Appellate Case: 25-5089 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 06/22/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 22, 2026 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court ALFONZO L. VINEYARD,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 25-5089 (D.C. No. 4:22-CV-00149-JFH-SH) CARRIE BRIDGES, Warden, (N.D. Okla.)
Respondent - Appellee. _________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * _________________________________
Before MATHESON, MORITZ, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Alfonzo Vineyard, an Oklahoma prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 application. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). We deny a COA and
dismiss this matter.
* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1 Because Vineyard appears pro se, “we liberally construe his filings, but
we will not act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). Appellate Case: 25-5089 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 06/22/2026 Page: 2
I
In 2017, the State of Oklahoma charged Vineyard with multiple felonies:
assault and battery with a deadly weapon, Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 652(C);
possession of a firearm after former conviction of a felony, id. § 1283; first-
degree burglary, id. § 1431; and domestic assault and battery, second offense,
id. § 644(C). 2 The state alleged that Vineyard burglarized the apartment of his
girlfriend, Tiffany Alexander, and later shot her during an argument.
At a preliminary hearing, Alexander, her neighbor Dorshell Fletcher,
and Fletcher’s daughter, Y.F., 3 testified about the two incidents. Relevant here,
Alexander described an argument at her apartment during which Vineyard
produced a handgun, pointed it at her, and told her she “was going to pay.” R.
II at 71. From the neighboring apartment, Y.F. testified that she heard
Vineyard say he “was going to kill [Alexander],” and Alexander scream “she
didn’t want to die.” R. II at 48, 56. Alexander then “pick[ed] up something” and
“hit his hand.” R. II at 71. The gun discharged, striking her under the arm.
Two months before trial, Vineyard orally asked the trial court to remove
his appointed counsel so he could represent himself. Vineyard told the court
2 Vineyard was also charged with two misdemeanor counts of obstructing
an officer, Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 540, which are not separately challenged in this appeal.
3 Because Y.F. was a minor at the time of the hearing, we refer to her by
her initials. See Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(5); Fed. R. Crim. P. 49.1(a)(3). 2 Appellate Case: 25-5089 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 06/22/2026 Page: 3
that counsel did not “have [his] best interest at heart.” R. II at 89. He explained
that counsel had refused to seek dismissal of the charges based on two
affidavits Alexander signed stating that she did “not wish to go through with
the charges,” R. III at 840–41, and had instead urged him to accept the State’s
plea offer. After advising Vineyard of the risks of self-representation, the trial
court granted his request and instructed counsel to serve in an advisory
capacity.
Vineyard proceeded to trial. On the first day, the State moved to declare
Alexander, Fletcher, and Y.F. unavailable. The trial court granted the motion
over Vineyard’s objection, and the preliminary hearing transcripts were read
to the jury. The jury convicted Vineyard on all counts, and the trial court
sentenced him to consecutive life sentences.
On direct appeal, Vineyard’s appellate counsel raised five claims:
Vineyard’s waiver of counsel was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; the
admission of Alexander’s preliminary hearing testimony violated the
Confrontation Clause; the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
of assault and battery with a deadly weapon; the trial court erred in failing to
instruct on the lesser-included offense of pointing a firearm; and cumulative
errors deprived Vineyard of a fair trial. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals (“OCCA”) affirmed in a summary opinion.
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Vineyard then sought post-conviction relief in state court, raising nine
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (IAAC) and one
freestanding claim of prosecutorial misconduct. The state district court denied
relief, holding the IAAC claims were meritless and the prosecutorial
misconduct claim procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct
appeal. Vineyard appealed the denial. He argued the prosecutorial misconduct
claim was not barred because it had been raised as an IAAC claim. The OCCA
rejected Vineyard’s characterization and affirmed the denial of all ten claims.
Vineyard next filed a § 2254 habeas application in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, raising the five claims
from his direct appeal and the ten IAAC claims. The district court denied the
application and Vineyard’s request for a COA. He now seeks a COA from this
court on the same grounds.
II
Vineyard must obtain a COA to appeal the denial of his habeas
application. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A COA will issue “only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). What that showing requires depends on the basis for
the district court’s ruling.
For a claim denied on the merits, an applicant must show “that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
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constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000). Where the state court adjudicated the claim, the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) adds another layer of deference.
The AEDPA precludes federal habeas relief unless the state court’s decision
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). At the COA stage, we therefore ask whether reasonable
jurists could debate the district court’s application of AEDPA. Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).
For a claim denied on procedural grounds, Vineyard must make two
showings. He must show that reasonable jurists would find it debatable that
(1) “the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right” and
(2) “the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at
484.
