EDELSTEIN, District Judge.
In an incident that has become one of several
causes celebres
of a trial frequented by scenes of “outrage * * disruption [and] violence in the courtroom,”
the defendant Anthony Mirra, while under cross-examination, “stood up, took the witness chair on which he was sitting, and hurled it at the Assist
ant United States Attorney * * * threw it some fifteen feet.”
The chair struck the jury rail about three feet from the lectern where the Assistant United States Attorney was standing. For committing such a violent outrage upon the dignity and decorum of the court, Mirra was summarily held in contempt of court and sentenced to imprisonment for one year. On June 26, 1962, the trial judge filed his certificate pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a) reciting the facts of the contemptuous conduct.
On July 12, 1962, the Government filed Indictment 62 Cr. 727, in one count which charged that Mirra:
“Unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did with the use of a deadly and dangerous weapon, forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate and interfere with an Assistant United States Attorney while said Assistant United States Attorney was engaged in and on account of the performance of his official duties.”
This indictment, charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111
was predicated on the
chair-throwing incident of June 4, 1962. Mirra now moves to dismiss the assault indictment on the ground that the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against Double Jeopardy
is violated by the Government’s attempt “to punish the same conduct upon successive proceedings.”
Mirra urges that the Double Jeopardy guarantee is applicable since the contempt conviction as well as the assault indictment are based on the same fact situation and “that both the instant indictment and the contempt conviction require the self-same evidence.” The defendant seeks to avoid being placed in the path of a cross-fire of, as he terms them, “prosecutions.” Having already proceeded to judgment on the chair-throwing incident the Government is barred, Mirra alleges, by the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy protection from prosecuting him on a “subsequent indictment.” The defendant’s claim is appealing but not well-founded. It is axiomatic that the prohibition of the Double Jeopardy clause is “not against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy.” Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 1034, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896). And an examination of the summary contempt power will provide a more definite answer to Mirra’s predicament and will serve to demonstrate that the Government is not barred from prosecuting a summary contemnor on a subsequent assault indictment.
Possibly no other exercise of judicial discretion has evoked as much critical discussion and recurrent inquiry as summary contempt. See generally, Goldfarb, The Constitution and Contempt of Court, 61 Mich.L.Rev. 283 (1962); Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 Colum.L.Rev. 956 (1931);
Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 78 S.Ct. 128, 2 L.Ed.2d 95 (1957); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L. Ed. 717 (1951). Mr. Justice Black’s oft quoted statement in Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193-194, 78 S.Ct. 632, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1957) (dissenting opinion), although made in a different context, is perhaps the high water mark of a flood of criticism leveled at the use of the contempt power itself and its increased utilization without affording the contemnor the commensurate protection of constitutional safeguards.
“The power of a judge to inflict punishment for criminal contempt by means of a summary proceeding stands as an anomaly in the law. In my judgment the time has come for a fundamental and searching reconsideration of the validity of this power which has aptly been characterized * * * as, ‘perhaps, nearest akin to the despotic power of any power existing under our form of government.’ Even though this extraordinary authority first slipped
into the law as a very limited and insignificant thing, it has relentlessly swollen, at the hands of not unwilling judges, until it has become a drastic and pervasive mode of administering criminal justice usurping our regular constitutional methods of trying those charged with offenses against society.”
Id., 356 U.S. at 194, 78 S.Ct. at 648 (1957). See Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 Harv. L.Rev. 673,707 (1963).
Mr. Justice Black’s concern that the punitive nature of a summary contempt conviction requires that a summary contemnor be afforded the full panoply of constitutional and statutory safeguards has not gained currency. See Sacher v. United States, supra, 343 U.S. at 20-23, 72 S.Ct. at 460-462 (dissent). Indeed, the courts have rejected attempts by contemnors to denominate their contemptuous conduct as a criminal offense to which more pervasive procedural safeguards pertain. Sacher v. United States, supra (con-temnors not entitled to court trial on summary contempt conviction committed in presence of court); Green v. United States, supra (conviction for criminal contempt without criminal trial constitutional) ; Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888).
