Dethmers, J.
Plaintiff is an honorably discharged marine of World War II. Prior to February 24, 1961, he was a detective on the Bedford township police department. On that date he was notified by letter from the township supervisor that, effective immediately, he was permanently removed as a member of the police department because of immoral conduct.
PA 1897, No 205, as amended (CL 1948, § 35.401 et seq., as amended [Stat Ann 1961 Bev § 4.1221 et seq.]), is “An act to prefer honorably discharged members of the armed forces of the United States for public employments” in every public department of the State and of every county and municipal corporation thereof. It is commonly known as the veterans’ preference act. Section 1 provides for veterans’ preference in hiring for such positions. Section 2 provides that no veteran holding such employment in any public department of the State or any county, city or township, shall be removed therefrom except for certain specified misconduct, and then only after full hearing, in the case of a township, before the township board, which right the veteran waives, however, if he fails to file a written protest with the board within 30 days from the day of his removal. The statute further provides that such hearing shall be afforded the veteran within 30 days after the filing of his protest.
[142]*142PA 1935, No 78, as amended (CL 1948, § 38.501 et seq., as amended [Stat Ann 1958 Bev § 5.3351 et seq.]), hereinafter called the civil service act, provides for a civil service merit system for police and fire departments in municipalities, if adopted by a majority of the electors therein voting thereon. It was adopted by the electors in Bedford township in 1952. Section 14 of that act permits removal of a member of the police department only for cause and, upon his demand, after a public hearing before the civil service commission.
On February 28, 1961, plaintiff filed a demand for hearing before the civil service commission, and a protest of his dismissal with the township board under the veterans’ preference act.
A public hearing was had, as demanded, before the civil service commission. It sustained plaintiff’s removal. He appealed, by certiorari, to the circuit court. The court affirmed the action of the civil service commission. No appeal therefrom has been taken to this Court.
Plaintiff was never afforded a hearing before the township board under the veterans’ preference act. He demanded reinstatement because such hearing was not held within 30 days after his protest, as provided in that act. Upon denial thereof he sought mandamus in circuit court to compel his reinstatement accordingly. This was denied by the circuit court. From that plaintiff appeals here.
Defendants contend that, to the exent that it had application to this situation, the veterans’ preference act has been repealed by the subsequently enacted civil service act. This the plaintiff denies.
It is interesting to note that the civil service act, as originally enacted, contained a section 19 providing:
[143]*143“All acts and parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed insofar as they conflict with the provisions of this act.”
Section 19 was repealed by PA 1945, No 267. More significant is the fact that, after enactment of PA 1941, No 370 (CL 1948, § 38.401 et seq., as amended [Stat Ann 1961 Rev § 5.1191(1) et seq.]), providing for a civil service system in certain counties, section 1 of the veterans’ preference act was amended in 1959, by Act No 179, to provide that if, in any instance, there is a conflict between the provisions of those 2 acts, the said county civil service act of 1941 “shall prevail.” No such provision is contained in the veterans’ preference act with respect to the civil service act covering townships. From this it is evident that the legislature was cognizant of the existence of the veterans’ preference act when it enacted the civil service acts and well knew how to effect an express repeal of veterans’ preference provisions in favor of civil service act provisions and how to cause the former, by express terms, to be superseded by the latter when it so desired. Having done this expressly in the case of county civil service by amendment of the veterans’ preference act and not having done so with respect to township civil service, and having incorporated in the 1935 civil service act section 19 repealing all acts or parts of acts in conflict therewith and, thereafter, in 1945, having repealed that section 19, it seems evident that the legislature has not intended that the veterans’ preference act, in whole or in part; should be deemed repealed by the 1935 civil service act as amended and as applied to townships. This view finds further support in the fact that in section 9 of the 1935 civil service act, as amended, it is required that the civil service commission shall [144]*144“keep a roster of the members of the fire and police department, together with a record of service, military or naval experience.” Certainly the repeal contended for by defendants is not express. As noted above, the legislative intent appears to have been to the contrary.
Is there repeal by implication as defendants urge ?
“Repeal by implication is not permitted if it can be avoided by any reasonable construction of the statutes. Couvelis v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 281 Mich 223; People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich 611 (4 LRA 751). If by any reasonable construction 2 statutes can be reconciled and a purpose found to be served by each, both must stand, Garfield Township v. A. B. Klise Lumber Co., 219 Mich 31; Edwards v. Auditor General, 161 Mich 639; People v. Harrison, 194 Mich 363. The duty of the courts is to reconcile statutes if possible and to enforce them, Board of Control of the Michigan State Prison v. Auditor General, 197 Mich 377. The courts will regard all statutes on the same general subject as part of 1 system and later statutes should be construed as supplementary to those preceding them, Wayne County v. Auditor General, 250 Mich 227. See, also, Rathbun v. State of Michigan, 284 Mich 521.” People v. Buckley, 302 Mich 12, 22.
“This court has held that only, when 2 acts are so incompatible that both cannot stand, does a later act repeal a former.” In re Estate of Reynolds, 274 Mich 354, 360.
