the Secretary violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by
discriminating against her based on disability (Count I) and subjecting her to a hostile work
environment (Count II). Compl. ¶¶ 40–71, ECF No. 16. On July 3, 2025, the Secretary moved to
partially dismiss Ms. Wallace’s lawsuit under Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 17. The motion is fully
briefed and ripe for review. See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 18, Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 19.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court will dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts “must construe the complaint in
favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from
the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal
quotations omitted). But courts need not accept as true “a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation,” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Trudeau v.
FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
4 DISCUSSION
The Secretary does not challenge Ms. Wallace’s ability to proceed with a disability
discrimination claim premised on her termination. Mot. Dismiss at 1. He instead argues: (1) that
she has failed to exhaust administrative remedies for many of her other claims; (2) that even if
exhausted, her retaliation and failure to accommodate claims fail; and (3) that she has failed to
plausibly state a claim for hostile work environment. The Court finds many but not all of the
Secretary’s arguments persuasive and thus grants in part and denies in part the Secretary’s motion.
Ms. Wallace may proceed with claims alleging discrimination and retaliation premised on her
termination. The rest of her claims are dismissed.
A. Administrative Exhaustion
Federal employees alleging discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act must “exhaust
administrative remedies before filing suit in federal district court.” Barkley v. U.S. Marshals Serv.,
766 F.3d 25, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1)). This means that an employee
“must ‘initiate contact’ with an EEO Counselor in her agency ‘within 45 days of the date of the
matter alleged to be discriminatory.’” Steele v. Schafer, 535 F.3d 689, 693 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing
29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1)). This forty-five-day clock begins to run “when an employee has a
reasonable suspicion of a discriminatory action.” Nguyen v. Mabus, 895 F. Supp. 2d 158, 171
(D.D.C. 2012) (cleaned up).
If the matter cannot be resolved informally after the employee’s initial contact with the
counselor, the counselor must inform the employee of the right to sue, and the employee “must
file a formal complaint of discrimination with the agency.” Id. “The agency must then investigate
the matter, after which the complainant may demand an immediate final decision from the agency
or a hearing before an EEOC administrative judge.” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.106(e)(2),
5 1614.108(f)). After receiving a final decision from the agency, the complainant has ninety days to
file a civil action in federal court. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407).
“A discrimination lawsuit brought after an employee goes through this process must be
limited to the claims that were alleged in the EEO complaint or that were ‘like or reasonably related
to the allegations . . . and growing out of such allegations.’” Bozgoz v. James, No. 19-cv-239, 2020
WL 4732085, at *7 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2020) (quoting Park v. Howard University, 71 F.3d 904, 907
(D.C. Cir. 1995)). In other words, the claims must “arise from the administrative investigation that
can reasonably be expected to follow the charge of discrimination.” Id. at *8 (cleaned up). “A
plaintiff’s purported failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, and
defendants bear the burden of pleading and proving it.” Id. at *6.
Here, the Secretary asserts that Ms. Wallace has not successfully exhausted “(1) the
discrete disability discrimination claim premised on any threats of termination, ridicule, the
requirement she attend a May 8-12, 2023, work trip, the revocation of a reasonable
accommodation, or the revocation of her email access; (2) any discrete retaliation claim; (3) any
retaliatory hostile work environment claim; and (4) any failure-to accommodate claim[.]” Mot.
Dismiss at 9. The Court agrees as to all but the retaliation claims.
The most obvious deficiency of many of Ms. Wallace’s claims is that they were not raised
with an EEO Counselor within forty-five days of their occurrence. The Supreme Court has advised
in the context of administrative exhaustion of employment discrimination claims that “strict
adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of
evenhanded administration of the law.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 108
(2002) (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980)). Accordingly, “discrete
discriminatory acts are not actionable” if they were not raised in the statutorily mandated “time
6 period after the discrete discriminatory act occurred.” Id. at 113. An act is a “discrete act” that
might support a standalone claim of discrimination if it occurs at a “fixed time.” Coleman-Adebayo
v. Leavitt, 326 F. Supp. 2d 132, 137–38 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114). This
generally includes acts like termination, failure to promote, or denial of an accommodation request.
Id. Importantly, this does not mean that these prior acts may never be raised in a plaintiff’s lawsuit.
In some instances, for example, they may be actionable as “component acts” of a “hostile work
environment claim” that was timely filed. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117. They might also be cited “as
background evidence in support of a timely claim.” Id. at 113. These discrete prior acts cannot,
however, serve as independent bases for discrimination claims if they occurred “outside the
statutory time period.” Id. at 105.
Here, Ms. Wallace first initiated contact with the EEO Counselor on July 6, 2023. Compl.
¶ 7. This means that the only discrete acts that may serve as independent bases for Ms. Wallace’s
claims are acts that occurred less than forty-five days before that date—i.e., after May 22, 2023.
