Vidal v. Duke

295 F. Supp. 3d 127

• Court: District Court, E.D. New York
• Decided: November 9, 2017
• Docket: 16–CV–4756 (NGG) (JO); 16–CV–5228 (NGG) (JO)
• Status: Published

Opinion

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Pursuant to the Second Circuit's direction, the court addresses only "issues of jurisdiction and justiciability" at this point in the proceedings. (Oct. 24, 2017, USCA Order; Oct. 27, 2017, Order (Dkt. 98).) Accordingly, the court will consider only those portions of Defendants' motion to dismiss that challenge the court's subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Under Rule 12(b)(1), the court must dismiss a claim "for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ... when the ... court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court "must take all uncontroverted facts in the complaint ... as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction." Tandon v. Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, "the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction 'has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.' " Id. (quoting Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113 ). "[W]here jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute, the court has the power and obligation to decide issues of fact by *147reference to evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits." Id. (quoting APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 2003) ).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants raise four challenges to the court's authority to hear the above-captioned cases. First, Defendants argue, these cases are not justiciable under the APA because the decision to rescind the DACA program was "committed to agency discretion by law." See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). (Defs. Mem. at 12-17.) Second, Defendants contend that the decision to terminate the DACA program constitutes a denial of deferred action, judicial review of which is barred by Section 1252(g) of the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). (Id. at 17-19.) Third, they maintain, the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs lack standing to bring certain claims (id. at 28-29, 34-35, 37), and the State Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to bring any claims (id. at 19-21). Fourth, Defendants assert, the State Plaintiffs and MRNY cannot bring claims under the APA because they assert interests that fall outside the "zone of interests" protected by the INA. (Id. at 19-20.) The court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Committed to Agency Discretion by Law

Defendants first argue that these cases are non-justiciable because the decision to end the DACA program was committed to DHS's exclusive discretion by law. The court disagrees. Certain agency decisions, including decisions not to institute enforcement action, are presumptively immune from judicial review under the APA because they are "committed to agency discretion by law." See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) ; Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). But the rescission of the DACA program was not such a decision, nor have Defendants explained why Section 701(a)(2) precludes review of Plaintiffs' constitutional claims or other claims challenging actions other than the decision to rescind the DACA program.⁹

1. Statutory and Equitable Claims

Section 701(a)(2) of the APA does not preclude judicial review of Plaintiffs' statutory and equitable claims. "Under the APA, a party aggrieved by agency action is generally 'entitled to judicial review thereof.' " Westchester v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 778 F.3d 412, 418 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 ). "There is a strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action." Salazar v. King, 822 F.3d 61, 75 (2d Cir. 2016). Judicial review is not available, however, "to the extent that ... statutes preclude judicial review," 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), or "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law," § 701(a)(2). The latter is "a very narrow exception" to the presumption of reviewability of agency action under the APA, and it applies "in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.' " Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (quoting S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945) ), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977) ; see also *148Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649 (agency action is unreviewable "if a statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion"). "To determine whether there is Taw to apply' that provides 'judicially manageable standards' for judging an agency's exercise of discretion, the courts look to the statutory text, the agency's regulations, and informal agency guidance that govern the agency's challenged action." Salazar, 822 F.3d at 76 (quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649 ). These enactments supply "law to apply" because they may govern the agency's exercise of its own discretion. See id. at 76-77 (citing INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32, 117 S.Ct. 350, 136 L.Ed.2d 288 (1996) ); Sec'y of Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co., 456 F.3d 151, 158-59 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

a. "Law to Apply"

Here, there is "law to apply," permitting meaningful judicial review of Plaintiffs' statutory claims. Plaintiffs assert statutory claims under the APA and RFA. With respect to Plaintiffs' procedural APA and RFA claims, the relevant "law to apply" is found in the APA and RFA themselves, both of which specify procedures that agencies must follow when engaging in "substantive" or "legislative" rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 604. The process by which an agency makes a rule may be reviewed for compliance with applicable procedural requirements regardless of whether the substance of the rule is itself reviewable. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 195-98, 113 S.Ct. 2024, 124 L.Ed.2d 101 (1993); Am. Med. Ass'n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1995); N.Y.C. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1995).

There is also "law to apply" permitting meaningful judicial review of Plaintiffs' substantive APA claims. In order to satisfy Section 706(2)(a), Plaintiffs must identify some source of law, other than the APA's "arbitrary and capricious" standard, against which the court can review their claims: "If agency actions could be challenged as 'arbitrary and capricious,' without reference to any other standard, then § 701(a)(2)'s limitation on APA review would amount to no limitation at all, and nothing would ever be 'committed to agency discretion by law.' " Lunney v. United States, 319 F.3d 550, 559 n.5 (2d Cir. 2003). The court agrees that Plaintiffs have identified "law to apply" to these claims. In deciding to rescind the DACA program, Defendants expressly and exclusively relied on a legal determination that the program was unlawful and could not be sustained in court. (Sessions Letter, AR 251; DACA Rescission Memo, AR 253-55.) The court may review that rationale in light of, among other sources, the text of the INA and other statutes, the history of the use of deferred action by immigration authorities, and the OLC Opinion.¹⁰ While Defendants attempt to recast the decision to rescind the DACA program as the product of a discretionary "balancing of the costs and benefits of keeping the policy in place, on one hand, with the risk of 'potentially imminent litigation' that could throw DACA into immediate turmoil" (Defs. Mem. at 15), that argument is unsupported *149by the text of the Sessions Letter and the DACA Rescission Memo.