By reasonable construction the 2 statutes can be reconciled and a purpose may be found to be served by each act, so both must stand. The civil service act was designed, according to its title, to provide, in the public interest, a civil service system based upon merit and to confer certain benefits upon civil service employees, including tenure, rights of promotion, and others. The veterans’ preference act [145]*145was enacted for the purpose of discharging, in a measure, the debt of gratitude the public owes to veterans who have served in the armed services in time of war, by granting them a preference in original employment and retention thereof in public service. These purposes need not be considered irreconcilable. It is our duty to reconcile the 2 statutes, if possible, and to enforce them.
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Dethmers, J.
Plaintiff is an honorably discharged marine of World War II. Prior to February 24, 1961, he was a detective on the Bedford township police department. On that date he was notified by letter from the township supervisor that, effective immediately, he was permanently removed as a member of the police department because of immoral conduct.
PA 1897, No 205, as amended (CL 1948, § 35.401 et seq., as amended [Stat Ann 1961 Bev § 4.1221 et seq.]), is “An act to prefer honorably discharged members of the armed forces of the United States for public employments” in every public department of the State and of every county and municipal corporation thereof. It is commonly known as the veterans’ preference act. Section 1 provides for veterans’ preference in hiring for such positions. Section 2 provides that no veteran holding such employment in any public department of the State or any county, city or township, shall be removed therefrom except for certain specified misconduct, and then only after full hearing, in the case of a township, before the township board, which right the veteran waives, however, if he fails to file a written protest with the board within 30 days from the day of his removal. The statute further provides that such hearing shall be afforded the veteran within 30 days after the filing of his protest.
[142]*142PA 1935, No 78, as amended (CL 1948, § 38.501 et seq., as amended [Stat Ann 1958 Bev § 5.3351 et seq.]), hereinafter called the civil service act, provides for a civil service merit system for police and fire departments in municipalities, if adopted by a majority of the electors therein voting thereon. It was adopted by the electors in Bedford township in 1952. Section 14 of that act permits removal of a member of the police department only for cause and, upon his demand, after a public hearing before the civil service commission.
On February 28, 1961, plaintiff filed a demand for hearing before the civil service commission, and a protest of his dismissal with the township board under the veterans’ preference act.
A public hearing was had, as demanded, before the civil service commission. It sustained plaintiff’s removal. He appealed, by certiorari, to the circuit court. The court affirmed the action of the civil service commission. No appeal therefrom has been taken to this Court.
Plaintiff was never afforded a hearing before the township board under the veterans’ preference act. He demanded reinstatement because such hearing was not held within 30 days after his protest, as provided in that act. Upon denial thereof he sought mandamus in circuit court to compel his reinstatement accordingly. This was denied by the circuit court. From that plaintiff appeals here.
Defendants contend that, to the exent that it had application to this situation, the veterans’ preference act has been repealed by the subsequently enacted civil service act. This the plaintiff denies.
It is interesting to note that the civil service act, as originally enacted, contained a section 19 providing:
[143]*143“All acts and parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed insofar as they conflict with the provisions of this act.”
Section 19 was repealed by PA 1945, No 267. More significant is the fact that, after enactment of PA 1941, No 370 (CL 1948, § 38.401 et seq., as amended [Stat Ann 1961 Rev § 5.1191(1) et seq.]), providing for a civil service system in certain counties, section 1 of the veterans’ preference act was amended in 1959, by Act No 179, to provide that if, in any instance, there is a conflict between the provisions of those 2 acts, the said county civil service act of 1941 “shall prevail.” No such provision is contained in the veterans’ preference act with respect to the civil service act covering townships. From this it is evident that the legislature was cognizant of the existence of the veterans’ preference act when it enacted the civil service acts and well knew how to effect an express repeal of veterans’ preference provisions in favor of civil service act provisions and how to cause the former, by express terms, to be superseded by the latter when it so desired. Having done this expressly in the case of county civil service by amendment of the veterans’ preference act and not having done so with respect to township civil service, and having incorporated in the 1935 civil service act section 19 repealing all acts or parts of acts in conflict therewith and, thereafter, in 1945, having repealed that section 19, it seems evident that the legislature has not intended that the veterans’ preference act, in whole or in part; should be deemed repealed by the 1935 civil service act as amended and as applied to townships. This view finds further support in the fact that in section 9 of the 1935 civil service act, as amended, it is required that the civil service commission shall [144]*144“keep a roster of the members of the fire and police department, together with a record of service, military or naval experience.” Certainly the repeal contended for by defendants is not express. As noted above, the legislative intent appears to have been to the contrary.
Is there repeal by implication as defendants urge ?
