Mr. Justice Eield
delivered the.opinion of the court.
Several questions of interest arise upon the construction of section 5346 of the Bevised Statutes, upon which the indict[253]*253ment in this case was found. The principal one is whether the term “ high seas,” as there used, is applicable to the open, unenclosed waters of the Great Lakes, between which the Detroit River is a connecting stream. The term was formerly used, particularly by writers on public law, and generally in official communications between different governments, to designate the open, unenclosed waters of the ocean, or of the British seas, outside of their ports and havens. At one time it was claimed that the ocean, or portions of it, were subject to the exclusive use of particular nations. The Spaniards, in the 16th century, asserted the right to exclude all others from the Pacific Ocean. The Portuguese claimed, with the Spaniards, under the grant of Pope Alexander YL, the exclusive use of the Atlantic'Ocean west and south of a designated line. And the English, in the lYth century, claimed the exclusive right to navigate the seas surrounding Gréat Britain. "Woolsey on International Law7, § 55.
In the discussions which took place in support of and against these extravagant pretensions the term “high seas” was applied, in the sense stated.. It was also used in that sense by English courts and law writers. There was no dis7 cussion with them as to the waters of other seas: The public discussions were generally limited to the consideration of the question whether the high seas, that is, the- open, unenclosed seas, as above defined, or any portion thereof, could be the property or under the exclusive jurisdiction of any nation, ..or whether they were open and free to the navigation of all nations. The inquiry in the English courts was generally limited to the question whether the jurisdiction of the admiralty extended to the waters of bays and harbors, such extension depending upon the fact whether they constituted a part of the high seas.
In his treatise on the rights of the sea, Sir Matthew Hale says: “ The sea is either that which lies within the body of a county, or without. That arm or branch of the sea which lies within ths fauces term, where a man may reasonably discern between shore and shore, is, or at 'least may be, within the body of a county, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the [254]*254sheriff or coroner. That part of the sea which, lies not within the body of a county is called the main sea or ocean.” De Jure Maris, c. iv. By the “main sea.” Hale here means the same thing expressed by the term “high sea” — “mare altum,” or “ le /unit meer.”
In Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 440, 453, this court said that it had been frequently adjudicated in the. English common law courts'since the restraining statutes of Richard II. and Henry IY., “that high seas mean that portion of the sea which washes the open coast.” In United States v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290, it was held by Mr. Justice Story, in the Unitéd States Circuit Court, that the term “ high seas,” in its usual sense, expresses the unenclosed ocean or that portion of the sea which is without the fauces terra on the sea coast, in contradistinction to that which is surrounded or enclosed between narrow headlands or promontories. It was the open, unenclosed waters of the ocean, or the open, unenclosed waters of the sea, which constituted the “'high seas” in his judgment. There was no distinction made by him between the ocean and the sea, and there was no occasion for any such distinction. .The question in issue was whether the alleged offences were committed within a county of Massachusetts on the sea coast, or without it, for in the latter case they were committed upon the high seas and within the statute. It-was held that they were committed in the county of Suffolk, and thus were hot covered by the statute.
If there were no seas other than the ocean, the term “ high seas ” would be limited to the open, unenclosed waters of the ocean. But as there are other seas besides the ocean, there must- be high seas other than those of the ocean. A large commerce is conducted on seas other than the ocean and,the English seas, and it is equally necessary to distinguish between their open waters and their ports and havens, and to provide for offences on vessels navigating those waters and for collisions between them. The term “ high seas ” does not, in either case, indicate any separate and distinct body of water; but' only the open waters of the sea or ocean, as distinguís]) ed from ports, and havens and waters within narrow headlands [255]*255on the coast. This distinction was observed by Latin writers between the ports and havens of the Mediterranean and its open waters — the latter being termed the high seas.1 In that sense the term may also be properly used in reference to the open waters of the Baltic and the Black Sea, both of which are inland seas, finding their -way to the ocean by a narrow and distant channel. Indeed, wherever there are seas in fact, free to the navigation of all nations and people on their borders, their open waters outside of the portion “ surrounded or enclosed between narrow headlands or promontories,” on the coast, as stated by Mr. Justice Story, or “ without the body of a county,” as declared by Sir Matthew Hale, are properly characterized as high seas, by whatever name the bodies of water- of which they are a part may be designated. Their names do not determine their character. There are, as said above, high seas on the Mediterranean, (meaning outside of the enclosed -waters along its coast,) upon which the principal commerce of the ancient -world was conducted and its great naval battles- fought. To hold that on such seas there are no high seas, within the true meaning of that term, that is, no open, unencloséd waters, free to the navigation of all nations and people on their borders, would be to place upon that term a narrow and contracted meaning. We prefer to use it in its true sense, as'applicable to the open, unenclosed waters of all seas; than to adhere to the common meaning of the term two centuries ago, -when it was generally limited to the open waters of the ocean and of seas surrounding Great Britain, the freedom of which -was then the principal subject- of discussion. If it be conceded, as we think it must be, that the open, unenclosed waters of the Mediterranean are high seas, that concession is a sufficient answer to the claim that the high seas always denote the open waters óf the ocean.