Defendants' argument that the decision to rescind the DACA program is unreviewable, notwithstanding the "substantive legal" rationale given for that decision (Defs. Mem. at 15), is unpersuasive. Defendants correctly note that unreviewable agency action does not become reviewable simply because "the agency gives a reviewable reason for otherwise unreviewable action." (Defs. Mem. at 13 (quoting ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283, 107 S.Ct. 2360, 96 L.Ed.2d 222 (1987) (" BLE")).) See BLE, 482 U.S. at 283, 107 S.Ct. 2360 ("[A] common reason for failure to prosecute an alleged criminal violation is the prosecutor's belief ... that the law will not sustain a conviction. That is surely an eminently 'reviewable' proposition, in the sense that courts are well qualified to consider the point; yet it is entirely clear that the refusal to prosecute cannot be the subject of judicial review."). That argument simply begs the question, however, of whether the decision to rescind DACA is actually unreviewable. While it may be true that a presumptively unreviewable decision does not become subject to judicial review simply because the decisionmaker expresses a "reviewable" rationale," see id., the decision to rescind the DACA program was not inherently such a decision, as the following section discusses in detail.

b. Prosecutorial Discretion

Nor does the decision to end the DACA program fall within a class of decisions traditionally regarded as presumptively immune from judicial review under Section 701(a)(2) of the APA. (Defs. Mem. at 12-14.) Defendants assert that the decision to rescind the DACA program constitutes "an exercise of enforcement discretion" that is "entrusted to the agency alone" and immune from judicial review. (Id. at 15.) The court concludes, however, that the decision to eliminate the DACA program-a program by which certain undocumented immigrants could request immigration authorities to exercise prosecutorial discretion with respect to them-was not itself a presumptively unreviewable exercise of enforcement discretion.

Defendants rely in particular on Chaney , which held that decisions not to take enforcement action were presumptively not subject to judicial review under the APA. In Chaney, the Court rejected an attempt by a group of prisoners awaiting execution by lethal injunction to force the Food and Drug Administration to take enforcement action to prevent the use of certain drugs for capital punishment. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 823-25, 830-33, 105 S.Ct. 1649. The Court held that a regulator's refusal to take enforcement action was presumptively unreviewable, because decisions not to take enforcement action typically "involve[ ]a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within [the agency's] expertise," id. at 831, 105 S.Ct. 1649, and do not implicate the agency's exercise of "coercive power over an individual's liberty or property rights, and thus do[ ] not infringe upon areas that courts often are called to protect," id. at 832, 105 S.Ct. 1649.

The decision to rescind DACA is unlike the non-enforcement decision at issue in Chaney. First, Plaintiffs do not challenge an agency's failure or refusal to prosecute or take enforcement actions with respect to certain violations of law. Instead, they challenge Defendants' affirmative decision to eliminate a program by which DHS exercised prosecutorial discretion with respect to a large number of undocumented immigrants. The DACA Rescission Memo curtails (if it does not eliminate outright)

*150DHS's ability to exercise prosecutorial discretion with respect to individuals previously eligible to request deferred action. Although the DACA Rescission Memo notes that it does not limit DHS's "otherwise lawful enforcement or litigation prerogatives," it makes clear that DHS "[w]ill reject all DACA initial requests and associated applications for Employment Authorization Documents filed after [September 5, 2017]" and "[w]ill reject all DACA renewal requests and associated applications for Employment Authorization Documents" inconsistent with the terms of the Memo. This affirmative decision to constrain DHS's prosecutorial discretion cannot be analogized to an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which would be presumptively immune from judicial review. Cf. Texas, 809 F.3d at 165-69 (creation of the DAPA program was reviewable because it was a "affirmative agency action," not an exercise of enforcement discretion). Second, Plaintiffs do not challenge non-enforcement decisions, which do not subject individuals to the "coercive power" of the state. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831, 105 S.Ct. 1649. To the contrary, the rescission of the DACA program subjects individuals who previously enjoyed some protection from removal to coercive state authority. Third, Defendants' decision to rescind the DACA program does not appear to have been motivated by a "complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within [the agency's] expertise." See id. Instead, Defendants stated that they were required to rescind the DACA program because it was unlawful, which suggests both that Defendants did not believe that they were exercising discretion when rescinding the program and that their reasons for doing so are within the competence of this court to review. (Sessions Letter; DACA Rescission Memo at 4.) The decision to rescind the DACA program is thus manifestly unlike the non-enforcement decision at issue in Chaney. While courts have also held that agency decisions to take (as opposed to refrain from taking) enforcement action are also unreviewable under the APA when there are no judicially manageable standards for reviewing the agency's discretion in choosing to bring an enforcement action, see Speed Mining, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 528 F.3d 310, 316-19 (4th Cir. 2008) ; Twentymile Coal, 456 F.3d at 155-59, those cases are inapposite because there is "law to apply" to review the decision to rescind DACA.

Finally, Defendants' arguments that Section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review of Plaintiffs' suits focus on the decision to rescind the DACA program. Defendants do not explain why the alleged decision to change DHS's policy regarding the use of DACA applicants' information should be immune from judicial review. To the contrary, there is "law to apply" in reviewing that decision (namely, DHS's prior statements about the uses of DACA applicants' information), and the court does not understand how the change in that policy can be analogized to the sorts of decisions, such as enforcement and non-enforcement decisions, that courts have recognized as presumptively exempt from judicial review. Accordingly, to the extent the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs also challenge DHS's alleged change in information-use policy as part of their substantive APA claim, that claim is reviewable. (SAC ¶¶ 151, 153-54.)

2. Constitutional Claims

Nor does Section 701(a)(2) preclude judicial review of Plaintiffs' constitutional claims. It is well-established that "even where agency action is 'committed to agency discretion by law,' review is still available to determine if the Constitution has been violated." Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1987);accord *151Inova Alexandria Hosp. v. Shalala, 244 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2001) ; Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1072-73 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

In Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988), the Court rejected the Government's argument that Section 701(a)(2) barred a former CIA employee from bringing constitutional claims challenging his termination from the agency. Because the National Security Act of 1947 vested the CIA Director with authority over firing decisions, the decision to fire the plaintiff because of his sexual orientation had been "committed to agency discretion by law," and he could not challenge that decision under the APA. Id. at 594-95, 599-601, 108 S.Ct. 2047. The National Security Act did not expressly preclude review of constitutional claims, however, so the Court would not presume that such claims were unreviewable. Id. at 603-04, 108 S.Ct. 2047 (noting that the Court has held that "where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear," in order to "avoid the 'serious constitutional question' that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim" (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n. 12, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) ) ). Similarly, Defendants identify no express indication that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of the actions at issue in these cases. While DHS undoubtedly exercises "wide discretion ... in the enforcement of the immigration laws" (Defs. Mem. at 16), that is insufficient to preclude review of Plaintiffs' constitutional claims.

