United States v. Zangari

677 F.3d 86, 2012 WL 1323189, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7847
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedApril 18, 2012
DocketDocket 10-4546-cr
StatusPublished
Cited by72 cases

This text of 677 F.3d 86 (United States v. Zangari) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Zangari, 677 F.3d 86, 2012 WL 1323189, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7847 (2d Cir. 2012).

Opinion

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we consider, as a matter of first impression in this Circuit, the propriety of substituting a defendant’s gain for his victims’ losses in calculating restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A-3664. Although we join several of our sister circuits in concluding that such a substitution is error, we decline to exercise our discretion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) to notice the error in this case because the defendant failed to object to the restitution calculation before the District Court and has not satisfied his burden of persuading us that the erroneous restitution order both “affected [his] substantial rights” and “seri *88 ously a£fect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed.

BACKGROUND

From about August 1998 through October 2006, defendant-appellant Salvatore Zangari worked as a securities broker in the securities-lending departments of, first, Morgan Stanley and, subsequently, Bank of America. As a broker, Zangari’s responsibilities included borrowing and loaning securities on behalf of his employers and their clients in the securities-lending market.

As described by a leading commentator: Securities lending is an important and significant business that describes the market practice whereby securities are temporarily transferred by one party (the lender) to another (the borrower). The borrower is obliged to return the securities to the lender, either on demand, or at the end of any agreed term. For the period of the loan the lender is secured by acceptable assets delivered by the borrower to the lender as collateral.

Mark C. Faulkner, “An Introduction to Securities Lending,” in Securities Lending & Repurchase Agreements 3-4 (Frank J. Fabozzi & Steven V. Mann eds., 2005). Typically, the collateral — which, in the United States, often takes the form of cash 1 — is valued at 102%-105% of the market value of the loaned securities. Peter Economou, “Risk, Return, and Performance Measurement in Securities Lending,” in Securities Lending & Repurchase Agreements 152-53.

The borrower of securities may be motivated by any number of factors, including the desire to cover a short position, to sell the borrowed securities in hopes of buying them back at a lower price before returning them to the lender, or to gain tax advantages associated with the temporary transfer of ownership of the securities. See Faulkner, supra, at 21-25. The lender, meanwhile, is principally motivated by the ability to earn a return on the collateral during the course of the loan, either through fees paid by the borrower (in the case of noncash collateral) or (in the case of cash collateral) by reinvesting it or making short-term loans to other borrowers at a higher interest rate than that paid to the borrower. See id. at 6-9.

In addition to the lender and borrower, stock-loan transactions often involve a third party, known as a “stock-loan finder.” According to the Information filed in this case,

[s]tock-loan finders [are] entities that [are] in the business of facilitating stock loan transactions in exchange for fees.... Borrowers and lenders typically pa[y] the finders’ fees from the fees, rebates and negative rebates that they earn[ ] in connection with particular stock-loan transactions.

Information ¶ 3, United States v. Zangari, No. 10-cr-255 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2010), EOF No. 3. See generally Morgan, Olmstead, Kennedy & Gardner, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 637 F.Supp. 973, 975 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1986).

*89 The Information alleged that, while Zangari was employed as a broker with Morgan Stanley, he and a co-worker, Peter Sherlock, agreed to cause Morgan Stanley to enter into stock-loan transactions with two other financial institutions, Paloma Securities, LLC (“Paloma”) and Swiss American Securities, Inc. (“SASI”). As a result of those transactions, Paloma and SASI paid sham finder’s fees to Clinton Management, Ltd. (“Clinton Management”), a straw stock-loan finder operated by Anthony Lupo, an acquaintance of Sherlock’s. Lupo, in turn, paid cash kickbacks to Sherlock (among other co-conspirators) and Sherlock paid a portion of these kickbacks to Zangari. The arrangement continued when Zangari moved to Bank of America. Neither Morgan Stanley nor Bank of America approved the stock-loan transactions that were the subject of the Information.

According to the Government, as a result of the fraudulent scheme, Bank of America and Morgan Stanley suffered losses in the form of unrealized profit. As summarized in its brief on appeal:

Zangari knew Paloma and SASI were willing to charge less to loan or pay more to borrow securities than Morgan Stanley or Bank of America ultimately paid or received. Rather than obtain this readily available profit for his employers, however, Zangari had his employers pay the higher price and receive the lower price, thereby causing his employers and their clients to lose money.

Government’s Brief at 13. 2

On April 15, 2010, Zangari waived indictment and pleaded guilty to the Information, which charged him with one count of conspiracy to violate the Travel Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 & 1952. By the terms of his plea agreement, Zangari conceded that his conduct involved a bribe greater than $70,000, but agreed to forfeit the smaller sum of $65,600, which represented the amount that he had actually deposited into his bank account. The plea agreement also stipulated that restitution was “[applicable, in an amount to be determined by the [District] Court.” Plea Agreement, United States v. Zangari, No. 10-cr-255 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2010).

Following Zangari’s plea, the United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), which laid out the facts underlying Zangari’s plea and calculated the applicable sentencing range pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “USSG”). In calculating Zangari’s adjusted offense level, the PSR included a six-level enhancement under USSG § 2B4.1, reflecting that the amount of loss to the victims of Zangari’s crime was more than $30,000 and less than $70,000. 3 To support this enhancement, the PSR stated that, though neither Morgan Stanley nor Bank of America had submitted affidavits of *90

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Bluebook (online)
677 F.3d 86, 2012 WL 1323189, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7847, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-zangari-ca2-2012.