COLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BELL, D. J., joined. CLAY, J. (pp. 702-07), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
OPINION
COLE, Circuit Judge.
George and Connie Blair were convicted of various drug and money laundering charges and sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment. The Blairs now appeal their convictions; George also appeals his sentence. Specifically, George argues that the district court erred: by denying his motion to suppress evidence; by denying his motion to dismiss the original indictment based on the composition of the grand jury; by denying his motion to vacate his sentence based on “promises” made to testifying witnesses; and by failing to reduce his sentence based on the 100:1 sentencing disparity of crack cocaine versus powder cocaine. Connie joins George’s argument with respect to the district court’s denial of their motion to suppress evidence and, in addition, contends that the district court erred by denying her motion to dismiss the superseding indictment based on the composition of the grand jury that returned the original indictment. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the Blairs’ convictions and George’s sentence.
I.
Beginning in approximately 1992, George Blair and Connie Blair (aka Launa Miakowski) operated several prostitution houses in Detroit, Michigan. As a part of their operation, the Blairs sold drugs— typically crack cocaine or heroin — to the prostitutes who worked in the houses, most of whom had serious drug addictions. In addition to requiring the prostitutes to buy their drugs from them, the Blairs sold drugs to the prostitutes’ clients. The Blairs also sold drug paraphernalia such as syringes and pipes at their houses. During a routine “shift” at a house, the Blairs sold approximately $1000 worth of drugs.
In April 1997, IRS Special Agent Thomas Kraft, having information that the Blairs were engaged in narcotics trafficking, provided an affidavit in order to obtain a search warrant for the Blairs’ residence and one of the prostitution houses. A federal magistrate judge issued the warrant, which authorized law enforcement agents to seize records “relating to the transportation, importation, ordering, sale, and distribution of controlled substances.” Detroit police officers assisted in the execution of the warrant to search the Blairs’ residence. In that capacity, a Detroit police officer who was also a DEA Task Force Agent, Sergeant James Raby, aided in the search. Raby observed on top of a dresser an open pill vial that contained a plastic bag in which there was “a white substance [that appeared] to be narcotics.” Raby conducted a field test on the substance which revealed the presence of cocaine.
At this point, Raby left the Blairs’ residence to obtain a state search warrant authorizing agents to seize “[a]ll suspected controlled substances, all items used in the [sic] connection with the sales, manufacture, use, storage, distribution, transportation, delivery or concealment of controlled substances.” Raby then returned to the Blairs’ residence with the state warrant. Law enforcement agents ultimately seized 350 grams of crack cocaine, 50 grams of heroin, drug paraphernalia, four loaded [695]*695firearms and approximately $13,000 in cash.
In December 1997, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Michigan indicted the Blairs in a six-count indictment, setting forth five counts of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. Both George and Connie were represented by the same attorney, Milton Henry,1 who filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of the Blairs’ residence. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion.
The case was set for trial. The day before trial was scheduled to begin, Henry indicated that because of potential conflicts, he wished to withdraw from the representation of Connie.2 The court severed Connie, but proceeded to trial in George’s case. George waived his right to a jury trial; thus, the court conducted a bench trial. The court found George guilty of the five drug counts, but acquitted him of the CCE count.
Two weeks after George’s trial and prior to Connie’s trial, this court issued a decision invalidating a portion of the jury selection plan in the Eastern District of Michigan. See United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092 (6th Cir.1998). Citing Ovalle, the Blairs filed a motion to dismiss their indictment. On April 24, 1998, the district court denied the motion as to George, but granted it as to Connie after the government agreed that her indictment should be dismissed without prejudice because she had not yet been tried. Approximately two weeks later, another grand jury returned a superseding indictment against Connie, charging her with the same six counts set forth in the original indictment and adding a count of money laundering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. The Blairs then filed another motion to dismiss both indictments, which the district court denied.
In July 1998, the Blairs filed a motion for dismissal or other relief, arguing that the government induced prosecution witnesses to testify, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c). The district court denied the motion.
In August 1998, the district court sentenced George. George raised several objections at that time, including an objection to the calculation of his sentence on the basis of crack cocaine rather than powder cocaine. The district court sentenced George to 262 months’ imprisonment to be followed by five years of supervised release. George filed a timely notice of appeal of his conviction and sentence.
In October 1998, Connie entered into a conditional plea agreement with the government pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). Connie entered a plea of guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances and to the money laundering conspiracy count, in exchange for the dismissal of the other five charges. In addition, Connie reserved her right to appeal the denial of the joint motion to suppress evidence and her motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. The district court sentenced Connie to 168 months’ imprisonment to be followed by five years of supervised release. Connie filed a timely notice of appeal of her conviction.