3. Deference to the Executive Branch on Immigration Matters Does Not Counsel a Different Result

Lastly, Defendants contend that the court should read Section 701(a)(2) broadly in light of the Executive Branch's wide discretion to enforce the immigration laws. (Id. at 16-17.) The Supreme Court, however, has applied the "strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action" in the immigration context. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001). Defendants' specific arguments for a broad reading of Section 701(a)(2) likewise unavailing. While Defendants argue that judicial review of these cases is inappropriate because review could slow down the Executive Branch's removal of undocumented immigrants from this country, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) already precludes individuals in removal proceedings from delaying those proceedings by claiming that they were improperly denied deferred action. See AAADC, 525 U.S. at 485, 119 S.Ct. 936. In any event, those concerns do not apply to these cases, as the court discusses in Section III.B below. Defendants also argue that judicial review of immigration decisions is inappropriate because judicial review "may involve 'not merely the disclosure of normal domestic law enforcement priorities and techniques, but often the disclosure of foreign-policy objectives' or other sensitive matters." (Defs. Mem. at 16 (quoting AAADC, 525 U.S. at 490, 119 S.Ct. 936 ).) Defendants' stated rationale for rescinding the DACA program, however, turns wholly on questions of U.S. constitutional and administrative law, not sensitive law-enforcement, intelligence, or foreign-policy issues. In any event, vague speculation that judicial review might somehow implicate foreign-policy concerns is insufficient to justify a presumption that immigration cases are not subject to judicial review. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly and explicitly rejected the notion that the political branches have unreviewable authority over immigration...."), re consid.

*152en banc denied, 853 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2017), superseded by 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017). While the court is sensitive to the deference warranted to the Executive Branch in this sphere, Defendants' claims for deference cannot substitute for the "clear and convincing evidence" that Congress intended to restrict judicial review of administrative action. Sharkey v. Quarantillo, 541 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. INA Jurisdictional Bar

Nor does the INA divest the court of jurisdiction to hear this case. That Act contains a provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), that limits judicial review of certain actions "by or behalf of any alien arising from" certain deportation proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) ; see AAADC, 525 U.S. at 472, 119 S.Ct. 936. As explained below, that provision has no bearing on these cases, which do not arise from one of the three specifically enumerated actions by immigration authorities that trigger application of the statute. Moreover, by its terms, Section 1252(g) does not apply to claims brought by MRNY or the State Plaintiffs.

1. Programmatic Challenges to DACA-Related Decisions

First, the court considers whether Section 1252(g) strips the court of jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' challenges to the decision to rescind the DACA program. The court begins, as usual, with the text of the statute. In relevant part, Section 1252(g) provides as follows:

Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory) ... no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.

(emphasis added). As the Court has stated, this "provision applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General make take: her 'decision or action' to 'commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.' " AAADC, 525 U.S. at 482, 119 S.Ct. 936. Accordingly, the court must consider whether Plaintiffs' suits "arise from [a] decision or action by [DHS¹¹ ] to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

They do not. Defendants' termination of the DACA program does not, by itself, "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien." Id. By rescinding the DACA program, Defendants eliminated a set of guidelines identifying a discrete class of undocumented immigrants who were eligible to apply for deferred action. (See 2012 DACA Memo.) That decision, by itself, did not trigger any specific enforcement proceedings.¹² Nor do the individual Batalla *153Vidal Plaintiffs attack decisions by DHS to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders" against them or any other specific individuals. Each of those Plaintiffs has received deferred action (see SAC 3-42), and the record does not suggest that any are currently in removal proceedings and seek to challenge the end of the DACA program as a means of obstructing those proceedings. Instead, Plaintiffs bring broad, programmatic challenges to Defendants' decisions (1) to end the DACA program; (2) to provide limited notice of that decision to DACA recipients; and (3) to change DHS's information-use policy. None of those constitutes a "decision or action ... to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) ; cf. Texas, 809 F.3d at 164 (creation of DAPA reviewable because "decision to grant lawful presence to millions of [undocumented immigrants] on a class-wide basis" was not enumerated in the text of Section 1252(g) ). Accordingly, Section 1252(g) does not bar judicial review of challenges to those decisions.

This conclusion comports with both the plain meaning of the statute and with the Supreme Court's decision in AAADC . First, AAADC makes clear that Section 1252(g) only limits judicial review with respect to suits arising from certain enumerated decisions by immigration authorities. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia specifically rejected the notion that Section 1252(g) was "a sort of 'zipper' clause that says 'no judicial review in deportation cases unless this section provides judicial review." 525 U.S. at 482, 119 S.Ct. 936. Instead, "[t]he provision applies only to [the] three discrete actions" referenced above. Id. While "[t]here are of course many other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation process," the Court stated, "[i]t is implausible that the mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation was a shorthand way of referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings." Id. Defendants' argument that Section 1252(g) encompasses challenges to the decision to end the DACA program because "[t]he denial of continued deferred action is a necessary step in commencing enforcement proceedings at some later date" (Defs. Mem. at 18), is thus at odds with AAADC .

Second, the reasoning of AAADC does not support extending Section 1252(g) to encompass challenges to the decision to rescind DACA. In AAADC , the Court reasoned that Section 1252(g) must have been intended to limit judicial review of denials of deferred action:

Section 1252(g) seems clearly designed to give some measure of protection to "no deferred action" decisions and similar discretionary determinations, providing that if they are reviewable at all, they at least will not be made the bases of separate rounds of judicial intervention outside the streamlined process that Congress has designed [ (i.e., for judicial review of final orders of removal) ].