Whether the term is applied to the open waters of the ■ [256]*256ocean or of a particular sea, in any case, will depend, upon the context or circumstances attending its use, which in all cases affect, more or less, the meaning of language. It may be conceded that if a statement is made that a vessel is on the high seas, without any qualification by language or circumstance, if will be generally understood as meaning that the vessel is upon the open waters of one of the oceans of the world. It is true, also, that the ocean is often spoken of by writers on public law as the sea, and characteristics are then ascribed to the sea generally which are properly applicable to the ocean alone; as, for instance, that its open waters are. the highway of all- nations. Still the fact remains that there are other seas than the ocean whose open waters constitute a free highway for navigation to the nations and people residing on their borders, and are not a free highway to other nations and people, except there be free access to those seas by open waters or by conventional arrangements.
As thus defined, the term would seem to be as applicable to the open waters of the great Northern lakes as it is to the open waters of those bodies usually designated as seas. The Great Lakes possess every essential characteristic of seas. They are of large extent in length and breadth; they are navigable the whole distance in either direction by the largest vessels known to commerce; objects are not distinguishable from the opposite shores; they separate, in many instances, States, and in some instances constitute the boundary between independent nations; and their waters, after passing long distances, debouch into the ocean. The fact that their waters are fresh and not subject to the tides, does not affect their essential character as seas. Many seas are tideless, and the ■waters of some are saline only in a very slight degree.
The waters of Lake Superior, the most northern of these lakes, after traversing nearly 400 miles, with an average breadth of over 100 miles, and those of Lake Michigan, which extend over 350 miles, with an average breadth of 05 miles, join Lake Huron, and, after flowing about 250 miles, with an average breadth of 10 miles, pass into the river St. Clair; thence through the small hike of St. Clair into the Detroit [257]*257Elver; thence into Lake Erie and, by the Niagara Eiver, into Lake Ontario; whence they pass, by the river St. Lawrence, to the ocean, making a total distance of over 2000 miles. Ency. Britannica, vol. 21, p. 178. The area of the Great Lakes, in round numbers, is 100,000 square miles. Ibid. vol. 14, p. 217. They are of larger dimensions than many inland seas which are at an equal or greater distance from the ocean. The waters of the Black Sea travel a like distance before they ■come into conta’ct with the ocean. Their first outlet is through the Bosphorus, which is about 20 miles long and for the greater part of its Way less than a mile in width, into the sea of Marmora, and through that to the Dardanelles, which is about 40 miles in length and less than four miles in width, and then they find their way through' the islands of the Greek Archipelago, up the Mediterranean Sea, past the Straits of Gibraltar to the ocean, a distance, also, of over 2000 miles..
In the Genesee Chief ease, 12 How. 443, this court, in considering whether the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States extended to the Great Lakes, and speaking, through. Chief Justice Taney, of the general character .of those lakes, said: “ Thpse lakes, are, in truth, inland seas. Different States border on them pn one side, and a foreign nation on the other. A great and growing commerce is carried on upon them between different States and a foreign nation, which is subject to all the incidents and hazards that attend commerce on the ocean. Hostile fleets have encountered on them, and prizes been made; and every reason which existed for the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the general government on the Atlantic seas applies with equal force to the lakes. There is an equal necessity for the instance and for the prize power of the admiralty court to administer international law, and if the one cannot be established, neither can the other'.” (p. 453.)
After using this language, the Chief Justice commented upon the inequality which would exist, in the administration of justice, between the citizens of the States on the lakes, if, oh account of the absence of tide water in those lakes, they were not entitled to the remedies afforded by the grant of [258]*258admiralty jurisdiction, of the Constitution, and the citizens of the States bordering on the ocean or upon navigable waters affected by the tides. • The court, perceiving that the reason for the exercise of the jurisdiction did not in fact depend upon the tidal character of the waters, but upon their practical navigability for the purposes of commerce, disregarded the test of tide water prevailing in England as inapplicable to our country with its vast extent of inland waters. Acting upon like considerations in the application of the term “ high seas” to the waters of the Great Lakes, which are equally navigable, for the purposes of commerce, in all respects, with the bodies of water usually designated as seas, and are in no respect affected by the tidal or saline character of their waters, we disregard the distinctions made between salt and fresh water seas, which are not essential, and hold that the reason of the statute, in providing for protection against violent assaults on vessels in tidal waters, is no greater but identical with the reason for providing -against similar assaults on vessels in navigable waters that are neither tidal nor saline. The statute was intended to extend protection to persons on vessels belonging to citizens of the United States, not only upon the high seas, but in all navigable waters of every kind out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, whether moved by the tides or free from their influence.
