Vermont Agency of Transportation v. Sumner

Supreme Court of Vermont

Vermont Agency of Transportation v. Sumner

460 A.2d 446, 142 Vt. 577, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 458

CourtSupreme Court of Vermont

DecidedMarch 28, 1983

Docket476-81

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 460 A.2d 446 (Vermont Agency of Transportation v. Sumner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Vermont Agency of Transportation v. Sumner, 460 A.2d 446, 142 Vt. 577, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 458 (Vt. 1983).

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Underwood, J.

The plaintiff, the Vermont Agency of Transportation (Agency), pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 2281, sought to enjoin the defendant, Francis Sumner, from establishing, operating or maintaining a junkyard, alleging violations of 24 V.S.A. § 2242, which requires a license to operate a junkyard, and 24 V.S.A. § 2257, which requires screening of junkyards.

The trial court found that the Agency proved the existence of a junkyard on the defendant’s property, that it was visible from two public highways, and that he had failed to comply with the licensing and screening requirements. However, it concluded that these facts were not sufficient to establish that the defendant was in violation of § 2242 or § 2257. The Agency appeals from this decision, arguing that the above facts were sufficient to support its prayers for relief. We disagree and affirm.

There is no language in § 2242 nor in § 2257 which requires the Agency to prove that a junkyard constitutes a public [579]*579danger or a nuisance before its owner can be compelled to obtain a junkyard license and comply with the screening requirements. Nonetheless, the trial court interpreted these statutes as imposing this requirement on the Agency. It held, in the instant case, that the Agency failed to show the defendant’s junkyard constituted a public danger or a nuisance, and that therefore he cannot be found liable for failing to comply with § 2242 or § 2257.

Although we agree with the trial court’s holding that the defendant did not violate § 2242 or § 2257, we disagree with the reasoning used by it to reach such result. We find that the lower court erroneously stated the law when it ruled that § 2242 and § 2257 have a public danger or nuisance requirement. However, “[w]e will affirm a judgment which is correct, even if the grounds stated in support of it are erroneous.” Pike Industries, Inc. v. Middlebury Associates, 140 Vt. 67, 71, 436 A.2d 725, 727 (1981). In this instance we affirm the trial court for the following reason.

The trial court found that the defendant was not engaged in the junkyard business. It characterized his activity as that of maintaining a private automobile graveyard of some thirteen unregistered automobiles, varying in vintage from 1947 to 1971. It found that the defendant robbed this graveyard of auto parts from time to time to repair one or more of the vehicles he was using in his business of trucking sawdust and lime.

Upon review of the junkyard law, 24 V.S.A. §§ 2241-2264, and taking each section in pari materia with the others, as we must, Villeneuve v. Town of Underhill, 130 Vt. 446, 453, 296 A.2d 192, 197 (1972), we hold that the legislature intended the licensing and screening requirements to apply only to persons engaged in the active operation of a junkyard business. Our holding is supported by the legislative mandate that: “A person shall not operate, establish or maintain a junkyard unless he . . . [h]olds a license to operate a junkyard business.” (Emphasis added.) 24 V.S.A. § 2242(2). Furthermore, the relevancy of the screening requirement makes little sense unless it is intended to apply to an operating junkyard business, viz:

[580]*580Junkyards shall be screened by a fence or vegetation which effectively screens it from view from the highway, and have a gate which shall be closed, except when the yard is in operation. (Emphasis added.) 24 V.S.A. § 2257(a).

The legislature rarely requires licensing of activities conducted on one’s premises unless such person is engaging in some business or profession. Compare, for example: 9 V.S.A. § 3061 (license to operate an inn, hotel or restaurant); 9 V.S.A. § 3862 (license to carry on the business of pawnbroker); 10 V.S.A. § 2623 (operator of portable saw mill must obtain license and register his mill); 6 V.S.A. § 762 (license to carry on the business of livestock dealer); 6 V.S.A. § 3196 (license to operate a slaughtering plant); 24 V.S.A. § 2232 (license to maintain or operate a trailer or mobile home park); 18 V.S.A. § 2003 (license to operate a nursing home); and 26 V.S.A. § 1391 (license to practice medicine and surgery).

Since § 2242 and § 2257 only apply to junkyard businesses and the defendant was not engaged in such, we hold that he did not violate said statutes.

Affirmed.

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Underwood, J.

The plaintiff, the Vermont Agency of Transportation (Agency), pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 2281, sought to enjoin the defendant, Francis Sumner, from establishing, operating or maintaining a junkyard, alleging violations of 24 V.S.A. § 2242, which requires a license to operate a junkyard, and 24 V.S.A. § 2257, which requires screening of junkyards.

The trial court found that the Agency proved the existence of a junkyard on the defendant’s property, that it was visible from two public highways, and that he had failed to comply with the licensing and screening requirements. However, it concluded that these facts were not sufficient to establish that the defendant was in violation of § 2242 or § 2257. The Agency appeals from this decision, arguing that the above facts were sufficient to support its prayers for relief. We disagree and affirm.

There is no language in § 2242 nor in § 2257 which requires the Agency to prove that a junkyard constitutes a public [579]*579danger or a nuisance before its owner can be compelled to obtain a junkyard license and comply with the screening requirements. Nonetheless, the trial court interpreted these statutes as imposing this requirement on the Agency. It held, in the instant case, that the Agency failed to show the defendant’s junkyard constituted a public danger or a nuisance, and that therefore he cannot be found liable for failing to comply with § 2242 or § 2257.

Although we agree with the trial court’s holding that the defendant did not violate § 2242 or § 2257, we disagree with the reasoning used by it to reach such result. We find that the lower court erroneously stated the law when it ruled that § 2242 and § 2257 have a public danger or nuisance requirement. However, “[w]e will affirm a judgment which is correct, even if the grounds stated in support of it are erroneous.” Pike Industries, Inc. v. Middlebury Associates, 140 Vt. 67, 71, 436 A.2d 725, 727 (1981). In this instance we affirm the trial court for the following reason.

The trial court found that the defendant was not engaged in the junkyard business. It characterized his activity as that of maintaining a private automobile graveyard of some thirteen unregistered automobiles, varying in vintage from 1947 to 1971. It found that the defendant robbed this graveyard of auto parts from time to time to repair one or more of the vehicles he was using in his business of trucking sawdust and lime.

Upon review of the junkyard law, 24 V.S.A. §§ 2241-2264, and taking each section in pari materia with the others, as we must, Villeneuve v. Town of Underhill, 130 Vt. 446, 453, 296 A.2d 192, 197 (1972), we hold that the legislature intended the licensing and screening requirements to apply only to persons engaged in the active operation of a junkyard business. Our holding is supported by the legislative mandate that: “A person shall not operate, establish or maintain a junkyard unless he . . . [h]olds a license to operate a junkyard business.” (Emphasis added.) 24 V.S.A. § 2242(2). Furthermore, the relevancy of the screening requirement makes little sense unless it is intended to apply to an operating junkyard business, viz:

[580]*580Junkyards shall be screened by a fence or vegetation which effectively screens it from view from the highway, and have a gate which shall be closed, except when the yard is in operation. (Emphasis added.) 24 V.S.A. § 2257(a).

The legislature rarely requires licensing of activities conducted on one’s premises unless such person is engaging in some business or profession. Compare, for example: 9 V.S.A. § 3061 (license to operate an inn, hotel or restaurant); 9 V.S.A. § 3862 (license to carry on the business of pawnbroker); 10 V.S.A. § 2623 (operator of portable saw mill must obtain license and register his mill); 6 V.S.A. § 762 (license to carry on the business of livestock dealer); 6 V.S.A. § 3196 (license to operate a slaughtering plant); 24 V.S.A. § 2232 (license to maintain or operate a trailer or mobile home park); 18 V.S.A. § 2003 (license to operate a nursing home); and 26 V.S.A. § 1391 (license to practice medicine and surgery).

Since § 2242 and § 2257 only apply to junkyard businesses and the defendant was not engaged in such, we hold that he did not violate said statutes.

Affirmed.

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460 A.2d 446, 142 Vt. 577, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 458, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vermont-agency-of-transportation-v-sumner-vt-1983.

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