525 U.S. at 485, 119 S.Ct. 936. These limits were "entirely understandable" in order to prevent "the deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence prolongation of removal proceedings" that could result if immigrants were allowed to attack in-process removal proceedings by claiming that they were singled out by immigration authorities for adverse treatment. Id. at 487, 119 S.Ct. 936 ; see id. at 487-92, 119 S.Ct. 936. Because the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs challenge the programmatic decision to rescind DACA, rather than attempting to obstruct their specific removal proceedings by claiming that they were improperly denied *154deferred action, these cases do not implicate the concern raised in AAADC .

Accordingly, Section 1252(g) does not preclude review of these actions.

2. Claims by MRNY and the State Plaintiffs

Moreover, Section 1252(g) does not preclude judicial review of the claims brought by MRNY or the State Plaintiffs in particular. Again, the court begins with the text of the statute. Section 1252(g) only bars suits "by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action ... to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien." (emphasis added). But neither MRNY nor the State Plaintiffs are suing "on behalf of any alien" in removal proceedings or subject to an order of removal. Instead, MRNY sues in its own right, because it claims that the rescission of DACA has interfered with its operations. (SAC ¶¶ 54-57.) Likewise, the State Plaintiffs sue not "on behalf of any alien," but instead to vindicate their own proprietary and quasi-sovereign interests.¹³ (State Pls. Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss ("State Pls. Opp'n") (No. 17-CV-5228, Dkt. 82) at 19-22.) MRNY and the State Plaintiffs seek to assert their own rights and the rights of the general public, not those of individual immigrants in removal proceedings or subject to orders of removal. There is no reason why Section 1252(g) would deprive the court of jurisdiction over their claims, brought on their own behalf.

C. Standing

The court next considers whether Plaintiffs have established that they have standing to sue. Defendants only cursorily raise Article III standing defenses. (Defs. Mem. at 19-20, 34, 37.) "Because the standing issue goes to this [c]ourt's subject matter jurisdiction," however, "it can be raised sua sponte." Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005).

Under the U.S. Constitution, federal courts may hear only certain "cases" or "controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. This "case-or-controversy requirement" means that a plaintiff must have "standing," or a sufficient interest in a live dispute, to sue in federal court. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1546-47, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). At its "irreducible constitutional minimum," Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), standing consists of three elements:

To establish Article III standing, [Plaintiffs] must demonstrate: "(1) injury-in-fact, which is a concrete and particularized harm to a legally protected interest; (2) causation in the form of a fairly traceable connection between the asserted injury-in-fact and the alleged actions of the defendant; and (3) redressability, *155or a non-speculative likelihood that the injury can be remedied by the requested relief."

Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., LLC v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2008) ); accord Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The "first and foremost" of these three requirements, "injury-in-fact" requires a plaintiff to "show that he or she suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is 'concrete and particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.' " Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1548, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 ). To be "imminent," the injury must be "certainly impending"; "allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient." Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). The second and third requirements, "causation" and "redressability," require a plaintiff to demonstrate that the "injury-in-fact" he or she suffers is "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1386, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 ). A plaintiff need not, however, demonstrate that the defendant was the proximate or "but-for" cause of the injury-in-fact. Id. at 1391 n.6 ; Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2013).

The court considers standing separately with respect to each claim raised in each case. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006). "[T]he presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III's case-or-controversy requirement" with respect to each claim and form of relief sought. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 53 n.3, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006) (" FAIR"). The court therefore considers whether, for each claim raised in each of these two actions, at least one plaintiff has standing to sue.

1. Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs

a. DACA Rescission Claims

Defendants unsurprisingly do not contest that the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the decision to rescind the DACA program. If the DACA program ends, the individual Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs almost certainly will lose their work authorization, the availability of which turns on their status as recipients of deferred action. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l2(c)(14). Loss of their ability to work in the United States is clearly an "injury-in-fact" fairly traceable to the rescission of the DACA program. Additionally, if they were to lose their deferred action, the individual Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs would be subject to removal from the United States. There is nothing "speculative" about the possibility that they would actually be removed. See Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 195-97 (2d Cir. 2013) (to establish standing, a plaintiff who is clearly in violation of a "recent and not moribund" statute need not affirmatively demonstrate the government's intent to enforce the statute, absent "a disavowal by the government or another reason to conclude that no such intent exist[s]" (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973) )); cf. Amnesty Int'l, 568 U.S. at 410-16, 133 S.Ct. 1138 (no standing where alleged injury-in-fact rested on a "speculative" "chain of contingencies"). Those harms are "fairly traceable" to the termination of the DACA program and *156would be redressed by the vacatur of that decision. The Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs thus have Article III standing to challenge the decision to rescind the DACA program.

The Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs also have standing to challenge the process by which Defendants decided to end the DACA program. Plaintiffs have standing to assert procedural rights "so long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest ... that is the ultimate basis of [their] standing." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8, 112 S.Ct. 2130. "When a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant." Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007). Here, there is "some possibility" that if Defendants had subjected the decision to rescind the DACA program to notice and comment and analyzed the impact of that decision on small entities, they would have reached a different outcome. Accordingly, the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs also have Article III standing to assert their procedural APA claim, and MRNY has Article III standing to assert its RFA claim.