III
In support of his application for a COA, Vineyard raises the same fifteen
issues presented to the district court. We first consider the five claims raised
in his direct appeal and then turn to the ten IAAC claims. As we explain, the
district court’s resolution of each is not debatable or wrong.
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A
On direct appeal, Vineyard argued he did not make a voluntary,
knowing, or intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. In his view, the trial
court’s colloquy was constitutionally inadequate because he was not informed
of the range of punishment, the allegations against him, possible defenses, or
his right to testify. The OCCA rejected the claim, holding “[t]he record
established that Vineyard was adequately advised of both general and specific
dangers, disadvantages, and pitfalls of self-representation.” R. I at 250.
In his § 2254 application, Vineyard argued the “[t]rial court failed to
adequately explain the rights that he was waiving and information that was
relevant to his ability to make such a waiver. [Vineyard] told judge about the
breakdown in communication and of request to substitute counsel and [about
his] grievance to [the Oklahoma Bar Association].” Id. at 8. The district court
interpreted Vineyard as raising two arguments. First, that the trial court’s
Faretta advisements were inadequate. The court rejected this argument,
holding the OCCA’s application of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975),
to the waiver colloquy was not unreasonable. Second, the court construed the
alleged communication breakdown and request for substitute counsel as
presenting additional circumstances bearing on the validity of his waiver. The
court determined that to the extent Vineyard raised such a claim, it was barred
by anticipatory procedural default: Vineyard had not presented the claim in
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state court, it would be procedurally barred if he attempted to do so now, and
he offered no basis to excuse the default. Vineyard challenges both rulings in
his COA application.
Reasonable jurists could not debate either determination by the district
court. Faretta requires a defendant “be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” 422 U.S. at 835
(internal quotation marks omitted). It does not prescribe a checklist. United
States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 959 (10th Cir. 1987). The colloquy is judged by
“the total circumstances of the individual case including [the defendant’s]
background, experience and the conduct of the accused.” Id. at 958 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
As the district court acknowledged, the trial court did not go “charge by
charge through the Information and possible sentences.” R. I at 410. But the
trial court informed Vineyard of the dangers associated with self-
representation. It explained Vineyard faced seven charges, R. II at 116; that
his minimum sentence given his prior convictions was twenty years, id. at 115;
and that he was likely facing life imprisonment, id. at 101, 115. It warned him
he would be held to the same standard as a licensed attorney despite lacking
legal training, id. at 88, 98; confirmed he was waiving any claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, id. at 99; told him directly that the court believed
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he was making a mistake, id. at 113; and offered him the opportunity to later
withdraw his decision, id. at 116–17. Throughout the hearing, Vineyard’s
responses confirmed his understanding. See id. at 98 (stating he would “rather
represent myself than have him”); id. at 99 (“not going to trial with him”); id.
at 101 (responding “[n]obody care about my life more than I do, so I’m fine with
it” when warned he was “probably go[ing] to prison [for] the rest of [his] life,”).
And beyond the colloquy itself, the district court noted Vineyard’s “many prior
convictions,” which confirmed his ability to make that choice with eyes open.
R. I at 410; see Padilla, 819 F.2d at 958. On this record, the district court’s
resolution of this claim was not “debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
Vineyard’s challenge to the district court’s procedural-default ruling does
not render this issue debatable. The district court concluded that Vineyard’s
contention he informed the trial court of a communication breakdown and
requested substitute counsel was not fairly presented to the state courts and
was subject to an anticipatory procedural bar. Vineyard responds there was no
default because the statements merely added facts to the same waiver-of-
counsel claim he raised on direct appeal. Alternatively, he suggests, appellate
counsel’s failure to raise the issue constituted cause excusing any default. We
need not resolve either contention.
Even assuming the procedural ruling is debatable, Vineyard must still
demonstrate that the underlying constitutional claim is also debatable. Slack,
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529 U.S. at 484. He has not done so. As both the state and the district courts
observed, the record does not support the premise that Vineyard requested
substitute counsel and was denied. Vineyard points to five lines from the
hearing transcript, but that passage reflects his dissatisfaction with appointed
counsel rather than a request for new counsel. See COA Appl. at 14. On this
record, Vineyard has not shown that reasonable jurists would debate the
district court’s conclusion that the OCCA reasonably conducted a Faretta
inquiry.
