19-4373 United States v. Ramos
United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit
August Term 2020
Argued: September 14, 2020 Decided: November 12, 2020
No. 19-4373
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
BETSY RAMOS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York No. 93-cr-360, Nicholas G. Garaufis, Judge.
Before: LYNCH, SULLIVAN, AND PARK, Circuit Judges.
Appellant challenges her 24-month sentence following a violation of supervised release, arguing that the district court (Garaufis, J.) could not consider a recidivism enhancement to determine that the violation – commission of a state felony while on supervised release – involved an offense “punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding twenty years” under U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 7B1.1(a)(1)(B). We disagree, and hold that calculation of the term of imprisonment under § 7B1.1(a)(1)(B) includes state law enhancements that increase the maximum penalty for recidivists. Because we conclude that the district court did not err in calculating the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, and because we disagree with Appellant’s assertions that the district court committed other procedural errors during the sentencing hearing, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
RONALD L. KUBY (Rhidaya S. Trivedi, on the brief), Law Office of Ronald L. Kuby, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
M. KRISTIN MACE (Kevin Trowel, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Seth D. DuCharme, Acting United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge:
This appeal requires us to decide whether, in grading a violation of
supervised release under U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 7B1.1(a), it is appropriate for
a district court to consider a state law recidivism enhancement to determine that
the violation involved an offense “punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding twenty years.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1)(B). We hold that it is, and that the
district court did not otherwise commit a procedural error in sentencing the
defendant, Betsy Ramos, to a two-year term of imprisonment.
2 I. Background
Ramos’s extensive criminal history began in 1986 when, at the age of
twenty-one, she sold a small amount of cocaine to an undercover law enforcement
officer. One year later, Ramos was again convicted of selling narcotics to an
undercover police officer – this time, heroin. The following year, she was arrested
for yet another drug sale, resulting in her third narcotics conviction in as many
years and a sentence of two-and-a-half to five years’ incarceration.
Almost immediately after her release from prison, Ramos returned to a life
of crime. On March 21, 1993 – while still on probation – Ramos arrived at John F.
Kennedy International Airport aboard a flight from Bogotá, Colombia. During a
routine Customs inspection, it was revealed that Ramos and a coconspirator were
acting as drug mules, having ingested dozens of balloons filled with more than
818 grams of heroin.
Four months after her arrest, and facing between five and forty years behind
bars, Ramos pleaded guilty, pursuant to a cooperation agreement with the
government, to importing heroin into the United States. Given both the severity
of her crime and her extensive criminal history – which rendered her a Career
Offender – the district court calculated Ramos’s Guidelines range to be 151 to 188
3 months’ imprisonment. 1 Nevertheless, in light of Ramos’s cooperation and
personal history, the court determined that a substantial downward departure
was warranted, and ultimately sentenced Ramos to only 36 months’
imprisonment, to be followed by a 10-year term of supervised release.
In 1995, just weeks after moving from prison to a halfway house, Ramos
learned that she was HIV positive. Following that diagnosis, she slipped back into
old patterns and began abusing drugs. It was around that time that Ramos became
romantically involved with Joseph Serrano.
As Ramos tells it, “[t]heir relationship was fraught from the beginning.”
Ramos Br. at 7. Not only was Serrano a drug user himself, but he was also verbally
and physically abusive to Ramos. And because Serrano was a convicted felon,
associating with him put Ramos in violation of her conditions of supervision – a
fact which her probation officer warned her about. Ramos nevertheless stayed
with Serrano and even allowed him to move in with her.
On May 26, 1998, two New York City police officers, Anthony Mosomillo
1 At that time, the Guidelines range was mandatory. But, prior to sentencing, the government submitted a motion pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), indicating that Ramos had provided substantial assistance to the government. As a result, the district court had discretion to impose a sentence below that range and below the otherwise applicable five-year statutory minimum.
4 and Miriam Torres, went to Ramos’s residence to execute a bench warrant for
Serrano’s arrest. Ramos lied to the officers and told them that she had not seen
Serrano in some time. The officers left, but quickly returned after learning from
Ramos’s neighbor that there was a trap door in the floor of Ramos’s apartment.
Sure enough, upon searching her home, the officers located Serrano hiding in that
hidden compartment.
