Mr. Justice Jackson
' delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Government, by direct appeal from the District Court,1 invites us to reconsider and overrule the interpretation of the commodities clause of the Interstate Commerce Act2 promulgated in United States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co., 298 U. S. 492. That holding, in substance, is that the prohibition3 against a railroad company transporting any commodity which it owns or in which it has an interest, except for its own use, does not prevent it from transporting commodities of a corporation whose stock is wholly owned by a holding company which also owns all of the stock of the railway, unless the control of the railway is so exercised as to make it the alter ego of the holding company.
The present challenge to that doctrine is predicated on the following facts: Bethlehem Steel Corporation (the [773]*773holding company) owns substantially all of the stocks of South Buffalo Railway Company (South Buffalo) and of Bethlehem Steel Company (the Steel Company). At its Lackawanna plant, near Buffalo, N. Y., the Steel Company produces steel and from it fabricates various products. These commodities are transported by the South Buffalo from the plant to the rails of trunk-line carriers. In fact, South Buffalo provides the sole terminal connection between this industry and the trunk-line railroads. It operates about 6 miles of main-line track and 81 miles of spur track, 58 miles of its trackage being on leased right-of-way within the steel plant where it connects with other trackage owned by the Steel Company itself.
While about 70% of South Buffalo revenues have been derived from the Steel Company traffic, it also renders terminal switching for 27 unrelated industries, some of considerable size. It enables all of them to ship, by direct connection, over five trunk-line systems and through interchange over seven more.
South Buffalo performs no transportation service and owns no facilities outside of the State of New York, where it operates only within the Buffalo switching district. It is classified by the Interstate Commerce Commission as an “S-l” carrier, which is defined as one engaged in “performing switching services only.” It files tariffs covering switching service, both with the Interstate Commerce Commission and with the New York Public Service Commission. It does not appear to participate with any line-haul railroad in a through interstate route or to receive a division of any joint or through rate.
In 1936 this Court decided United States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co., 298 U. S. 492, and held that the production and transportation set-up of the United States Steel Corporation, one of Bethlehem’s competitors, did not violate the commodities clause. Thereupon, Beth[774]*774lehem made a study of the relations between itself, South Buffalo and the Steel Company in the light of this decision. It revised its intercorporate relationship in the next few years to comply, as it was advised, with the conditions under which this Court had found the statute inapplicable to United States Steel. It does not seem necessary to recite the complex details of intercorporate dealings before the reorganization about 1940 as this action for injunction was not begun until 1943 and the crucial question is whether there was a contemporaneous violation or a threat of violation against which the writ of the Court should be directed. Voluntarily abandoned courses of conduct are not grounds for injunction, though they may sometimes be relevant evidence of intent or similar issues.
At all times crucial to the Government’s case, Bethlehem controlled the stock of both the shipper and the carrier corporations. It unquestionably had power to favor its shipping subsidiary at the expense of its carrying subsidiary, or vice versa. The first question is whether we will now hold that mere possession of the power, regardless of whether it is exercised or remains dormant, makes out a violation of the statute. This Court said in the Elgin case that it does not.
It is the Government’s contention that the Elgin decision misconstrued the Act, misunderstood its legislative history and misapplied the Court’s own prior decisions. It is not necessary in the view we take of the case to decide to what extent, if any, these contentions are correct. It is enough to say that if the Elgin case were before us as a case of first impression, its doctrine might not now be approved. But we do not write on a clean slate. What the Court has written before is but one of a series of events, which convinces us that its overruling or modification should be left to Congress. As the Court held on our last decision day, when the questions are [775]*775of statutory construction, not of constitutional import, Congress can rectify our mistake, if such it was, or change its policy at any time, and in these circumstances reversal is not readily to be made. Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U. S. 611, decided April 19, 1948. Moreover, in this case, unlike the cited one, Congress has considered the alleged mistake and decided not to change it.
The Interstate Commerce Commission, after repeatedly calling the attention of Congress to the Elgin case during its pendency, in 1936 reported its defeat in the litigation. Referring to commodities clause cases it said, “We recommend that Congress, in the light of facts already made available in our reports and in reports of investigations conducted by congressional committees, shall determine the appropriate limit of our jurisdiction in such cases and whether further legislation to extend that jurisdiction is necessary.”4 Congress took no action.