The character of these lakes as seas was recognized by this court in the recent Chicago Lake Front case, where we said: “These lakes possess all the general characteristics of open seas, except in the freshness of their waters, and in the absence of the ebb and flow of the tide.” “ In other respects,” we 'added, “ they are inland seas, and there is no reason .or principle for the assertion of dominion and sovereignty over and ownership by the State of lands covered by tide waters that is not equally applicable to its ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by the fresh waters of these lakes.” Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 435.
It is to be observed also that the term “ high ” in one of its significations, is used to denote that which is common, open, [259]*259and public. Thus every road or way or navigable river which ' is used freely by the public is a “ high ”■ way. So a large body of navigable water other than a river, .which is of an extent bejmnd the measurement of one’s' unaided vision, and is open and unconfined, and not under the exclusive control of any one nation or people, but is the free highway of adjoining-nations or people, must fall under the definition of “ high seas” within the meaning of the statute. "We may as appropriately designate the open, unenclosed waters of the lakes as the- high seas of the lakes, as to désignate similar waters of the' ocean as the high seas of "the ocean, or similar waters of the Mediterranean as the high seas of the Mediterranean.
The language of section 5346, immediately following the term" “ high seas,” declaring the penalty for violent assaults when committed on board of'a vessel in any arm of the sea or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, equally as when committed on board of a vessel on the high seas, lends force to the construction given to that term. The language used must be read in conjunction with that term, and as referring- to navigable waters out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, but connecting with the high seas mentioned. The Detroit Diver, upon which was the steamer Alaska at the time the assault was committed, connects the waters of Lake Huron (with which, as stated above, the waters of Lake Superior and Lake. Michigan join) with the waters of Lake Erie, and separates the Dominion of Canada from the United States, constituting the boundary between them, the dividing line running nearly midway between its banks, as established by commissioners, pursuant to the treaty between- the two countries. 8 Stat. 214, 276. The river is about 22 miles in length' and from one to three miles in width, and is navigable at all seasons of the year by vessels of the largest size. The number of vessels passing through it each year is immense. Between 'the years 1880 and 1892, inclusive, they averaged from thirty-one to forty thousand a year, having a tonnage varying from sixteen to twenty-four [260]*260millions.1 In traversing the river they are constantly passing from the territorial jurisdiction of the one nation to that of the other. All of them, however, so far as transactions had on board are concerned, are deemed to be within the country of their owners. Constructively they constitute a part of the territory of the nation to which'the owners belong. Whilst' they are on the navigable waters of the river they are within the admiralty jurisdiction of that country. This jurisdiction is not changed by the fact that each of-.the neighboring nations' may in some cases assert its own authority over persons on such vessels in relation to acts committed by them within its territorial limits. In what cases jurisdiction by each country will be thus asserted and to what extent, it is not necessary to inquire, for no question on that point is presented for our con- ' sideration. The general rule is that the country to which the vessel belongs will exercise jurisdiction over all matters affecting the vessel or those belonging to her, without interference of the local government, unless they involve its peace, dignity, or tranquillity, in which case it may assert its authority. Wildenhus’s case, 120 U. S. 1, 12; TIalleck on International Law, c. vii, § 26, p. 112. The admiralty jurisdiction of the country of the owners of the steamer upon which the offence charged was committed is not denied. They being citizens of [261]*261the United States, and the steamer being upon navigable waters, it is deemed to be within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. It was, therefore, perfectly competent for Congress to enact that parties on board committing an assault with a dangerous weapon should be punished when brought within the jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States. But it will hardly be claimed that Congress by the legislation in question intended that violent assaults committed upon persons on vessels owned by citizens of the United States in the Detroit Biver, without the jurisdiction of any particular State, should be punished, and that similar offences upon persons on vessels of like owners upon the adjoining lakes should be unprovided for. If the law can be deemed applicable to offences committed on vessels in any navigable river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, connecting with the lakes, out' of the jurisdiction of any particular State, it would not be reasonable to suppose