United States v. Riley

90 F. Supp. 3d 176, 2015 WL 891675
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 3, 2015
DocketNo. 13-CR-339-1 (VEC)
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 90 F. Supp. 3d 176 (United States v. Riley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Riley, 90 F. Supp. 3d 176, 2015 WL 891675 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

Opinion

OPINION & ORDER

VALERIE CAPRONI, District Judge:

After a 10-day jury trial and several days of deliberations, David Riley was convicted of two counts of securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5 and 240.10b5-2, and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; the jury did not reach a unanimous decision on a third securities fraud count. At trial the Government adduced substantial evidence showing that Riley provided material, nonpublie information (“MNPI”) to Matthew Teeple, an analyst who worked for a hedge fund.1 Riley informed Teeple of, inter alia, nonpublic information regarding his employer’s worldwide sales data, an impending (but unannounced) acquisition of his employer, and obstacles delaying the acquisition;

Relying on the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir.2014), Riley moves for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, 33. Although the Court’s instructions to the jury would have been different following Newman, the evidence adduced at trial left no reasonable doubt of Riley’s guilt. Accordingly, Riley’s motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND2

David Riley was the Chief Information Officer (“CIO”) and the Vice-President for Information Systems (“IS”) and Information Technology (“IT”) at Foundry Networks, Inc. (“Foundry”), a network equipment company that was a leading producer of ethernet switch routers. Tr. 556, 722. As CIO, Riley was responsible for maintaining Foundry’s sophisticated IS and IT infrastructure, which meant that he oversaw all of Foundry’s computer hardware and software. Tr. 560-61. Riley, as a senior officer of the corporation, reported direct to Foundry’s Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”). Tr. 560.

Foundry was historically a seasonal business; sales were weakest in the.first quarter of each fiscal year, and strongest [182]*182at the end of each year. Tr. 650-51. When Foundry experienced a quarter that was significantly above or below investor expectations, it would pre-announce its quarterly revenue to help smooth the market correction. Tr. 652-53. Although Foundry would share some information with investors who participated in “bus tours,” Tr. 650, it was careful to tailor its responses to investor inquiries and to keep most information regarding its revenue secret, even from its sales force, until it was publicly announced each quarter. Tr. 912. Foundry relied on an Oracle software system to manage its worldwide sales and other information. Tr. 457, 481. Foundry Business Online (“FBOL”), part of Oracle, enabled Foundry’s sales force to view their sales and the sales of staff below them in the organization (limited to' their direct reporting chain). Tr. 482, 381-82. The sales portion of the FBOL database was called FNI Web BBB Data, for Bookings, Billings, and Backlog. Tr. 483-84. Regional sales directors could view BBB data for their entire region or sector, but very few Foundry employees could view worldwide BBB data. Tr. 488. BBB data was not identical to revenue information, but it was a “strong predictor of the revenue [of] the company.” Tr. 565,1726.

When he was hired by Foundry, Riley was still in touch with Matthew Teeple, a man with whom he had worked at River-stone Networks. After Riverstone, Teeple had joined the Field Check Group, a company that provided research regarding technology companies to a small number of clients who made or managed investments. Tr. 128, 203. In 2007, Teeple left the Field Check Group to work as an analyst for Artis Capital Management, LP (“Ar-tis”), a hedge fund. Tr. 93, 766, 966, 980. Teeple advised Artis’s leadership, including Michael Harden, an analyst, Tr. 723, and Stuart Peterson, Artis’s founder and president, Tr. 533-34, mostly about networking companies and the semiconductor industry, Tr. 1249. While it is not clear whether Riley was aware of Teeple’s exact employment, Riley knew that Teeple advised hedge and mutual funds “with a primary focus on Silicon Valley tech companies.” GX 4104.

From at least 2007 through 2009, Teeple would frequently travel to San Jose, where he would meet with Riley, among other Foundry employees.3 Tr. 203, 286, 331; GX 413, GX 414, GX 428, GX 429; see, e.g., GX 4000, GX 4001. After and during at least some of his trips to meet with Riley and other Foundry employees, Teeple would contact Harden and Peterson. On at least some occasions, immediately thereafter, Artis would alter its position in Foundry. GX 240, GX 4005, GX 708, GX 2218 (pattern of meeting between Teeple and Riley, Teeple’s contacting Artis, and Artis’s changing its position in Foundry in September 2007); GX 4008, GX 300, GX J01, GX 712, GX 2224 (same in February 2008). Teeple’s insights were predicated in part on information that was available only to a small subset of Foundry insiders. See, e.g., GX 18, Tr. 566.

One of the most lucrative pieces of information that Teeple received was information concerning the planned acquisition of Foundry by Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. (“Brocade”), a storage area networking company that specialized in storage disk drives and arrays. Tr. 98. When this acquisition was publicly announced, the Foundry share price rose dramatically. Tr. 625, GX 2258.4 On the morning of July [183]*18316, 2008 (prior to the public announcement), Teeple called 15 individuals who immediately obtained (or caused their companies to obtain) bullish positions in Foundry. GX 704, GX 2257. Several of the individuals whom Teeple called that day and thereafter, including Andrew Miller and Karl Motey, testified that Teeple informed them during the call that Brocade would be acquiring Foundry and told them a rough estimate of the per share acquisition price. Tr. 346-47, 828-29. Immediately before his calling spree, Teeple had met with Riley, GX 4012, GX 3801, GX 716, who had been informed of the planned acquisition earlier that month, GX 271, Tr. 614. Several months later, when Brocade had trouble securing financing for the acquisition, Riley again spoke to Teeple prior to the public announcement. Also in advance of the public announcement, Artis sold Foundry’s securities short, avoiding significant losses when the price dropped following the public announcement. Tr. 633, GX 2208, GX 2209, GX 2210, GX 2211, GX 2212, GX 705.

Artis’s trading pattern surrounding the Brocade acquisition was suspicious enough to elicit attention from the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Tr. 531. In explaining their fortuitous decisions to acquire and sell Foundry securities at the best possible times, Artis failed to mention Teeple at all, despite the fact that his phone calls to Artis’s leadership, made from a location near to Foundry’s office, immediately preceded Artis’s well-timed securities transactions. Tr. 543.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
90 F. Supp. 3d 176, 2015 WL 891675, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-riley-nysd-2015.