United States v. Texas Education Agency (South Park Independent School District)

647 F.2d 504, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12841
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedMay 28, 1981
Docket80-1870
StatusPublished
Cited by55 cases

This text of 647 F.2d 504 (United States v. Texas Education Agency (South Park Independent School District)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Texas Education Agency (South Park Independent School District), 647 F.2d 504, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12841 (5th Cir. 1981).

Opinion

SHARP, District Judge.

The South Park Independent School District (SPISP) desegregation case is now entering its second decade. This litigation has a protracted history and has already resulted in one judgment and opinion of this court found at 566 F.2d 1221. Therefore, only the briefest summary of the facts of the case is necessary here. A fuller description may be found in this court’s previous opinion.

The United States has contended since July of 1976 that the 1970 desegregation plan ordered by the district court produced unacceptable levels of integration and that supplemental relief was necessary. The government’s position was then, and remains, that the SPISD must adopt and implement a desegregation plan which satisfies the requirements of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). On September 9, 1976 the district court held the SPISD was a unitary school system from the moment it entered its original desegregation order August 31, 1970. On appeal this court reversed the district court and remanded the cause for further findings of fact. United States v. South Park Independent School Dist., 566 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir.), cert. den., 439 U.S. 1007, 99 S.Ct. 622, 58 L.Ed.2d 684 (1978). There this court stated:

In allowing the existence of one race schools in limited situations, the Swann opinion emphasized that findings should be made demonstrating that their existence is not the result of present or past discriminatory action. The district court’s holding that the SPISD is a “unitary” school system is not detailed enough to show us whether or not the school system meets this Swann requirement. For this reason, it is necessary to remand this case to the district court for supplemental findings of fact in order to determine whether or not the SPISD is in fact a “unitary” school system. 566 F.2d at 1225.

On remand, an evidentiary hearing was held on December 3-6, 1979. The testimo *506 ny of 49 witnesses was heard; much undisputed statistical evidence was presented. The district court filed its memorandum opinion and order on June 6, 1980 denying the requested relief. The district court again found that its desegregation order of August 31, 1970 created a unitary school system by implementing a racially neutral attendance zone for each school. Therefore, the district court reasoned it was without jurisdiction to consider the request for supplemental relief in the form of additional plans to desegregate. The court explained that this was not a “step at a time” desegregation plan so it was unnecessary to specifically retain jurisdiction in the 1970 order to determine when a unitary system had finally been obtained. Rather, the district court believed it had devised a plan which immediately eliminated all vestiges of the previous dual school system and created a unitary school. The court also found that there was no evidence to support a finding that either the SPISD or the State of Texas had attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the schools. Thus, having not retained jurisdiction and lacking evidence that would trigger its jurisdiction the district court found itself foreclosed by lack of jurisdiction from considering the motion for supplemental relief.

The district court also found that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that racial considerations played any part in the reassignment of principals prior to the 1977-1978 school year. It is unnecessary to address this finding herein as it is subordinate to this court’s conclusions on the broader issue of unitariness. The district court also held that the United States had failed to meet its burden of pleading and proof pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1758. This court stated in its prior opinion that “under the facts of this case, the statute [20 U.S.C. § 1758] is not controlling; but, if it were, reversal would nevertheless be mandated because the government has complied with its basic requirement.” Supra, 566 F.2d at 1226. The doctrine of the law of the case in firmly established, its basis being the sound policy that when an issue is once litigated and decided that should be the end of the matter. Pickens v. Okolona Mun. Separate School Dist., 594 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1979), citing United States v. United States Smelting, Refining and Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198, 70 S.Ct. 537, 544, 94 L.Ed. 750 (1950); Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1290 (5th Cir. 1978). There has been no new life breathed into this issue by the subsequent evidence and the parties' argument here, so it remains as previously decided.

The scope of review here is controlled by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. It provides that findings of fact “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” F.R.Civ.Pro. 52(a). Justice Reed wrote in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948) that “a finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id., (emphasis in original). This circuit has long relied on that formulation of the rule. See Gele v. Wilson, 616 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1980); Amstar Corp. v. Dommino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.), cert. den., -U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 268, 66 L.Ed.2d 129 (1980); Western Cotton Oil Co. v. Hodges, 218 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1954). In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 rehearing den., 444 U.S. 887, 100 S.Ct. 186, 62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979), the Supreme Court addressed the obligation of the Courts of Appeal in school desegregation cases. There the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the defendants were operating a dual school system and that the finding of the district court to the contrary was clearly erroneous. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243, 253 (6th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court stated that *507 the role and duty of the Courts of Appeals are clear: it must determine whether the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous, sustain them if they are not, but set them aside if they are.

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Bluebook (online)
647 F.2d 504, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12841, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-texas-education-agency-south-park-independent-school-ca5-1981.