25-1613 United States v. Briggs
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 14th day of July, two thousand twenty-six.
Present: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, STEVEN J. MENASHI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. 25-1613
GIOVANNI VASQUEZ, AKA SCREECH, HARRY FRANKLIN, AKA STREETS, AKA UNCLE STACKS,
Defendants,
THEODORE BRIGGS, AKA PEEJAYE,
Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________
For Appellee: Daniel P. Gordon (Elena Lali Coronado, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys for David X. Sullivan, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT. For Defendant-Appellant: Tracy Hayes, Assistant Federal Defender for Terence S. Ward, Federal Defender for the District of Connecticut, Hartford, CT.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
(Hall, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant Theodore Briggs (“Briggs”) appeals from the June 26, 2025
judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Hall, J.), revoking his
earlier-imposed term of supervised release. At his revocation hearing, Briggs admitted to five
violations of the conditions of his supervision. The district court sentenced Briggs, principally,
to three years’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. On appeal, Briggs argues that
his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer
only as necessary to explain our decision to AFFIRM.
* * *
“We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.” 1 United States v. Yilmaz, 910 F.3d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 2018).
“The abuse-of-discretion standard incorporates de novo review of questions of law (including
interpretations of the Guidelines) and clear-error review of questions of fact.” United States v.
1 “When a party properly objects to a sentencing error in the district court, we review for harmless error; issues not raised in the trial court because of oversight, including sentencing issues, are normally deemed forfeited on appeal unless they meet our standard for plain error.” United States v. Vargas, 961 F.3d 566, 570-71 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). We need not decide which, if any, issues Briggs preserved for appeal because, for the reasons explained below, his arguments fail under either standard.
2 Vargas, 961 F.3d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Legros, 529 F.3d 470, 474 (2d
Cir. 2008)).
I. Procedural Reasonableness
“A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court ‘fails to calculate (or
improperly calculates) the Sentencing Guidelines range, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as
mandatory, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous
facts, or fails adequately to explain the chosen sentence.’” United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60,
66 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Chu, 714 F.3d 742, 746 (2d Cir. 2013)). Briggs
contends that the district court violated his “due process right to be sentenced based on accurate
information” by relying on unproven facts at sentencing. United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694,
700 (2d Cir. 2007). He alleges that “[the] sentence imposed [by the district court] reflects a
heightened sanction seemingly driven not by the charged violations alone, but by unverified
suspicions and prejudicial inferences.” Appellant’s Br. 16. We disagree.
The district court did not base its sentence on any of the substantive allegations Briggs now
contests on appeal. Rather, the court made clear that its sentence rested on Briggs’s continued
failure to comply with his conditions of supervision. As the court explained, that lack of
compliance prevented the Probation Officer from obtaining “the fundamental information she
needed to be able to” ensure Briggs was refraining from engaging in further criminal activity.
App’x 208. The court thus did not make—let alone rely on—any factual findings regarding the
alleged fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program loan, Briggs’s use of electronic devices, or the
failed polygraph examination. With respect to each of these allegations, the court instead
highlighted Briggs’s failure to comply with required procedures and otherwise provide Probation
with relevant information.
3 Because the court did not in fact rely on any of the allegations Briggs identifies, we reject
Briggs’s procedural reasonableness challenge. 2 See United States v. Leavens, No. 23-7993-CR,
2025 WL 387810, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2025) (summary order) (rejecting procedural
reasonableness challenge where “the District Court did not rely on the recommendation to justify
the sentence”); United States v. Morales-Plumei, No. 25-168-CR, 2026 WL 479804, at *2 (2d Cir.
Feb. 20, 2026) (summary order) (finding no procedural error where “nothing in the record
indicate[d] that the District Court relied on any such finding in determining the sentence”).
II. Substantive Reasonableness
Briggs also asserts that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. “Review for
substantive unreasonableness requires that we consider ‘the totality of the circumstances, giving
due deference to the sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion, and bearing in mind the institutional
advantages of district courts.’” Smith, 949 F.3d at 66 (quoting United States v. Brown, 843 F.3d
74, 80 (2d Cir. 2016)). And “a trial court’s sentencing decision will be classified as error only if
it ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’” United States v. Bonilla, 618
F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.2008)
(en banc)).
Briggs contends that his sentence of 36 months was substantively unreasonable because it
substantially exceeded the non-binding advisory range of eight to 14 months. We again disagree.
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25-1613 United States v. Briggs
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 14th day of July, two thousand twenty-six.
Present: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, STEVEN J. MENASHI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. 25-1613
GIOVANNI VASQUEZ, AKA SCREECH, HARRY FRANKLIN, AKA STREETS, AKA UNCLE STACKS,
Defendants,
THEODORE BRIGGS, AKA PEEJAYE,
Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________
For Appellee: Daniel P. Gordon (Elena Lali Coronado, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys for David X. Sullivan, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT. For Defendant-Appellant: Tracy Hayes, Assistant Federal Defender for Terence S. Ward, Federal Defender for the District of Connecticut, Hartford, CT.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
(Hall, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant Theodore Briggs (“Briggs”) appeals from the June 26, 2025
judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Hall, J.), revoking his
earlier-imposed term of supervised release. At his revocation hearing, Briggs admitted to five
violations of the conditions of his supervision. The district court sentenced Briggs, principally,
to three years’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. On appeal, Briggs argues that
his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer
only as necessary to explain our decision to AFFIRM.