After ordering Serrano to step out of the hole, the officers attempted to arrest
him. Serrano refused, and after struggling with the officers, managed to get hold
of Officer Torres’s service weapon. At that point, Serrano and Officer Mosomillo
exchanged gunfire, which resulted in the deaths of both men.
The following year, Ramos was tried for her role in Officer Mosomillo’s
death and was ultimately convicted of second-degree manslaughter – otherwise
known as reckless manslaughter – pursuant to New York Penal Law § 125.15.
Although the sentence for a class C felony such as second-degree manslaughter
typically cannot exceed 15 years’ imprisonment, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(2)(c); see
also People v. Lewie, 17 N.Y.3d 348, 356 (2011), Ramos’s past narcotics convictions
rendered her a “persistent felony offender,” meaning that she was eligible for a
sentence of up to life imprisonment, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00(2)(a), 70.10. Ramos
5 was ultimately sentenced to fifteen years to life imprisonment.
More than twenty years later, on December 10, 2019, Ramos was released
from state prison and immediately transferred to federal custody, where she was
presented on a violation of the terms of her supervised release stemming from the
May 1998 shooting. In connection with the federal violation, the U.S. Probation
Department determined that Ramos’s state offense constituted a “Grade A”
violation as defined by U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1), and concluded that the applicable
Guidelines range was 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment. But, as the original offense
of conviction was a class C felony, the maximum allowable sentence for the
violation was determined to be 24 months. Ramos promptly admitted to the
specified violation, and, ten days later, the parties reconvened before the district
court for sentencing.
At the sentencing hearing, several friends and family members of Officer
Mosomillo appeared and asked to testify about Ramos’s role in the shooting and
its impact on their lives. Although the district court permitted their testimony, the
court explained that its “role . . . [wa]s not to sentence Ms. Ramos for” the death of
Officer Mosomillo, but to sentence her for the “breach of trust” associated with the
violation of her supervised release. App’x at 18–19. For her part, Ramos focused
6 on the significant amount of time she had already spent in custody, her
rehabilitation, and the difficult circumstances in her life, including the abuse she
suffered at the hands of Serrano. Notably, Ramos did not dispute Probation’s
Guidelines calculations.
Ultimately, the district court adopted Probation’s violation report without
change, including its proposed Guidelines range, and sentenced Ramos to the
maximum permitted term – 24 months’ incarceration. In reaching that
determination, the district court indicated that it considered each of the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors, and expressly mentioned, among other things, (i) that Ramos
squandered the chance to turn her life around following an exceedingly lenient
sentence in 1994, (ii) that Ramos was headed down “a disastrous path” “even
before she met Mr. Serrano,” App’x at 76, (iii) the “extremely serious” nature of
Ramos’s violation, id., (iv) a recent disciplinary infraction that Ramos incurred
while detained pending her sentencing before the district court, and (v) Ramos’s
declining health.
Ramos now appeals that sentence, arguing that the district court committed
several procedural errors. She also requests that, in the event of vacatur and
remand, her case be reassigned to a different judge for resentencing.
7 II. Standard of Review
Like any other sentence, we review a sentence for a violation of supervised
release for both procedural and substantive reasonableness. See United States v.
Smith, 949 F.3d 60, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2020). This means that we check the sentence to
ensure both that the district court followed the right steps in imposing it, and that
the sentence is not unreasonably harsh or unreasonably lenient. See United States
v. Chu, 714 F.3d 743, 746 (2d Cir. 2013).
In conducting that review, we ordinarily apply a lenient “abuse-of-
discretion standard.” Smith, 949 F.3d at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
That standard requires us to “take into account the totality of the circumstances,
giving due deference to the sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion, and bearing
in mind the institutional advantages of district courts.” Chu, 714 F.3d at 746
(internal quotation marks omitted).
But things change when a defendant raises an objection on appeal that she
failed to raise below. In that circumstance, we review the sentence only for plain
error. See Smith, 949 F.3d at 66. To meet the plain error standard, a defendant must
establish four elements: “(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious,
rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s
8 substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Balde, 943 F.3d 73, 96 (2d
Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2
III. Discussion
Although Ramos does not challenge the substantive length of her sentence,
she argues that the district court conducted the sentencing proceeding in a
procedurally unreasonable manner.
