Manneh v. F.B.I.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 13, 2020
Docket1:19-cv-07177
StatusUnknown

This text of Manneh v. F.B.I. (Manneh v. F.B.I.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Manneh v. F.B.I., (E.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE US DISTRICT COURT E.D.N.Y. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT (3 sa EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SANT? 20 nana nanan nanan een neem □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ K . BROOKLYN OFFICE YAYA MANNEH, □

Plaintiff, inst . MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ~ agains’ 1:19-CV-07177 (AMD) (LB) FBI AND DIRECTOR GENERAL, FBI, Defendants.

nnn □□□ nnn nnn nner een □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ KX ANN M. DONNELLY, United States District Judge: On December 12, 2019, the plaintiff, Yaya Manneh, commenced this pro se action against the FBI and the Director General of the FBI. (ECF No.1.) The plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted. For the reasons that follow, the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice. BACKGROUND The plaintiff's lawsuit claims that the FBI “impounded” all of his documents, including multiple passports, four years ago. (ECF No. 1 at 5,8.) The plaintiff claims that without his documents, he is jobless and homeless. (/d. at 8.) He also claims that the FBI is “operating” on him “with zooming and humming.” (/d.) Though the plaintiff has “not come in touch with the [FBI] directly,” he alleges that the FBJ has been “zooming and humming” on a “24/7 basis” for the past four years. (Jd. at9.) According to the plaintiff, the FBI sends “information through humming, zooming and mindset.” (/d.) The plaintiff names four individuals he identifies as “Clearance Agents,” who he says “have successfully cleared me. They have my case and only need a judge to make it legal with a court order.” (/d. at 7.) The plaintiff seeks a court order enabling him to get his documents back. (/d. at 8.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pro se complaint is held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see Harris y. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly, the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”). Nevertheless, the Court is required to dismiss sua sponte an in forma pauperis action if the Court determines that it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An action is frivolous when “the factual contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Moreover, a plaintiff seeking to bring a lawsuit in federal court must establish that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See, e.g., Rene v. Citibank NA, 32 F. Supp.

2d 539, 541-43 (E.D.NLY. 1999). “[F]ailure of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and may be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte. If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be dismissed.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000). Federal subject matter jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is presented, or when the plaintiff and defendants have complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. In order to invoke federal question jurisdiction, the plaintiff's claim(s) must arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. DISCUSSION The complaint, which names the FBI and the Director General of the FBI, does not state a plausible claim under any standard. The plaintiff seems to be claiming that the FBI seized and is holding his travel documents, which has caused him to become homeless and jobless. However, the plaintiff has admitted that he has had no direct contact with the FBI. The plaintiff also asserts that the FBI is “operating” on him “with zooming and humming.” These claims, devoid of any factual explanations, must be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (“[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible[.]”). Moreover, the plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would bring his claims within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), permits claims for some constitutional violations by federal agents acting in their individual capacities. However, the plaintiff has not alleged that any federal officials violated his constitutional rights. The only relief the plaintiff seeks is a court order directing the return of his documents,

but he does not explain the circumstances surrounding the “impounded documents.” The Federal Tort Claims Act does not provide any basis for relief in this case, as it specifically excludes most claims related to the detention of property by customs officials or law enforcement officers. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c); Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Matson v. BD. OF EDUC., CITY SCHOOL DIST. OF NY
631 F.3d 57 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Rene v. CITIBANK NA
32 F. Supp. 2d 539 (E.D. New York, 1999)
United States v. Pinto-Thomaz
352 F. Supp. 3d 287 (S.D. Illinois, 2018)

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Bluebook (online)
Manneh v. F.B.I., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/manneh-v-fbi-nyed-2020.