This court consolidated the Blairs’ appeals and granted Connie’s motions to consolidate and adopt George’s joint appendix and his argument regarding the denial of the Blairs’ motion to suppress evidence.
[696]*696II.
A. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
The Blairs argue that the district court erred by denying their motion to suppress evidence because Agent Kraft’s affidavit was insufficient to support the federal search warrant, the federal search warrant did not comply with the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the federal search warrant was a “subterfuge” to search for drugs, and Sergeant Raby impermissibly field tested the suspected drugs. The Blairs further argue that the state search warrant was invalid because it was obtained on the basis of Raby’s unlawful actions.
We review a district court’s factual findings regarding a motion to suppress for clear error, and its legal conclusions de novo. See United States v. Leake, 998 F.2d 1359, 1366 (6th Cir.1993). In addition, a magistrate’s finding of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant is accorded “great deference.” See id. at 1362-63; United States v. Sonagere, 30 F.3d 51, 53 (6th Cir.1994). On appeal, we must determine whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for concluding that “a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” Sonagere, 30 F.3d at 53 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)).
1. The Federal Warrant
a. Sufficiency of the affidavit
The Blairs argue that the affidavit was insufficient .to support the warrant in this case, because the magistrate judge had no basis to conclude that records relating to the Blairs’ businesses would be found in their residence. We disagree.
The application for the federal search warrant was based on an eleven-page affidavit by Agent Kraft, who had extensive experience in drug-trafficking investigations. Kraft testified that the purpose of the search warrant was “to locate and seize evidence relating to an investigation into violations of Title 18, United States Code Section 1956, Laundering of Monetary Instruments, Title 18, United States Code Section 1957, Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity and Title 21, United States Code Section 841 and 846.” Kraft’s affidavit set forth his experience in investigating the financial aspects of drug trafficking and stated that in his experience it was common for drugs traffickers to store financial records in their homes. Kraft also provided information obtained about the Blairs from several cooperating witnesses, with statements attesting to their reliability. The cooperating witnesses stated that they had worked as prostitutes for the Blairs and purchased quantities of drugs from them. The affidavit also provided that electric company records for the suspected houses of prostitution listed the subscriber for electric services as Launa Miakowski. Finally, the affidavit reported that although the Blairs owned a new home, a motor home, a barber shop, and a party store, George had not filed income tax returns for the years 1990 through 1995, and Connie had filed returns under the name Launa Miakowski indicating a total income of $46,462 for the years 1990 through 1994.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that Kraft’s affidavit established probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. Accordingly, the magistrate judge had a substantial basis to conclude that wrongdoing would be uncovered by the search. The affidavit provided information regarding Kraft’s extensive experience in investigating the financial aspects of drug trafficking and his professional opinion that drug traffickers keep financial records at their homes. In addition, the affidavit provided information obtained from reliable cooperating witnesses and electric company records. This information was sufficient for the issuance of the search warrant in this case. See United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 975 (6th Cir.1998) (stating that “[i]n the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the dealers live”).
[697]*697b. Particularity
The Blairs also argue that the federal search warrant was overbroad in that it lacked particularity as to the items to be seized. Because the Blairs failed to make this argument to the district court, it is waived. See United States v. Critton, 43 F.3d 1089, 1094 (6th Cir.1995) (holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal). Even if the Blairs’ argument were properly before us, that argument would fail.
It is well settled that items to be seized pursuant to a search warrant must be described with particularity to prevent “the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976). However, we have recognized that the degree of specificity in a warrant must be flexible, depending upon the type of items to be seized and the crime involved. See United States v. Ables, 167 F.3d 1021, 1033 (6th Cir.) (citing United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir.1988) (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1027, 119 S.Ct. 2378, 144 L.Ed.2d 781 (1999). “Thus[,] a description is valid if it is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit.” Id. We also have agreed with the Second Circuit’s conclusion that “ ‘[o]nce a category of seizable papers had been adequately described, with the description delineated in part by an illustrative list of seizable items, the Fourth Amendment is not violated because the officers executing the warrant must exercise some minimal judgment as to whether a particular document falls within the described category.’ ” Id. at 1034 (quoting United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir.1990)).