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot assert procedural APA claims because, if the decision to rescind the DACA program was a "substantive" or "legislative" rule requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking, then, "a fortiori so was enacting the policy in the first place," and the DACA program itself was thus "void ab initio-leaving Plaintiffs without a remedy." (Defs. Mem. at 28-29.) It does not follow, however, that if the rescission of the DACA program required notice and comment, the program's creation necessarily required notice and comment as well. (See Defs. Mem. at 29 n.7.) While Defendants might be correct on the merits (an issue that the court does not consider or resolve at this time), all that Article III requires is that Plaintiffs show that their alleged injury would be redressed by the ruling they seek-i.e., that the decision to rescind DACA should be vacated because it was procedurally defective.

b. Information-Use Policy Claim

The Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs also have standing to challenge the alleged changes to DHS's information-use policy. To obtain deferred action and work authorization under DACA, an applicant was required to provide USCIS with extensive personal information, including his or her home address, height, weight, hair and eye color, fingerprints, photograph, and signature, and submit to a background check. (See USCIS, Form I-821D: Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (SAC, Ex. B (Dkt. 60-1) ) at ECF pp.6-8; USCIS, Instructions for Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (SAC, Ex. B (Dkt. 60-1) ) at ECF p.3.) The Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs also allege that DACA applicants "routinely provided" other personal information, "including copies of school records, pay stubs, bank statements, passports, birth certificates, and similar records," in support of their applications. (SAC ¶ 70.) They contend that this information will enable DHS to deport them more easily once their deferred action expires. (Id. ¶ 127.) The court agrees. It is not difficult to infer that this information would facilitate DHS's ability to remove these individuals from the country. This increased likelihood of removal is sufficiently concrete, imminent, and traceable to Defendants' alleged conduct to establish standing.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their information-use policy claims because "[n]o Plaintiff plausibly alleges that the agency has in fact used his DACA information for any enforcement *157purpose, much less initiated enforcement proceedings against him as a result, or that there is any imminent threat of this occurring." (Defs. Mem. at 37.) The individual Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs need not wait, however, until they are deported to have standing to press this claim. Once their deferred action expires, they will be subject to removal from the United States, and the court will presume that Defendants will enforce the immigration laws against them. See Hedges, 724 F.3d at 197. Nor will the court ignore the obvious reality that many DACA recipients will be removed from the country when their deferred action expires. (See, e.g., State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶ 71 (quoting a statement by Acting Director of ICE Thomas Homan that undocumented immigrants "should be uncomfortable" and "should look over [their] shoulder[s]" and "be worried").) The threat of removal based on information provided to DHS is sufficiently imminent as to constitute injury-in-fact.

c. Notice Claim

The Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs lack standing, however, to assert their notice claim. In their Second Amended Complaint, the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs allege that, following the enactment of the DACA Rescission Memo, Defendants failed to send DACA recipients whose status expired by March 5, 2018, individualized notices "advising them that they must apply to renew DACA by October 5, 2017 or be forever ineligible to renew their status." (SAC ¶ 165; see id. at 3, 48, 103-05, 160-66.) As Defendants correctly note, however, the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs have not alleged that any of them missed the October 5, 2017, deadline or suffered other adverse effects from not receiving such individualized notice. (Defs. Mem. at 34-35.) Nor, even drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, does the Second Amended Complaint show that MRNY was injured by Defendants' failure to provide DACA recipients with individualized notice of the renewal deadline.¹⁴ While the Second Amended Complaint alleges that "MRNY has not been able to reach four DACA recipients to inform them that they need to renew now" (SAC ¶ 48), that does not support the reasonable inferences either that those individuals failed to apply for renewal or that such failure was "fairly traceable" to Defendants' actions.¹⁵ In the absence of a showing that anyone has been harmed by a failure to receive notice of the change to the application deadline, the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they have Article III standing to bring this claim.

2. State Plaintiffs

The court next considers whether the State Plaintiffs have Article *158III standing. As the Court has noted, the ordinary rules of standing are somewhat different when a state is a plaintiff. States are "not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction," and they are entitled to "special solicitude" when they seek to vindicate their "proprietary" or "quasi-sovereign" interests.¹⁶ Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518, 127 S.Ct. 1438. This does not mean, however, that states have unbridled license to sue.

a. The State Plaintiffs Have Standing to Challenge the DACA Rescission

The State Plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge Defendants' decision to rescind the DACA program, as well as the procedures by which that decision was made and implemented, based on that decision's impacts to the State Plaintiffs' proprietary interests. States, "like other associations and private parties," may have a "variety of proprietary interests" that they may vindicate in court. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601-02, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982) (" Snapp"). A state has proprietary interests, for example, in its ownership of land, id. at 601, 102 S.Ct. 3260, and in its relationships with its employees, see Indiana v. IRS, 38 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1009 (S.D. Ind. 2014) ("The Defendants recognize, as they must, that a State and its political subdivisions may sue in their capacity as employers."). A state also has proprietary interests in its "participat[ion] in a business venture," Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601, 102 S.Ct. 3260, and in the operation of state-run institutions, such as state colleges and universities, Washington, 847 F.3d at 1159-61 ; Aziz v. Trump, 231 F.Supp.3d 23, 32-33 (E.D. Va. 2017).

Here, the State Plaintiffs have amply alleged and documented that the rescission of DACA would harm the states' proprietary interests as employers and in the operation of state-run colleges and universities. (State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶ 190 (states employ "[m]any DACA recipients").). For example, the State of Washington represents that it employs DACA recipients within state government (e.g., Decl. of Paul Quinonez ¶¶ 1-6 (State Pls. Am. Compl., Ex. 56 (Dkt. 55-56) ); Decl. of E. Alexandra Monroe ¶ 3-4 (State Pls. Am. Compl., Ex. 62 (Dkt. 55-62) ) ) and at state-run colleges and universities (e.g., Decl. of Lucila Loera ¶ 4 (State Pls. Am. Compl., Ex. 58 (Dkt. 55-58) ) ). If DACA were rescinded, these employees would lose their work authorization, and the State of Washington would incur expenses in identifying, hiring, and training their replacements. (State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶ 190.) Accordingly, the State of Washington has standing to assert equal protection and substantive APA claims challenging the decision to end the DACA program. Moreover, Washington has standing to *159challenge the procedures by which Defendants decided to end the DACA program, because "there is some possibility" that, if DHS complied with notice-and-comment and RFA rulemaking procedures, it might "reconsider the decision." See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518, 127 S.Ct. 1438. Because Washington has established its standing to assert substantive and procedural APA and RFA claims, the State Plaintiffs therefore have Article III standing to bring these claims. SeeFAIR, 547 U.S. at 53 n.3, 126 S.Ct. 1297.

