University of Colorado Health at Memorial Hospital v. Burwell

233 F. Supp. 3d 69, 2017 WL 535246, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18173
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedFebruary 9, 2017
DocketCivil Action No. 2014-1220
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 233 F. Supp. 3d 69 (University of Colorado Health at Memorial Hospital v. Burwell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
University of Colorado Health at Memorial Hospital v. Burwell, 233 F. Supp. 3d 69, 2017 WL 535246, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18173 (D.D.C. 2017).

Opinion

*73 MEMORANDUM OPINION

Granting Dependant’s Motion por Leave to Supplement her Answer to the Fourth Amended Complaint; Granting Dependant’s Motion for Leave to Further Supplement her Answer to the Fourth Amended Complaint and Move por Summary Judgment Out op Time; Staying Proceeding

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, a group of acute care hospitals (Hospitals), have challenged several regulations governing outlier payment reimbursements under Medicare. Before the Court is the Secretary of Health and Human Services’s (Secretary) motion to supplement her answer with the affirmative defense of preclusion based on Banner Health v. Burwell, 174 F.Supp.3d 206 (D.D.C. 2016). Also before the Court is the Secretary’s motion to supplement her answer with the affirmative defense of preclusion based on Lee Memorial Health System v. Burwell, 206 F.Supp.3d 307, No. 13-cv-643, 2016 WL 4687072 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2016) and to move for summary judgment out of time on the same grounds. For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that the Secretary’s proposed amendments would not be futile and thus grants leave to supplement the answer to include both defenses. Because the Secretary has shown good cause and the Hospitals would not be prejudiced, the Court further grants the Secretary leave to move for summary judgment out of time. Finally, having determined that the affirmative defense of preclusion is not futile, the Court stays this action until the D.C. Circuit completes its review of Banner Health and, if an appeal is taken, of Lee Memorial. 1

II. BACKGROUND

This case concerns the Hospitals’ challenges to the Secretary’s system for calculating outlier payments under Medicare. In particular, the Hospitals challenge the “fixed loss threshold” rulemakings for fiscal years (FY) 2007, 2008, 2011, and 2012. The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs also challenge the 2003 amendments to the outlier payment regulations. 2 The Court assumes familiarity with the facts and its previous opinions, see generally Mem. Op., ECF No. 67; Mem. Op., ECF No. 47, and focuses only on the most relevant background.

A. Statutory background

Medicare is a federal program that provides health insurance to the elderly and the disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. After hospitals provide covered care, they are reimbursed through the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS). The IPPS provides reimbursements in two ways. First, IPPS provides the lion’s share of reimbursements at a fixed rate for each category of service, aiming to thereby in-centivize hospitals to reduce costs. Lee Memorial Health System v. Burwell, 206 F.Supp.3d 307, 311-14, No. 13-cv-643, 2016 WL 4687072, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2016). Second, hospitals’ reimbursements may be supplemented with “outlier payments” to compensate for “patients whose hospitalization [is] extraordinarily costly or lengthy.” Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1999). An *74 outlier payment is triggered when- cost of caring for a particular patient exceeds the fixed--loss threshold (FLT), a dollar amount that the Secretary sets each year. 3 Banner Health v. Sebelius, 945 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated in part, 2013 WL 11241368 (D.D.C. Jul. 30, 2013). The instant case challenges reimbursements under the FLTs for FYs 2007, 2008, 2011, and 2012. The outlier payment system is also governed-by a set-of overall-regulations, codified at 42 C.F.R. § 412.84. These regulations are not updated every year, and the 2003 amendments apply to the reimbursements at issue here, 4th Am. Compl. at ¶ 29, EOF No. 41.

Setting the FLT is a complicated task. Congress has instructed the Secretary that outlier payments should constitute between five and six percent of total IPPS reimbursements. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iv). To this end, the Secretary sets the FLT for each upcoming year prospectively, so that “when tested against historical data, [it] will likely produce aggregate outlier payments totaling between five and six percent of projected .,. payments.” Cnty. of Los Angeles, 192 F.3d at 1013. After setting the FLT, the Secretary then withholds the predicted total amount of outlier payments in advance from all other IPPS reimbursements, such that the hospitals are essentially sharing the risk of encountering unusually costly patients. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(3)(B). For example, in many recent years the Secretary has aimed to pay 5.1% of the total reimbursements in outlier payments, see Banner Health v. Burwell, 126 F.Supp.3d 28, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2015), and has therefore prospectively reduced all non-outlier payments by 5.1%, id. at 43.

Because Medicare reimbursements— and the hospital-provided care that triggers them—are highly complex, the Secretary’s predictions frequently differ from what actually transpires, and the actual outlier repayments are either higher or lower than the amount withheld. The Secretary need not take corrective action when the actual outlier payments vary from the projected values. Dist. Hosp. Partners L.P. v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 46, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2015). This creates competing incentives between -hospitals and the Secretary—hospitals prefer a lower FLT, with the concomitant possibility that it will be “too low” and hospitals as a group will receive more in outlier payments than they lost in withholding; while the Secretary on the other-hand, may prefer a higher FLT, because if the FLT is “too high” then the total outlier payments will be less than the amount the Secretary withheld to pay for them. If the mismatch between the Secretary’s prediction and the actual outlier payments is small as a percentage of IPPS payments, it can still be large in magnitude due to the scale of Medicare. For example, in the period from FY 1997 to FY 2003, IPPS paid out more than $9 billion in excess of its projections. Pis.’ Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 8, EGF No. 64. This motivated several reforms to the outlier payment system, including the 2003 amendments to the overall regulations. In the following yeps from FY 2004 to FY 2012, IPPS repeatedly paid out less than it projected in outlier payments, for a $6 billion shortfall. Pis.’ Mem. Points Auth. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 2. This system sets the stage for claims like those at issue here, in which hospitals argue that' the *75 Secretary set the FLT too low, denying them outlier reimbursements they should have received.

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233 F. Supp. 3d 69, 2017 WL 535246, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18173, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/university-of-colorado-health-at-memorial-hospital-v-burwell-dcd-2017.