But its inaction has not been from inadvertence or failure to appreciate the effect of the Court’s interpretation. A bill was introduced in the Senate containing language relating to affiliates and subsidiaries calculated in effect to set aside the Elgin decision.5 Section 12 of the bill as introduced read as follows:
“It shall be unlawful for any carrier by railroad and, on and after January 1, 1941, it shall be unlawful for any carrier, other than a carrier by air, to transport, in commerce subject to this Act, any article or commodity, other than timber and the manufactured products thereof, manufactured, mined, or produced by or under the authority of such carrier or any subsidiary, affiliate, or controlling person of such carrier, or any such article or commodity in [776]*776which such carrier, subsidiary, affiliate, or controlling person has any interest, direct or indirect, legal or equitable, except such articles or commodities as may be necessary or intended for use in the conduct of the carrier business of such carrier.”
The italicized portions indicate the proposed additions which would have extended the clause to cover (1) carriers other than railroads, and (2) subsidiaries, affiliates and controlling persons.
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Mr. Justice Jackson
' delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Government, by direct appeal from the District Court,1 invites us to reconsider and overrule the interpretation of the commodities clause of the Interstate Commerce Act2 promulgated in United States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co., 298 U. S. 492. That holding, in substance, is that the prohibition3 against a railroad company transporting any commodity which it owns or in which it has an interest, except for its own use, does not prevent it from transporting commodities of a corporation whose stock is wholly owned by a holding company which also owns all of the stock of the railway, unless the control of the railway is so exercised as to make it the alter ego of the holding company.
The present challenge to that doctrine is predicated on the following facts: Bethlehem Steel Corporation (the [773]*773holding company) owns substantially all of the stocks of South Buffalo Railway Company (South Buffalo) and of Bethlehem Steel Company (the Steel Company). At its Lackawanna plant, near Buffalo, N. Y., the Steel Company produces steel and from it fabricates various products. These commodities are transported by the South Buffalo from the plant to the rails of trunk-line carriers. In fact, South Buffalo provides the sole terminal connection between this industry and the trunk-line railroads. It operates about 6 miles of main-line track and 81 miles of spur track, 58 miles of its trackage being on leased right-of-way within the steel plant where it connects with other trackage owned by the Steel Company itself.
While about 70% of South Buffalo revenues have been derived from the Steel Company traffic, it also renders terminal switching for 27 unrelated industries, some of considerable size. It enables all of them to ship, by direct connection, over five trunk-line systems and through interchange over seven more.
South Buffalo performs no transportation service and owns no facilities outside of the State of New York, where it operates only within the Buffalo switching district. It is classified by the Interstate Commerce Commission as an “S-l” carrier, which is defined as one engaged in “performing switching services only.” It files tariffs covering switching service, both with the Interstate Commerce Commission and with the New York Public Service Commission. It does not appear to participate with any line-haul railroad in a through interstate route or to receive a division of any joint or through rate.
In 1936 this Court decided United States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co., 298 U. S. 492, and held that the production and transportation set-up of the United States Steel Corporation, one of Bethlehem’s competitors, did not violate the commodities clause. Thereupon, Beth[774]*774lehem made a study of the relations between itself, South Buffalo and the Steel Company in the light of this decision. It revised its intercorporate relationship in the next few years to comply, as it was advised, with the conditions under which this Court had found the statute inapplicable to United States Steel. It does not seem necessary to recite the complex details of intercorporate dealings before the reorganization about 1940 as this action for injunction was not begun until 1943 and the crucial question is whether there was a contemporaneous violation or a threat of violation against which the writ of the Court should be directed. Voluntarily abandoned courses of conduct are not grounds for injunction, though they may sometimes be relevant evidence of intent or similar issues.
At all times crucial to the Government’s case, Bethlehem controlled the stock of both the shipper and the carrier corporations. It unquestionably had power to favor its shipping subsidiary at the expense of its carrying subsidiary, or vice versa. The first question is whether we will now hold that mere possession of the power, regardless of whether it is exercised or remains dormant, makes out a violation of the statute. This Court said in the Elgin case that it does not.
It is the Government’s contention that the Elgin decision misconstrued the Act, misunderstood its legislative history and misapplied the Court’s own prior decisions. It is not necessary in the view we take of the case to decide to what extent, if any, these contentions are correct. It is enough to say that if the Elgin case were before us as a case of first impression, its doctrine might not now be approved. But we do not write on a clean slate. What the Court has written before is but one of a series of events, which convinces us that its overruling or modification should be left to Congress. As the Court held on our last decision day, when the questions are [775]*775of statutory construction, not of constitutional import, Congress can rectify our mistake, if such it was, or change its policy at any time, and in these circumstances reversal is not readily to be made. Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U. S. 611, decided April 19, 1948. Moreover, in this case, unlike the cited one, Congress has considered the alleged mistake and decided not to change it.