that Congress intended that no remedy should be afforded for similar offences committed on vessels upon the lakes, to which the vessels on the river, in almost all instances, are directed, and upon whose waters they are to be chiefly engaged. The more reasonable inference is that Congress intended to include the open, unenclosed waters of the lakes under the designation of high spas. The term, in the eye of reason, is applicable to the open, unenclosed portion of all large bodies of navigable waters, whose extent cannot be measured by one’s vision, and the navigation of which is free to all nations and people on their borders, by whatever names those bodies may be locally designated. In some countries small lakes are called seas, as in the case of the Sea of Galilee, in Palestine. In other countries large bodies of water, greater than many bodies denominated seas, are called lakes, gulfs, or basins. The nomenclature, however, does not change the real character of either, nor should it affect our construction of terms properly applicable to the waters, of either. By giving to the term “ high seas ” the construction indicated, there is consistency and sense in the whole . statute, but there is neither if it be disregarded. If the term applies to the open, unenclosed waters of the lakes, the appli[262]*262cation of the legislation to the case under indictment cannot be questioned, for the Detroit River is a water connecting such high seas, and all that portion which is north of the boundary line between the United States and Canada is without the jurisdiction of any State of the Union. But if they be - considered as not thus applying, it is difficult to give any force to the rest of the statute- without supposing that Congress intended to provide against violence- on board of vessels in navigable riverá, havens, creeks, basins, and bays, without the jurisdiction of any particular State, and intentionally omitted the much more important provision for like violence and disturbances on vessels upon the Great Lakes. All vessels in any navigable river, haven, creek, basin, or bay of the lakes, whether ' within or without the jurisdiction of any particular State, would some time find their way upon the waters of the lakes; and it is not a reasonable inference that Congress intended that the law’should apply to offences only on a limited portion of the route over which the vessels were expected to pass, and that no provision should be made for such offences over a much greater distance on the lakes.
Congress in thus designating the open, unenclosed portion of largo bodies of water, extending beyond one’s vision, naturally used the same term to indicate it as was used with reference to similar portions of the ocean or of bodies which had been designated as seas. "When Congress, in 1790, first used that term the existence of the Great Lakes was known ; they had been visited by great numbers of persons in trading with the neighboring Indians, and their immense extent aud character were generally understood. Much more accurate was this knowledge when the act of March 3, 1825, was passed, 4 Stat. 115, c. 65, and when the provisions of section 5346 were reenacted in the Revised Statutes in 1874. In all these cases, when Congress provided for the punishment of violence on board of vessels, it must have intended that the provision should extend to vessels on those waters the same as to vessels on seas, technically so called. There were no bodies of water in the United States to any portion of which the term “high seas” was applicable if not to the open, [263]*263unenclosed waters of tlie Great Lakes. It does not seem reasonable to suppose that Congress intended to confine its legislation to the high seas of the ocean, and to its navigable rivers, havens, creeks, baúns, and bays, without the jurisdiction of any State, and to make no provision for offences on those vast bodies of inland waters of the United States. There are vessels of every description on those inland seas now carrying on a commerce greater than the commerce on any other inland seas of the world. And we cannot believe that the Congress of the United States purposely left for a century those who navigated and those who were conveyed in vessels upon those seas without any protection.
The statute under consideration provides that every person who, upon the high seas or in any river connecting with them, as we construe its language, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction -of any particular -State, commits, on board of any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States, or any citizen thereof, an assault on another with a dangerous weapon or ivith intent to perpetrate a felony, shall. be punished, etc. The Detroit Eivei’, from shore to shore, is within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and connects with the open waters.of the lakes — high seas, as we hold them to be, within the meaning of the statute. From the boundary line, near its centi’e, to the Canadian shore it is out of the jurisdiction of the State of Michigan. The case presented is therefore, directly within its provisions. The act of Congress of September 4, 1890, 26 Stat. 424, c. 874r(l Sup. to the Eev. Stat. chap. 874, p. 799,) providing' for the punishment of crimes subsequently committed on the Great Lakes, does not, of course, affect the construction of the law previously existing.
