Vicor Corp. v. FII USA Inc.

132 F.4th 1

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: March 6, 2025
• Docket: 24-1620
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 24-1620

VICOR CORPORATION,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

FII USA INC., a/k/a FOXCONN INDUSTRIAL INTERNET USA INC.; INGRASYS TECHNOLOGY INC.; INGRASYS TECHNOLOGY USA INC.,

Defendants, Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Leo T. Sorokin, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Gelpí, Thompson, and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.

Marcus E. Sernel, P.C., with whom Russell E. Levine, P.C., Philip M. Cooper, Mark C. Gillespie, Tiffany M. Knapp, and Kirkland & Ellis LLP were on brief, for appellants.

Lawrence K. Kolodney, with whom Steven R. Katz, Elizabeth G. H. Ranks, and Fish & Richardson P.C. were on brief, for appellee.

March 6, 2025 RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. The United States

International Trade Commission (ITC) investigates complaints

alleging unfair competition related to imported goods. A federal

statute provides that until the ITC's resolution of a complaint

becomes final, courts are limited in what disputes they can resolve

between the parties involved in the ITC matter. Specifically, at

the request of the party charged in the ITC complaint, a federal

district court must stay proceedings in a civil action between the

same parties "with respect to any claim that involves the same

issues [as those] involved" in the ITC action. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1659(a) ("Section 1659"). This case concerns when the

requirements for a Section 1659 stay are triggered.

After doing business together for many years, the

parties here developed a dispute about Vicor Corporation's

patents. Vicor eventually filed a complaint before the ITC,

alleging that Appellants (collectively "Foxconn") infringed

Vicor's patents by importing knock-off products into the United

States. In response, Foxconn initiated arbitration in China.

Vicor then sued Foxconn in federal court, contending that it had

never agreed to arbitrate and seeking to enjoin the arbitration.

Despite Foxconn's request for a Section 1659 stay, the district

court granted a preliminary injunction of the arbitration,

concluding that it had authority to do so even though Section 1659

applied. On appeal, Vicor defends the district court's ruling but

- 2 - on different grounds, arguing that Section 1659 does not apply

because this case is not a parallel patent infringement action.

We conclude that Section 1659's scope is not as narrow as Vicor

claims and that the statute's plain text required the district

court to grant Foxconn's stay request. Thus, we vacate the order

granting the preliminary injunction and remand to the district

court for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Facts

Foxconn assembles electronic products, and Vicor

manufactures power converter modules. For years, Vicor supplied

its modules to Foxconn for use in Foxconn's products.

According to Vicor, Foxconn eventually switched from

Vicor's patented modules to "knock-off" modules, which Foxconn

manufactured and imported into the United States from abroad. As

a result, in July 2023, Vicor filed a complaint with the ITC

alleging that Foxconn, among others, was unlawfully importing

power converter modules that infringed Vicor's patents.

The ITC is a federal agency with a range of trade-related

responsibilities. One of them is to investigate complaints brought

under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 that allege unfair

competition in connection with imported goods, such as the

infringement of U.S. intellectual property rights. See 19 U.S.C.

§ 1337 ("Section 337"). Each investigation is assigned to an

- 3 - Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who holds a hearing and issues an

initial ruling. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.10, 210.36, 210.61. The ITC

reviews the ALJ's ruling and renders a final determination. Id.

§ 210.42. It can also elect not to review the ALJ's ruling, in

which case that ruling becomes the ITC's final decision. Id.

§ 210.42(h). Additionally, the ITC may issue remedial orders,

such as orders excluding the challenged products from entry into

the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d). The United States

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction

over final determinations by the ITC on claims made under Section

337. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6).

The same day that Vicor filed a complaint with the ITC,

it also sued Foxconn and others for patent infringement in the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Foxconn and the other defendants moved to stay the Texas

proceedings pursuant to Section 1659. The district court granted

the motion, staying the case pending resolution of the ITC

complaint.