The Interstate Commerce Commission, after repeatedly calling the attention of Congress to the Elgin case during its pendency, in 1936 reported its defeat in the litigation. Referring to commodities clause cases it said, “We recommend that Congress, in the light of facts already made available in our reports and in reports of investigations conducted by congressional committees, shall determine the appropriate limit of our jurisdiction in such cases and whether further legislation to extend that jurisdiction is necessary.”4 Congress took no action.
But its inaction has not been from inadvertence or failure to appreciate the effect of the Court’s interpretation. A bill was introduced in the Senate containing language relating to affiliates and subsidiaries calculated in effect to set aside the Elgin decision.5 Section 12 of the bill as introduced read as follows:
“It shall be unlawful for any carrier by railroad and, on and after January 1, 1941, it shall be unlawful for any carrier, other than a carrier by air, to transport, in commerce subject to this Act, any article or commodity, other than timber and the manufactured products thereof, manufactured, mined, or produced by or under the authority of such carrier or any subsidiary, affiliate, or controlling person of such carrier, or any such article or commodity in [776]*776which such carrier, subsidiary, affiliate, or controlling person has any interest, direct or indirect, legal or equitable, except such articles or commodities as may be necessary or intended for use in the conduct of the carrier business of such carrier.”
The italicized portions indicate the proposed additions which would have extended the clause to cover (1) carriers other than railroads, and (2) subsidiaries, affiliates and controlling persons.
At the beginning of hearings thereon by the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce its chairman said that, with respect to the commodities clause, the purpose of the Bill was “To make effective the intent of Congress in prohibiting railroads, or other carriers after January 1, 1941, from transporting products not utilized in the conduct of their transportation business but in which they have an interest, direct or indirect.” 6 A week later, in the course of the hearings when evidence began to be offered showing the effect the proposed clause might have on various industries, the chairman made this statement:
“Let me say this to you with reference to the commodities clause, so that there will not be a lot of time wasted on it. I am speaking for myself and not for the committee. I think the commodities clause will have to be changed; and if we are going to make such drastic changes in the commodity clause as this bill would suggest, I think it ought not to be incorporated in this particular piece of legislation, but should come up as a separate piece of legislation so that we can devote considerable time and thought to that particular subject. This would so change the economic structure of a lot of industries that I [777]*777think it is something that would have to have particular consideration in a separate piece of legislation.” 7
In a further discussion the Chairman added: “I might say, also, that if the commodities clause should stay in as it is at the present time it would disrupt a great many industries, and I would seriously question as to whether or not I wanted to attempt anything of that kind at this time, particularly in this specific piece of legislation.”8
When the bill was reported to the Senate, the proposed change had been eliminated and the original language of the Act retained. The Committee, in reporting the bill, said, “The rewritten commodities clause was considered far too drastic and the subcommittee early decided against any change therein.” 9
The Government argues that the characterization of the rejected revised commodities clause as “too drastic” was based on the proposed extension of its terms to all common carriers and not on the proposal to include a “subsidiary, affiliate, or controlling person” of a carrier. We believe, however, that a fair reading of the legislative history leads to the conclusion that the “drastic readjustment” feared by the Committee was that expected from the application sought here by the Government, at least as much as that feared from extension of the clause to cover carriers other than railroads. If the Committee objected only to extending the clause to other carriers, it would have been a simple matter to delete the short series of words which would have accomplished that change, and still leave undisturbed the more complicated provision concerning subsidiaries and affiliates, since the text of each provision is wholly disconnected from the other.
[778]*778In view of the foregoing, it seems clear that when, in discussing whether or not this revised clause would have “prevented the steel company, or somebody in that position, from operating their own railroad,” the Committee Chairman said “I did not intend such a result,” he expressed the view which prevailed in the Committee and in the Congress.
The Government now asks us to apply the unchanged language as if Congress had adopted the proposal which it rejected as “far too drastic.” The considerations which led to the suggestion that the problem presented by the Government’s position would require separate legislation and particular consideration seems to us to require that the problem be left to legislation rather than to the judicial process. And the pertinent portions of the legislative history which are set out at length in the margin10 indi[779]*779cate clearly, we think, that this Senate Committee responsible for S. 2009, which became the Transportation Act of 1940, deliberately refused to recommend and the Con[780]*780gress refused to legislate into the law the change we are now asked to make by judicial decision.
