OAKES, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from judgments of conviction entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Eugene H. Nickerson, Judge, following a jury trial. Appellant William Valencia was acquitted on Count One of the indictment charging him with conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, but convicted on Counts Two and Three charging him with distributing cocaine and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Appellant Olga Valencia was convicted on all three counts, but at sentencing the Government moved to dismiss Count One as to her.- Appellant William Valencia was sentenced to concurrent terms of three years’ imprisonment with a special parole of five years. Appellant Olga Valencia was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three years and six months with a special parole term of ten years.
Appellant William Valencia primarily argues that the trial court erred in improperly withdrawing a major part of his entrapment defense during jury deliberations. Because we agree with that argument, we reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial. Both appellants also claim that the warrantless search of their apartment violated their Fourth Amendment rights and that other portions of the district court’s supplemental instructions on entrapment were erroneous. In addition, appellant Olga Valencia argues that the evidence at trial established that she was entrapped as a matter of law and that the court’s modified Allen charge1 was coercive. We disagree with these arguments and accordingly affirm Olga Valencia’s conviction.
I. FACTS
On May 17, 1979, government informant Maria Palacio and undercover detective Jose Guzman, assigned to the New York Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Task Force, arrived at the apartment of appellants William and Olga Valencia in [1161]*1161Queens, New York. Olga let them into the apartment where William was sitting at the kitchen table. Palacio told the Valencias that Guzman had come to buy cocaine from them. When Guzman asked to examine the cocaine, Olga produced a triple-beam balance scale and two bags containing a white substance. Guzman told her that she need not weigh the cocaine because any discrepancy could be rectified in future purchases. The Valencias assured him that the cocaine was pure. After Guzman performed a test on the cocaine, there was a disagreement about the price. Olga sought to charge him $6,500 for the one-eighth of a kilogram involved, while Guzman countered with $6,300 because he claimed that the cocaine was not pure. According to Guzman’s testimony, William interjected that they could not accept $6,300 because their profit margin would be too low. They finally settled on a price of $6,450. Guzman testified that he handed this sum to William and that William then handed it to Olga, stating that she could count it more quickly.
As the money was being counted, according to Guzman, William told Guzman that he “used to be in the business,” but had to turn the duties over to Olga because he had been injured in an automobile accident. Before leaving, Guzman expressed interest in making additional purchases. Appellants told him that they would be able to supply as much “weight” as he wanted as long as they received one day’s advance notice.
Five days later, Guzman went back to the apartment. There he talked with William and another person who was later identified as Arturo Arboleda. In response to a question from William, Guzman told him that the cocaine that he had purchased from them was not as pure as he had been led to believe. Olga was not home, but William urged Guzman to wait because Olga had some higher quality cocaine to sell him. Guzman left and returned in half an hour, but Olga still had not returned. Guzman then left without making any additional purchases.
Guzman next met with Olga on June 14, 1979, on a Queens street. He sought to buy additional cocaine, but she told him that she did not have any. According to Guzman, she told him that her “connection,” Arbole-da, had been arrested, but that she was attempting to find a new connection and knew one source of supply from which she could get a kilogram for $68,000. On June 20, the Valencias told Guzman at their apartment that they had found a new connection, but that he had failed to meet them at a prearranged time. When Olga failed to reach the connection after trying again, Guzman left.
The Valencias had advised Guzman that they were planning to move because they feared they were being followed by the police. Thus alerted, the DEA Task Force arrested the Valencias on June 21, 1979. Olga was arrested without a warrant on a street outside the Valencias’ apartment. In response to a question from the officers, Olga told them that William was inside the apartment. They asked Olga if they could enter the apartment. She did not respond, but walked toward the apartment. The officers then followed her into the apartment without protest from her. Once inside the apartment, the officers arrested William, also without a warrant. One of the officers, Detective Robert Johnson, drew his gun just before entering, but Olga did not see it. Johnson then handed to Olga and William a card with Miranda warnings in Spanish. The Valencias indicated that they understood the warnings. According to the officers’ testimony at a pretrial suppression hearing, which testimony Judge Nickerson found “wholly credible,” Johnson asked Olga if the officers could search the apartment and she gave her consent, stating that she had “nothing to hide.” Johnson then searched Olga’s pocketbook, which was lying on the kitchen table within reach of Olga and William. Pieces of paper with narcotics-related writing were found in the pocketbook. A balance scale, strainer and spoon with traces of cocaine were found in a closet, and a bag containing a cocaine cutting substance, ino-sitol, was found in the bedroom.