B
Vineyard next contends the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation by declaring Alexander unavailable and admitting her
preliminary hearing testimony at trial. The Confrontation Clause permits the
use of prior testimony only where the witness is unavailable and the defendant
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 68 (2004). A witness may be deemed “unavailable” only if “the
prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence
at trial.” Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724–25 (1968).
On direct appeal, the OCCA found the State’s efforts “more than
adequate” to establish Alexander’s unavailability. R. I at 253. The district court
concluded the OCCA reasonably applied Crawford and Barber. That decision
is not debatable.
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In his COA application, Vineyard primarily relies on Holmes v. State,
501 P.2d 830 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972), to argue the State did not make a good-
faith effort to locate Alexander. This argument lacks merit. Holmes is a
decision of the OCCA. It is not clearly established federal law against which
the OCCA’s decision is measured. See § 2254(d)(1); Kernan v. Cuero, 583 U.S.
1, 9 (2017) (per curiam) (stating that “state-court decisions” do “not constitute
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
And even assuming Holmes correctly states the federal standard, it is
inapposite on this record. In Holmes, the State issued two subpoenas that were
returned “not found” and did nothing more, efforts the OCCA found insufficient
to establish due diligence. 501 P.2d at 833. Here, the State went significantly
further. At the hearing on the State’s motion to declare Alexander unavailable,
three witnesses described the State’s efforts. An investigator visited two
addresses associated with Alexander a total of five times. R. II at 136, 140, 142.
He met with her mother, explained the subpoena and the pending cases, and
left the subpoena and the prosecutor’s contact information. See id. at 140–41.
Alexander’s mother stated she had no working phone number for her daughter,
and her own efforts to relay the information were unsuccessful. See id. at 146–
50. A victim witness coordinator also attempted to reach Alexander by phone
approximately five times without success. See id. at 155–56.
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Of course, it is always possible to identify additional steps the State
might have taken. “[B]ut the Sixth Amendment does not require the
prosecution to exhaust every avenue of inquiry . . . .” Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S.
65, 71 (2011) (per curiam). Vineyard has not shown that reasonable jurists
would debate the district court’s resolution of this claim, and we accordingly
deny a COA.
C
In support of his COA, Vineyard also insists the State’s evidence was
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed assault and
battery with a deadly weapon, violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, “the relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979) (emphasis in original). On habeas review, sufficiency claims face a “high
bar” because they are “subject to two layers of judicial deference”: deference to
the jury’s verdict and deference to the state court’s assessment of that verdict.
Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per curiam). Accordingly, a
federal court may overturn a state-court decision rejecting a sufficiency
challenge “only if the state court decision was objectively unreasonable.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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On direct appeal, Vineyard argued the State failed to prove the shooting
was willful as required the crime of battery. See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §§ 641, 642;
id. § 92 (defining willfulness as “a purpose or willingness to commit the act”).
As he put it, “the gun went off because Alexander threw something that hit
Mr. Vineyard’s hand, not because he purposefully pulled the trigger.” R. I at
174. The OCCA rejected the claim, holding “[t]he State proved each element of
the crime of assault and battery with a deadly weapon beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 254. The district court agreed, concluding “a rational juror,
properly instructed on the law of assault and battery with a deadly weapon,
could have found Vineyard guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt,” and that
Vineyard failed to show “the OCCA applied Jackson to the facts of the case in
an objectively unreasonable manner.” Id. at 418.
Vineyard’s COA application reasserts the same insufficiency argument
that Alexander’s testimony describes an accidental discharge. But that is only
one possible inference. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, we agree with the district court that “[t]he testimony that Vineyard
pointed a gun at Alexander and told her she was going to pay coupled with the
resulting gunshot wound was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude
Vineyard willfully assaulted and battered Alexander.” R. I at 418; see also
Avants v. State, 660 P.2d 1051, 1052 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (“[W]hen assault
culminates in a battery, the offense is assault and battery.”). On appeal,
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Vineyard does not raise any distinct arguments that would render the district
court’s determination debatable, and we find none in our review. This claim
also does not warrant a COA.
D
In his COA application, Vineyard argues the trial court erred by failing
to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of pointing a firearm. As the district
court recognized, that argument is not cognizable on federal habeas review. We
apply “a rule of automatic non-reviewability for claims based on a state court’s
failure, in a non-capital case, to give a lesser included offense instruction.”
Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, Vineyard was convicted of a non-capital offense; no reasonable
jurist could debate the district court’s denial of relief on this ground. We deny
a COA on this claim.
E
Vineyard next contends the cumulative effect of the trial errors deprived
him of a fair proceeding. But as we have explained, Vineyard has identified no
errors to aggregate. In the federal habeas context, cumulative-error analysis
“aggregates all constitutional errors found to be harmless and analyzes
whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such that
collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless.” Cuesta-
Rodriguez v. Carpenter, 916 F.3d 885, 915 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation
13 Appellate Case: 25-5089 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 06/22/2026 Page: 14
marks omitted). The doctrine “does not apply, however, to the cumulative effect
of nonerrors.” Id. Because Vineyard has not established any underlying
constitutional error, no reasonable jurist could debate the district court’s
denial of relief based on cumulative error, and we accordingly deny a COA on
this claim.
F
In Claims 6 through 14, Vineyard contends appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge on direct appeal: (1) the trial court’s reading
of his prior conviction during voir dire; (2) admission of Y.F.’s preliminary-
hearing transcript; (3) admission of Dorshell Fletcher’s preliminary-hearing
transcript; (4) the State’s motion to exclude the victim’s affidavits stating she
did not wish to proceed with the charges; (5) the State’s failure to disclose
certain jail and video calls to the jury; (6) the propriety of three jury
instructions; (7) denial of his oral motion for substitute counsel; (8) admission
of recorded phone conversations from jail he contends were unauthenticated;
and (9) a claim of vindictive prosecution for the addition of charges after the
preliminary hearing.
An IAAC claim is governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (applying Strickland to
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel). To succeed, Vineyard must show
that (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
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reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694.
Vineyard raised each claim in his state court application for post-
conviction relief. Applying this framework, the state district court dismissed
Vineyard’s IAAC claims. The OCCA affirmed. Vineyard raised the same issues
again in his federal § 2254 petition. Because the OCCA adjudicated these
claims on the merits, the district court’s review was “doubly deferential,”
taking a “highly deferential look at counsel’s performance through the
deferential lens of § 2254(d).” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court concluded
that the OCCA reasonably applied Strickland and denied relief.
Rather than address the district court’s reasoning in rejecting these
claims, Vineyard repeats the underlying contentions of error he presented to
the district court and state courts. The district court’s thorough order
addressed each omitted claim, identified the controlling authority, and
explained why the OCCA’s rejection of each was not an unreasonable
application of Strickland. See R. I at 423–34. Vineyard’s COA application does
not identify any argument that would render the district court’s
determinations debatable. We therefore deny a COA on these claims.
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G
Vineyard’s final claim also alleges his appellate representation was
ineffective, this time premised on counsel’s failure to raise a prosecutorial-
misconduct claim on direct appeal. This claim is procedurally barred.
Vineyard first raised prosecutorial misconduct in his state post-
conviction application as a freestanding claim, and the state district court held
it procedurally barred because “it could have been raised in his direct appeal,
but was not.” R. I at 306. On appeal to the OCCA, he argued the issue was not
barred because it was “filed under ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 354.
The OCCA rejected this argument, finding the IAAC “claim was not included
in the post-conviction application presented to the District Court,” and was
barred by Rule 5.2(A) of the Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.
R. I at 367; see Rule 5.2(A), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,
Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2026) (“The appeal to this Court . . . constitutes an
appeal from the issues raised . . . in the District Court.”). The district court
held the basis of the OCCA’s ruling under Rule 5.2(A) was an independent and
adequate state ground barring federal habeas review, and Vineyard had not
demonstrated the requisite cause to warrant review. See R. I at 435 (citing
Brown v. Allbaugh, 678 F. App’x 638, 642 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished)); see
Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 797 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the
state appeals court’s application of Rule 5.2(C) was both adequate and
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independent); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (a claim
procedurally defaulted on “an independent and adequate state procedural rule
. . . is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and
actual prejudice” or that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” will result from
failure to consider the claim).
Reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s decision.
Vineyard’s COA application does not challenge that Rule 5.2(A) is an
independent and adequate ground barring review. Rather, he maintains the
claim is not barred because he raised it as an IAAC claim, and “[i]neffective
assistance of appellate counsel cannot be raised on direct appeal.” COA Appl.
at 59. Maybe so, but Rule 5.2(A) turns on whether the claim was raised in the
state district court in his post-conviction proceeding, not direct appeal. And the
OCCA determined Vineyard had not done so. Because Vineyard identifies
nothing excusing the default, the OCCA’s determination is not ours to revisit.
See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. We accordingly deny a COA on this claim.
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IV
We deny Vineyard a COA, grant his motion to proceed in forma pauperis
(Doc. No. 6), and dismiss this matter.
Entered for the Court
Richard E.N. Federico Circuit Judge