United States v. Santoro

302 F.3d 76, 2002 WL 1899654
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit·Decided August 8, 2002·No. Docket No. 01-1616·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Chief Judge.

Defendant-appellant Richard P. Santoro appeals from the November 28, 2001 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Loretta A. Preska, District Judge) convicting him, pursuant to a jury verdict, of one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire fraud, and commercial bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and two counts of securities fraud by use of manipulative and deceptive devices, in violation of 15. U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, and 18 U.S.C. § 2. He was sentenced principally to a term of five months of imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release including five months of home confinement. Santoro is presently serving his sentence.

On appeal, Santoro argues that (1) the district court erred at sentencing by applying a two-level abuse of trust enhancement and refusing to apply a minor role reduction; (2) the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his co-conspirators’ ties to organized crime; (3) the evidence was insufficient to present the case to the jury; (4) the district court erred by denying Santoro’s request for a severance from co-defendant Edward Cés-pedes; and (5) the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which mandate a term of imprisonment for his criminal activity, violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Defendant’s conviction stems from a conspiracy to artificially inflate the price of the common stock of a publicly held company, HealthTech International, Inc. (“HealthTech”), by giving brokers extraordinary commissions to recommend the stock to their clients. Three stock promoters, Eugene Lombardo, Irwin Schneider and Claudio Iodice (collectively, “stock promoters”), conspired with Gordon Hall, the CEO of HealthTech, to pay brokers employed at the New Hyde Park office of Meyers Pollock Robbins, Inc. (“Meyers Pollock”), a registered broker-dealer firm, to recommend HealthTech stock. Under the agreement, the brokers were assigned a 30% “gross” commission on the sales of HealthTech stock from which the broker received a “net” commission in cash equal to half of that amount. Three brokers at [79]*79Meyers Pollock, Arnold Schneider, Lawrence Schneider, and Michael Motsyku-lashvili (collectively, “supervisory brokers”), supervised the other brokers and were responsible for distributing the cash to the brokers.

The brokers at Meyers Pollock who carried out the scheme can be divided into two groups. The first group had recently transferred to Meyers Pollock from another securities firm, Toluca Pacific, and were the first to become involved in the scheme (“Toluca Group”). The second group, to which Santoro belonged, acted under the direction of Jonathan Lyons and joined the scheme one week after it began (“Lyons Group”).

Between January and February 1997, Santoro recommended and sold 20,500 shares of HealthTech stock to five customers for a total of approximately $45,000. Motsykulashvili, one of the supervisory brokers, testified that he discussed the 15% commission with Santoro shortly before Santoro started selling HealthTech stock and that Santoro received cash amounting to 15% of his sales of the stock in exchange for his recommendation. The government also submitted into evidence a spreadsheet that, according to Motsyku-lashvili, was prepared by the supervisory brokers to keep track of the sales of HealthTech stock and the commissions owed to each broker participating in the scheme. Santoro does not dispute that the spreadsheet identified the brokers that sold HealthTech stock in furtherance of the conspiracy.

The spreadsheet indicated that “Rick” made four sales to named customers in January 1997 and, under the heading “Gross,” listed dollar amounts for each transaction that equaled approximately 30% of Santoro’s sales of HealthTech stock during January to those customers. These figures were added and were represented on the spreadsheet as Rick’s “total.” These transactions and the customers identified on the spreadsheet matched the records of Santoro’s trading activity in HealthTech stock kept by Bear Sterns Clearing Corporation, an independent clearing agent for Meyers Pollock. At the bottom of the spreadsheet, the “totals” for all of the brokers were aggregated and then halved. Motsykulashvili testified that he used the spreadsheet to determine the amount of each broker’s commissions. Santoro never disclosed the 15% cash commissions to his clients. Between late 1996 and February 1997, the trading volume and price of HealthTech stock rose dramatically before the fraud was discovered a few months later.

DISCUSSION

I. Abuse of Trust Enhancement

Section 3B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level enhancement if the defendant “abused a position of public or private trust ... ‘in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. In the case of a fraud conviction, an abuse of trust enhancement may not be imposed on a defendant solely because in committing the fraud, he violated a legal obligation to be truthful. See United States v. Hirsch, 239 F.3d 221, 227 (2d Cir.2001); United States v. Broderson, 67 F.3d 452, 455-56 (2d Cir.1995). Rather, to warrant the enhancement, the defendant must abuse a relationship of trust and confidence with the victim that enabled the defendant to commit the crime or escape detection. See Hirsch, 239 F.3d at 227; United States v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir.1996); Broderson, 67 F.3d at 456. A defendant’s position in this relationship is characterized by “substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference” by the victim. U.S.S.G. [80]*80§ 3B1.3 cmt. 1; see Hirsch, 239 F.3d at 227; United States v. Laljie, 184 F.3d 180, 194 (2d Cir.1999) (“[T]he primary trait that distinguishes a position of trust from other positions is the extent to which the position provides the freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong.”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

At sentencing, Santoro argued that he did not occupy a position of trust, relying on evidence that at least two of his clients independently researched HealthTech stock before purchasing it. In addition, Santoro submitted a letter written by one of those clients, Duncan Hoffman, that stated, “I do not believe that Mr. Santoro did anything that I would consider an abuse of trust.”

The district court rejected defendant’s arguments and imposed a two-level enhancement on his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 based on its finding that the “extraordinary commissions” were Santero’s sole reason for recommending HealthTech stock and that he failed to disclose the commission, despite his duty to his clients.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

United States v. Santoro, 302 F.3d 76, 2002 WL 1899654 (2d Cir. 2002).

302 F.3d 76 (United States v. Santoro) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related