[1162]*1162Olga’s defense at trial was essentially entrapment. William relied on entrapment to some extent, although counsel for William also argued in summation that there was insufficient evidence to link William to the cocaine transactions at all.2
Maria Palacio, the government informant, was called to testify by William Valencia. She had agreed to cooperate with the DEA because her son had been arrested on a cocaine charge and she was trying to aid his case. Palacio testified that she first spoke to Olga in Elisa’s Bar in Queens in May of 1979, when Olga approached her, although she had seen Olga in the bar before that time. According to Palacio, Olga told her that she needed money and Palacio expressed a similar need to Olga. Palacio testified that Olga then told her that she had cocaine to sell, but did not have any customers. They entered into an agreement, according to Palacio, whereby Palacio would find customers for Olga in exchange for a share of the proceeds. Palacio later testified that Olga was the first one to bring up the subject of drugs. Palacio then reported this conversation to the DEA authorities and agreed to introduce an undercover agent to Olga.
Palacio further testified that on the evening of May 16, 1979, the day before the sale to Guzman, she and Olga met a man, whom Olga described as her “connection,” on a street corner in Queens. According to Palacio, Olga said the connection had left a sample of the coeaine at the Valencias’ apartment. Palacio testified that they then drove to the apartment where they found a tinfoil packet of cocaine which had been left with William. Olga gave it to Palacio, who turned it over to Detective Johnson. Palacio indicated that she never spoke to William directly about cocaine.
Olga then took the stand in her own defense and testified that she had met Pala-cio at Elisa’s Bar after she had begun to work there as a cleaning woman in February of 1979. Olga testified that she complained to Palacio about her need for money as a result of William’s auto accident, and that Palacio responded that her son had been involved in selling cocaine and that they could make money by selling cocaine themselves to her son’s former customers. Olga claimed that she initially resisted the idea, but that from February to May of 1979 Palacio was continually “pushing” and “coercing” her to enter into the cocaine selling plan. Olga testified that she finally capitulated because of her financial difficulties. Shortly after this, Olga testified, Pa-lacio supplied her with the scale, the spoon, the strainer, and a small amount of cocaine.
It was Olga’s testimony that on May 17, 1979, the day the cocaine was sold to Guzman, she received one-eighth of a kilogram of cocaine and the cutting substance at Elisa’s Bar from someone she knew only as “Jose.” She testified that Jose gave her the cocaine on credit even though they did not know each other well. Olga admitted selling the cocaine to Guzman, and admitted that the narcotics-related writing found in her pocketbook was hers. But she denied that William had any involvement with the sale of cocaine and disputed testimony by Detective Johnson that she had engaged in evasive driving tactics on one occasion as she and William were driving to Arboleda’s apartment.
II. INSTRUCTIONS
No objection was taken by defense counsel or is made here to the district court’s initial instruction on entrapment noted in the margin.3 Twice more, in response to jury requests, the court reread this original [1163]*1163entrapment charge. Upon a third request by the jury for elaboration upon the subject of entrapment, particularly with respect to “the degree of inducement by a Government agent which would constitute entrapment,” the court delivered a modified and extended version of its previous charge, also set forth in the margin.4 This charge was objected to by defense counsel on the grounds that it was one-sided and failed to mention reasonable doubt.
Shortly thereafter, the judge solicited counsel’s views on whether or not the defendant William Valencia was entitled to the defense of entrapment at all because he had not been directly induced by a government agent but rather, if at all, by his codefendant Olga. After some argument on the issue, the court decided that it would not withdraw the entrapment defense entirely from William despite the fact that a portion of his defense was that he had [1164]*1164nothing to do with the transaction. The court instead permitted the jury to consider whether or not William was entrapped directly by Guzman or Palacio at some point, but instructed the jury that William could not be indirectly entrapped through communications from Olga. That supplementary instruction is also set forth in the margin.5 Counsel for William then objected to the charge on the grounds that the jury had not requested it and that it was inconsistent with the court’s prior instructions. Ten minutes later, the jury returned with its verdict finding William not guilty on the conspiracy count but guilty on the other two counts. At the same time, the jury stated that it was “deadlocked on whether Olga was a victim of entrapment.” The next day the court gave the jury a modified Allen charge and further explanation of the entrapment principle, which is also set forth in the margin.6 There is no indication that defense counsel objected to either. Thereafter, the jury returned with yet another note, which read:
According to the law does the willingness and readiness of a person to commit an unlawful act have to be present before any initiation by a government agent-or does the fact that a person was willing and ready to commit an unlawful act without hesitation when the suggestion was made by the agent determine whether entrapment exists?