Defendants' arguments that State Plaintiffs lack Article III standing because they would be only "incidentally" harmed by the rescission of the DACA program are without merit. (See Defs. Mem. at 19.) Defendants protest that "[i]t would be extraordinary to find Article III standing" based on a state's assertions of "alleged harms to their residents, employees, tax bases, health expenditures, and educational experiences at their universities," as "virtually any administration of federal law by a federal agency could have such effects." (Id. ) That a federal policy may have sweeping, adverse effects on states and state-run institutions is not, however, a convincing argument that states should not have standing to challenge that policy. Moreover, Defendants' position is irreconcilable with their own stated rationale for rescinding the DACA program. Defendants have stated that they rescinded the DACA program because it suffered from the same legal flaws as the DAPA program and could not be defended in court against the threatened challenge by Texas and other state plaintiffs. That necessarily assumes that at least one of the plaintiff states in the Texas litigation has standing to challenge the existence of the DACA program. Cf. Texas, 809 F.3d at 150-62 (finding standing based on the likely costs of having to issue drivers licenses to DAPA beneficiaries). Defendants offer no convincing reason why states should have standing to challenge the DACA program but not to challenge the decision to end that program.¹⁷

b. The State Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Bring Notice and Information-Use Policy Claims

Whether the State Plaintiffs can assert their notice or information-use policy claims, however, is a close question. In order to assert these claims, the State Plaintiffs must identify some cognizable proprietary or quasi-sovereign interest that was harmed by Defendants' challenged conduct-i.e., (1) with respect to the notice claim, Defendants' communication *160of its decision to rescind the DACA program and impose an October 5, 2017, renewal deadline; and (2) with respect to the information-use policy claims, the alleged change in DHS policy regarding the use of DACA applicants' information. In the court's view, the State Plaintiffs have not identified any interests harmed by these actions that they can sue the federal government to redress, and so they lack standing to bring these claims.

i. Proprietary Interests

While the State Plaintiffs allege that their proprietary interests will be harmed by the termination of DACA (State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 100), they do not identify any proprietary interests that have been or will be harmed by Defendants' alleged failure to provide DACA recipients with "adequate notice" of the "procedures and timeline for renewing their DACA status," "about the general termination of the DACA program after March 5, 2018," or "of [DACA recipients'] inability to apply for renewal of their DACA status after March 5, 2018" (id. ¶¶ 276-78; cf. State Pls. Mem. at 19-21). It is certainly conceivable that many DACA recipients who were eligible to renew their deferred action and work authorization under the DACA Rescission Memo failed to do so before the October 5, 2017 deadline. (State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶ 96 (noting that "up to one third of DACA grantees who are eligible for renewal had not applied as of two days before the ... deadline").) The State Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint does not provide a sufficient basis for the court to conclude, however, that (1) such failures to renew were "fairly traceable" to Defendants' decision not to provide each DACA recipient with individualized notice of the change in application procedures and timelines; or (2) that these failures to renew harmed any State Plaintiff's proprietary interests (for example, by depriving a state employee of work authorization). See Amnesty Int'l, 568 U.S. at 410-16, 133 S.Ct. 1138. Accordingly, the State Plaintiffs fail to assert a proprietary interest that would give them standing to bring their notice claim.¹⁸

Nor do the State Plaintiffs identify a cognizable proprietary interest harmed by the alleged change to DHS's information-use policy. The State Plaintiffs' information-use policy claims challenge not the decision to rescind DACA itself, but the alleged changes in DHS's information-use policy, which, Plaintiffs allege, will facilitate the deportation of DACA applicants. As discussed above, the court accepts that these changes (if true) will likely result in more undocumented immigrants' removal from the United States. (See State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶ 86.) The State Plaintiffs have not, however, identified any cognizable harm to their proprietary interests that would result from the removal of their undocumented residents. The State Plaintiffs have proffered evidence that the removal of DACA beneficiaries would grievously affect state economies. (See Decl. of Dr. Ike Brannon ¶¶ 12, 14 (State Pls. Am. Compl., Ex. 4 (Dkt. 55-4) ) (estimating that the removal of DACA recipients from the United States "would cost ... the economy as a whole $215 billion in lost GDP," with impacts falling hardest on states with the largest number of DACA recipients).) Despite the scale of these impacts, the State *161Plaintiffs' own authority makes clear that states lack standing to bring a "claim ... that actions taken by United States Government agencies had injured a State's economy and thereby caused a decline in general tax revenues." Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 448, 112 S.Ct. 789, 117 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). Absent some showing of injury to their own proprietary interests (for example, "direct injury in the form of a loss of specific tax revenues," id. ), the State Plaintiffs cannot maintain their information-use policy claims based on alleged harms to their proprietary interests.

ii. Quasi-Sovereign Interests

Accordingly, the court will consider whether the State Plaintiffs can assert these claims parens patriae to vindicate their quasi-sovereign interests. States may bring parens patriae (literally, "parent of the country") suits to vindicate what the Court has characterized as "quasi-sovereign" interests. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600-02, 102 S.Ct. 3260. There are no bright-line rules for which interests qualify as "quasi-sovereign." See id. at 600, 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260 ; 13B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.11.1, at 117 (3d ed. 2008) ("Wright & Miller"). In general, however, the Court has recognized that a state has quasi-sovereign interests in the "health and well-being-both physical and economic-of its residents in general," in protecting state "residents from the harmful effects of discrimination," and in challenging the discriminatory denial of a state's "rightful status within the federal system." Id. at 607, 609, 102 S.Ct. 3260. There are, however, at least two notable limitations on states' parens patriae standing.

