William Brown, Jr. v. United States

264 F.2d 363, 105 U.S. App. D.C. 77, 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 4455

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: February 5, 1959
• Docket: 14389_1
• Status: Published

Opinions

PRETTYMAN, Chief Judge,

announced the judgment and division of the court as follows:

The judgment of conviction is affirmed, Judges PRETTYMAN, WILBUR K. MILLER, DANAHER, BASTIAN and BURGER vote to affirm. Judges EDGERTON, BAZELON, FAHY and WASHINGTON vote to reverse and remand for a new trial. Judge MILLER files an opinion in which Judges PRETTYMAN, DANAHER and BASTIAN concur. Judge BURGER files an opinion in which he concurs in affirming the conviction. Judge WASHINGTON files a dissenting opinion in which Judges EDGERTON, BAZELON and FAHY join. Judge BAZELON files a separate opinion in which he joins in Judge WASHINGTON’S dissent.

WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge, with whom PRETTYMAN, Chief Judge, and DANAHER and BASTIAN, Circuit Judges, concur.

The appellant, William Brown, Jr., was indicted in seven counts: one for simple assault, one for assault with intent to kill, one for housebreaking, and four for assault with a dangerous weapon.

At the trial it appeared that, in four different episodes of violence, the appellant wounded three different persons during one turbulent evening. This was amply shown by the testimony of his victims and certain other eyewitnesses who were not hurt. In addition, Brown took the stand in his own behalf and testified rather freely and frankly, substantially showing his own guilt of simple assault and at least one instance of assault with a dangerous weapon.

The jury took him at his word and found him guilty only of the two offenses which he admitted and described: simple assault and assault with a dangerous weapon. Bather surprisingly, in view of the strong evidence of guilt, it acquitted him on all of the other five counts.

Able and ingenious counsel appointed by this court to represent Brown on appeal ¹ presents the following questions:

“1. Did the Trial Court err when, upon being informed by appointed counsel for the defendant prior to the commencement of trial and out of the presence of the defendant that ‘because I told him that I didn’t think he had a chance of beating the thing [indictment], he wants to have a new attorney appointed’, the Trial Court failed to advise the defendant that, although counsel had been appointed for him, he had the right to proceed in proper person, could discharge that counsel, and could elect whether he would so proceed or continue with appointed counsel?

“2. Upon the record as a whole, was the defendant denied effective assistance of counsel?”

He contends, of course, that these questions should be answered in the affirmative. The only basis for the two inquiries posed by counsel is the following colloquy, a part of which is quoted in question No. 1, -which took place between the trial judge and appellant’s trial attorney when the case was called for trial:

“Mr. Mansfield: Your Honor, because I told [the defendant] that I didn’t think he had a chance of beating the thing, he wants to have a new attorney appointed.

“The Court: Were you appointed?

“Mr. Mansfield: I was appointed in the first place. I think I can do a good job for him. I can do as good as anybody else could.

“The Court: You mean he doesn’t want to plead to anything?

“Mr. Mansfield: The only thing he wants to plead to is the simple assault.

“The Court: All right, let’s proceed.”

The appellant contends this colloquy required the judge to inform him of his right to defend himself so he might elect to do so if he chose. We observe, however, that Brown did not say to the district judge nor to trial counsel that he wanted to proceed alone and waive the assistance of an attorney. His contention is, then, that it was reversible error not to inform him that he could try his own case, even though he indicated no desire to do so.

Appellant’s argument might have some validity if a defendant has a constitutional right to dispense with a lawyer and represent himself. We find nothing in the Constitution which confers it, or from which a guaranty of such a right may be inferred.² The truth is that the right is statutory in character,³ and does not rise to the dignity of one conferred and guaranteed by the Constitution.

As Brown did not request the right to act for himself, we conclude that this record presents no issue as to whether his statutory right to do so was violated ; for it has been held, correctly we think, that where a defendant fails to expressly assert his statutory right to conduct his own defense he cannot later successfully contend that the right was denied him. United States v. Gutterman, 2 Cir., 1945, 147 F.2d 540, 157 A.L.R. 1221; Mayes v. United States, 8 Cir., 1949, 177 F.2d 505; People v. Ephraim, 1952, 411 Ill. 118, 103 N.E.2d 363.

Moreover, even if Brown had demanded the right to proceed alone (which he did not) and the trial court had not permitted him to dispense with counsel, its error in denying appellant his statutory right would not warrant reversal of the conviction in the absence of a showing that appellant was prejudiced by the refusal. United States v. Cantor, 2 Cir., 1954, 217 F.2d 536. He makes no effort here to demonstrate that he was prejudiced. The only criticism of his appointed counsel is that he told Brown he “didn’t think he had a chance of beating the thing.” Counsel’s pessimism as to the outcome — -which was inevitable in view of appellant’s factual statements — did not prevent him from wanting to go forward with his delegated duty: “I think I can do a good job for him. I can do as good as anybody else could.” Nor did it render him to any extent incompetent, inefficient or ineffective; for acquittal on five counts out of seven amply shows he gave appellant effective assistance. At any rate, we are certain that appellant showed no prejudice.