“A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court fails to
calculate (or improperly calculates) the Sentencing Guidelines range, treats the
Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selects
a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails adequately to explain the
chosen sentence.” Smith, 949 F.3d at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ramos
identifies what she believes to be two such errors. First, she claims, for the first
time on appeal, that the district court improperly calculated her Sentencing
2 To be sure, the typical plain error standard can often be “relaxed . . . in the sentencing context because the cost of correcting an unpreserved error is not as great as” it would be following a trial. United States v. Haverkamp, 958 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). But we have questioned whether it is appropriate to automatically apply this “relaxed” standard in every appeal involving an unpreserved sentencing objection. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 819 F. App’x 41, 43 n.2 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. Fuller, 801 F. App’x 14, 16 n.3 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338, 343 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008). We need not decide which species of plain error review applies here since the result would be the same under either one.
9 Guidelines range. Second, she argues that in determining what sentence would
be appropriate, the district court based its decision on erroneous facts and
unreasonably failed to consider relevant mitigating information. We address each
argument in turn.
A. Ramos’s Guidelines Range
“In imposing a sentence for violation of supervised release, the sentencing
judge may freely impose a term lower or higher than the recommended Guidelines
range, but must start with a legally correct interpretation of the Guidelines.”
United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 2005). Among other things, that
requires the district court to consult the policy statements contained in Chapter 7
of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Kingdom (U.S.A.), Inc., 157 F.3d
133, 136 (2d Cir. 1998). Chapter 7 provides an alphabetical classification system
with different recommended sentencing ranges based on the severity of the
violation of supervised release. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a). In descending order of
severity, that system classifies violations as either Grade A, B, or C. The higher the
grade, the longer the suggested sentence. Formatted for clarity, the Sentencing
Guidelines describe Grade A and Grade B violations, the two grades relevant here,
as follows:
10 (1) Grade A Violations – conduct constituting (A) a federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year that (i) is a crime of violence, (ii) is a controlled substance offense, or (iii) involves possession of a firearm or destructive device of a type described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a); or (B) any other federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding twenty years;
(2) Grade B Violations – conduct constituting any other federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a).
Ramos argues that the district court committed plain error by classifying her
state crime as a Grade A violation, when it should have been deemed a Grade B
violation. The district court’s decision was driven by its determination that the
offense was a “crime of violence” under § 7B1.1(a)(1)(A). But the Guidelines
define an offense as a “crime of violence” only if it either “has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another” or is, among other specifically enumerated crimes, “voluntary
manslaughter.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). As Ramos sees it, her conviction for reckless
manslaughter cannot be deemed a conviction for “voluntary” manslaughter, nor 11 did her offense categorically involve the use or threatened use of force. As a result,
she asserts that her offense was not a Grade A violation and the district court thus
relied on an improper Guidelines range.
Rather than dispute Ramos’s assertions, the government instead points out
that the Grade A classification was appropriate because, even assuming Ramos’s
argument on appeal is correct, the state offense that constituted the violation was
“punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding twenty years.” U.S.S.G.
§ 7B1.1(a)(1)(B). After all, Ramos was sentenced up to life in prison, and in fact
served 22 years for her offense. And it is beyond question that “[a]n error in
Guidelines calculation is harmless if correcting the error would result in no change
to the Guidelines offense level and sentencing range.” United States v. Cramer, 777
F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 2015).
Ramos’s response is a technical one. As noted above, the maximum term of
imprisonment for second-degree manslaughter is ordinarily 15 years. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 70.00(2)(c). Ramos was eligible for a sentence greater than 20 years
only because of her criminal history, which made her a “persistent felony
offender” subject to sentencing enhancements that increased her maximum
exposure from 15 years to life imprisonment. See id. §§ 70.00(2)(a), 70.10.
12 According to Ramos, the district court erroneously considered those sentencing
enhancements when it should have limited itself to the statutory maximum
sentence for a garden variety second-degree manslaughter charge.
Whether Ramos’s manslaughter conviction constituted a Grade A or
Grade B violation thus turns on whether a sentencing court may take recidivism
enhancements into account in determining the maximum potential term of
imprisonment for a crime. We have never answered that question. Fortunately,
many of our sister circuits have, and all are in agreement: a recidivism
enhancement is fair game for a sentencing court to consider when assessing the
maximum potential penalty for an offense constituting a violation of supervised
release. See United States v. Rodriguez, 945 F.3d 1245, 1251–52 (10th Cir. 2019);
United States v. Montgomery, 893 F.3d 935, 940–41 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v.