“Repeal by implication is not permitted if it can be avoided by any reasonable construction of the statutes. Couvelis v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 281 Mich 223; People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich 611 (4 LRA 751). If by any reasonable construction 2 statutes can be reconciled and a purpose found to be served by each, both must stand, Garfield Township v. A. B. Klise Lumber Co., 219 Mich 31; Edwards v. Auditor General, 161 Mich 639; People v. Harrison, 194 Mich 363. The duty of the courts is to reconcile statutes if possible and to enforce them, Board of Control of the Michigan State Prison v. Auditor General, 197 Mich 377. The courts will regard all statutes on the same general subject as part of 1 system and later statutes should be construed as supplementary to those preceding them, Wayne County v. Auditor General, 250 Mich 227. See, also, Rathbun v. State of Michigan, 284 Mich 521.” People v. Buckley, 302 Mich 12, 22.
“This court has held that only, when 2 acts are so incompatible that both cannot stand, does a later act repeal a former.” In re Estate of Reynolds, 274 Mich 354, 360.
By reasonable construction the 2 statutes can be reconciled and a purpose may be found to be served by each act, so both must stand. The civil service act was designed, according to its title, to provide, in the public interest, a civil service system based upon merit and to confer certain benefits upon civil service employees, including tenure, rights of promotion, and others. The veterans’ preference act [145]*145was enacted for the purpose of discharging, in a measure, the debt of gratitude the public owes to veterans who have served in the armed services in time of war, by granting them a preference in original employment and retention thereof in public service. These purposes need not be considered irreconcilable. It is our duty to reconcile the 2 statutes, if possible, and to enforce them.
As already observed, the civil service act requires the commission to keep a roster of policemen together with a record of their military or naval experience. This could serve no purpose other than for granting preference to veterans for appointment, tenure, or promotion under the civil service system. At the same time, section l of the veterans’ preference act provides that aln appointee thereunder, aside from the preference due him as a veteran, shall “possess other requisite qualifications, after credit allowed by the provisions of any civil service laws.” Claims of irreconcilability seem effectively refuted by these provisions of the 2 acts.
Defendants say that sections 11(b) and 14, and particularly the language of section 7, of the civil service act are in flat contradiction of the rights contended for by plaintiff under the veterans’ preference act, inasmuch as it is there provided that appointment shall not be in any manner or by any means other than in the civil service act prescribed. Again it is to be observed that it is possible, without conflict between the 2 acts, in making appointments under the civil service act, to accord, by civil service commission rule, the preference required under the veterans’ preference act. Section 14 of the civil service act provides that “tenure * * * under the [146]*146provisions of this act” can be terminated by the civil service commission. There can be no donbt that plaintiff’s rights theretofore earned by his service under that act have come to an end by commission action. That does not mean to say that his right to employment, without continued benefit of rights conferred by the civil service act in connection with his previous service, may not still be subject to the determination of the township boa,rd under the veterans’ preference act. The civil service commission’s termination of plaintiff’s rights theretofore enjoyed or earned under the civil service act would not necessarily be in conflict with a townshiji board holding that he is entitled to remain in his previous job under the veterans’ preference act. Future civil service act rights would still be subject to commission determination.
Defendants point to the statement in the title of the 1935 civil service act that 1 of its purposes was to repeal all acts inconsistent therewith. This was no doubt included in the title to accommodate section 19 containing such repealing language. As already stated, that section was repealed by PA 1945, No 267. The purpose and effect of the noted language in the title must be deemed to have fallen with the repeal of that section. Even so, defendants’ argument begs the question, which still must be, in this connection, as it is in regard to the question of repeal by implication, whether there is such inconsistency between the 2 acts. We conclude that there is not.
Defendants cite People v. Buckley, supra, to the effect that plaintiff could not participate in the civil service commission hearing and thereafter claim the right of a hearing before the township board. In the Bucldey Case the defendant submitted to criminal trial before a circuit judge assigned, under a statute providing for such assignment, to the recorder’s [147]*147court of Detroit.' After conviction defendant urged-that the court had been without jurisdiction because the assignment statute had been repealed by implication by another, later statute making different provisions for assignment of judges to the traffic and ordinance division of the recorder’s court. Appropriate to the situation in that case was the holding that defendant could not submit to trial by the court and, after conviction, challenge the power of the court and demand in place thereof a new trial in a court otherwise constituted. It is inapt here. Plaintiff does not challenge the jurisdiction or power of the civil service commission to do what it here did, namely, terminate his rights under the civil service act. But he claims other substantive rights under the veterans’ preference act. As to these, he claims the right, as therein provided, to a hearing before the township board. We think it should have been accorded him.
Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandamus and prayer for relief in his brief filed here seek mandamus to compel his reinstatement to his job. While the veterans’ preference act does provide that the township board shall hold a hearing within 30 days after the veteran employee files a protest of his discharge, it does not provide that failing that the employee is automatically reinstated in his position. The hearing must precede such reinstatement. He has not had the hearing before the township board. He is entitled to it. His right to reinstatement is dependent on the decision of that board.
Beversed. Cause remanded for issue of a writ of mandamus requiring the defendant township board to conduct the hearing as herein provided. No costs, neither party having prevailed in full.
Carr, C. J., and Kelly, Black, Kavanagh, Smith, and O’Hara, JJ., concurred with Dethmers, J. -■