United States v. Union Pacific Railway Co.

148 U.S. 562, 13 S. Ct. 724, 37 L. Ed. 560, 1893 U.S. LEXIS 2253
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedApril 10, 1893
Docket149
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 148 U.S. 562 (United States v. Union Pacific Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 148 U.S. 562, 13 S. Ct. 724, 37 L. Ed. 560, 1893 U.S. LEXIS 2253 (1893).

Opinion

Me. Justice Bbown,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The object of this bill is to procure the surrender and cancellation of certain patents issued for a triangular tract of land of about 200,000 acres iii extent, lying upon the outside of the right angle, or elbow, made by the junction at Denver of the Nansas Pacific Railway, whose general course is east and west, with the Denver Pacific Railway and Telegraph Company, whose general course is north and south. These roads are now consolidated under the name of the Union Pacific Railway Company.

*568 By the Original act of July 1, 1862, incorporating the Union Pacific Railroad Company, 12 Stat. 189, c. 120, this company was empowered to construct a road from a point on the one hundredth meridian, between certain north'and south limits, to the western boundary of Nevada, and by the same act a Kansas corporation was empowered to construct its line from the Missouri River westwardly to the initial point of the Union Pacific at the one hundredth meridian, and to connect with the latter road at that point. Subsequently, and in 1866, the Kansas corporation, whose name had meantime been changed to the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, was authorized to so change its line as to connect with the Union Pacific at a point not more than fifty miles westward from the meridian of Denver.- Acting upon this, the company did change its line so as to make the same extend from Kansas City westward in a direct line to Denver, and thence northward in a direct line to Cheyenne. By the original act, the Union Pacific was to receive a grant of five alternate sections of land for every mile, (subsequently raised to ten,) on each side of the road, and as the Kansas corporation was to construct its road “ upon the same terms and conditions in all respects” as the Union Pacific, it followed that it was entitled to the same land grant. The act authorizing the Kansas corporation to change its' line of road, 11. Stat. 79, c. 159, provided that, upon the filing of a map, showing, the general route of the-road, the lands along the entire line thereof, so far as the same might be designated, should be reserved from sale by order of the Secretary of the Interior, showing clearly that it was designed to preserve the land grant to which the road was entitled under the original act.

In this condition of things tlie act of 18.69 was passed, which authorized this corporation, then, known as the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, to contract with the Denver Pacific, a Colorado corporation, for the construction of that portion of its line between ■ Denver and Cheyenne, (hereby clearly recognizing the validity of the change of location,) to adopt its road-bed, to grant to tlie Denver Pacific a “ perpetual use of its right of way and- depot grounds, and to transfer to it *569 all the rights and privileges, subject to all the obligations appertaining to such, part of its line.” Even supposing that the act of 1866 did not, upon its face, authorize the change that was actually made, that is, westwardly to Cheyenne, by the way of Denver, it is clear that, by the act of March, 1869, this line was recognized as a proper compliance with the act of 1866, and as a valid and continuous line from Kansas City to Cheyenne.

The position of the government in this connection is that the act of 1869 separated the grant of lands to the Denver Pacific from that in aid of the Eastern Division of the Union Pacific, and thereby made them two distinct and independent lines of road, each with its own land grant. This construction would disentitle the Kansas Pacific Company to any lands west of its terminus at Denver, or west of a north and south line across its twenty-mile limit, and the'Denver Pacific to any lands south of its terminus at the same place, leaving a triangular piece of about 200,000 acres to revert to the government.. These are the lands in dispute.

We do not, however, so read the act. It did not declare that the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, should end at Denver or that the Denver Pacific should begin at Denver, but simply that the former might contract with the latter for the construction, operation and maintenance of a part of its line. Under the interpretation contended for, if that part had been between the one hundredth meridian and Denver, instead of between Denver and Chejmnne, it would thereby have made it a distinct and independent line of road, though running in the same direction.

It is true that, under the original act of 1862, the grant was limited to the odd-numbered sections “ on each side of said railroad, on the line thereof, and within the limits of ten miles on each side of said road,” but it does not follow that if the road makes a curve or right angle, the grant ceases in any way to be operative at that point. The railroad is entitled to its grant of ten alternate sections to each mile, of road, and is entitled to have it selected within the limits of twenty miles on each side; but there is no requirement that *570 the lands shall be reached by a line run at right angles to the road.. Considerable light is thrown upon the interpretation of the statute of 1869 by the phraseology of section 2, which provides that the Union -Pacific, Eastern Division, shall extend its line to Denver, “ so as to form with that part of its line herein. authorized to be constructed ” by. the Denver Pacific 9 a continuous Une of railroad and telegraph from Kansas City, by way of Denver, to Cheyenne,” and that “ all the provisions of law for the operation of the Union Pacific Railroad, its branches and connections, as a continuous line, without discrimination, shall apply the same as if the road from Denver to Cheyenne had been constructed by the Union Pacific Railway Company, Eastern Division.” So far from this language indicating that this was not to be considered a single line, it is difficult to see how Congress could have expressed more clearly, by inference, that they were not to be treated as independent roads. This construction is also reinforced by the amendatory act of June 20, 1874, 18 Stat. Ill, which provides that “ for all the purposes of said act,” (of 1862,) “and of the acts amendatory thereof, the railway of the Denver Pacific Railway and Telegraph Company shall be deemed and taken to be a part and extension- of the road of the Kansas Pacific Railroad, to the point of junction thereof with the road of the Union Pacific Railroad Company at Cheyenne, as provided in the act- of March third, 1869.”

Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the act of 1862, being a grant inprmenti, the rights of the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, to the lands upon each side of its road became fixed from the moment it proceeded, under the act of 1866, to establish its line of definite location so as to make the same extend from Kansas City ivestwardly to Denver, and thence northwardly to Cheyenne; and, in fact, that was practically the ruling of this court in Missouri, Kansas &c. Railway v. Kansas Pacific Railroad Company, 97 U. S. 491, 496, 497, 498. But however this may be, it is entirely clear that the act of 1869 should not be construed to have the effect of breaking the continuity of the line unless its language impera *571 tively requires it.

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Bluebook (online)
148 U.S. 562, 13 S. Ct. 724, 37 L. Ed. 560, 1893 U.S. LEXIS 2253, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-union-pacific-railway-co-scotus-1893.