Wynn, 786 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Seiber, 516 F. App’x 208, 215
(3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1154–56 (7th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Boisjolie, 74 F.3d 1115, 1116–17 (11th Cir. 1996).3
3Ramos argues that the First Circuit broke with these decisions in United States v. García-Cartagena, 953 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2020). But García-Cartagena concerned what a court may consider in determining whether a violation was a “controlled substance offense” or a “crime of violence,” id. at 16, and its analysis was driven in large measure by the definitions for those terms provided in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, id. at 16–17, 22–24. Because the issue before us concerns neither the category of crime that Ramos committed nor the definitions found in § 4B1.2, we do not see García- Cartagena as contrary authority.
13 We agree with these decisions and adopt the same rule, both because of the
language of the Guidelines and because of the sentencing goals inherent in a
revocation of supervised release. The Sentencing Commission’s commentary
indicates that a court should “consider all conduct that affects the maximum
penalties for a supervised release violation,” not just “the ‘basic’ penalty for a
given offense.” Montgomery, 893 F.3d at 940 (citing Wynn, 786 F.3d at 343). Indeed,
as the Commission’s note to § 7B1.1 provides:
A violation of this condition may be charged whether or not the defendant has been the subject of a separate federal, state, or local prosecution for such conduct. The grade of violation does not depend upon the conduct that is the subject of criminal charges or of which the defendant is convicted in a criminal proceeding. Rather, the grade of the violation is to be based on the defendant’s actual conduct.
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1 cmt. n.1. In other words, the note “instructs that in grading a
violation of supervised release, a district court may consider not only conduct for
which a defendant is prosecuted in a criminal case, but all of a defendant’s
conduct.” Wynn, 786 F.3d at 343. And a direction to consider “all of a defendant’s
conduct” naturally also includes “all conduct that affects the maximum penalties
14 for a supervised release violation.” 4 Id.; see also United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S.
377, 386 (2008) (explaining that “[w]hen a defendant is given a higher sentence
under a recidivism statute . . . [,] 100% of the punishment is for the offense of
conviction”); Trotter, 270 F.3d at 1154 (asking “how can one determine whether an
offense is ‘punishable’ by a particular term without considering all of the
ingredients that set the maximum punishment?”).
In addition, “the very purpose of a supervised release revocation hearing is
to determine the gravity of the breach of trust committed by the defendant in the
context of the ‘conditional liberty’ [s]he was granted following h[er] conviction of
the underlying offenses.” Wynn, 786 F.3d at 343. That analysis “necessarily
requires consideration of the defendant’s criminal history” at the time the violation
occurred. Id.; see also Boisjolie, 74 F.3d at 1116 (“Using the maximum sentence
under the Habitual Felony Offender Act in determining [the defendant’s] violation
grade is consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines’ objective of achieving
proportionality in sentencing through tailoring a punishment to fit the individual
4 At oral argument, counsel for Ramos suggested that a recidivism enhancement can be considered in grading a violation, but only where the enhancement is found in the text of the provision setting the penalty for the particular crime at issue. We find this overreliance on form to be misguided, and can discern no reason why a legislature’s choice to put a sentencing enhancement in one section of a statutory scheme rather than another should affect how courts read the Guidelines.
15 criminal and the crime committed.”).
Relatedly, we reject Ramos’s assertion that considering recidivism
enhancements in assessing the violation grade unfairly results in the “double
counting” of past criminal convictions, once in setting the criminal history
category and then again in setting the offense level. Criminal history and offense
level measure two different things: “[t]he offense level represents a judgment as
to the wrongfulness of the particular act,” while “[t]he criminal history category
principally estimates the likelihood of recidivism.” United States v. Campbell, 967
F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1992); cf. United States v. Gibson, 135 F.3d 257, 261 (2d Cir. 1998)
(rejecting the notion that “the use of [a defendant’s] prior convictions both to
enhance the Career Offender Guideline and to add criminal history points
amount[s] to improper double counting”). Unsurprisingly, then, other courts of
appeals that have considered this “double counting” argument in the context of
grading a violation of supervised release have rejected it out of hand. See Seiber,
516 F. App’x at 216; Trotter, 270 F.3d at 1155 (“If the Guidelines’ use of criminal
history to influence the final sentence blocks recidivist enhancements under
§ 7B1.1, it logically does so for any offense . . . , for the use of criminal history is
ubiquitous in the Guidelines. Yet this has never before been thought incompatible
16 with using prior convictions to determine maximum permissible punishments.”);
United States v. Crace, 207 F.3d 833, 838 (6th Cir. 2000) (explaining that
consideration of a recidivism enhancement in grading a violation is not improper
double counting because the “single [prior] act is relevant to two dimensions of
the sentencing guidelines analysis”). We do so as well.
