Waldner v. Carr

618 F.3d 838, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17768, 2010 WL 3325614
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedAugust 25, 2010
Docket09-2246
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 618 F.3d 838 (Waldner v. Carr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Waldner v. Carr, 618 F.3d 838, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17768, 2010 WL 3325614 (8th Cir. 2010).

Opinion

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

This case arises from failed negotiations for the acquisition and management of H & W Motor Express, Inc. (“H & W”), a financially struggling trucking company in Dubuque, Iowa. Roger Waldner appeals *842 the district court’s 1 adverse grant of summary judgment on his various state law tort and contract claims against three sets of defendants: (1) Urban Haas and Patricia M. Haas (collectively the “Haas defendants”); (2) shareholders of H & W, a group including the Haas defendants and others (collectively the “HWK defendants”); and (3) Van Wyk, Inc., a family-owned trucking company, and the company’s owners (collectively the ‘Van Wyk defendants”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

I.

We view the facts in the light most favorable to Waldner, the nonmoving party. See R.D. Offutt Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 494 F.3d 668, 672 (8th Cir.2007). The events giving rise to this factually complex case began when Waldner, after working in the trucking industry for approximately ten years, developed a plan to resurrect several trucking companies with financial difficulties. He predicted that, by consolidating the struggling trucking companies into one regional union cartage 2 company, the new union company would receive preferential treatment under a master agreement with the freight division of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and benefit financially from new customer revenue.

During the developmental stages of his business venture, Waldner, seeking a partnership, contacted the Van Wyk defendants and inquired if they would provide the financing — approximately $3 million— towards his purchase of the various trucking companies. After Waldner explained his plan to the Van Wyk defendants, Arlan Van Wyk, the chairman of Van Wyk, Inc., stated “get it done.” No agreement was ever reduced to writing between the Van Wyk defendants and Waldner. However, the Van Wyk defendants formed Equity Holdings, Inc., a holding company for the stock of the trucking companies acquired by Waldner, opened and funded a checking account for Equity Holdings, 3 and agreed to an ownership interest in Equity Holdings which was equal to that of Waldner’s. No Equity Holdings stock was ever issued to the Van Wyk defendants.

One of the trucking companies that Waldner expressed an interest in acquiring was H & W. In December 2000, Waldner approached the HWK defendants to discuss the potential sale of H & W. Over the next few weeks, Waldner and the HWK defendants negotiated the proposed transaction whereby, in exchange for Waldner’s assumption of H & W’s corporate debt, he would acquire all H & W stock. During these negotiations, Waldner became aware of H & W’s potential withdrawal liability to the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (“Central States”), a multiemployer pension plan governed by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1405. 4 Despite his *843 knowledge of H & W’s underfunded pension plan and the fact that he would inherit this liability once he took control of H & W, Waldner continued negotiations for the purchase of H & W. On January 9, 2001, Waldner entered into three agreements relevant to this appeal.

1.The HWK defendants and Waldner signed a document dated January 4, 2001, 5 and titled Memorandum of Understanding (“HWK Memorandum”), which consisted of a two-page outline for the multi-milliondollar transaction whereby Waldner would acquire H & W. Relevant to this appeal, the HWK Memorandum indicated that: (1) Waldner would manage H & W; (2) Waldner would indemnify the HWK defendants from any unfunded pension liability; (3) the HWK defendants would transfer their stock in the Riverside Tractor-Trailer Company 6 (“Riverside stock”) to H & W; (4) after a Stock Purchase Agreement was approved, 7 the HWK defendants would transfer their H & W stock to Waldner in exchange for a net-profit distribution; and (5) the HWK defendants would commit to pay approximately $2.2 million of operating capital which would be used to pay H & W’s past debts. Most notably, paragraph ten of the document specifically stated: “This Memorandum of Understanding is clearly not the final and definitive agreement amongst the parties to this agreement. The parties realize and acknoiuledge that a final and determinative Stock Purchase Agreement will be drafted once all of the details of the transaction can be agreed upon.” (J.A. vol. I, 201 (emphasis added).)

2. The Haas defendants and Waldner entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement regarding 121,750 shares of Riverside stock (“Riverside Purchase Agreement”). In the agreement, Waldner personally guaranteed to pay approximately $265,000 plus additional costs for H & W’s purchase of Riverside stock from the Haas defendants (“the purchase price”). Waldner signed the agreement “In good faith for H & W.” (Id. at 85.) The HWK defendants were not a party to this agreement.

3. After signing the Riverside Purchase Agreement, the Haas defendants and Waldner signed a document dated January 9, 2001, and titled Memorandum of Understanding (“Haas Memorandum”). This document discussed the transfer of Riverside stock from the Haas defendants to H & W, and stated that the Haas defendants “will agree to give free and clear to H & W ... 121,750 shares of Riverside [stock]” and listed only the book value of the stock, not the purchase price. (Id. at 204 (emphasis added).) The Haas Memorandum also explicitly stated that the Haas defendants would not participate in either the five-year profit sharing scheme or the $2.2 million reimbursement scheme that had been set up between Waldner and the HWK defendants in the HWK Memoran *844 dum. The HWK defendants were not a party to the Haas Memorandum.

After signing these documents, Waldner began managing H & W. The HWK defendants transferred their shares in H & W to Waldner, who issued new stock certificates in his name. The HWK defendants also transferred their Riverside stock to H & W. Waldner then transferred all of the H & W stock to Equity Holdings. Waldner also appointed a new board, became CEO of H & W, and assumed control of H & W’s financial operations.

Waldner’s business plan soon began to unravel. Although the HWK defendants had previously transferred their shares of H & W and Riverside stock, a finalized Stock Purchase Agreement between the parties was never approved. Eventually, the HWK defendants demanded the return of their H & W and Riverside stock.

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618 F.3d 838, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17768, 2010 WL 3325614, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/waldner-v-carr-ca8-2010.