Here, the warrant described the items to be seized as “[bjooks, records, receipts, notes, ledgers, airline tickets, money orders, passports, and other papers relating to the transportation, importation, ordering, sale, and distribution of controlled substances.” The warrant also authorized seizure of records of financial transactions and “electronic equipment to aid them in their drug trafficking activities.” Thus, the warrant specified that the records sought were those related to drug-trafficking activities and did not violate the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
c. Subterfuge
The Blairs also argue that the federal warrant authorizing seizure of records and documents was merely a subterfuge; that, in actuality, law enforcement agents were impermissibly searching for drugs. As further support for their contention, the Blairs assert that law enforcement agents seized jewelry, money and vehicles that were obviously not records or documents, and that the federal warrant was executed primarily by police officers who worked in narcotics. The Blairs’ argument lacks merit.
The federal warrant was issued on the basis of an affidavit provided by an IRS agent who specialized in the monetary transactions that occurred as a result of drug trafficking. Although drug-trafficking activities were suspected, the IRS agent was seeking financial records indicating money laundering or monetary proceeds from illegal activities. Thus, the federal “document” warrant was properly issued and executed by federal agents, with the assistance of Detroit police officers. The investigation did not turn into a drug investigation until law enforcement officers observed the presence of drugs in plain view while executing the federal warrant. The subsequent state warrant then authorized officers to seize items related to narcotics transactions or the proceeds of narcotics transactions, which would include vehicles, jewelry and money. Accordingly, there is no evidence that the document warrant was a pretext to enable law en[698]*698forcement agents to search for drugs, that the agents “manipulated” the system, or that the agents seized items not authorized by the warrants.
d. The plain view doctrine
The Blairs contend that Sergeant Raby violated their Fourth Amendment rights with respect to the drugs found during the search pursuant to the federal warrant, because the drugs were not in plain view and Raby had no authority to field test the substance. The Blairs essentially assert that Raby’s actions went beyond the scope of the federal warrant. The district court concluded otherwise, finding that the drugs were in fact in plain view and Raby therefore had authority to perform a field test. We agree with the district court.
It is well established that law enforcement agents may seize items in plain view, so long as the agent is lawfully present, the discovery is inadvertent, and the incriminating nature of the item is “immediately apparent.” United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1028 (6th Cir.1991); see generally Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). When officers executing a search warrant seize an item in plain view that is outside the scope of the warrant, the officers must have probable cause to believe that there is a nexus between the viewed item and criminal activity. See United States v. Calloway, 116 F.3d 1129, 1133 (6th Cir.1997); United States v. Beal, 810 F.2d 574, 576 (6th Cir.1987).
Here, the district court relied on Raby’s statement in his affidavit in support of the state search warrant to determine that the drugs were in plain view. Raby testified that while searching the master bedroom on the federal warrant, he:
observed in a[sie] open pill vial, a clear plastic bag containing a hard off white substance that the affiant believed to be cocaine. The affiant conducted a field test on the substance which tested positive for the presence of cocaine. Further, the affiant observed numerous bundles several inches each containing one hundred dollar, fifty and-twenty dollar bills. Further,' the affiant observed boxes of syringes lying on the bed in the master bedroom.
In light of this statement, we do not believe that the district court clearly erred in its factual finding that the drugs were in plain view, because Raby was lawfully present, the discovery of the drugs was inadvertent, and the incriminating nature of the drugs was immediately apparent. We further conclude that Raby had probable cause to believe there was a nexus between the suspected drugs and criminal activity.
In addition, we find no problem with the fact that Raby field tested the suspected cocaine. Because the drugs legitimately fell into the plain view exception, their warrantless seizure was permissible. See Blakeney, 942 F.2d at 1028. Thus, it would have been permissible for Raby to seize the suspected drugs for later testing. Accordingly, Raby did not violate the Blairs’ Fourth Amendment rights by field testing the suspected drugs.3
2. The State Warrant
The Blairs allege that the state warrant was invalid, because it was issued on the basis of Raby’s impermissible discovery of the cocaine. We can easily dispose of that argument, having found that the discovery of the cocaine was constitutionally sound. Moreover, there was no problem with Raby’s affidavit in support of the state warrant. Raby’s affidavit clearly stated his qualifications, and what he observed in plain view during the execution [699]*699of the federal warrant. Accordingly, the Blairs’ argument regarding the legitimacy of the state warrant fails.
B. OVALLE ISSUE
In Ovalle, this court held that the jury selection plan in the Eastern District of Michigan — which was essentially the same plan in place at the time of the original indictment in this case4 — violated the Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1862, and the Equal Protection Clause, because it allowed the removal of every fifth non-black juror from the jury wheel in order to increase the number of black jurors. See Ovalle, 136 F.3d at 1099-1100, 1105-07. The Blairs contend that the district court erred by denying their motions to dismiss their indict-. mente — in the case of Connie, the superseding indictment — based on the composition of the grand jury that returned the original indictment pursuant to Ovalle. We review a defendant’s challenge to the composition of a grand jury de novo. See Ovalle, 136 F.3d at 1100.