The court’s response to this question was not objected to by counsel and is set forth in the margin.7 The jury returned fifteen minutes later with a verdict of guilty as to Olga on all three counts.
[1165]*1165III. DISCUSSION
We dispose of appellants’ meritless contentions first.
A. The warrantless entry into and search of appellants’ apartment. Appellants claim that the evidence seized during the warrantless entry into and search of their apartment should have been suppressed because it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. This evidence included the narcotics-related writing, the triple-beam balance scale, the strainer, the spoon, and the cocaine cutting substance. Appellants had stipulated that on June 21, 1979, the date of their arrest, police officers from the DEA Task Force had probable cause to arrest them.
Despite Olga’s testimony that she never consented to a search of the apartment, the district court denied appellants’ suppression motion. The court found that following Olga’s arrest she consented to the entry by the officers into the apartment and that even if she had not there were exigent circumstances which permitted entry. The court further found that the items obtained in the apartment were seized pursuant to a valid consent, and that the seizure of the narcotics-related writings was incident to the lawful arrest of William.
There is no reason to disturb the district court’s findings that Olga voluntarily consented to the entry into and search of the apartment. Whether consent is voluntarily given is “a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In order to establish a valid consent, it need not be shown that there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to refuse consent, unlike the situation in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), which required such an explicit waiver before a defendant could be found to have relinquished rights designed “to preserve a fair trial.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at 237, 93 S.Ct. at 2053. The Court in Schneckloth held such a strict standard inapplicable to waivers of Fourth Amendment rights because those rights do not affect the fairness of the trial. Id: at 241, 93 S.Ct. at 2055. Nor does the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), “require[ ] the conclusion that knowledge of a right to refuse is an indispensable element of a valid consent.” Schneckloth v. Busta-monte, supra, 412 U.S. at 246, 93 S.Ct. at 2058. Since no showing is thus required that Olga knew of her right to refuse consent or that she intelligently waived that right, the district court’s findings that she voluntarily consented to the entry and search must be upheld unless it is clear from the evidence either that she was coerced or that the court’s finding of consent was clearly erroneous.
There is no evidence that the DEA agents coerced Olga into letting them enter the apartment. When they asked if they could enter, Olga walked toward the apartment and opened the door for them with a set of keys. She did not protest their entry in any way. There was no coercion other than that inherently arising from the fact of her arrest, which is itself insufficient to demonstrate that the consent was coerced. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 828, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). While Detective Johnson drew his gun just before Olga opened the apartment door, Olga testified that she never saw Johnson draw the gun.
Similarly, there is no reason to dispute the district court’s finding that Olga gave her voluntary consent to a search of the apartment. Although Olga testified at the suppression hearing that she never gave such consent, the district judge found her testimony on this score “wholly incredible” and the agents’ testimony “wholly credible.” Nothing in the record indicates that the district court erred in evaluating the testimony in this fashion, or that Olga was in any way coerced into consenting to the search.
Finally, the search of Olga’s pocketbook containing the narcotics-related writing can also be justified as incidental to a [1166]*1166lawful arrest, irrespective of Olga’s consent to search. The pocketbook was on the table within reach of both William and Olga, and an arresting officer is entitled to search belongings in “the area into which an arres-tee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
B. The charge as a whole. Leaving aside momentarily the question of the instruction that removed most of the entrapment defense from William Valencia, the rest of the court’s charge contained no reversible error. The court’s initial instruction on entrapment, note 3 supra, conformed with this court’s recommendations in United States v. Martinez-Carcano, 557 F.2d 966, 970 (2d Cir. 1977), and United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799, 805 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1064, 92 S.Ct. 1493, 31 L.Ed.2d 794 (1972). As this court suggested in those cases, nowhere in the charge did the district court refer to any “burden” or “burden of proof” imposed on defendants to establish government inducement as a prerequisite to claiming entrapment. In response to notes from the jury, the court twice reread this charge, which appellants have never challenged.
