Dubuque & Pacific Railroad v. Litchfield

64 U.S. 66, 16 L. Ed. 500, 23 How. 66, 1859 U.S. LEXIS 753
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedApril 18, 1860
StatusPublished
Cited by66 cases

This text of 64 U.S. 66 (Dubuque & Pacific Railroad v. Litchfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dubuque & Pacific Railroad v. Litchfield, 64 U.S. 66, 16 L. Ed. 500, 23 How. 66, 1859 U.S. LEXIS 753 (1860).

Opinion

Mr. Justice CATRON

delivered the opinion of the court.

The land in controversy lies within five .miles of the Des Moines river, and within the limits of what was the Iowa Territory when the act of Congress of 1846 was passed, making the grant to improve the navigation of the Des Moines river from its mouth to the Raccoon fork; but'the land sued for lies nearly sixty miles above the mouth of that fork.'

Litchfield, the plaintiff below, claims by virtue of a title derived from the State of Iowa, acting as trustee of the Des Moines river fund.

The Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company is in possession of the section of land, under a grant from Congress for the purpose of constructing a railroad from Dubuque, on the Mississippi river, to a point on the Missouri river near Sioux city. This grant was made to the State of Towa in 1856, and is for every alternate section, (designated by odd numbers,) for six sections in width on each side of the road. The road was located, the lands designated by the United States, and accepted by Iowa; and then they were transferred to the railroad company by the Legislature of that State. The section iu dispute is one of those vested in the railroad company. This is the younger and inferior title, .if the first grant for im *84 proving the river extends álong.its whole length; and the ma< terial question in this case, is, whether the grant made by the act of Congress of August 8th, 1846, for the river improvement, is limited to lands lying next the river, and below the Raccoon Fork. And although this depends on a true construction of the. act, still it becomes necessary to give a brief historical statement of the proceedings before the Executive department respecting this claim, extending through -more than ten years; these proceedings being relied on, either to . conclude the title, or to control the construction of the act of Congress.

They are as follows: By the act of Congress approved August 8th, 1846, a grant of land was made to the Territory of Iowa “for the purpose of aiding said Territory .to improve the navigation of the Des Moines river from its mouth to the Raccoon fork, in said Territory, one equal moiety, in alternate sections, of the public lands (remaining unsold and not otherwise disposed of, encumbered, or appropriated) in a strip five miles in width on each side of said river, to be selected within said Territory, by an agent to be appointed by the Governor thereof, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States.”

. .The 4th section of that act provides that.the lands shall be-come the property of the. State of Iowa on her. admission'into the Union, which was. very- soon expected to occur! The Governor of Iowa was notified by the Commissioner of the General Land Office of this act, soon after its passage, viz: October 17, 1846, by letter, in which it is stated that, “ under the grant, the Territory is entitled to the vacant lands,; in alternate sections, within five miles on each side of the Des Moines rivér, from the "northern boundary of Missouri to the Raccoon fork.”

No objection to this construction was then made by the State authorities, and the agent , of the State, proceeded to make the selections within the limits, above stated.

No question as to the extent of this grant arose until nearly two years after. . It "appears, however, that a letter dated February 23d, 1848, from Commissioner Young, did not adhere *85 to the restrictions .mentioned in the.first- letter, but its terms seemed to concede to it a greater extent. And in 1849 this question was brought to the attention of the Secretary of the Treasury, by the delegation of the State in Congress; they claiming that the State was entitled to land along the whole course of the river to its source. In reply, (March 2d, 1849,) the Secretary, Mr. Walker, expresses an opinion that the “ grant extends on both sides of the river from its source to its mouth, but not into lands on the river in the State of Missouri.” • This opinion conceded that nine hundred, ihousand acres above the Raccoon fprk. was within the grant. "

In conformity with this view of Mr. Walker, selections of lands above the fork were reported by the Commissioner- of the General Land Office, for confirmation, to the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Ewing; the supervision of-the public lands-having passed from the Treasury to the Interior Department. Mr. Ewing, upon the ground that the opinion of Mr.-Walker had not been carried into efiect, held thatrthé same was open for revision’; and not concurring therein* refused to approve the selections. But, as Congress was .then in session, and might.. “ extend the grant,” ordered a suspension of action in the matter.