Based on Ms. Wallace’s Complaint, the only discrete discriminatory act that occurred after May
22, 2023, was her termination. While Ms. Wallace may allege that discriminatory acts prior to
May 22 are part of her hostile work environment claims or are background evidence for why her
termination was discriminatory, she may not assert separate discrimination claims based on those
acts because they were not administratively exhausted. Accordingly, the Court dismisses any
disability discrimination, retaliation, or accommodation claims premised on actions that occurred
before May 22, 2023. This includes threats of termination related to her work trip to South
Carolina, any comments or actions that made her feel she was required to attend the May 8-12
work trip, and denial of or revocation of her medical accommodation through the May 16, 2023,
directive from her supervisors that she come into the office.
7 The only remaining question is whether Ms. Wallace has exhausted a retaliation claim
premised on her termination. The Secretary says no because she did not adequately raise such a
claim in her formal EEO Complaint. Specifically, the Secretary says that Ms. Wallace “did not
check the box for ‘retaliation’ in her formal EEO Complaint” and thus did not put the agency on
notice of that claim. Mot. Dismiss at 8. The Court disagrees. As one of the cases cited by the
Secretary notes, a claimant who does not check the proper box on her EEO Complaint may still
properly raise the claim if she otherwise describes it on the charge form. Carter v. Washington
Post., No. 05-cv-1712, 2006 WL 1371677 at *4 (D.D.C. May 15, 2006). And here, the Secretary
acknowledges that Ms. Wallace listed “retaliation” in the title of her EEO complaint. Reply at 5.
The Court sees no legal basis for meaningfully distinguishing between “checking the box” for
retaliation and listing retaliation in the title of a complaint. At this early stage, where the Plaintiff
must be given the benefit of all inferences, the Court is satisfied that DOE was sufficiently on
notice that Ms. Wallace was alleging retaliation. Thus, the retaliation claim based on her
termination has been administratively exhausted.
B. Retaliation and Accommodation
The Secretary next asserts that even if Ms. Wallace’s retaliation and accommodation claims
have been exhausted, they have not been plausibly alleged. See Mot. at 9–16. As noted previously,
Ms. Wallace may not assert claims premised on discrete acts that occurred before May 22, 2023,
as those claims were not administratively exhausted. This forecloses any claims related to lack of
accommodation because Ms. Wallace’s Complaint contains no allegations regarding conduct after
May 22, 2023, that could support such claims. Ms. Wallace is not foreclosed, however, from
asserting a retaliation claim premised on her termination. And the Court concludes that her
Complaint contains sufficient allegations to support such a claim.
8 To state a retaliation claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege that: “(i) she
engaged in statutorily protected activity; (ii) she suffered a materially adverse action by her
employer; and (iii) a causal link connects the two.” Doak v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1096, 1107 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). At the motion to dismiss stage, “the issue is not whether a plaintiff will
ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002); see also Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d
1211, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, all the complaint has to say is
[that] the [defendant] retaliated against me because I engaged in protected activity.” (cleaned up)).
Here, Ms. Wallace’s allegations satisfy all three elements. First, she alleges that she made
“weekly accommodation requests” during the period in which she was recovering from surgery.
Compl. ¶ 50. Second, her termination was an obviously adverse employment action. And third,
Ms. Wallace’s allegations support a reasonable inference that her termination was connected to
her protected activity. This inference is supported by temporal proximity because Ms. Wallace’s
termination occurred within approximately two months of her becoming disabled and requesting
accommodation. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (temporal
proximity can “support an inference of causation . . . where the two events are ‘very close’ in time”
(quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001))). This inference is also
supported by Ms. Wallace’s allegations that her supervisors did not like that she needed to telework
because of her medical condition and that she was unable to participate in previously scheduled
work travel. Compl. ¶ 28. While Ms. Wallace may not ultimately prevail on her retaliation claim—
indeed, her allegations of retaliation are not robust—she has sufficiently alleged that she engaged
in protected activity and that DOE terminated her as a result. Compl. ¶ 61. This is enough to
survive dismissal. See Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1220.
9 C. Hostile Work Environment
Finally, the Secretary seeks dismissal of Ms. Wallace’s hostile work environment claim. A
hostile work environment claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act 2 is analyzed under the same
framework as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See Sanders v. Kerry, 180 F. Supp. 3d 35, 44
(D.D.C. 2016). To adequately plead such a claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) she is a
member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) she was harassed
because of her protected status; (4) the harassment was severe to a degree which affected a term,
condition, or privilege of her employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known about
the harassment but nonetheless failed to take steps to prevent it. Hartzler v. Mayorkas, No. 20-cv-
3802, 2022 WL 15419995, at *21 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2022).
“To determine whether a hostile work environment exists, the court looks to the totality of
the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its
offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Baloch v.
Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998)). The Supreme Court has also made clear that “conduct must be extreme
to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.” George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d
405, 416 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788). By adhering to these standards, a
court “ensure[s] that Title VII does not become a general civility code” that involves courts in
policing “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace[.]” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (cleaned up).