Appellants contend that the court’s first supplemental instruction, note 4 supra, failed to correct a possible misunderstanding on the part of the jury that defendants were required initially to prove inducement beyond a reasonable doubt before entrapment could be found. This instruction was given in response to a jury request for elaboration on “the degree of inducement by a Government agent which would constitute entrapment” and for “the definition of inducement.” The court once again declined to allocate the burden of proof on the inducement question and focused instead on whether defendants had the propensity to commit the offense. If the court had followed the course now suggested by appellants and had instructed the jury on “the burden and level of proof required to show inducement,” it once again would have run afoul of the principles set out by this court in Martinez-Carcano, supra, and Braver, supra. Under those cases, the district court should not instruct the jury that there is any burden at all on defendants to prove inducement. There is little risk that the jury will impose too great a burden on defendants if no burden is mentioned at all. Indeed, if anything, the district court’s initial and first supplemental instructions here were generous to defendants since there instructions emphasized the question of propensity-a question that is only reached when there is sufficient evidence of inducement.
Appellants further challenge this first supplemental instruction on the ground that it failed to reiterate the requirement that the Government prove propensity beyond a reasonable doubt. At the conclusion of this instruction, however, the court explicitly stated: “Bear in mind, the balance of my instructions with respect to every element of the case, the burden of proof and so forth.” This referred the jury back to the initial charge where the Government’s burden of proof was properly set out.
Appellants also argue that the district judge, in the same instruction in which he discussed William Valencia’s entrapment defense, note 5 supra, confused the jury by implying that defendants were obligated to prove inducement beyond a reasonable doubt. The portion of the charge objected to reads:
[W]hatever entrapment there is, if you find that there was under the instructions that I have given you, if you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, there was the element which I charged you, the entrapment would have to take place by a government employee or agent.
(Emphasis added.) To the extent that there is any arguable confusion in this charge, it is insignificant when the entire charge is read in context. And a subsequent instruction, note 6 supra, corrected any misimpression that may have been left.
Appellant Olga further claims that the court improperly failed to clarify the [1167]*1167meaning of the term “hesitation” in its final supplemental charge on entrapment, note 7 supra, but counsel did not object, the term has a common, readily understandable meaning, and there was no need for further clarification. Several other passages which appellants argue were confusing to the jury are also insignificant given the' correctness of the charge as a whole.
The modified Allen charge, given after about a day and a half of deliberations, was practically identical to that approved by this court in United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 111, 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975, 985, 99 S.Ct. 1545, 1801, 59 L.Ed.2d 794, 60 L.Ed.2d 248 (1979). Appellant Olga seeks to distinguish this case from Corcione on the following grounds: (1) that there was a large heroin smuggling operation in Corcione while this case involved only one sale of one-eighth of a kilogram of cocaine; (2) that the trial judge in Corcione asked the jury to decide for itself if further deliberations would be productive, while in this case the jury was told to deliberate further; (3) that in Corcione the jury deliberated for four additional hours after the charge, while here they deliberated only a little over an hour; and (4) that in the present case the jury had already previously convicted the codefendant, whereas in Corcione there had been no convictions when the Allen charge was given. These distinctions are insubstantial and do not make the charge given here any more coercive than that in Corcione. The district court made it clear to the jurors that they were not to surrender any conscientiously held views. See United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 517 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905, 98 S.Ct. 1451, 55 L.Ed.2d 496 (1978).
C. Entrapment as a matter of law. Appellant Olga argues that the Government failed as a matter of law to prove that she was ready, willing and able to commit the crimes charged, i. e., that she had a propensity to sell cocaine, once defendants had introduced evidence of inducement. She contends that the sole evidence of predisposition in the record was Detective Guzman’s testimony that she had a familiarity with terms and expressions related to narcotics. But even if the jury found that Olga was induced by Palacio, there was still sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, for the jury to find that Olga had the propensity to commit the offense and hence was not entrapped.
Once evidence of inducement has been introduced, the Government may prove the propensity of the defendant to commit an offense by showing:
(1) an existing course of criminal conduct similar to the crime for which he is charged, (2) an already formed design on the part of the accused to commit the crime for which he is charged, or (3) a willingness to commit the crime for which he is charged as evidenced by the accused’s ready response to the inducement.
United States v. Viviano, 437 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983, 91 S.Ct. 1659, 29 L.Ed.2d 149 (1971). There is evidence in the record to support all three of these elements of propensity.
Maria Palacio testified that Olga told her that she had cocaine to sell but needed customers. There was evidence that the Valencias had a readily available source of supply for cocaine, Arturo Arboleda. The fact that Olga was able to get a substantial amount of cocaine on credit from Jose at Elisa’s Bar would support an inference that Olga had dealt in cocaine on prior occasions. Moreover, Detective Johnson’s testimony about Olga’s evasive driving maneuvers and Detective Guzman’s testimony as to the Valencias’ knowledge of the quality and price of the cocaine might lead a jury to believe that the Valencias were somewhat experienced with cocaine transactions. The jury could also have relied on Guzman’s testimony that William told him that he used to be in the drug business and Guzman’s additional testimony that the Valencias told him they could supply him with as much cocaine as he could handle. All of this evidence could support a jury finding either that the Valencias had been engaged in a similar “course of criminal conduct,” or had already formed the design to sell cocaine and were merely looking for a buyer.
[1168]*1168In addition, even if the jury found that Olga had not intended to sell cocaine until her contact with Palacio, there was evidence that Olga made a “ready response to the inducement” by agreeing with Palacio’s plan when first proposed. While Olga testified to the contrary that she resisted the idea for some time, the jury was entitled to discredit that testimony. See United States v. Ordner, 554 F.2d 24, 28-29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824, 98 S.Ct. 71, 54 L.Ed.2d 82 (1977).
D. William’s defense of entrapment. The most troubling question in the case relates to William Valencia’s entrapment defense and the supplementary charge, note 5 supra. It was the judge’s thought, and is the Government’s position on appeal, that because a defendant cannot be entrapped unless he has had actual contact with a government agent who directly induced him to commit the offense, William was not entitled to have the defense of entrapment through indirect inducement go to the jury.8 We cannot agree with this view. If a person is brought into a criminal scheme after being informed indirectly of conduct or statements by a government agent which could amount to inducement, then that person should be able to avail himself of the defense of entrapment just as may the person who receives the inducement directly.
Our reading of United States v. Swider-ski, 539 F.2d 854, 858-59 (2d Cir. 1976), is to this effect.9 The Government argued in that case that since codefendant De Los Santos was not exposed to constant conversations with the government informant, her willpower could not have been broken down. Id. at 858. Thus the Government asserted that there never was any inducement of De Los Santos, who had been brought into the illegal activity by her fiance, Swiderski, who in turn had been in contact with the government agent. Id. at 859. This court rejected that argument and held that De Los Santos was entitled to an entrapment instruction, noting that, since De Los Santos was Swiderski’s “fiancee and apparently his constant companion,” there was a “fair inference that he told her of the importuning by [the informant], if that, in fact, happened.” Id. In the present case, there was more than simply the close marital relationship between William and Olga. Olga’s testimony revealed that after the inducement to her and prior to the sale underlying the May 17, 1979 sale, Palacio, the allegedly inducing government informant, had made frequent visits to William’s and Olga’s apartment, which William was unable to leave because of his injuries, during which time Palacio was continually “pushing” and “coercing” Olga to sell cocaine. It also appeared, from Palacio’s testimony, that William was aware that a sale was in progress the night before it took place. From all these circumstances the inference might readily be drawn that the inducement had been communicated to William.10 In general, we hold that a vicarious [1169]*1169entrapment defense can be presented to a jury only where the defendant first introduces admissible evidence that the agent’s inducement was directly communicated to him by another. In this case, however, we remand for a determination by the trial judge whether there was sufficient evidence of direct communication between Olga and William to permit the question of inducement of William to go to the jury. If there was not, the conviction should be affirmed. If there was, William should be given a new trial.