Several months after Vicor filed its ITC complaint,

Foxconn initiated an arbitration in China before the China

International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC).

Foxconn argued that Vicor had agreed to arbitrate their current

dispute, pointing to the arbitration terms ("Arbitration Terms")

contained in the purchase orders ("Purchase Orders") it repeatedly

- 4 - sent to Vicor during their power converter module transactions.

CIETAC accepted the arbitration in December 2023.

Foxconn then asked the ITC to terminate its proceedings

in favor of the CIETAC arbitration. It also argued that Vicor was

bound by the license terms in the Purchase Orders ("License

Terms"), which it claimed granted Foxconn a license to Vicor's

patents and therefore undermined Vicor's infringement claim

against it. In January 2024, the ALJ refused to dismiss the ITC

proceeding in favor of arbitration, finding that Foxconn had waived

its right to arbitrate by participating in the ITC proceeding for

months without invoking that right. Several weeks later, Vicor

moved for a summary determination by the ALJ that it was not bound

by the Purchase Orders and had not granted a license to Foxconn.

B. Procedural History

After Foxconn initiated arbitration in China, Vicor

filed a new lawsuit against it, this time in the United States

District Court for the District of Massachusetts (where Vicor is

headquartered). Vicor maintained that it had never agreed to

arbitrate and thus could not be forced into proceedings before

CIETAC. In its complaint, Vicor requested (1) an injunction

staying the CIETAC arbitration and preventing Foxconn from

prosecuting it, (2) a declaratory judgment that Vicor is not bound

by the Arbitration Terms, and (3) a declaratory judgment that Vicor

is not bound by the License Terms.

- 5 - Vicor then filed a series of motions in the Massachusetts

lawsuit. On January 9, 2024, Vicor moved for preliminary and

permanent injunctions against the CIETAC arbitration and for a

declaration that Foxconn lacked a license to use Vicor's

intellectual property. Three days later, Vicor moved for a

temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the arbitration. The

thrust of each of these motions was that Vicor could not be

compelled to arbitrate before CIETAC because it had never agreed

to the terms in the Purchase Orders. The district court granted

Vicor's motion for a TRO.

In response, Foxconn filed an emergency motion

requesting that the district court issue a stay under Section 1659

and vacate the TRO. Foxconn argued that under Section 1659's plain

text, the overlap of issues between the Massachusetts action and

the ITC action triggered its right to obtain a stay. The district

court agreed that Section 1659 applied given its plain text. See

Vicor Corp. v. FII USA, Inc., No. 24-cv-10060-LTS, 2024 WL 1675681,

at *2 (D. Mass. Feb. 16, 2024). Nevertheless, it denied Foxconn's

motion to the extent that it sought to vacate the TRO and to

preclude entry of Vicor's requested preliminary injunction. See

id. at *3-4. The district court referenced the All Writs Act,

which provides that federal courts "may issue all writs necessary

or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions." See

id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). It also cited its inherent

- 6 - authority to preserve its jurisdiction. See Vicor Corp., 2024 WL

1675681, at *3. Thus, it concluded that it could grant Vicor

preliminary relief. See id. at *3-4.

With the TRO still in force, the district court turned

to Vicor's motion for a preliminary injunction. Foxconn opposed

the motion; it reiterated that Section 1659 required the district

court to stay the proceedings and argued on the merits that Vicor

had accepted the terms in the Purchase Orders, including an

agreement to arbitrate any disputes. Consistent with its order

entering the TRO, the district court rejected Foxconn's arguments.

See Vicor Corp. v. FII USA, Inc., No. 24-cv-10060-LTS, 2024 WL

3548786, at *16 (D. Mass. June 24, 2024). In a detailed analysis,

the court concluded that Vicor was likely to succeed on the merits

of its claim that it had not agreed to the Purchase Orders (and

therefore had never agreed to arbitrate its disputes with Foxconn).