Accordingly, we agree with our sister circuits that recidivism enhancements
should enter the mix when a court is grading a violation of supervision. 5 As a
result, Ramos’s crime of second-degree manslaughter was “punishable by a term
of imprisonment exceeding twenty years” – a Grade A violation under
§ 7B1.1(a)(1)(B). Any error in the district court’s Guidelines calculation, then, was
harmless.
B. Procedural Reasonableness of the Sentencing Hearing
In addition to challenging the district court’s Guidelines calculation, Ramos
also asserts that the sentencing hearing was conducted in a procedurally improper
manner. Again, we disagree.
5 Ramos’s assertion that this outcome conflicts with the rule of lenity is mistaken. The rule of lenity requires courts to resolve statutory ambiguities in favor of defendants, see Mendez v. Barr, 960 F.3d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 2020), and, as explained above, there is no ambiguity here after accounting for “the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of” the Guidelines, Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17 In practice, the procedure that a district court employs in sentencing a
defendant for violating her term of supervision is nearly identical to any other
sentencing. See Smith, 949 F.3d at 65–66. But there are two aspects unique to a
sentence imposed in the revocation context that bear mentioning. First, “the
degree of specificity required for the reasons behind [such] a . . . sentence is less
than that for plenary sentencing.” Id. at 66. Second, a sentence for a violation of
supervised release should primarily sanction the defendant’s “breach of trust,” not
the conduct constituting the violation itself. United States v. Edwards, 834 F.3d 180,
194 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b)). To be clear,
this does not mean that a district court cannot consider the seriousness of the
violation conduct. Of course it can. But that fact should be considered only “to a
limited degree.” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b)).
Although Ramos puts forward over a half-dozen different arguments for
why her sentencing hearing was procedurally improper, they all essentially
reduce to two main points: (i) the district court based its sentencing decision on
improper evidence, as it both failed to consider relevant mitigating facts and
incorrectly placed significant stock in victim impact statements, and (ii) the district
court primarily sentenced her based on the severity of her state offense and not
18 her breach of trust. Neither of these arguments has merit.
The district court began the proceeding by clarifying that its “role . . . [wa]s
not to sentence Ms. Ramos” for the 1998 killing of Officer Mosomillo, but “to
determine the appropriate punishment for [her] breach of trust” by committing a
new crime while still on supervised release. App’x at 18–19. The court then
explained each of the section 3553(a) factors and indicated that those factors would
help guide the court’s decision-making process. Then, after again reiterating the
“limited purpose” of the sentencing, id. at 21, the court allowed various friends
and family of Officer Mosomillo, including Officer Torres, to make statements on
the record about how Ramos’s actions had affected them.
Unsurprisingly, the victims were emotional. But while Ramos argues that
the victim statements were “excessive,” Ramos Br. at 36, and inappropriately
influenced the district court’s decision, it cannot be said that the district court
abused its discretion simply by permitting these victims to share how Ramos’s
actions impacted their lives. For one thing, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act
expressly guarantees the right of victims and, in certain instances, their family
members “to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court
involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.” 18 U.S.C.
19 § 3771(a)(4). For another, district courts are obligated to at least consider the
severity of the conduct constituting the violation in setting a sentence for a
violation of supervised release, and the impact of the defendant’s actions on her
victims is no doubt a legitimate component of that consideration. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) (directing courts to consider § 3553(a)(1)); see also Smith, 949 F.3d at 66–
67 (considering the seriousness of the defendant’s violation conduct in assessing
whether the district court’s above-Guidelines sentence was reasonable). So given
the “largely unlimited discretion of a sentencing court either as to the kind of
information it may consider[] or the source from which it may come,” United States
v. Cacace, 796 F.3d 176, 190–91 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), as
well as the “strong presumption that the sentencing judge has considered all
arguments properly presented to h[im],” United States v. Robinson, 799 F.3d 196,
202 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), we cannot say that, on the
record before us, the district court improperly considered or weighed this
testimony in sentencing Ramos. 6
6 In her opening brief, Ramos makes a passing argument that the district court improperly credited some of this victim testimony in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). But Apprendi concerns only factual findings that “increase[] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.” Id. at 490; see also United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 663–64 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc). Here, Ramos’s sentence was not increased beyond the statutory maximum of 24 months.
20 Indeed, in ultimately concluding that a sentence of 24 months’
imprisonment was appropriate, the district court identified a host of supporting
reasons, many of which did not concern the severity of the violation. To start, the
district court noted that it considered all the required section 3553(a) factors, which
alone “reinforce[s] the presumption” that the court acted appropriately. See United
States v. Hernandez, 604 F.3d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 2010). Next, the district court observed
that Ramos “rejected” the “gift of a relatively brief prison sentence” following her
narcotics smuggling conviction in 1993. App’x at 75–76. In the wake of an original
sentence that was nearly 10 years below Ramos’s recommended Guidelines range,
Ramos’s decision to violate the terms of her supervision constituted a particularly
egregious breach of trust. See United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir.
2008) (reasoning that the breach of trust reflected in a violation is exacerbated if
the defendant received a “lenient [original] sentence[]”).
The district court also pointed to a recent prison disciplinary event that
occurred while Ramos was in custody pending her sentencing as evidence that
Ramos still has trouble with authority figures. While Ramos suggests that this
“tangent about [an] ‘unmade bed’” was unreasonable, Ramos Br. at 36, we
disagree. The disciplinary infraction at issue was not simply the failure to make a
21 bed, but verbal aggression against the corrections officer who called that failure to
her attention. Moreover, the “fail[ure] to abide by institutional regulations” is
surely relevant under section 3553(a), United States v. Mumuni, 946 F.3d 97, 112 (2d
Cir. 2019), particularly where, as here, the defendant points to her rehabilitation
as grounds for a lenient sentence. And while the prison infraction clearly was not
a major driver in the district court’s sentence, it was hardly improper for the court
to consider the infraction along with the constellation of other facts before it.
As for Ramos’s contention that the district court failed to appropriately
consider mitigating factors, that too is simply incorrect. The parties discussed such
information at length, including the domestic violence Ramos suffered at the
hands of Serrano and her declining health. See United States v. DiRose, 586 F. App’x
808, 810 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining that a discussion of the relevant issues by the
parties “reinforce[d] the presumption that the district court took all of the required
factors into account”). And while the district court was not obligated to
exhaustively list on the record every fact it considered in imposing Ramos’s
sentence, see United States v. Pugh, 945 F.3d 9, 25 (2d Cir. 2019), it expressly
referenced several of these mitigating circumstances.
For instance, the district court acknowledged that Serrano played some role
22 in exacerbating the “disastrous path” that Ramos found herself on in 1998. App’x
at 76. It also credited Ramos’s expressions of remorse for her actions. And, finally,
the court discussed the “particular difficulty” it faced in sentencing Ramos given
her declining health. Id. at 77. In fact, the district court delayed Ramos’s
sentencing for more than a week because the court wanted “to hear more about
[her] medical condition.” Id. at 108. The district court expressly considered and
weighed these mitigating circumstances. It was within the court’s discretion to
assign the weight to be given to them in balancing the many considerations
relevant to selecting the appropriate sentence.
At bottom, Ramos engaged in a serious violation of the terms of her
supervised release after having been the beneficiary of a remarkably lenient
sentence in 1994. While the seriousness of her violation, and the carnage it caused,
were undoubtedly a major focus of the evidence submitted to the district court at
the sentencing hearing, the court repeatedly explained that its role was to punish
Ramos’s breach of trust and that its sentencing decision would be driven by a
holistic assessment, which included the applicable section 3553(a) factors.
Considering the record as a whole, we cannot say that the district court imposed
a procedurally unreasonable sentence.
23 IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.