* * *
“We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.” 1 United States v. Yilmaz, 910 F.3d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 2018).
“The abuse-of-discretion standard incorporates de novo review of questions of law (including
interpretations of the Guidelines) and clear-error review of questions of fact.” United States v.
1 “When a party properly objects to a sentencing error in the district court, we review for harmless error; issues not raised in the trial court because of oversight, including sentencing issues, are normally deemed forfeited on appeal unless they meet our standard for plain error.” United States v. Vargas, 961 F.3d 566, 570-71 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). We need not decide which, if any, issues Briggs preserved for appeal because, for the reasons explained below, his arguments fail under either standard.
2 Vargas, 961 F.3d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Legros, 529 F.3d 470, 474 (2d
Cir. 2008)).
I. Procedural Reasonableness
“A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court ‘fails to calculate (or
improperly calculates) the Sentencing Guidelines range, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as
mandatory, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous
facts, or fails adequately to explain the chosen sentence.’” United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60,
66 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Chu, 714 F.3d 742, 746 (2d Cir. 2013)). Briggs
contends that the district court violated his “due process right to be sentenced based on accurate
information” by relying on unproven facts at sentencing. United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694,
700 (2d Cir. 2007). He alleges that “[the] sentence imposed [by the district court] reflects a
heightened sanction seemingly driven not by the charged violations alone, but by unverified
suspicions and prejudicial inferences.” Appellant’s Br. 16. We disagree.
The district court did not base its sentence on any of the substantive allegations Briggs now
contests on appeal. Rather, the court made clear that its sentence rested on Briggs’s continued
failure to comply with his conditions of supervision. As the court explained, that lack of
compliance prevented the Probation Officer from obtaining “the fundamental information she
needed to be able to” ensure Briggs was refraining from engaging in further criminal activity.
App’x 208. The court thus did not make—let alone rely on—any factual findings regarding the
alleged fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program loan, Briggs’s use of electronic devices, or the
failed polygraph examination. With respect to each of these allegations, the court instead
highlighted Briggs’s failure to comply with required procedures and otherwise provide Probation
with relevant information.
3 Because the court did not in fact rely on any of the allegations Briggs identifies, we reject
Briggs’s procedural reasonableness challenge. 2 See United States v. Leavens, No. 23-7993-CR,
2025 WL 387810, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2025) (summary order) (rejecting procedural
reasonableness challenge where “the District Court did not rely on the recommendation to justify
the sentence”); United States v. Morales-Plumei, No. 25-168-CR, 2026 WL 479804, at *2 (2d Cir.
Feb. 20, 2026) (summary order) (finding no procedural error where “nothing in the record
indicate[d] that the District Court relied on any such finding in determining the sentence”).
II. Substantive Reasonableness
Briggs also asserts that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. “Review for
substantive unreasonableness requires that we consider ‘the totality of the circumstances, giving
due deference to the sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion, and bearing in mind the institutional
advantages of district courts.’” Smith, 949 F.3d at 66 (quoting United States v. Brown, 843 F.3d
74, 80 (2d Cir. 2016)). And “a trial court’s sentencing decision will be classified as error only if
it ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’” United States v. Bonilla, 618
F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.2008)
(en banc)).
Briggs contends that his sentence of 36 months was substantively unreasonable because it
substantially exceeded the non-binding advisory range of eight to 14 months. We again disagree.
2 Briggs also contests the district court’s description of him as “unsupervisable,” App’x 208, and suggestion that he had exhibited “resistance to the idea that he had issues he should be dealing with” at his initial sentencing, id. at 160. But based on his documented failure to comply with the terms of his supervision, “unsupervisable” was not an unfair characterization of Briggs, let alone a clearly erroneous factual finding. And though Briggs is correct the statements referenced by the district court seem to have been made during his pre-sentencing interview and period of supervision, we discern no indication the precise timing was in any way material to the district court’s determination of the appropriate sentence.
4 Absent any procedural error a “sentencing judge may freely impose a term lower or higher than
the recommended Guidelines range[.]” United States v. Ramos, 979 F.3d 994, 999 (2d Cir.
2020); see also United States v. Pelensky, 129 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that “the court
ultimately has ‘broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of
imprisonment’ up to the statutory maximum” (quoting United States v. Sweeney, 90 F.3d 55, 57
(2d Cir.1996)); United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (highlighting that
“the sentencing judge has unique insights into both the circumstances that prompted the initial
non-incarceratory sentence and the degree to which the violation represents a serious betrayal of
the court’s trust and a risk of future criminal conduct”). And in light of Briggs’s five admitted
violations and extensive failure to comply with his conditions of supervision, we conclude Briggs’s
sentence, which falls below the five-year statutory maximum, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), “is not
‘manifestly unjust’ and does not ‘shock the conscience,’” United States v. Richardson, 958 F.3d
151, 155 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 122–24 (2d Cir. 2009));
see also Pelensky, 129 F.3d at 70 (affirming above-guidelines sentence for violation of supervised
release).
We have considered Briggs’s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without
merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk