[242]*242PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Robert Wayne Tinker, was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (“count 1”) and unlawful possession of a .38 caliber revolver and a .22 caliber rifle under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (“count 2”). The issues are whether: (1) count 2 of the indictment stated a valid charge against defendant; (2) the disparate treatment of powder and crack cocaine for sentencing purposes violates due process; and (3) the district court erroneously admitted evidence of other crimes. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
ANALYSIS
1.Count 2 of the indictment stated a valid charge against defendant.
Pursuant to count 2 of the indictment, defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a revolver and rifle under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He contends that Michigan law restored his civil rights before the date of possession charged in the indictment. Therefore, citing 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), he argues that he was legally entitled to possess firearms on that date.
What constitutes a conviction ... shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction ... for which a person has ... had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction ..., unless such ... restoration ... expressly provides that the person may not ... possess, or receive firearms.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). This exclusion must be analyzed in light of the “whole of state law.” United States v. Cassidy, 899 F.2d 543, 549 (6th Cir.1990). Accordingly, we must look to whether Michigan law entitled defendant to vote, seek and hold public office, serve on a jury, and ship, transport, possess, or receive a firearm. Id.
However, “[ujnder federal law, a person is either treated as a convicted felon, and thus prohibited from carrying any firearms, or is treated as though he [or she] had a clean record, and thus allowed to carry all legal firearms.” United States v. Driscoll, 970 F.2d 1472, 1480-81 (6th Cir.1992). “Michigan has [not] demonstrated sufficient trust in its convicted felons to exempt them from the prohibitions listed in § 922(g)(1).” Id. Due to “the state’s refusal to vouch for” defendant’s trustworthiness, he cannot claim “the protection of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).” Id. at 1481-82. Therefore, Count 2 of the indictment stated a valid charge against defendant.
2. Disparate treatment of powder and crack cocaine for sentencing purposes is constitutional.
Defendant argues that treating cocaine base as equal to 100 times the same cocaine amount for sentencing purposes violates due process and equal protection. These constitutional challenges are merit-less. United States v. Williams, 962 F.2d 1218, 1227-28 (6th Cir.1992); United States v. Pickett, 941 F.2d 411, 418 (6th Cir.1991). “Congress’s act was sufficiently rational to meet the demands of substantive due process.” Id. Moreover, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) and the United States Sentencing Guidelines,1 which treat one gram of crack as the equivalent of 100 grams of cocaine, do not violate equal protection. Williams, 962 F.2d at 1227-28 (joining “every circuit which has addressed this issue”).
3. The district court properly admitted the evidence of other crimes.
Prior to trial, counsel agreed to refer to a drive-by shooting as a “traffic incident.” At trial, Officer Nagy testified that when he interviewed defendant regarding a car [243]*243chase, defendant asked him if he could remove a .22 caliber rifle from a car trunk. Pursuing a theory of recent fabrication, defense counsel asked Officer Gemmato about the fact that Officer Nagy’s police report did not mention the .22 rifle. Then, the prosecutor asked Agent Gemmato: “[I]f Robert Tinker had told that police officer that he thought he had a .22 caliber rifle in his trunk, would that have related to the alleged incident?” He answered: “No, it would not have. The alleged incident stated that the driver of the gold Nissan, alleged to be Mr. Tinker, was firing a handgun out the window.”
Defense counsel objected to the response and moved for a mistrial, stating that the testimony violated counsels’ agreement and was “extrinsic to the charges.” The district court overruled the objection and denied the mistrial motion, stating:
[T]hat statement ... could have been entered into evidence, not for the truth of it but ... that policeman went to that home when he saw that Nissan parked in front of it. That gave him ample probable cause to do everything that he did_ [H]ow you elicited that stipulation, I don’t know_ But ..., I don’t think there’s any harm — totally harmless.
Thus, it released the Government from its pretrial agreement.
Generally, parties are entitled to rely on pretrial agreements. United States v. Laboy, 909 F.2d 581, 586 (1st Cir.1990). However, in its “substantial discretion,” the district court may release the parties from a pretrial agreement. Id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 621 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir.1980). Normally, this decision depends upon: (1) “whether the defendant had reasonable notice of the breach of the agreement”; and (2) “the balance between the potential for prejudice and the reason for the release.” Id. Nonetheless, “[d]e-spite the lack of reasonable notice and the potential for prejudice there may be some cases where the reason for the requested release from an agreement ... will outweigh all other factors.” United States v. Scanland, 495 F.2d 1104, 1107 (5th Cir.1974). Subsequent events may make a release both necessary and justifiable. Id.
Here, defendant opened up the matter by asking Officer Gemmato whether Officer Nagy’s police report mentioned the .22 rifle. Cf. United States v. Reece, 614 F.2d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir.1980).
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[242]*242PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Robert Wayne Tinker, was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (“count 1”) and unlawful possession of a .38 caliber revolver and a .22 caliber rifle under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (“count 2”). The issues are whether: (1) count 2 of the indictment stated a valid charge against defendant; (2) the disparate treatment of powder and crack cocaine for sentencing purposes violates due process; and (3) the district court erroneously admitted evidence of other crimes. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
ANALYSIS
1.Count 2 of the indictment stated a valid charge against defendant.
Pursuant to count 2 of the indictment, defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a revolver and rifle under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He contends that Michigan law restored his civil rights before the date of possession charged in the indictment. Therefore, citing 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), he argues that he was legally entitled to possess firearms on that date.