First, to be "quasi-sovereign," the state's interests must be sufficiently generalized that the state is seeking to vindicate its citizens' welfare, rather than simply pressing suit on behalf of its individual residents. See id. at 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260 ("[M]ore must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual residents...."). A state cannot sue parens patriae when it is "merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens." Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665, 96 S.Ct. 2333, 49 L.Ed.2d 124 (1976).

Second, special considerations are present when a state brings a parens patriae suit against the federal government. See 13B Wright & Miller § 3531.11.1, at 96. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923), the Court rejected Massachusetts's attempt to bring a parens patriae suit challenging a federal statute as unconstitutional. See id. at 485-86, 43 S.Ct. 597. "While the state, under some circumstances, may sue in [a parens patriae ] capacity for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations with the federal government. In that field it is the United States, and not the state, which represents them as parens patriae...." Id. (emphasis added); see also Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609 n.16, 102 S.Ct. 3260 ("A State does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government."). The Court has rejected the argument, however, that Massachusetts v. Mellon bars all state parens patriae claims against the federal government. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2652, 2664 n.10, 192 L.Ed.2d 704 (2015) (observing that "[t]he cases on the standing of states to sue the federal government seem to depend on the kind of claim that the state advances" (quoting Richard Fallon et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 263-66 (6th ed. 2009) ) ).

*162Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17, 127 S.Ct. 1438, with id. at 538-39, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Instead, states may sue the federal government parens patriae to enforce rights guaranteed by a federal statute. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17, 127 S.Ct. 1438 ; see also New York v. Sebelius, No. 1:07-CV-1003 (GLS) (DRH), 2009 WL 1834599, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. June 22, 2009) (collecting cases). Massachusetts v. EPA expressly did not disturb the settled rule, however, that a state may not sue parens patriae to "protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes." Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (quoting Georgia v. Penn. R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447, 65 S.Ct. 716, 89 L.Ed. 1051 (1945) ).

The court concludes that the State Plaintiffs lack standing to bring either their notice and information-use policy claims. With respect to their notice claim, the State Plaintiffs have not argued or demonstrated that Defendants' alleged failure to provide DACA applicants with adequate notice of changes in the DACA program and renewal deadline has actually harmed "the health and well-being" of state residents or any other cognizable quasi-sovereign interest. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260. (Cf. State Pls. Am. Compl. 15, 100; State Pls. Opp'n at 21-22.) Even if they had done so, they would be challenging federal enforcement of federal immigration laws as unconstitutional, which Massachusetts v. Mellon prohibits. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17, 127 S.Ct. 1438 ("[T]here is a critical difference between allowing a State 'to protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes' (which is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a State to assert its rights under federal law (which it has standing to do)."). For the same reason, the State Plaintiffs also lack standing to assert their information-use policy claims. Even assuming, as discussed above, that the change in information-use policy will facilitate the removal of undocumented immigrants from these states, and that this removal will harm the "health and well-being-both physical and economic" of state residents, see Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260, the thrust of the State Plaintiffs' information-use policy claims is to challenge as fundamentally unfair a change in federal policy that will facilitate the federal government's enforcement of the immigration laws.

The State Plaintiffs' argument that they merely seek to "enforce-as opposed to overturn or avoid-application of a federal statute" is unpersuasive. (State Pls. Opp'n at 21 n.11) Plaintiffs plainly seek to invalidate federal action as unconstitutional. Such claims more closely resemble constitutional challenges to application of federal statutes, which Massachusetts v. Mellon prohibits states from asserting parens patriae, than suits to enforce compliance with federal statutory law, which Massachusetts v. EPA permits states to bring parens patriae. When challenging federal action on constitutional grounds, "it is no part of [the state's] duty or power to enforce [its citizens'] rights in respect of their relations with the federal government." Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485-86, 43 S.Ct. 597. But see Aziz, 231 F.Supp.3d at 31-32 (concluding that "a state is not be barred by the Mellon doctrine from a parens patriae challenge to executive action when the state has grounds to argue that the executive action is contrary to federal statutory or constitutional law" (emphasis added) ).

The court concludes, therefore, that the State Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their notice and information-use policy claims.

*163D. Whether State Plaintiffs Have Cause of Action under the APA

Lastly, Defendants assert that neither MRNY's nor the State Plaintiffs' claims are justiciable because those Plaintiffs do not assert interests that are "arguably within the zone of interests ... protected or regulated by the statute ... in question." (Defs. Mem. at 21 (quoting Clarke v. Secs. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 395, 107 S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987) (first alteration added) ).) To bring suit under the APA, a plaintiff "must satisfy not only Article Ill's standing requirements, but an additional test: [t]he interest he asserts must be 'arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute' that he says was violated." Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 224, 132 S.Ct. 2199, 183 L.Ed.2d 211 (2012) (" Match-E-Be-Nash") (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) ). This test "is not meant to be especially demanding' " and "forecloses suit only when a plaintiff's 'interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.' " Id. (quoting Secs. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. 750 ).

Critically, for the court's current purposes, whether MRNY and the State Plaintiffs assert interests falling within the "zone of interests" protected by the APA is not a question of "jurisdiction" or "justiciability." As the Supreme Court has explained, the question of whether a plaintiff falls within the zone of interests protected by a statute is not properly classed as an issue of "prudential standing," but is instead an issue of "whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff's claim." Lexmark Int'l, 134 S.Ct. at 1387. That issue "goes not to the court's jurisdiction-that is, 'power'-to adjudicate a case, but instead to whether the plaintiff has adequately pled a claim." Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cnty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm'n, 768 F.3d 183, 201 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Lexmark Int'l, 134 S.Ct. at 1387 n.4, 1389 n.5 ); see also Casper Sleep, Inc. v. Mitcham, 204 F.Supp.3d 632, 637-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (arguments for dismissal for lack of "prudential standing" were appropriately addressed under Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1), of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ). Because this argument does not raise an issue of "jurisdiction or justiciability," the court does not address it here.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Dkt. 95) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The following claims are dismissed:

• Batalla Vidal v. Duke, No. 16-CV-4756:

• Fourth claim for relief (Due Process Clause-Notice)

• New York v. Trump, No. 17-CV-5228:

• Second claim for relief (Due Process Clause-Information-Use Policy)

• Third claim for relief (Equitable Estoppel-Information-Use Policy)

• Seventh claim for relief (Due Process Clause-Notice)

Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is denied with respect to all other claims. The court RESERVES

*164RULING on Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

SO ORDERED.

