Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District

716 F. Supp. 1162
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedJune 27, 1989
DocketNo. LR-C-82-866
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 716 F. Supp. 1162 (Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District, 716 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. Ark. 1989).

Opinion

INTERIM ORDER

HENRY WOODS, District Judge,

I

SETTLEMENT OF STATE’S LIABILITY

The parties agreed to settle the state’s liability as outlined generally by the Court of Appeals in its decision of February 9, 1988, Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District, 839 F.2d 1296, 1306, (8th Cir.) et seq. Although this settlement was effectuated by a legislative appropriation, a successful lawsuit was filed attacking all appropriations of the 1989 regular session of the Legislature. Chancellor Lee Munson held these appropriations invalid since they violated Article 5, Section 30 and Article 5, Section 40 of the Arkansas Constitution. His decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Fisher v. Perroni, 299 Ark. 227, 771 S.W.2d 766 (1989). In response to this ruling, Governor Clinton called a special session of the Arkansas Legislature to convene June 20, 1989.

A new bill, SB 151, approving the settlement was considered by the House of Representatives on Friday, June 23, 1989, having been passed by the Senate. After an amendment was placed on the bill and it was called up on third reading and final passage, a bizarre series of events occurred. A pair was stricken and one legislator’s voting machine key was allegedly stolen or was misplaced. The votes were cast and the ballot sounded. The Speaker declared that the bill had failed by one vote. The House then adjourned. The bill was however sent to the Senate stamped “Failed” and without the Speaker’s approval endorsed thereon. The Senate, still in session, concurred in the House Amendment and sent the bill to the Governor, who signed it. The actions of the Senate and the Governor were apparently taken to facilitate a lawsuit to determine whether the bill had actually passed.

Enactment of this bill would have avoided much further litigation and would [1164]*1164have removed an enormous burden from my shoulders. Nevertheless, it would be a serious breach of comity for a federal court to invade the precincts of a state legislature and interpret its rules and procedures to determine whether a bill secured enough votes to become law. This is an issue for presentation to the Arkansas courts, since it ultimately involves interpretation of Arkansas statutes and the Arkansas Constitution. It may be months before this issue is settled in the Arkansas courts. Whether this bill actually became law is highly questionable. I cannot approve the settlement because the settlement is contingent upon legislative approval and a legislative appropriation to fund it. I cannot in good conscience accept this bill as having passed. Only the Arkansas courts can make this determination. I recognize that the actions of the Senate and Governor Clinton were taken in good faith to preserve the matter for judicial review. However, I am sure that both recognize the difficulty of establishing the validity of the bill’s passage in the House. Adherence to the separation of powers doctrine makes courts, state or federal, highly reluctant to invade the internal workings of the legislative branch.

Be that as it may, I cannot await the ultimate resolution of this matter. The Little Rock School District (LRSD) and Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD) are in dire financial straits. I must assume my responsibility to assess the extent of the State’s liability. There are three areas involved in the state’s liability:

(1) The magnet schools area;
(2) Compensatory education for the 1988-89 school year; and
(3) Other past and future liability of the State (the major component).

Hearings were held on the magnet school issue (1), supra, by Special Master McCut-cheon, who filed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations on March 10, 1989 (Docket # 1169).

The parties asked me to hold my ruling in abeyance since they were working on an overall settlement and desired to incorporate his formulations therein. This was done, and the provisions with regard to the magnet funding claims of the three districts were included on pages 2-7 of the settlement agreement. Reference is made thereto for further elucidation of the Master’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations, which I now approve. The State is ordered to make immediate payment of these funds to the districts.

Special Master McCutcheon held hearings as to the State’s liability for the 1988-89 school year but withheld, at the request of the parties, making findings of fact and conclusions of law pending settlement negotiations. Since the settlement has apparently now been vitiated, the parties are given twenty (20) days to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to Special Master McCutcheon so that a determination can be made as to the State’s liability for the 1988-89 school year.

Hearings have not been held as to the other liability issues of the State. Those hearings will be scheduled as soon as practicable.

II

METROPOLITAN SUPERVISOR

I accept the recommendation of Special Master McCutcheon regarding the appointment of a Metropolitan Supervisor. As previously announced, Eugene Reville will serve as the Metropolitan Supervisor for a period of three years, commencing July 1, 1989. In light of the inadequacies in the proposed plans, his first priority shall be to oversee, direct and insure the development of acceptable, workable and constitutional student assignment plans. Although student assignments need not necessarily be made across district lines, if such assignments serve to reduce busing, promote educational goals, and reduce costs, they should not be precluded. While it is true that school district lines should not be “casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience,” it is well-settled that “[bjoundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional violation calling for interdistrict re[1165]*1165lief.” Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 3125, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974) (Milliken I).

Contrary to the situation in Milliken I, all of the school districts in this case have been adjudicated to be constitutional violators. All have had a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Not only were the North Little Rock School District (NLRSD) and PCSSD found liable for interdistrict segre-gatory acts, but both have been found liable for segregatory acts within their own districts. All three districts have had four years since my consolidation order was reversed to develop independent autonomous plans to remedy the conditions that offend the Constitution within their districts. None has been successful. See, Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (Milliken II).

In their objections to the Findings of the Special Master, NLRSD and PCSSD contend that the mandates of the Eighth Circuit constitute the complete remedy for their interdistrict violations. Even if that were true, the Special Master’s Findings and Recommendations clearly indicate that interdistrict cooperation is required to remedy each district’s intradistrict violations.

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