United States v. Paul Van Eyl

468 F.3d 428, 2006 WL 2876832
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedOctober 5, 2006
Docket05-1785
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 468 F.3d 428 (United States v. Paul Van Eyl) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Paul Van Eyl, 468 F.3d 428, 2006 WL 2876832 (7th Cir. 2006).

Opinions

ROVNER, Circuit Judge.

Paul Van Eyl went to trial on a twelve-count indictment for various financial crimes. The jury hung on ten of the counts and returned a verdict of guilty on the other two. The district court granted Van Eyl’s subsequent motion for a new trial because the government’s closing argument contained a damaging theory of guilt that the court had earlier excluded in response to a motion in limine. Although the argument was made in good faith, and although the court overruled the defendant’s objection in the heat of the closing arguments, the court later determined that the argument was improper and likely had a substantial effect on the verdict in this very close case. The government appeals the grant of a new trial. Because of the deferential review we accord such decisions, we affirm.

I.

Van Eyl worked for First Merchants Acceptance Corporation (“FMAC”), a finance company specializing in the sub-prime auto lending market. Van Eyl served as vice president for strategic planning and risk management. Mitchell Kahn, a lawyer who co-founded FMAC and served as its chief executive officer, was Van Eyl’s co-defendant. Kahn pled guilty and cooperated with the government in its prosecution of Van Eyl. FMAC was in the business of lending money at above-market interest rates to people with problematic credit histories so that they could purchase cars. The company’s primary [430]*430asset was its accounts receivable, which FMAC used to secure a line of credit with LaSalle Bank, the company’s primary source of funds. Given the nature of FMAC’s business, not all of the customer accounts were current at any given time, with some customers being so late in their payments that their accounts were charged off as a loss. Because of delinquent accounts, two important aspects of FMAC’s business were collections and repossessions. Accounts receivable were tracked by a computer system called Nor-west, which was run by an outside contractor. The Norwest system grouped delinquent accounts into thirty-day increments (called “buckets” in the system) depending on how late the customers were in paying. For example, the thirty-day bucket contained accounts that were thirty-one to sixty days late in payment, the sixty-day bucket was comprised of accounts that were sixty-one to ninety days late, and the ninety-day bucket contained accounts more than ninety-one days delinquent. Tracking the lateness of payments was a crucial function because only relatively current accounts receivable could serve as collateral when FMAC needed financing. LaSalle Bank extended to FMAC a line of credit capped at $205 million, secured by accounts receivable, and permitting a monthly draw equal to 80% of eligible receivables. These loans were repaid out of incoming cash when FMAC customers made their monthly car payments. FMAC was a publicly traded company and shareholders and potential investors relied on company policies and the value of accounts receivable in making investment decisions. These policies and values were revealed in SEC filings that listed assets and liabilities. In its SEC filing for the year ending December 31, 1996, for example, FMAC reported that it charged off as a loss the balance left on any account that was more than ninety days delinquent. In some instances, FMAC was able to repossess the car and recover some of the outstanding balance of a loan; in other cases, the car disappeared along with the borrower and the account was a total loss.

Van Eyl interacted with a number of other FMAC employees in the course of his job. Julie Freisinger was FMAC’s liaison to the contractor that ran the Norwest system. Tom Ehmann was the chief financial officer, Brian Hausman (who co-founded the company with Kahn) was in charge of operations, and Peter Gorman was a specialist in collections. Van Eyl also worked closely with Kahn. Part of Van Eyl’s job was to compile data from Nor-west and keep track of delinquent accounts and charge-off rates on a monthly basis, and to use that data to project future charge-offs on an annualized basis. Van Eyl regularly submitted this information to Kahn. Some of this information was reported in FMAC’s SEC filings and was also used in presentations to investment bankers to promote investment in FMAC. The charge-off rate was a very important number to potential investors because it was highly correlated to profitability, potential future earnings, and the value of FMAC’s stock.

Early in 1996, senior management responsible for reviewing this data noticed that the charge-off rate was steadily climbing. The norm in the industry was 6-8% and FMAC was charging off 9-10% of its loans. Collection efforts, directed by Gor-man, were slipping and delinquency rates were rising. Van Eyl conceded at trial the events that ensued from the rising delinquencies but vigorously contested the issue of his involvement and intent in these events. According to the government, Ehmann suggested to Kahn that in order to hide FMAC’s problems, they should manipulate FMAC’s financial reporting. At first, Kahn and Ehmann tried keeping [431]*431the books open, that is, posting payments received in one month to the previous month in order to minimize the delinquency rate for the previous month. They soon realized that this practice merely delayed the inevitable. Kahn then approached Van Eyl about manipulating the accounting. Kahn, Ehmann and Van Eyl discussed several strategies and decided to postpone charging off accounts that were more than ninety-one days overdue, to grant deferrals on some accounts and to treat “skips” as if they were “repos.” “Skips” were delinquent accounts where neither the customer nor the car could be located. FMAC’s policy was to charge-off as a loss the entire balance of these accounts. “Re-pos,” shorthand for repossessions, were delinquent accounts where the car could be located, recovered and re-sold. Repossessions typically resulted in recovery of approximately 55% of the remaining balance of an account, and for this reason, FMAC’s policy was to charge-off as a loss 45% of the balance on a repossession. Treating a “skip” as if it were a repossession on the company books meant that only 45% rather than 100% of the balance was written off as a loss even though the remaining 55% was virtually uncollectible. In order to implement these changes, Van Eyl directed Freisinger (the Norwest system liaison) not to enter skips and repos into the system until he instructed her to do so. Van Eyl then told Freisinger to place some skips into repo status and charge off others. Van Eyl did not specify which accounts to treat differently but rather gave Freisinger a dollar amount of skips to charge off and a dollar amount to change to repo status and left it to her to determine which accounts to change to achieve the desired accounting results. Charge-off decisions were thus based not on collecti-bility but on achieving certain accounting numbers.

According to the government, this practice continued from June 1996 through January 1997. During that time, Kahn, Ehmann and Van Eyl represented publicly that accounts more than ninety-one days delinquent were being charged off. Nonetheless, delinquencies continued to rise and Kahn discussed new strategies with Van Eyl. Out of these discussions came the customer service deferral program. A deferral was an agreement between FMAC and the borrower to defer a monthly payment to the end of the loan period. Deferrals are a legitimate practice in the lending business, typically used to assist borrowers through a brief period of money trouble without having the account reported as delinquent.

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Bluebook (online)
468 F.3d 428, 2006 WL 2876832, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-paul-van-eyl-ca7-2006.