United States v. Namer

149 F. App'x 385
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedAugust 25, 2005
Docket03-5763
StatusUnpublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 149 F. App'x 385 (United States v. Namer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Namer, 149 F. App'x 385 (6th Cir. 2005).

Opinion

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-Appellant David Namer (“Namer”) appeals his conviction and sentence for ninety-four counts of conspiracy, securities fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion, and a separate count of criminal forfeiture. For the following reasons, we affirm Namer’s conviction in all respects, but remand his case for re-sentencing.

BACKGROUND

A. The Issuance of Private Placement Corporate Notes

After his release from prison following a 1980 conviction for wire fraud, Namer moved to Memphis, Tennessee, where he began a scheme to raise funds for cash-strapped companies with no credit. The scheme involved issuing unregistered corporate notes, known as private placements. These private placements, which would be marketed and sold across the country by licensed security dealers, are not rated by any quality-control organization and are thus high risk.

Namer hired attorney Larry Baresel to prepare the Private Placement Memoranda (“PPM’s”) and to serve as bond counsel during closings. On most of the note issuances Namer planned he was the primary control person, but since Baresel told him that listing himself as control person would require Namer to disclose his prior fraud conviction, Namer never disclosed himself as primary control person in any of the PPM’s.

In 1993, Namer recruited Craig Colwell, a licensed broker at Sutter Securities (“Sutter”), to sell Namer’s private placement notes. Colwell informed Namer that no one would purchase his notes without some form of insurance (a “financial guarantee”). This presented a problem for Namer because any potential insurer would want to conduct due diligence, which Namer’s corporations would not withstand.

B. Namer’s Bribery of Richard Quackenbush

To solve his due diligence problem, Namer entered into a relationship with Richard Quackenbush, a vice-president for Universal Bonding Company (“Universal”) in New Jersey. Universal’s business was issuing performance bonds, which essentially acted as financial guarantee (insurance) bonds, and Quackenbush was in a *389 position to influence whether such bonds were issued. In January 1994, Quackenbush issued a series of performance bonds for Namer’s companies. These guarantees would normally have required collateral equal to the full coverage amount of the bonds, but Namer did not have the collateral, so Universal issued the bonds anyway at a $50,000 premium.

In February 1994, Namer asked Quackenbush for additional bonds without collateral, which Quackenbush approved. Later that month, Quackenbush asked Namer for a $50,000 loan to use in a personal investment. Namer gave him the $50,000 in two checks, making no provision for repayment. A few days later Namer also gave Quackenbush $400 in cash that the latter implied he would accept as a bribe.

Quackenbush continued to approve millions of dollars of performance bonds in violation of Universal’s underwriting requirements and without requiring any collateral. The bribes continued as well. Namer helped Quackenbush create an offshore company (“RJJJ”) to which Namer sent $34,959.46 in checks. In October 1994, Quackenbush sent Namer a fax asking him to pay Quackenbush’s home mortgage, and over a two-year period thereafter, Namer funneled $36,154.91 from one of his companies to pay Quackenbush’s mortgage.

This scheme resulted in Quackenbush’s issuing $17 million in performance bonds for Namer’s companies. Namer never pledged any collateral for these bonds, which ultimately cost Universal and its re-insurer $7.75 million. Namer also never informed any of his investors that their notes were backed up by fraudulently obtained bonds.

C. Namer’s Bribery of Craig Colwell

Once Namer had obtained the performance bonds, Colwell could market Namer’s notes. Over the course of a year and a half, Namer made $90,000 in under-the-table payments to Colwell, who sold over $22 million of Namer’s notes to investors. None of the payments to Colwell was ever disclosed to Colwell’s employer (Sutter) or its clients, or in the PPM’s prepared by Namer and Baresel for prospective investors. The payments to Colwell for selling notes began in January 1994, which coincided with the beginning of Namer’s bribery of Quackenbush in return for his issuing bonds as insurance. The whole scheme ended up costing Sutter $1.2 million, because when the notes went into default Universal refused to pay under some of the performance bonds.

D. Namer’s Bribery of Bruce Barbers

Namer engaged in a similar bribery arrangement with Bruce Barbers of the New York-based brokerage firm Meyers, Pollock, Robbins (“MPR”). As an MPR broker, Barbers sold over $1.5 million in notes for Namer; in return, Namer made $141,155 in corporate check and wire payments to an account held by Barbers under another name. These payments were never disclosed to any purchasers of the notes.

E. Namer’s Falsely Representing That Notes Were Insured

Meanwhile, an audit at Universal revealed problems with performance bonds issued to Namer, causing Quackenbush to resign in March 1995. This development left Namer without a source of performance bonds for his note issues. Namer’s Ponzi scheme required issuing additional notes to pay off prior note obligations. Without new note issues, Namer would default on principal and interest payments on old ones, and his scheme would be discovered.

*390 After leaving Universal, Quackenbush joined another firm, National Surety Specialists. In mid 1995, Namer contacted Quackenbush and succeeded in getting National Surety to issue “consents of surety” for some of his companies. “Consents of surety” are not actual performance bonds insuring the notes, but merely commitment letters from insurance companies to issue insurance if they receive the appropriate collateral. No insurance was ever issued, however, because Namer never provided the requisite collateral; his intent all along was to use the consents of surety to trick investors into believing his notes were insured when they were not.

Namer needed more consents of surety than he could get from National Surety, which led Quackenbush to introduce Nam-er to Fred Smith, who owned Associated Insurance Agency, an insurance brokerage firm in Boston. Smith issued several consents of surety from Ranger Insurance Company, which Ranger never knew of or approved.

Smith gave Namer consents for $18 million in insurance, but both men realized Namer could never provide the $18 million in collateral necessary actually to obtain the insurance and only wanted documents to make it look as if he had failsafe insurance commitments. Therefore, Nam-er indicated in his PPM’s that he had irrevocable and unconditional insurance commitments. When brokers or potential investors asked to see the consents of surety, Namer simply whited out the collateral condition from the letters, and then faxed the apparently unconditional consents to the relevant inquirers.

Namer sent such forged documents to various brokers trying to verify his insurance, the trust company overseeing the bond offerings, and any investors attempting to verify the insurance.

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Related

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449 F. App'x 456 (Sixth Circuit, 2011)
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651 F.3d 453 (Sixth Circuit, 2011)
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257 F. App'x 879 (Sixth Circuit, 2007)
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Namer
183 F. App'x 120 (Second Circuit, 2006)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
149 F. App'x 385, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-namer-ca6-2005.