United States v. Oregon & California Railroad

164 U.S. 526, 17 S. Ct. 165, 41 L. Ed. 541, 1896 U.S. LEXIS 1888
Supreme Court of the United States·Decided December 14, 1896·No. 318·Published·Cited by 57 cases

Opinion

*537 Mr: Chief Justice Fuller,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

If the act of May I, 1870, should be held to have authorized the construction of a main road from Portland to Astoria, and that the lands adjacent to, and coterminous with, such main road, on both sides, were granted in order to accomplish that purpose; and also to have authorized the construction of a branch from the main line, at a junction near Forest Gr.ove, to McMinnville, then it would follow that all of the lands available on both sides as far as Forest Grove, and to an extent of twenty miles on each side, would be absorbed in aiding to build the main line; and so of the lands along the main line from Forest Grove to Astoria. And inasmuch as the line from Forest Grove to Astoria, and from Forest Grove, at the junction with the main line, south toward McMinnville, was, in its general bearing, at right angles to the main line from Portland to Forest Grove, the line from Portland to Forest Grove would absorb nearly all of the lands lying east of the branch line to McMinnville, and a part of the lands lying east of the line from McMinnville through Forest Grove, the point of junction, northwards toward Astoria. Hence but little could be earned for building the branch line except the lands lying west of it and south of the point of junction at Forest Grove, and none of the land lying north of a line drawn from Portland through Forest Grove could be held to have been within the contemplation of the act as donated for the purpose of building a branch road from the junction to McMinnville.

In this aspect, as no road was built from Forest Grove toward Astoria, substantially all that was earned was the land lying within the twenty mile limits on each side of the main road from Portland to Forest Grove, and the land lying west of the McMinnville branch and south of a line drawn from Portland through- Forest Grove; and all of the lands lying in the quadrant north and west of Forest Grove were unearned lands, and forfeited under the act of January 31, 1885. These lands “ are adjacent to and coterminous with the uncompleted portions of said road, and not embraced within the limits of *538 said grant for the completed portions of said road.” But although a part of the lands lying east of this quadrant “are adjacent to and coterminous with the uncompleted portions of said road,” yet they are “ embraced within said grant for the'completed portions of said road,” for they lie within the twenty mile limits of the completed portion from Portland to Forest Grove.

The railroad companies contend that no such thing as a branch road or a junction in the ordinary sense of the word was contemplated, and that, having a right to build from Portland to Astoria, and “ from a suitable point of junction near Forest Grove to the Yamhill Biver near McMinnville,” .they could treat the act as if it authorized the building of a continuous road from Portland via Forest Grove to McMinnville, without regard to the provisions for a road beyond Forest Grove to Astoria; and, by constructing their road with, a curve at Forest Grove, could properly claim all of the lanas falling within twenty miles of this circuitous route from Portland to McMinnville as intended to be granted for the construction of such a road. And, having actually so built, that they were entitled to all the lands lying within a quadrant produced by a radius reaching twenty miles from the curve.

Secretary Lamar rejected this contention and held that the act' of May 4, 1870, contemplated two distinct roads, a road from Portland to Astoria, and a road from Forest Grove to McMinnville; that the words “point of junction” were to be given their usual meaning of a point where two or more roads join; that had the words of forfeiture “ so much of the lands granted ... as are adjacent to and coterminous with the uncompleted portion of said road,” been unqualified, the line dividing the forfeited lands from those not forfeited would have been drawn through Forest Grove at right angles to the unconstructed road at that point and terminating at the lateral limits of the grant, but that as this would have thrown out of the grant large tracts of lands that were opposite to the constructed portions of the road, Congress qualified the words of forfeiture by adding “ and not embraced within the limits *539 of said grant for the completed portions of said road,” which saved to the grant a full complement of lands granted for every mile of road actually constructed, and the Secretary remarked that this view of the act was much strengthened “ when it is observed that the lands in said quadrant lie along the uncompleted portion on both sides thereof, and could have been earned, if at all, by that line.”

The rule of construction applicable to the granting act is the familiar rule that all grants of this description must be construed favorably to the government, and that nothing passes but what is conveyed in clear and explicit language. Dubuque & Pacific Railroad v. Litchfield, 23 How. 66, 88; Leavenworth, Lawrence &c. Railroad Co. v. United States, 92 U. S. 733, 740; Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U. S. 412, 437; Coosaw Mining Company v. South Carolina, 144 U. S. 550, 562. And that the construction should be such as will effectuate the legislative intention, avoiding, if possible, an unjust or absurd conclusion, is also well settled.

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United States v. Oregon & California Railroad, 164 U.S. 526, 17 S. Ct. 165, 41 L. Ed. 541, 1896 U.S. LEXIS 1888 (1896).

164 U.S. 526 (United States v. Oregon & California Railroad) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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