2 The D.C. Circuit has not affirmatively decided whether the Rehabilitation Act provides a cause of action for a hostile work environment but has been willing to assume that it does. See Hartzler v. Mayorkas, No. 20-cv-3802, 2022 WL 15419995, at *21 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2022) (citing Kuraner v. Mineta, No. 00-5416, 2001 WL 936369, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 2001) (per curiam)).
10 Here, Ms. Wallace alleges that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on
a “continuous and escalating series of discriminatory acts.” Opp’n at 8. These include that her
supervisors “harass[ed] and ridicul[ed] [her] . . . because of her disability”; threatened her with
termination because she was “unable to attend a work trip” due to her disability; “publicly
ridicul[ed]” her by making her “come into the office” despite knowing her doctor had said she
should not do so; placed her “under so much pressure and duress to attend the May work trip” that
she felt she had to attend; and “unjustifiably revok[ed] [her] medical accommodation” by making
her come into the office in-person to sign her termination paperwork. Compl. ¶¶ 52–53. 3
These allegations do not support a hostile work environment claim. As an initial matter,
Ms. Wallace’s allegations are exceedingly vague. Her allegations about being harassed and
ridiculed, for example, reveal very little about what was actually said to her, who said it, and where
and when they said it. Ms. Wallace’s only moderately specific allegation on that topic is that at
some point after she missed the South Carolina trip, Ms. Lillo made “veiled threats about how
missing work trips can result in termination of employment.” Compl. ¶ 28. This allegation on its
own does not support a conclusion that Ms. Wallace was subject to the frequent, severe, or
pervasive harassment needed to create a hostile work environment.
Ms. Wallace’s other allegations are similarly lacking. Indeed, several of the other
allegations that she frames as a “series” or “pattern” of “actionable instances of unlawful
misconduct” all appear to arise from what is essentially a single incident: her in-office termination.
See Compl. ¶¶ 52–53. This includes her allegation that she was “publicly ridicule[ed]” by being
made to come into the office, and her allegation that her supervisors’ order on May 16, 2023, that
3 Ms. Wallace’s Complaint also includes an allegation about “the abrupt revocation of her email access” but says nothing about when this occurred, who ordered it, and why it was discriminatory. Compl. ¶ 53.
11 she come into the office “unjustifiably revok[ed] [her] medical accommodation.” Compl. ¶ 52.
Ms. Wallace cannot salvage her deficient factual allegations by piling on top of them conclusory
legal allegations that the conduct to which she was subject was “severe or pervasive,” that it
“alter[ed] the conditions of [her] employment,” or that it “cultivated a pervasively hostile and
abusive work atmosphere.” Compl. ¶¶ 54–57.
The inadequacy of Ms. Wallace’s claim is laid bare by the slew of cases cited in the
Secretary’s motion involving more substantial allegations that did not survive dismissal. See Mot.
Dismiss at 16–20; see, e.g., Smith v. Jackson, 539 F. Supp. 2d 116, 138 (D.D.C. 2008) (plaintiff
alleged supervisor had “called [him] into his office numerous times a day, repeatedly called him
on the phone, constantly sent him emails, changed his [work schedule], charged him with [being
away without leave] and physically blocked his path when he sought to leave the office”); Hartzler,
2022 WL 15419995, at *22 (plaintiff alleged that she was “verbally ridiculed, including having
her medical conditions insulted and discussed openly,” placed on a performance improvement
plan, “given undesirable work,” and “excluded from meetings”).
In response, Ms. Wallace cites two cases—Bonnette v. Shinseki, 907 F. Supp. 2d 54
(D.D.C. 2012) 4, and Brooks v. Grundmann, 748 F.3d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2014)—for the proposition
that “courts have recognized” allegations of a “systematic campaign of discrimination and
retaliation . . . as sufficient to state a hostile work environment claim.” Opp’n at 9. Setting aside
that Ms. Wallace’s allegations do not describe a “systematic campaign of discrimination,” neither
Bonnette nor Brooks stands for that proposition. Nor do they help Ms. Wallace’s case. In both
cases, the courts found that hostile work environment claims could not be established even though
4 Ms. Wallace’s Opposition cites this case as Bonnell v. Shinseki, which the Court assumes is a typographical error. See Opp’n at 9.
12 the plaintiffs had made allegations that were arguably more severe than Ms. Wallace. Bonnette,
907 F.Supp.2d at 80–82; Brooks, 748 F.3d at 1276–78.
At bottom, Ms. Wallace simply has not alleged conditions that are “sufficiently severe or
pervasive to . . . create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.
17, 21 (1993). Accordingly, her hostile work environment claim must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Secretary’s motion
to dismiss. ECF No. 17. Ms. Wallace may proceed with claims alleging discrimination and
retaliation premised on her termination. All of her other claims are dismissed.
A separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge
Date: October 31, 2025