From this decision of Mr. Ewing an appeal was taken in - 1850 to the President, by whom the matter was referred to the Attorney -General, Mr. Johnson, who, in his opinion of July. 19, 1850, construed the grant as extending above the Raccoon fork.

No action appears to have been taken under this opinion of Mr. Johnson ; ¿nd the question remained open at the accession of-the next President, Mr. Fillmore, when it was submitted to the Attorney General, Mr. Crittenden, who, on the 30th Jun.e, 1851, replied that the letter of Mr. Walker, had no binding effect on his’ successor, being but an opinion expressed, not an act done ;■ that the opinions of Attorney Generals are merely advisory; and that the grant, in hisiopinion, was limited to the lands below the -fork. In this opinion it appears that Mr. Stuart- (then Secretary of the Interior) concurred; but after-.wards, on the 29th October, 1851, he addressed the Commis *86 sioner of the General Land Office on the subject, and directed the selections above the Raccoon fork to be reported for his approval, for the reasons and upon the conditions thérein stated, viz: “that the question involved partakes more of a judicial than of an executive character, which must ultimately b‘e determined by the judicial tribunals of the country.” In conformity with this decision, lists of lands above the fork were submitted by the Commissioner in. October, 1851, and March, 1852, and approved by Mr. Stuart in accordance with the .views expressed in his letter of the'29th October, 1851. Acting under this authority, the Commissioner, in 1853, submitted lists to Secretary McClelland also, which were approved. The subject was again brought before the Secretary of the Interior in 1856, and by him referred to Attorney General Cushing. Mr. Cushing,,-in his reply of 29th May,-1856, advised that a proposition set forth by him be submitted to the State for a final adjustment of the matter. This proposition was not accepted by the State; and in 1858 -the subject was laid before Attorney General Black, whose’opinion clearly restricted the grant to the river below the Raccoon fork; that being in accordance with the construction Originally given to it at the General -Land Office. On mature consideration, we -are of opinion that the title of neither party has been affected by the proceedings in the Land Office, or by the opinions of the officers of the Executive department, but that the claims of the 'parties under the two acts 'of Congress must be 'determined by the construction to be given to those acts. This we are required'to do in deciding this cause.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r
126 T.C. No. 6 (U.S. Tax Court, 2006)
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company v. Murray City
277 P.2d 798 (Utah Supreme Court, 1954)
California v. United States
119 F. Supp. 174 (Court of Claims, 1954)
United States v. Goltra
312 U.S. 203 (Supreme Court, 1941)
United States v. Great Northern Ry. Co.
32 F. Supp. 651 (D. Montana, 1940)
State ex rel. Hunter v. Home Savings & Loan Ass'n
288 N.W. 691 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1939)
Noble v. Oklahoma City
1935 OK 162 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1935)
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. United States
66 Ct. Cl. 378 (Court of Claims, 1928)
Zinberg v. United States
16 Ct. Cust. 268 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1928)
Eiken v. Minnesota & Manitoba Railroad
186 N.W. 226 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1922)
City of Sacramento v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
161 P. 978 (California Supreme Court, 1916)
United States v. Midwest Oil Co.
236 U.S. 459 (Supreme Court, 1915)
Russell v. Sebastian
233 U.S. 195 (Supreme Court, 1914)
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. United States
47 Ct. Cl. 59 (Court of Claims, 1911)
State ex rel. Chandler v. McQuillin
130 S.W. 9 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1910)
Oregon v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co.
95 P. 722 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1908)
Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville
200 U.S. 22 (Supreme Court, 1906)
Story v. Woolverton
78 P. 589 (Montana Supreme Court, 1904)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
64 U.S. 66, 16 L. Ed. 500, 23 How. 66, 1859 U.S. LEXIS 753, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dubuque-pacific-railroad-v-litchfield-scotus-1860.