See id. at *9-14. The court also reaffirmed its prior conclusion

that Section 1659 did not preclude the preliminary relief that

Vicor sought. See id. at *16. After granting Vicor's request for

a preliminary injunction of the arbitration, it stayed any further

proceedings in the case pending final resolution of the ITC action.

See id.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court's entry of a preliminary

injunction for abuse of discretion. See OfficeMax, Inc. v.

- 7 - Levesque, 658 F.3d 94, 97 (1st Cir. 2011). Under that umbrella

standard, we evaluate any legal issues de novo. See id.

III. DISCUSSION

The district court concluded that Section 1659 applies

to this case, but it nevertheless granted Vicor's request for a

preliminary injunction of the CIETAC arbitration, relying on the

All Writs Act and its inherent authority. Foxconn argues that, in

granting the injunction, the district court violated Section 1659.

By contrast, Vicor asks us to affirm the injunction, contending

that Section 1659 does not apply to this case at all because it is

not a parallel infringement action. We agree with the district

court that Section 1659 applies here, but we conclude that the

provision's plain text required the court to grant an immediate

stay upon Foxconn's request. Thus, we vacate the preliminary

injunction.

A. Applicability of Section 1659

Section 1659 requires a district court to stay certain

proceedings between parties that are also involved in a proceeding

before the ITC. The relevant text of Section 1659 provides:

(a) Stay. -- In a civil action involving parties that are also parties to a proceeding before the United States International Trade Commission under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, at the request of a party to the civil action that is also a respondent in the proceeding before the Commission, the district court shall stay, until the determination of the Commission becomes final, proceedings in

- 8 - the civil action with respect to any claim that involves the same issues involved in the proceeding before the Commission, but only if such request is made within --

(1) 30 days after the party is named as a respondent in the proceeding before the Commission, or

(2) 30 days after the district court action is filed, whichever is later.

28 U.S.C. § 1659(a) (emphasis added).

As the parties agree, the threshold issue we must

consider is whether Vicor's claims against Foxconn in this case

"involve[] the same issues involved in the proceeding before the

Commission." Id. If so, and if no other source of authority

permitted the district court to deny Foxconn's Section 1659 stay

request, we must vacate the preliminary injunction.

We conclude that the plain text of Section 1659

encompasses Vicor's claims in this case. See Evans v. Akers, 534

F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2008) ("As in any case of statutory

construction, we begin our analysis with the plain language of the

statute.") Critically, Vicor and Foxconn do not dispute the

meanings of "claim," "issues," or "involved" in Section 1659, nor

do they dispute that Vicor's claims in this case involve issues

that are involved in the ITC proceeding.

We agree with Vicor that "claim" means "cause of action"

and that "issue" means "fundamental factual and legal allegation."

See Claim, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (defining "claim"

- 9 - as "cause of action"); Issue, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)

(defining "issue" as "[a] single, certain, and material point,

deduced by the allegations and pleadings of the parties, which is

affirmed on the one side and denied on the other"). Applying these

definitions, Section 1659 requires a stay of "proceedings in the

civil action with respect to any [cause of action] that involves

the same [fundamental factual and legal allegations] involved in

the proceeding before the Commission."

The district court proceedings here fit squarely within

this reading of Section 1659. In its complaint in this case, Vicor

brought claims under the Federal Arbitration Act, seeking to enjoin

the CIETAC arbitration, as well as the Declaratory Judgment Act,

seeking orders declaring that "Vicor is not bound by" the License

Terms or the Arbitration Terms. Because the License and

Arbitration Terms were incorporated into the Purchase Orders,

these causes of action hinge on whether Vicor is bound by the terms

in the Purchase Orders. Accordingly, Vicor seeks a finding in

district court that it did not agree to the Purchase Orders' terms.

See Vicor Corp., 2024 WL 3548786, at *5-14. Vicor also seeks a

finding in the ITC proceeding that it did not agree to the Purchase

Orders' terms. Thus, whether Vicor was bound by the Purchase

Orders is a "fundamental factual and legal allegation" involved in

both the district court and ITC proceedings. For that reason,

"proceedings in [this] civil action" must be stayed "with respect

- 10 - to [each of Vicor's causes of action]" because they "involve" these

allegations.