It is also said that the colloquy between court and counsel, which is quoted above, required the presiding judge to inquire of Brown himself whether he was dissatisfied with his appointed counsel and, if so, why. In other words, although his assigned counsel had told the court his client wanted him replaced because of his pessimism as to the result, appellant contends here that the judge committed reversible error by not consulting him personally as to the cause of his dissatisfaction with his lawyer. But he does not say there was any cause other than that stated by the attorney or that, had he personally been asked, he would have given a different reason.

As was said in United States v. Mitchell, 2 Cir., 1943, 137 F.2d 1006, 1010, “Under these circumstances we think it proper at least to require that the defendant must show his hand.” The court also said in that case, at page 1011,— and we adopt the language as appropriate in this case — “In the situation here, where no reason appears in the record for defendant’s action [in wanting to dismiss assigned counsel] other than the damaging nature of the case against him, we do not think it was incumbent on the court to search beneath the surface for other grounds.”

We cannot suppose that, had he been asked, appellant would have given a different reason for being displeased with his attorney, when he does not suggest there was a different reason which he would have given. Nor can we reverse and remand for a new trial merely to give the appellant the satisfaction of being personally asked why he wanted to dismiss his counsel and have another appointed when, as far as we know or have been informed, he would give no reason except that given by his attorney.

The question then becomes whether, in the circumstances here, the attorney’s statement of the reason his client wanted to dismiss him was sufficient to require that it be done. We think not. A criminal defendant for whom an attorney has been appointed is not entitled to dismiss him and have a substitute appointed unless he has an adequate reason for requesting the change. The fact that his counsel “didn’t think he had a chance of beating the thing” is not such a reason, particularly in view of Brown’s version of his own conduct on the night in question. Presumably he told his lawyer substantially what he testified to at the trial; if so, it is not surprising that counsel was pessimistic. Any other attorney appointed, when told the same story by the appellant, would also have been forced to say in substance, “I do not believe you can beat the thing.”

The Gutterman case, supra, is particularly in point. There a criminal defendant had personally indicated to the trial judge his dissatisfaction with assigned counsel because the latter had advised him to plead guilty.⁴ On appeal, the majority (composed of Judges Learned Hand and Augustus N. Hand) rejected appellant’s contentions that the trial court was compelled (1) to assign him new counsel, and (2) to ask him whether he wanted to proceed without a lawyer. The court, speaking also of its earlier Mitchell case, supra, stated that, “In neither case did it appear that the defendant was really seeking to take over the personal conduct of his defense or that he was doing more than to claim the privilege of changing his counsel because he did not approve of the latter’s judgment.” 147 F.2d at page 542. Referring to the appellant’s claim that his dissatisfaction with assigned counsel based, inter alia, on his advice to plead guilty, entitled him to new counsel the court added, at page 542:

“If a defendant is unable to employ an attorney he must accept such counsel as the court assigns unless he can furnish a better reason for requiring a change than he has given here or unless he chooses to dispense with counsel and undertake his own defense. In the case at bar, when [defendant] found that he could not procure another assignment he availed himself of the services of the excellent lawyer appointed by the court and relied on his objections to counsel in order to upset a verdict though based on overwhelming proof of guilt.”

See also Swope v. McDonald, 9 Cir., 1949, 173 F.2d 852, in which the full bench reversed McDonald v. Swope, D.C.N.D. Cal. 1948, 79 F.Supp. 30, 35.

Although Brown was at first displeased with his attorney because he disliked his appraisal of the situation, apparently he changed his mind as the trial progressed; for not only did he make no complaint to the court — which he might easily have done — but he also accepted without question the effective aid provided by the attorney whom he had at first criticized. Thus in effect he waived his initial complaint concerning his attorney’s judgment. Cf. Moore v. United States, 1955, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 92, 220 F.2d 198.

Conceding for the discussion, without deciding, that the judge should not have accepted counsel’s version of the reason for Brown’s displeasure with him, but should have asked the appellant himself if he had any other reason for being dissatisfied with his appointed counsel, the question remains whether the court’s failure to do so was so prejudicial as to require reversal.

No prejudice whatever has been demonstrated. As we have said, appellant does not assert that, had he been asked, he would have given any reason for dissatisfaction other than that given by his attorney. And the verdict was much more favorable than appellant could reasonably have expected.

What has been said sufficiently disposes of appellant’s contention that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. In a practical view of the situation, Brown’s appeal is without substance.

Affirmed.

1 . He was not the trial counsel.

2 . There is a passage in Adams v. United States, 1942, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268, which speaks o£ that right as “correlative” to the constitutional right to counsel; but the opinion does not say the defendant’s right to defend himself is constitutional.

3 . 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1952) is as follows:

“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”

The section is derived from § 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 92.

4 . The defendant had said to the trial judge, “If I am going to plead guilty I might as well defend myself.”