1. George’s Argument
In George’s case, the district court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of Ovalle, holding that George waived his right to challenge the composition of the grand jury by failing to make a pretrial motion under Fed. R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2),5 and by failing to establish cause or prejudice for this procedural default. See Blair, 9 F.Supp.2d at 780-81. We agree.
George contends that the district court should have found that cause existed to excuse his failure to raise the Ovalle issue prior to trial, because Ovalle was not decided until February 23, 1998, two weeks after his trial. Pursuant to Ovalle, it is clear that a defendant’s failure to object to the composition of the grand jury prior to trial constitutes waiver of that argument. See 136 F.3d at 1107-09; Fed R.Crim. P. 12(b)(2). In order to show cause to excuse this type of procedural default, a defendant must demonstrate that “some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the ... procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). “[T]he mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it, does not constitute cause for the procedural default.” Id. at 486, 106 S.Ct. 2639. George’s reliance on the timing of Ovalle is therefore misplaced. Ovalle did not recognize a new right; instead, it held that the 1992 jury selection plan violated well established constitutional rights. Prior to trial, George failed to recognize or chose to ignore a potential challenge to the jury selection plan. This failure does not establish cause to overcome George’s waiver of the issue; the fact that Ovalle illuminated [700]*700this issue two weeks later does nothing to change that result. George has failed to demonstrate an objective external factor that prohibited him from raising an objection to the jury selection plan prior to his trial; accordingly, he has not shown cause to excuse his waiver of this issue. See United States v. Simpson, Nos. 97-2305, 97-2307, 97-2316, 98-1050, 1999 WL 777348, at *10 (6th Cir. Sept.21, 1999) (stating that “the fact that Ovalle was not decided until after [defendant’s] trial is not sufficient cause for this court to grant relief from the waiver of the issue”); see also United States v. Bischoff, Nos. 97-1980, 97-1983, 1999 WL 644340, at *6 (6th Cir. Aug.19, 1999) (cause not shown for failure to raise Ovalle in district court); United States v. Valme, No. 98-1340, 1999 WL 519232, at *5 (6th Cir. July 16, 1999) (holding that cause did not exist for.defen-' dant’s failure to timely raise Ovalle issue); United States v. Garavaglia, Nos. 98-1512, 98-1674, 1999 WL 220125, at *6 (6th Cir. April 6, 1999) (stating that defendant’s contention that “case law was against him” did not constitute cause to excuse waiver of Ovalle issue); United States v. Carr, Nos. 97-1367, 97-1422, 97-1513, 97-1584, 97-1814, 1999 WL 211928, at *6 (6th Cir. March 11, 1999) (cause not shown for failure to raise Ovalle issue prior to trial).
In addition, George argues that the district court should have construed his co-defendant’s timely objection to the composition of the grand jury to include him. In so arguing, George relies on the fact that, in Ovalle, we allowed a “narrow exception” to the Ovalles with respect to waiver pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2) because their co-defendants raised a timely exception before their joint trial. We stated, however, that:
We emphasize that it is only because the Ovalles’ codefendants Canales and Garcia raised a timely objection to the seating of the grand and petit juries that the Ovalles are permitted the benefit of this decision. Had Canales and Garcia not raised these objections prior to trial, all of the appellants would be barred from raising such an objection for the first time on appeal or in a collateral proceeding attacking their convictions since the objection would be waived by the failure to object prior to trial. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2).
Ovalle, 136 F.3d at 1109.
We agree with the district court and the government that Connie’s timely objection, i.e., prior to her trial, does not create an exception for George. Unlike the situation in Ovalle, Connie did not raise her valid objection prior to George’s trial, but after George had been convicted. This does not fall into the ’ narrow exception to Rule 12(b)(2) created by Ovalle. Accordingly, the district court did not err by denying George’s motion to dismiss his indictment on the basis of the composition of the grand jury. '
2. Connie’s Argument
As for Connie, the district court dismissed the original indictment with respect to her without prejudice and, two weeks later, a new grand jury issued a superseding indictment against her. Connie now contends that a superseding indictment can only be issued when a valid, prior indictment is still pending. Connie further argues that a superseding indictment cannot arise from an invalid, original indictment. Connie’s argument’s lack merit.