We could, of course, refuse to follow the Elgin precedent, and apply a different and more drastic rule to Bethlehem than applies to its competitor. Congress, [781]*781however, in making a rule for the future, can make one of impartial application to all like situations. Limitations that are traditional upon our powers do seem not to permit us to do so.
[782]*782Whatever may be said of the Elgin decision, when the Committee of Congress faced the readjustments its overruling would force, and with special reference to the steel [783]*783industry,11 it concluded the decision should be allowed, at least for the present, to stand. We cannot ignore the considerations they found to be so persuasive, and which are equally involved in the request that we do what Congress considered and abandoned.
The relief asked of us as a court of equity is so drastic in nature as to afford an example of an “upset” in an industry owning a short line of railroad of the type referred to by the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee of the Senate, who said “it is questionable whether we would want to make such a radical departure from the present system.” The demand is for an injunction perpetually to enjoin and restrain South Buffalo from transporting commodities in which the Steel Company or the holding company owns an interest. There is no other rail route by which inbound raw materials or outbound products of this huge industry can reach trunk-line railroads. And the traffic that we are asked thus to prohibit yields 70% of the railroad’s revenues, and if taken away would doubtless substantially increase the cost of service to the unaffiliated industries that would remain to be served. Of course, what is literally asked is probably not what is ultimately desired. To forbid the physical operation as now conducted would be needlessly damaging to both shipper and carrier. What is aimed at, we suppose, is to force such a change of financial structure as will divorce shipper interest from all transportation interest. It seems clear, however, in the light of the legislative his[784]*784tory, that this is the kind of operation that Congress did not want to prohibit because the prohibition was thought too drastic. If an independent ownership could be found for South Buffalo, it might be desirable. But independent ownership of a dependent facility wedged in between shippers, one of whom controls 70% of its revenues, and the trunk-line railroads, is not shown to be likely. Under the Government’s theory, no other shipper or group of shippers any more than Bethlehem could own the road. Nor is it clear that any evils exist or are threatened which would be eliminated if this operation were transferred to control of one of the trunk-line railroads or to a pool of them. This road, despite its shipper ownership, is bound by both federal and state law to serve all shippers without discriminations or unreasonable charges. The Commission has power to exact compliance with these duties. The argument, however, is that a situation exists which presents opportunity and temptation for abuse and for concealed evasions of duty. But to forestall possible abuses we are asked to apply a remedy which there is indication failed of congressional approval because its application to many situations would be too drastic and would do greater injury to shipper and transportation interests than could result from its withholding. In the light of the history of this clause since the Elgin decision and the equitable considerations involved in this case, we decline to overrule the interpretation Congress has not seen fit to set aside.
The argument is made that even accepting the Elgin decision the evidence here establishes that Bethlehem has so exercised its power over South Buffalo as to reduce the railroad to a mere department of Bethlehem. The trial court found against the Government and considered that on this subject this case contains much less proof to sustain an injunction than did the Elgin case. Without reciting the voluminous evidence in detail, we agree. [785]*785Bethlehem, as a stockholder, of course controlled South Buffalo. It did not, however, disregard in either the legal or economic sense, the separate entity of its subsidiary or treat it as its own alter ego. On the contrary, it rather ostentatiously maintained the formalities of separate existence, choosing as directors several Buffalo citizens who were not interested in Bethlehem. We are not naive enough to believe that Bethlehem chose men for the posts whose interests or records left any fair probability that they would act adversely to Bethlehem in representing its interest as chief stockholder of the railroad. Nor has any instance been cited in which the best interests of the railroad would require them to do so. So long as Congress considers it inadvisable to extend the prohibition of the commodities clause to subsidiaries and affiliates, we see nothing that Bethlehem has done to incur liability for its violation. Of course, it could not expect the Commission or the courts to respect a corporate entity which Bethlehem itself disregarded; but that it has not done. The subsidiary would not have to establish its separate identity by a course of hostility to its sole stockholder or its chief customer. Its identity has been preserved in form and in substance — the substance of separate corporate existence being itself largely a matter of form. Under the Elgin case and until Congress shall otherwise decide, this is sufficient.
Judgment affirmed.