United States v. Pinto-Thomaz

352 F. Supp. 3d 287
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedDecember 6, 2018
DocketS2 18-CR-579 (JSR)
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 352 F. Supp. 3d 287 (United States v. Pinto-Thomaz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287 (S.D. Ill. 2018).

Opinion

JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.

The crime of insider trading is a straightforward concept that some courts have somehow managed to complicate. Essentially, insider trading is a variation of *296the species of fraud known as embezzlement, which is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "[t]he fraudulent taking of personal property with which one has been entrusted, especially as a fiduciary." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). In the case of insider trading, the property is a company's material confidential information that has value to the embezzler because of its potential use in the purchase and sale of securities. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 138 L.Ed.2d 724 (1997). Insider trading occurs when someone to whom this property has been entrusted pursuant to a fiduciary or similar relationship secretly embezzles, or "misappropriates," the information in order to take advantage of its securities-related value. If the embezzler, instead of trading on the information himself, passes on the information to someone who knows it is misappropriated information but still intends to use it in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, that "tippee" is likewise liable, just as any knowing receiver of stolen goods would be.

It is just that simple - or, conceptually, should be. But, as described below, some judicial decisions appear to have added complications.

These observations are prompted by the instant motion to dismiss of defendants Sebastian Pinto-Thomaz and Jeremy Millul, who are charged in a superseding indictment ("the Indictment") with substantive securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud.1 The Indictment alleges that Pinto-Thomaz, having received in a fiduciary capacity material nonpublic information concerning the forthcoming acquisition of the Valspar Corporation by the Sherwin-Williams Company, secretly misappropriated the information and provided it to Millul "with the intention to benefit" Millul by enabling him to trade profitably on the acquisition prior to its public announcement. See Indictment ¶¶ 5, 20.

In their motion, defendants argue that the Indictment should be dismissed as to both the tipper (Pinto-Thomaz) and the tippee (Millul) because the Indictment fails to allege that they shared a "meaningfully close personal relationship." United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014). This Opinion and Order first addresses the motion to dismiss, and then turns to a number of additional motions made by one or both defendants.

I. Motion to Dismiss

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder broadly prohibit any person from using any "scheme or artifice to defraud" "in connection with the sale or purchase of any security." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (2016) ; 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Embezzlement of a company's confidential information is unquestionably a fraud. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[a] company's confidential information ... qualifies as property to which the company has a right of exclusive use," O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654, 117 S.Ct. 2199,2 and, accordingly, "undisclosed misappropriation of such information, in violation of a fiduciary duty ... constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement - the fraudulent appropriation to one's own use of the money or goods entrusted *297to one's care by another." Id. If the embezzlement is for the purpose of using the information to trade, or to have others trade, in the securities market, it would seem to be a straightforward violation of Rule 10b-5.

Historically, insider trading charges were first pursued primarily against company executives who took advantage of their knowledge of the company's confidential information to purchase company stock from their own unwitting shareholders. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). Although sometimes referred to as the "classical theory" of insider trading, O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652, 117 S.Ct. 2199, this was in fact a rather narrow approach, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") itself had to labor somewhat to apply it even to the situation where a company executive or his agent used the company's negative inside information to sell short. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8, 100 S.Ct. 1108, 63 L.Ed.2d 348 (1980) (briefly describing this development). The Government also was only gradually able to extend the classical theory to "tippees" who traded on inside information supplied by the tipper. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659-61, 103 S.Ct. 3255, 77 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983). Thus, by the time the classical theory of insider trading reached its first challenge in the Supreme Court in 1980, it was clear that there were formidable limits on its application. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235

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352 F. Supp. 3d 287, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-pinto-thomaz-ilsd-2018.