Van Sciver v. Zoning Board of Adjustment

396 Pa. 646
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 2, 1959
DocketAppeal, 175
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 396 Pa. 646 (Van Sciver v. Zoning Board of Adjustment) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Van Sciver v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 396 Pa. 646 (Pa. 1959).

Opinions

Opinion by

Me. Justice McBride,

We have for review an order dismissing an appeal from the Zoning Board of Adjustment of Philadelphia.

The structure involved is a one-story, garage type building of brick and cinder block construction located in a district zoned “A” Commercial. The latest use of the premises was as a storeroom for the owner’s adjacent confectionery.

Appellant, the lessee of the property, sought a registration permit intending to install what is commonly referred to as a “laundromat” equipped with thirty coin operated automatic washers and ten automatic dryers. The items to be cleaned would be handled solely by the customers themselves. The applicant proposed operating the laundromat twenty-four hours a day seven days a week and it was to be unattended except for daily visits by a porter and a coin collector and periodic visits by a maintenance man.

The zoning board conducted a hearing at which the sole testimony was that of J ames Mitchell, an expert on the operation and maintenance of laundromats, statements by counsel for the applicant, and a petition signed by residents in the neighborhood in support of the application. The application was treated as a request for a variance, and a use registration permit was granted, conditioned on a limitation of business hours to the period between 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday and the requirement that some one be on duty during all hours of operation. The ap[649]*649plicant’s appeal to tbe court below challenging these restrictions was dismissed.

Appellant has maintained throughout that (1) A laundromat is a “Hand laundry or agency” within the meaning of §14-303 (m)1 of the Code of General Ordinances of the City of Philadelphia and is therefore permitted as a matter of right;

(2) Alternatively, this is a use “of the same general character as the uses” enumerated as being permitted as a matter of right under §14-303 and therefore should be permitted if a Zoning Board of Adjustment certificate2 is obtained; and

(3) The conditions attached to the granting of the variance bear no reasonable relation to the health, morals, safety and general welfare of the public and are therefore arbitrary, capricious and unjust. These contentions will be considered in order.3

[650]*650The zoning board of adjustment and the court below both rejected appellant’s contention that his proposed use is permissible as a “hand laundry”. The only related provisions in the City’s zoning regulations are those for “Hand laundry or agency” in an “A Commercial district”4 of the Philadelphia Code of General Ordinances and “Laundry (steam)” in a General Industrial District.5 Nowhere in the Code are laundromats specifically mentioned. Thus, it is a question of analyzing what was intended by the distinction between the commercial and industrial classifications of the two types of laundries and determining by analogy to which the laundromat is most akin from a zoning standpoint. The court below in making this analysis deferred in great measure to the expertise of the zoning board. We also recognize that the board’s experience in zoning problems does develop expertise in some areas upon which the Court should rely. This, however, is not one of those areas. The Board certainly knows no more about the operation of a laundromat than we do. They also had to rely on the testimony of an expert witness, Mitchell.6 This Court can interpret this same testimony. In doing so we come to a different result. Today, almost all hand laundries require the use of some form of automatic washing machines and driers. The only difference between the use in question here and the ordinary type of hand laundry is that this one is unattended.7

[651]*651In tracing the history of hand laundries to the present time Mitchell indicated how the unattended hand laundry, which we know as a laundromat, is the result of improving technology in this business.8

[652]*652It seems clear that considering the history of this type of operation, what was intended by the choice of the words “hand laundry” in the code was a designation that the laundry allowed in a commercial district must not be industrial, i.e., a laundry plant which was steam operated. In fact, the words “hand laundry or agency” in themselves show that a hand laundry means a neighborhood commercial laundry as opposed to a steam or industrial laundry in that this classification allows an “agency” of an industrial laundry in that commercial district, but not the industrial operation itself. Furthermore, the creation in the code of classifications of commercial and industrial laundry operations implies that it was intended that the difference between the two was to be industrial versus commercial. A laundromat basically derives its value from the service which it provides for its patrons. It does not provide an industrial service, but rather, provides a service of a commercial nature. That is, it gives working men and women ready access to automatic washing procedures whenever they need them just as if they were more fortunate and could afford their own washing machines. This service should be permitted in a commercial district, ordinarily located on the fringes of residential districts, so that it is readily available to the users thereof.

From the history of the term “hand laundry” and the fact that many such laundries had mechanization when the ordinance was adopted, it would seem that the word “hand” does not refer to the method of laundering but is a term used in the laundry industry to [653]*653designate a neighborhood commercial operation as opposed to a steam or industrial operation.

Also, the distinction drawn by the court below that uses requiring large amounts of machinery are relegated to industrial districts while uses in commercial districts do not so use machinery is patently insupportable. The expert testimony clearly showed that all but the most primitive of hand laundries do use machinery. A glance at the uses permitted in a commercial district and the ones permitted in an industrial district demonstrates that the number of machines or type of equipment is not a criteria to determine in which district that activity is to be considered.

For example, among the specific uses permitted in a commercial district as a matter of right are a central heating plant, telegraph or telephone office, craftsmen’s trades shops and job printing, engraving and print reproducing shops, all of which use machinery extensively. The key to determining in which district a laundromat is to be permitted is the “use” and the type of activity to be performed on the premises. It is our opinion that the use of this property as a laundromat is more analogous to a “hand laundry” than to a “laundry (steam)” and we hold it to be so within the meaning of the ordinance.

However, were we to hold that this is not a “hand laundry” within the meaning of the Code, there are also permitted in “A” Commercial districts “uses of the same general character as the uses specified above” 9 if a Zoning Board of Adjustment certificate is obtained.

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Bluebook (online)
396 Pa. 646, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/van-sciver-v-zoning-board-of-adjustment-pa-1959.