Vicor resists this conclusion, focusing on the meaning

of the phrase "the same issues" in Section 1659. It argues that

"the same issues" must mean "all the same issues." In Vicor's

view, Section 1659 would apply here only if it had sued Foxconn

for infringing the same patents involved in Vicor's ITC

complaint -- as it did in the Texas litigation.

But Vicor then turns its own argument about the phrase

"the same issues" on its head. It contends that an ITC proceeding

and a district court proceeding never have all the same issues.

That is because, as Vicor points out, infringement claims before

the ITC and the district courts have different elements. For

example, ITC claimants must prove the existence of a domestic

industry, which is not an element of a patent infringement claim

in district court.1 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a); John Mezzalingua

Assocs., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 660 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed.

Cir. 2011). Vicor therefore argues that Section 1659 is ambiguous

because a plain text reading "makes no sense," requiring us to

consult legislative history to construe the statute.

1Vicor also points out that district court plaintiffs generally seek damages, which are not available in Section 337 actions before the ITC. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337.

- 11 - We disagree with Vicor's argument that the phrase "the

same issues" in Section 1659 is ambiguous. First, Vicor's reading

requires inserting the word "all" into the statute, something we

cannot do.2 See Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 590 U.S.

212, 215 (2020). Second, "[a] statute is not ambiguous unless 'it

admits of more than one reasonable interpretation.'" Correa-Ruiz

v. Fortuño, 573 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting

United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2008)). An

interpretation that, by Vicor's own admission, "make[s] no sense"

is not a reasonable interpretation. See Gen. Motors Corp. v.

Darling's, 444 F.3d 98, 108 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining that we

"avoid statutory constructions that create absurd, illogical or

inconsistent results" (citation omitted)).

Foxconn's reading of Section 1659, by contrast, does

make sense: Foxconn contends that the phrase "the same issues"

means what it says and applies whenever a district court proceeding

shares issues with an ITC proceeding. We agree. Because this

"straightforward interpretation" of the terms of the statute

"produces an entirely plausible result, we are not obligated to

consult other aids to statutory construction." United States v.

2 Vicor also argues in its brief that "same" means "identical." But this proposed reading runs into the same problems we discuss below.

- 12 - Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 2001). Thus, our inquiry could

end here.

But even if we were to consult legislative history, that

history does not support Vicor's position that Section 1659 only

permits a stay of parallel enforcement proceedings. Vicor

emphasizes that Section 1659 was enacted as part of the Uruguay

Round Agreements Act, which implemented aspects of several

international trade agreements. See 19 U.S.C. § 3511.

Specifically, Congress enacted Section 1659 "to ensure that United

States procedures for dealing with alleged infringements by

imported products are consistent with . . . 'national treatment'

rules," which prohibit some forms of discrimination between

domestic and imported goods. In re Princo Corp., 486 F.3d 1365,

1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Vicor argues that Section 1659 was designed

to "provide an equal playing field among domestic and foreign

producers," given that a company can bring simultaneous actions

against foreign goods in the ITC and district court, but ITC

proceedings are not available to enforce intellectual property

rights against domestic goods. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a); H.R. Rep.

No. 103–826(I), at 142 (1994).

This legislative history does not suggest Section 1659

is as narrow as Vicor contends. If anything, interpreting Section

1659 to apply to ITC and district court proceedings with any

overlapping issues provides more protection to producers of

- 13 - foreign goods because such a reading reduces the likelihood that

they would have to defend simultaneously in the ITC and the

district court. Thus, accepting Vicor's argument that the purpose

of Section 1659 was to level the playing field between domestic

and foreign producers does not support its claim that Section 1659

only covers parallel enforcement lawsuits.

Vicor also points us to language in the House Report

that accompanied the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. Rep. No.