In Swiderski, the alleged inducement of De Los Santos took place not only through an invitation by the informant to have Swiderski attend a “party,” an invitation which was conveyed to De Los Santos by Swiderski, but also through the “fear” instilled in both of them by the informant when he sought to sell them cocaine. The Government seeks to distinguish Swiderski by the fact that De Los Santos was physically present with the informant when some of the purported inducement occurred. But the court explicitly said: “[T]he inducement .. . was the luring of appellants to a room for a party and the subsequent instilling of fear by the government informer.” Id. at 859 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the distinction is unavailing. The Swiderski court clearly contemplated that the invitation could be considered part of the inducement of De Los Santos even though it was communicated to her by her fiance and not directly by a government agent. Indeed, the argument in favor of William here is stronger than it was for De Los Santos since here the indirect inducement allegedly caused William to engage in actual criminal activity, as opposed to merely causing a defendant to appear at a scene where criminal activity was to take place.11
It is apparent that William could invoke the entrapment defense based on communications from Olga despite the fact that the jury found that Olga had not been entrapped. If there is sufficient evidence of inducement by a government agent to permit the case to go to the jury, then the question of entrapment turns on the individual propensity of each defendant who may have been induced. Thus, the jury might well have convicted Olga because it found that she had the propensity to commit the offense. That does not mean, how[1170]*1170ever, that the jury would necessarily find that William also had such a propensity.
The Government has another string in its bow, however, in that it argues that the defense of entrapment should not be available to a defendant who completely denies participation in the criminal acts alleged. The court in Swiderski reserved this question. 539 F.2d at 859 & n.4. As Swiderski pointed out, two cases in this circuit, United States v. Pagano, 207 F.2d 884, 885 (2d Cir. 1953) (per curiam), and United States v. Di Donna, 276 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam), have held that it was not error for a trial judge to refuse to charge entrapment where the defendant denied knowledge of participation in any criminal activity. In United States v. Bishop, 367 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1966), however, this court said that there was no need to decide whether a defendant’s denial of “the acts alleged to constitute a crime foreclosed the defense of entrapment.” Bishop took note of Pagano and Di Donna, and implicitly called those cases into question. Id. at 809 n.4. Subsequent cases in this circuit have treated this as an open question. See United States v. Alford, 373 F.2d 508, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 937, 87 S.Ct. 2063, 18 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1967); United States v. Braver, supra, 450 F.2d at 802 n.7; United States v. Licursi, 525 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Swiderski, supra, 539 F.2d at 859 & n.4; United States v. Brown, 544 F.2d 1155, 1159 (2d Cir. 1976). But see id. at 1162 (Bartels, J., concurring).
The other circuits are both literally and figuratively spread all over the map on this question. Indeed, several circuits have either modified or completely changed their positions during the last decade. The First, Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have never permitted a defendant to raise inconsistent defenses,12 while the District of Columbia and Fourth Circuits have consistently permitted such defenses.13 The Ninth Circuit used to prohibit inconsistent defenses, but now permits them.14 The Sixth Circuit has gone in the opposite direction, since it used to allow them, but now appar[1171]*1171ently prohibits them.15 The Fifth Circuit generally doe's not permit inconsistent defenses, but has created several exceptions and has begun to question the propriety of the general ban.16 Finally, the Eighth Circuit like the Second leaves the question [1172]*1172undecided despite earlier cases indicating inconsistent defenses were impermissible.17
In this situation, where the circuits appear to be in conflict, our own cases are not altogether consistent, and the Supreme" Court cases do not address the question,18 we hold that William Valencia, having put the Government on notice in counsel’s opening statement of the assertion of the dual defenses of entrapment and non-involvement, is entitled to raise the defense of entrapment since he did not take the stand to deny personally his participation in the transaction and did not affirmatively introduce any other evidence that he was not involved. Although William’s counsel in summation articulated his client’s position that William was in no way involved in the sale of cocaine and although counsel’s examination of Olga was only to elicit the response from her that William never had anything at all to do with cocaine, that is insufficient to withdraw the entrapment defense from William.
In reaching this conclusion, we need go no further than the Fifth Circuit in making the entrapment defense available to a defendant who, having duly notified the Government of the assertions of dual defenses, chooses not to testify and does not introduce any evidence inconsistent with the defense of entrapment.19 See United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602, 605 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933, 91 S.Ct. 2263, 29 L.Ed.2d 713 (1971). See also United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc). We therefore need not decide whether we would follow the District of Columbia, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits in making the entrapment defense available to a defendant who actually testifies that he did not participate in the alleged criminal activity or uses alibi witnesses to make the same point.
Judgment affirmed as to Olga Valencia; reversed and remanded as to William Valencia.