What constitutes a conviction ... shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction ... for which a person has ... had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction ..., unless such ... restoration ... expressly provides that the person may not ... possess, or receive firearms.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). This exclusion must be analyzed in light of the “whole of state law.” United States v. Cassidy, 899 F.2d 543, 549 (6th Cir.1990). Accordingly, we must look to whether Michigan law entitled defendant to vote, seek and hold public office, serve on a jury, and ship, transport, possess, or receive a firearm. Id.
However, “[ujnder federal law, a person is either treated as a convicted felon, and thus prohibited from carrying any firearms, or is treated as though he [or she] had a clean record, and thus allowed to carry all legal firearms.” United States v. Driscoll, 970 F.2d 1472, 1480-81 (6th Cir.1992). “Michigan has [not] demonstrated sufficient trust in its convicted felons to exempt them from the prohibitions listed in § 922(g)(1).” Id. Due to “the state’s refusal to vouch for” defendant’s trustworthiness, he cannot claim “the protection of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).” Id. at 1481-82. Therefore, Count 2 of the indictment stated a valid charge against defendant.
2. Disparate treatment of powder and crack cocaine for sentencing purposes is constitutional.
Defendant argues that treating cocaine base as equal to 100 times the same cocaine amount for sentencing purposes violates due process and equal protection. These constitutional challenges are merit-less. United States v. Williams, 962 F.2d 1218, 1227-28 (6th Cir.1992); United States v. Pickett, 941 F.2d 411, 418 (6th Cir.1991). “Congress’s act was sufficiently rational to meet the demands of substantive due process.” Id. Moreover, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) and the United States Sentencing Guidelines,1 which treat one gram of crack as the equivalent of 100 grams of cocaine, do not violate equal protection. Williams, 962 F.2d at 1227-28 (joining “every circuit which has addressed this issue”).
3. The district court properly admitted the evidence of other crimes.
Prior to trial, counsel agreed to refer to a drive-by shooting as a “traffic incident.” At trial, Officer Nagy testified that when he interviewed defendant regarding a car [243]*243chase, defendant asked him if he could remove a .22 caliber rifle from a car trunk. Pursuing a theory of recent fabrication, defense counsel asked Officer Gemmato about the fact that Officer Nagy’s police report did not mention the .22 rifle. Then, the prosecutor asked Agent Gemmato: “[I]f Robert Tinker had told that police officer that he thought he had a .22 caliber rifle in his trunk, would that have related to the alleged incident?” He answered: “No, it would not have. The alleged incident stated that the driver of the gold Nissan, alleged to be Mr. Tinker, was firing a handgun out the window.”
Defense counsel objected to the response and moved for a mistrial, stating that the testimony violated counsels’ agreement and was “extrinsic to the charges.” The district court overruled the objection and denied the mistrial motion, stating:
[T]hat statement ... could have been entered into evidence, not for the truth of it but ... that policeman went to that home when he saw that Nissan parked in front of it. That gave him ample probable cause to do everything that he did_ [H]ow you elicited that stipulation, I don’t know_ But ..., I don’t think there’s any harm — totally harmless.
Thus, it released the Government from its pretrial agreement.
Generally, parties are entitled to rely on pretrial agreements. United States v. Laboy, 909 F.2d 581, 586 (1st Cir.1990). However, in its “substantial discretion,” the district court may release the parties from a pretrial agreement. Id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 621 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir.1980). Normally, this decision depends upon: (1) “whether the defendant had reasonable notice of the breach of the agreement”; and (2) “the balance between the potential for prejudice and the reason for the release.” Id. Nonetheless, “[d]e-spite the lack of reasonable notice and the potential for prejudice there may be some cases where the reason for the requested release from an agreement ... will outweigh all other factors.” United States v. Scanland, 495 F.2d 1104, 1107 (5th Cir.1974). Subsequent events may make a release both necessary and justifiable. Id.
Here, defendant opened up the matter by asking Officer Gemmato whether Officer Nagy’s police report mentioned the .22 rifle. Cf. United States v. Reece, 614 F.2d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir.1980). This court reviews evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1029 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 974, 112 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1991). As defendant’s recent fabrication theory made the drive-by shooting more relevant than originally anticipated, the district court did not abuse its discretion in releasing the Government from the agreement. Id.
Moreover, “given the myriad safeguards provided to assure a fair trial, and taking into account the reality of the human fallibility of the participants, there can be no such thing as an error-free, perfect trial, and ... the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial.” United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1980, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). Therefore, we must consider the whole trial record and ignore harmless errors. Id. at 509, 103 S.Ct. at 1980.
Regarding count 1, agents testified about defendant’s proximity to the drugs found in his home, and defendant’s housemate testified that he had observed defendant selling crack cocaine on numerous occasions and purchased crack cocaine from defendant. Regarding count 2, agents discovered five spent .38 caliber shells and a .38 caliber revolver, wrapped in a bandanna, in defendant’s automobile and a box of .38 caliber ammunition and a .22 caliber rifle in defendant’s bedroom. Moreover, defendant’s housemate testified that he had observed defendant carrying a .38 caliber revolver numerous times and seen him wrap it in a bandanna and hide it under the dashboard of his car. In light of this evidence of defendant’s guilt, any error in admitting the evidence of other crimes was harmless.
[244]*244CONCLUSION
For these reasons, this court AFFIRMS defendant’s conviction and sentence.