103–826(I), at 141, to argue that Section 1659 is limited to

parallel enforcement proceedings, but this language does not

convince us either. The Report explains that Section 1659 was

added "to address the possibility that infringement proceedings

may be brought against imported goods in two forums at the same

time." Id. The Report continues:

The new section requires a district court hearing an infringement case to stay its proceedings, at the request of a respondent in a [S]ection 337 proceeding, with respect to any claim that involves the same issues as those pending before the Commission. Such issues would include questions of patent validity, infringement, and any defenses that might be raised in both proceedings.

Id. Vicor argues that the use of the phrases "infringement

proceedings" and "infringement case" in the House Report means

that the statute applies primarily to infringement cases. But

even Vicor concedes that Section 1659 can apply to other,

- 14 - non-infringement enforcement proceedings.3 Thus, Vicor provides

no reason to read this legislative history to limit the statute's

scope to infringement cases. Further, even if Congress's primary

purpose was to stay infringement proceedings, that does not mean

its intent was solely to stay infringement proceedings. "[E]ven

if Congress explicitly asserts a particular purpose, the courts do

not assume that it intended to pursue that purpose to the exclusion

of all others." United States v. Cano-Flores, 796 F.3d 83, 93

(D.C. Cir. 2015). And as Foxconn points out, the Report expressly

contemplates that "defenses" shared between the

proceedings -- like Foxconn's license defense here -- may give

rise to a stay, further undermining Vicor's reading of this

legislative history.4

Finally, we have carefully considered the parties'

representation that they are not aware of any other court that has

3 Unfair import investigations conducted by the ITC are not limited to infringement actions -- they also include, for example, false advertisement and antitrust violations. See Office of Unfair Import Investigations (OUII), U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, https://perma.cc/G9GC-CYAY (last visited Feb. 28, 2024). A reading of Section 1659 that would preclude the stay of a directly analogous false advertisement proceeding in district court simply because it is not an "infringement proceeding" would defy the plain text of the statute and common sense.

4 For the reasons we have just laid out, we do not find persuasive the analysis in Sandisk Corp. v. Phison Electronics Corp., 538 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (W.D. Wis. 2008), which held that Section 1659 applies only to patent infringement actions that allege infringement of the same patent asserted in an ITC proceeding. See id. at 1064-65.

- 15 - issued a Section 1659 stay in a case that did not involve parallel

enforcement proceedings. We note that in some cases, the "way

that [a statute] has been implemented" can inform our analysis.

See Ithier v. Aponte-Cruz, 105 F.4th 1, 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2024).

But all Vicor points to is the fact that no court has issued a

stay in a non-infringement case before. That bare fact, without

more, does not allow us to sidestep the plain text of the statute.

B. Other Bases for Granting Injunctive Relief

Despite determining that Section 1659 applied to Vicor's

claims, the district court concluded that the provision did not

tie its hands. See Vicor Corp., 2024 WL 1675681, at *3. It cited

the All Writs Act and the court's inherent authority to preserve

its jurisdiction as a basis for granting preliminary relief. See

id. at *3-4.

We disagree with the district court's ultimate

conclusion that it could provide relief to Vicor even in the face

of Section 1659. The court reasoned that Section 1659 "does not

divest this Court of jurisdiction in this matter, nor does it

preclude the Court from taking action to protect its jurisdiction."

Id. at *3. Although we agree that Section 1659 does not

permanently divest district courts of jurisdiction, it is a timing

rule that mandates a temporary stay of cases over which a district

court would otherwise have jurisdiction. See Fuji Photo Film Co.

v. Benun, 463 F.3d 1252, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[S]ection 1659

- 16 - places limits on the timing of parallel actions." (emphasis

added)); In re Princo Corp., 478 F.3d 1345, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir.

