United States v. Washington

19 F. Supp. 3d 1126
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedDecember 31, 1994
DocketNo. CV 9213
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 19 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (United States v. Washington) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Washington, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (W.D. Wash. 1994).

Opinion

[1128]*1128TABLE OF CONTENTS

ORDER PAGE

Order Denying Summary Judgment re: Certain Species and Deep-Water Harvest (1/14/94) 1128

Order Clarifying Prior Order Denying Summary Judgment re: Certain Species and Deep-Water Harvest (2/1/94) 1131

Order Denying Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (2/7/94) 1131

Consent Decree Regarding Shellfish Sanitation Issues (5/4/94) 1134

Consent Decree (11/28/94) 1169

Memorandum Opinion and Order. 873 F.Supp. 1422 (12/20/94) See Appendix

COMPILATION OF MAJOR POST-TRIAL SUBSTANTIVE ORDERS

(Through December 31, 1986)

ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: CERTAIN SPECIES AND DEEP-WATER HARVEST

Subproceeding No. 89-3

(January 13, 1994)

EDWARD RAFEEDIE, District Judge.

TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD:

The Court has read and considered the papers supporting and opposing the state of Washington’s motion for partial summary judgement regarding certain species and deep-water harvest. The Court finds that the two theories advanced by the State of Washington are inconsistent with a proper interpretation of the Stevens Treaty. Accordingly, these theories are rejected, and partial summary judgment is DENIED.

INTRODUCTION

The State of Washington (“Washington”) has moved for partial summary judgment to establish that the right of the tribes to harvest shellfish is limited to exclude:

(1) Species that were not harvested at or before treaty time, such as shrimp, scallops, squid or abalone
(2) Shellfish harvested in deep-water areas where no harvesting occurred at or before treaty time, such as sea cucumbers, sea urchins, octopus, geoduck and crab.

Standard for Summary Judgment

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment will be granted if the moving party can establish that there is “no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” British Airways Board v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir.1978). It is the moving party’s burden to inform the Court of the basis for its belief there are no genuine issues of material fact and this may be demonstrated by pointing out an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Principles of Treaty Interpretation

According to United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 531, 21 S.Ct. 149, 163, 45 L.Ed. 291, 306 (1900), the intentions of the parties to the treaty will control the treaty’s interpretation. In determining the intentions, a Court should look to “the words used — the words being interpreted, not literally nor loosely, but according to their ordinary signification. If the words be clear and explicit, leaving no room for doubt what the parties intend[1129]*1129ed, they must be interpreted according to their natural and ordinary significance.” Id. (emphasis added).

Therefore, under the familiar cannon of statutory construction, the starting point for interpreting a statute (in this case a treaty) is the language of the statute itself and “absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, ... [treaty] language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980); See also Sumitomo Shoji America Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180, 102 S.Ct. 2374, 72 L.Ed.2d 765 (1982) (“Clear import of treaty language controls unless application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent of expectations of its signatories”).

Special canons of construction are applied to determine the meaning of Indian treaties. These canons provide that any ambiguities in language must be resolved in favor of the Indians, that the language should not be construed to the prejudice of the Indians, and that technical meanings should be avoided in favor of the understanding of the Indians. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n., 443 U.S. 658, 675-676, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (1979); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 528, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577, 28 S.Ct. 207, 52 L.Ed. 340 (1908); U.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 25 S.Ct. 662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905). Finally, the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381, 25 S.Ct. 662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905) that Indian treaties should not be viewed as grants of rights to the Indians, but as grants of rights from the Indians to the United States. Any rights which were not granted by the Indians to the United States were reserved by the Indians because the Indians already possessed them.

Washington Theory Number One: Species Limitation

Washington begins with a factual assertion that the Tribes did not harvest certain species of shellfish, such as shrimp and scallops (“named species”), at or before treaty time. On that basis, Washington argues that the Stevens Treaty covers only species of fish harvested at or before treaty time, and that the Tribes therefore have no treaty right respecting the named species.

The starting point in evaluating this theory is the treaty language itself:

The right of taking fish at usual and accustomed grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians in common with all citizens of the Territory and of erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing, together with the privilege of hunting and gathering roots and berries on open and unclaimed lands. Provided, however, that they shall not take shell-fish from any beds staked or cultivated by citizens.

The Court has already held that shellfish are fish. Since the named species are shellfish, they are fish as well, and are covered by the treaty. There is no language in the treaty that undermines these simple propositions.

Any attempt by Washington to read such a limitation into the treaty must fail. All of the canons of treaty construction obstruct such an inference, but one such canon is particularly lethal to Washington’s theory: the “reservation of rights” canon.

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