Connie is correct in that some courts have narrowly defined the term “superseding indictment” to refer to an indictment returned when an original indictment still exists. See United States v. Bowen, 946 F.2d 734, 735 (10th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 237, 106 S.Ct. 555, 88 L.Ed.2d 537 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). However, this court has held that a superseding indictment returned one month after the original indictment had been dismissed for citing the wrong statute was valid. See United States v. Pi, 174 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 74, 145 L.Ed.2d 63 (1999). Moreover, even if the term “superseding” was inappropriate to describe the second [701]*701indictment, such a description is mere sur-plusage that can be ignored. See United States v. Caldwell, 176 F.3d 898, 902 (6th Cir.) (“A part of the indictment unnecessary to and independent of the allegations of the offense proved may normally be treated as a ‘useless averment’ that ‘may be ignored.’ ” (citation and quotation omitted)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 275, 145 L.Ed.2d 230 (1999).
We further note that Connie does not have a double jeopardy argument arising from the second indictment. It is well established that dismissal of an indictment prior to trial does not raise a double jeopardy issue and does not bar subsequent prosecution for the offenses described in the indictment. See Pi, 174 F.3d at 748. Connie argues, however, that jeopardy attached in her case because George had already been tried at the time the indictment against her had been dismissed. Connie’s argument is misplaced, as she cannot assert George’s jeopardy rights. Connie’s trial had been severed from George’s and had not yet begun when the original indictment was dismissed and the superseding indictment filed. Accordingly, jeopardy did not attach to the charges against Connie.
Finally, Connie asserts that the illegality of the original indictment somehow tainted the second indictment. Again, Connie misses the mark. Any irregularity in an original indictment has no effect on a subsequent indictment. See id. (citing United States v. Senak, 477 F.2d 304, 306 (7th Cir.1973) (“[a] federal grand jury may return a second indictment for the same offense when the first indictment has been dismissed or otherwise found defective”)).
C. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)6
George argues that his conviction should be vacated on the basis that law enforcement agents impermissibly promised witnesses leniency and paid their expenses in exchange for their testimony against him. George filed such a motion in the district court approximately five months after his trial, based on the Tenth Circuit’s panel decision in United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that promises made in a plea agreement could violate 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)), vacated, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1024, 119 S.Ct. 2371, 144 L.Ed.2d 775 (1999). On appeal, George concedes that the panel decision in Singleton has been overruled and acknowledges this court’s decision in United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 419 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that § 201(c), which penalizes an individual for giving anything of value in exchange for testimony, does not apply to the United States government), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1045, 119 S.Ct. 1348, 143 L.Ed.2d 511 (1999). Nonetheless, George contends that § 201(c) was violated because it was not the prosecutor who gave things of value to witnesses, it was Sergeant Raby. This argument fails.
First, as the government notes, George has waived this argument by failing to raise it before the trial court. In addition, even if George had not waived this argument, any “promises” made to witnesses by Sergeant Raby were made on behalf of the government; accordingly, George’s argument lacks merit.
D. CRACK COCAINE/POWDER COCAINE
George asserts that the government failed to establish at sentencing that [702]*702the involved cocaine was crack cocaine. We review factual determinations of the sentencing court for clear error. See United States v. Gort Didonato, 109 F.3d 318, 323 (6th Cir.1997).
The district court, after extensive arguments, determined that George should be sentenced on the basis of crack cocaine.The court noted:
The other evidence that leads this Court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the substance involved is crack cocaine is not only do I believe that the substance as identified by the lab report is, in fact, crack cocaine, the witnesses testified with a large amount of consistency. The police officers, who made the search, identified it as, quote, crack cocaine.... But as significant is the fact that the witnesses, the prostitutes!,] testified with a degree of regularity that the substance that they were buying from the house in which they were living was, in fact, crack cocaine. They referred to it as rocks that they were purchasing.
The district court’s statements provided ample reasoning for sentencing George on the basis of crack cocaine. The district court did not commit clear error.
Finally, George raises a constitutional challenge to the 100:1 sentencing disparity of crack cocaine versus powder cocaine. The law is well settled in this circuit that the 100:1 ratio withstands constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v. Bingham, 81 F.3d 617, 630-31 (6th Cir.1996); United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1488-89 (6th Cir.1996); United States v. Reece, 994 F.2d 277, 278-79 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Tinker, 985 F.2d 241, 242 (6th Cir.1992); United States V. Williams, 962 F.2d 1218, 1227 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Pickett, 941 F.2d 411, 418-19 (6th Cir.1991).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.