2007) (ordering district court to stay damages proceedings). And

no source of authority identified by the court or by the cases it

cited trumps Section 1659. For example, the district court cited

Rosselló-González v. Calderón-Serra, 398 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004),

to support its conclusion that it may take action to "protect its

jurisdiction." Vicor Corp., 2024 WL 1675681, at *3. But in that

case, we held that the district court abused its discretion by

granting a purportedly jurisdiction-preserving preliminary

injunction. See Rosselló-González, 398 F.3d at 18. To be sure,

we noted that "[a]cting pursuant to § 1651(a) [the All Writs Act],

a federal court may issue an injunction as a means to preserve its

jurisdiction." Id. at 14. But the All Writs Act provides no such

authority here because it cannot restore authority that Congress

has expressly foreclosed. See Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d

85, 97 (1st Cir. 2008) ("[W]hen a statute . . . specifically

addresses a particular class of claims or issues, it is that

statute, not the All Writs Act, that takes precedence."). Nor can

the court's inherent authority to protect its jurisdiction support

the preliminary injunction, because "the exercise of an inherent

power cannot be contrary to any express grant of or limitation on

the district court's power contained in a rule or statute." In re

- 17 - Petition for Ord. Directing Release of Recs., 27 F.4th 84, 90 (1st

Cir. 2022) (quoting Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45 (2016)).5

Further, nothing in the text of Section 1659 indicates

that the mandatory stay requirement does not apply to certain forms

of relief. And we have found no authority suggesting that

Section 1659 excludes preliminary injunctions. See Fuji Photo

Film Co., 463 F.3d at 1256 (holding that district court had

authority to issue preliminary injunction only because the ITC had

reached a final determination).6 Thus, we conclude that the

5The district court also reasoned that, because courts have the authority to compel arbitration, they have the authority to enjoin arbitration. See Vicor Corp., 2024 WL 1675681, at *4. We agree that courts generally have the authority to enjoin arbitration. But Section 1659 requires a district court to hold off on exercising authority it otherwise would have.

6The unpublished district court decisions cited by Vicor do not counsel otherwise. In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 05-cv-00468-JVS, 2005 WL 5925585 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2005), the district court lifted a Section 1659 stay to prevent the parties from litigating the same issues in another forum, in part because the forum selection issue was not "before the [ITC]." Id. at *1. Similarly, in Microsoft Corp. v. TiVo, Inc., No. 11-cv-00134-RSM, 2011 WL 1930640 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2011), the court held that it could rule on a motion to transfer venue despite Section 1659 because it involved "procedural matters that [were] not before the ITC," and not proceedings "inextricably tied to the merits of the patent claims." Id. at *2 & n.1. Here, by contrast, the arbitrability issue is before the ITC, and it is tied to the issue of whether Vicor is bound by a contract that would also defeat its infringement claim via the License Terms.

- 18 - district court erred in granting a preliminary injunction despite

Foxconn's request for a stay.7

We recognize that in enjoining the CIETAC arbitration,

the district court sought to advance the purpose of Section 1659

by allowing the ITC action to proceed undisturbed by an arbitration

to which Vicor purportedly had never agreed. But the plain text

of Section 1659 supports Foxconn's claim that it was entitled to

a stay here.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, we vacate the district court's

order preliminarily enjoining the CIETAC arbitration and remand

for proceedings consistent with this opinion.8 Each party shall

bear their own costs.

7 Given our conclusion that Section 1659 applies to Vicor's claims in this case and that neither the All Writs Act nor any source of inherent authority allowed the district court to enter a preliminary injunction, we do not address the other issues raised by Foxconn on appeal, including whether the preliminary injunction violated comity or should be vacated on the merits.

8 Vicor argues that even if Section 1659 were to apply to this action, the arbitration should remain enjoined. Vicor explains that by the time Foxconn requested a stay, the district court had already entered a TRO, and Section 1659 does not require a court to vacate prior orders. But the TRO provided that it would "expire upon [the district court's] resolution of the pending motion for a preliminary injunction." Thus, it expired when the district court ruled on the preliminary injunction motion in June 2024, and we need not vacate it.

- 19 -