Wo are not unmindful of the fact that it was held by the Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Tyler, 7 Michigan, 161, that the criminal jurisdiction of the Federal courts did not extend to offences committed upon vessels on the lakes. The judges who rendered that decision were able and distinguished; but that fact, whilst it justly calls for a careful consideration of their reasoning, does not render their conclu[264]*264sion binding or authoritative upon this court. Their opinions show that they did not accept the doctrine extending the admiralty jurisdiction to cases on the lakes and navigable rivers, which is now generally, we might say almost universally, received as sound by the'judicial tribunals of the country. It is true, as there stated, that, as a general principle, the criminal laws of a nation do not operate beyond its territorial limits, and that to give any government, or its judicial tribunals, the right to punish any act or transaction as a crime, it must have' occurred within those limits. We accept this doctrine as a general rule, but there are exceptions to it as fully recognized as the doctrine itself. One of those exceptions is that offences committed upon vessels belonging to 'citizens of the United States, -within their admiralty jurisdiction, (that is, within navigable waters,) though out of the territorial limits of the ' United States, may be judicially considered when the vessel and parties are brought within their territorial jurisdiction, As wo have before stated, a vessel is deemed part of the territory of the country to which she belongs. Upon that subject we quote the language of Mr. Webster, while Secretary of State, in his letter to Lord Ashburton of August, 1812. Speaking for the government of the United States, he stated with groat clearness and force the doctripe which is now recognized bv all countries. He said: “ It is natural to consider the vessels of a nation as parts o.f its territory, though at sea, as the State retains its jurisdiction over them; and, according to the commonly received custom, this jurisdiction is preserved over the vessels even in part's of the sea subject to a foreign dominion. This is the doctrine of the law of nations, clearly- laid down by writers of received authority, and entirely conformable, as it is supposed, with the practice Of modern nations. If a murder be committed on board of an-American vessel by one of the crew upon another or upon a passenger, or by a passenger on one of the crew or another passenger, while such vessel is lying in a port within the jurisdiction of a foreign State or sovereignty, the offence is cognizable and punishable by the proper court of the United States in, the same manner as if such offence had [265]*265been committed on board the vessel on the high seas. The law of England is supposed to be the same. It is true that the jurisdiction of a nation over a vessel belonging to it, while lying in the port of another, is not necessarily wholly exclusive. "We do not so consider or so assort it. For any unlawful acts done by her while thus lying in port, and for all contracts entered into while there, by her master or owners, she and they must, doubtless, be answerable to the laws of the place. Nor, if her master or crew, while on board in such port, break the peace of the community by the commission of crimes, can exemption be claimed for them. But, nevertheless, the law of nations, as I have stated it, and the statutes of governments founded on that law, as I have referred to them, show that enlightened nations, in modern, times, do clearly hold that the jurisdiction and laws of a nation accompany her ships not only over the high seas, but into ports and harbors, or wheresoever else they may be water-borne, for the general .purpose of governing and regulating the rights,duties, and obligations of those on board 'thereof, and that, to the extent of the exercise of this jurisdiction, they are considered as parts of the territory of the nation herself.” 6 "Webster’s "Works, 806, 807.
We do not accept the doctrine that, because by the treaty, between the United States arid Great Britain the boundary line between the two countries is run through the centre of the hikes, their character as seas is charged-, or that the jurisdiction of the United States to regulate vessels belonging to their citizens navigating those waters and to ptrnish offences ' committed upon such vessels, is in any respect impaired. "Whatever effect may be given to the boundary line between, the two countries, the' jurisdiction of the United States over the vessels of their citizens navigating those waters and the persons on board remains unaffected. The limitation to the jurisdiction by the qualification that the offences punishable are committed on vessels in- any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay “ without the jurisdiction of any particular State,” which means without the jurisdiction of tany State of the Union, does not apply to vessels on the “ high [266]*266seas ” of the lakes, but only to vessels on the waters designated as connecting with them. So far as vessels on those seas are concerned, there is no limitation named to the authority of the United States. It is true that lakes, properly so called, that is, bodies of water whose dimensions are capable of measurement by the unaided vision, within the limits of a State, are part of its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, but bodies of. water of an extent which cannot be measured by the unaided vision, and which are navigable' at all times, in all directions, and border on different nations or Stakes or people, and find their outlet in the ocean as in the present case, are seas in fact, however they may be designated.’ And seas in’ fact do not cease to be such, and become lakes, because by local custom they may be so called.
In our judgment the District Court of the Eastern District of Michigan had jurisdiction to try the defendant upon the indictment found, and it having been transferred to the Circuit Court, that court had jurisdiction to proceed with the trial, and the demurrer to its jurisdiction should have been overruled. ' Our opinion, in answer to the certificate, is that
The cou/ris of the United States ham jurisdiction, under section 5346 of the Revised Statutes, to try a person for an assault, with a dangerous %oeapon, committed on a vessel belonging to a citizen of the United Stales, when such vessel is in the Detroit River, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and within the territorial limits of the Dominion of Canada; audit will be returned to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Sixth Circuit and Eastern District of Michigan, and it is so ordered.