9 It is not clear whether Section 701(a)(2) limits the court's jurisdiction or instead forms an "essential element" of a claim for relief under the APA. Sharkey v. Quarantillo, 541 F.3d 75, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2008) ; accord Conyers v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137, 143 n.8 (2d Cir. 2009). Nothing turns on this distinction here, however, because Section 701(a)(2) does not shield Defendants' actions from judicial review.

10 The State Plaintiffs also assert a claim for equitable estoppel. (State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 246-52.) With respect to the State Plaintiffs' equitable estoppel claim, the court assumes for the sake of argument that the relevant "law to apply" may be found in DHS's past statements and practices regarding the use of DACA applicants' information. See Salazar, 822 F.3d at 76-77. (See State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39-44.) The court need not decide this question, however, because, as discussed below, the State Plaintiffs lack standing to assert this claim. (See infra Section III.C.2.b.)

11 As part of transferring many immigration-related responsibilities from the Attorney General to the Secretary of DHS, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides that statutory references "to any department, commission, or agency or any officer or office the functions of which are so transferred shall be deemed to refer to the Secretary [of DHS], other official, or component of [DHS] to which such function is so transferred." 6 U.S.C. § 557 ; Shabaj v. Holder, 718 F.3d 48, 51 n.3 (2d Cir. 2013).

12 Defendants have represented publicly that no action will be taken against DACA recipients prior to March 5, 2018. (See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter.com (Sept. 7, 2017, 6:42 a.m.), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/905788459301908480 ("For all of those (DACA) that are concerned about your status during the 6 month period, you have nothing to worry about-No action!").)

13 While a parens patriae suit is in some sense brought by a state "on behalf of" its citizens, "[t]he asserted quasi-sovereign interests will be deemed sufficiently implicated to support parens patriae standing only if 'the injury alleged affects the general population of a State in a substantial way.' " Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Bramkamp, 654 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1981) (emphasis added) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 738, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981) ). A state cannot sue parens patriae simply to assert its citizens' personal claims. See Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665-66, 96 S.Ct. 2333, 49 L.Ed.2d 124 (1976) (per curiam) (collecting cases). To the extent the State Plaintiffs attempt to bring parens patriae claims based on harm to their quasi-sovereign interests, those claims are not "on behalf of" specific immigrants, but instead seek to protect the general welfare of their residents. In any event, as the court discusses below, the State Plaintiffs lack parens patriae standing to bring these claims.

14 The court also notes that the renewal deadline provided by the DACA Rescission Memo was not significantly different than that provided by existing DHS policy. The State Plaintiffs allege that "[p]rior to termination of DACA, a DACA grantee whose renewal status expires in February 2018 would have received an individualized renewal notice informing the grantee that he or she had to file a renewal 120-150 days prior to expiration ... in order to avoid a lapse in deferred action and employment authorization." (State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶ 93.) Under the DACA Rescission Memo, a DACA recipient whose deferred action and work authorization was set to expire on March 4, 2018, was required to file an application for renewal by October 5, 2018-i.e., 150 days before those benefits were set to expire.

15 Even if those conditions were met, it is not clear that MRNY would have organizational standing to bring this claim. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) ("[O]ur prior cases ... have required plaintiff-organizations to make specific allegations establishing that at least one identified member had suffered or would suffer harm.")

16 The Court has categorized a state's litigation interests using the trichotomy of "sovereign," "quasi-sovereign," and "proprietary" interests. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982) ("Snapp"). Proprietary interests are those that a state may have akin to a private party, such as ownership of land or participation in a business venture. Id. at 601, 102 S.Ct. 3260. Sovereign interests are interests the state has in its capacity as a state, such as "the exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction" and "the demand for recognition from other sovereigns." Id."Quasi-sovereign" interests are harder to define but "consist of a set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace." Id. at 602, 102 S.Ct. 3260 ; see also id. at 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260 ("[T]he articulation of [quasi-sovereign] interests is a matter for case-by-case development-neither an exhaustive formal definition nor a definitive list of qualifying interests can be presented in the abstract....").

17 Defendants' arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. (Defs. Mem. at 21.) First, Defendants argue that neither the Acting Secretary nor the Attorney General "expressly relied upon or gave any indication that they agreed with the Fifth Circuit's justiciability rulings." (Id. ) Jurisdiction is, however, a prerequisite to a ruling on the merits, so the plaintiff states could prevail in their threatened challenge to the DACA program only if they had standing. Second, Defendants argue that "it was far from arbitrary and capricious for the Acting Secretary to weigh litigation risk based on judicial decisions without regard to whether those courts had been correct to assert jurisdiction in the first place," and that the Executive Branch has "an independent duty to consider the legality of ... policies regardless of whether they are judicially reviewable." (Id. ) The DACA Rescission Memo does not indicate, however, that Defendants actually considered these issues when deciding to rescind the DACA program. Finally, Defendants argue that the adoption of the DACA program could have been reviewed as an abdication of DHS's statutory responsibilities-a grounds for justiciability that would not apply to the decision to rescind the program. (Id. at 21-22.) The Fifth Circuit expressly did not rely on that theory of standing, 809 F.3d at 150, nor is there any indication that the Attorney General or Acting Secretary considered it in rescinding the DACA program.

18 In this circuit, the State Plaintiffs need not demonstrate, however, that the individuals they seek to protect must themselves meet the injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability requirements of Article III. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 338-39 (2d Cir. 2009), aff'd in relevant part by an equally divided court, 564 U.S. 410, 420, 131 S.Ct. 2527, 180 L.Ed.2d 435 (2011).