In rejecting attempts to equate, for procedural purposes, contempt with crime, the courts have bottomed their decisions on a rationale that finds its roots in “[sjtark necessity.” Green v. United States, supra, 356 U.S. at 213, 78 S.Ct. at 658. The courts have not been unmindful of the dangers of abuse inherent in the contempt power, but have found sound justification for it, nevertheless: “Summary punishment always, and rightly, is regarded with disfavor ánd, if imposed in passion or pettiness, brings discredit to a court as certainly as the conduct it penalizes. But the very practical reasons which have led every system of law to vest a contempt power in one who presides over judicial proceedings also are the reasons which account for it being made summary.
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EDELSTEIN, District Judge.
In an incident that has become one of several
causes celebres
of a trial frequented by scenes of “outrage * * disruption [and] violence in the courtroom,”
the defendant Anthony Mirra, while under cross-examination, “stood up, took the witness chair on which he was sitting, and hurled it at the Assist
ant United States Attorney * * * threw it some fifteen feet.”
The chair struck the jury rail about three feet from the lectern where the Assistant United States Attorney was standing. For committing such a violent outrage upon the dignity and decorum of the court, Mirra was summarily held in contempt of court and sentenced to imprisonment for one year. On June 26, 1962, the trial judge filed his certificate pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a) reciting the facts of the contemptuous conduct.
On July 12, 1962, the Government filed Indictment 62 Cr. 727, in one count which charged that Mirra:
“Unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did with the use of a deadly and dangerous weapon, forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate and interfere with an Assistant United States Attorney while said Assistant United States Attorney was engaged in and on account of the performance of his official duties.”
This indictment, charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111
was predicated on the
chair-throwing incident of June 4, 1962. Mirra now moves to dismiss the assault indictment on the ground that the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against Double Jeopardy
is violated by the Government’s attempt “to punish the same conduct upon successive proceedings.”
Mirra urges that the Double Jeopardy guarantee is applicable since the contempt conviction as well as the assault indictment are based on the same fact situation and “that both the instant indictment and the contempt conviction require the self-same evidence.” The defendant seeks to avoid being placed in the path of a cross-fire of, as he terms them, “prosecutions.” Having already proceeded to judgment on the chair-throwing incident the Government is barred, Mirra alleges, by the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy protection from prosecuting him on a “subsequent indictment.” The defendant’s claim is appealing but not well-founded. It is axiomatic that the prohibition of the Double Jeopardy clause is “not against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy.” Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 1034, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896). And an examination of the summary contempt power will provide a more definite answer to Mirra’s predicament and will serve to demonstrate that the Government is not barred from prosecuting a summary contemnor on a subsequent assault indictment.
Possibly no other exercise of judicial discretion has evoked as much critical discussion and recurrent inquiry as summary contempt. See generally, Goldfarb, The Constitution and Contempt of Court, 61 Mich.L.Rev. 283 (1962); Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 Colum.L.Rev. 956 (1931);
Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 78 S.Ct. 128, 2 L.Ed.2d 95 (1957); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L. Ed. 717 (1951). Mr. Justice Black’s oft quoted statement in Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193-194, 78 S.Ct. 632, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1957) (dissenting opinion), although made in a different context, is perhaps the high water mark of a flood of criticism leveled at the use of the contempt power itself and its increased utilization without affording the contemnor the commensurate protection of constitutional safeguards.
“The power of a judge to inflict punishment for criminal contempt by means of a summary proceeding stands as an anomaly in the law. In my judgment the time has come for a fundamental and searching reconsideration of the validity of this power which has aptly been characterized * * * as, ‘perhaps, nearest akin to the despotic power of any power existing under our form of government.’ Even though this extraordinary authority first slipped
into the law as a very limited and insignificant thing, it has relentlessly swollen, at the hands of not unwilling judges, until it has become a drastic and pervasive mode of administering criminal justice usurping our regular constitutional methods of trying those charged with offenses against society.”
Id., 356 U.S. at 194, 78 S.Ct. at 648 (1957). See Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 Harv. L.Rev. 673,707 (1963).
Mr. Justice Black’s concern that the punitive nature of a summary contempt conviction requires that a summary contemnor be afforded the full panoply of constitutional and statutory safeguards has not gained currency. See Sacher v. United States, supra, 343 U.S. at 20-23, 72 S.Ct. at 460-462 (dissent). Indeed, the courts have rejected attempts by contemnors to denominate their contemptuous conduct as a criminal offense to which more pervasive procedural safeguards pertain. Sacher v. United States, supra (con-temnors not entitled to court trial on summary contempt conviction committed in presence of court); Green v. United States, supra (conviction for criminal contempt without criminal trial constitutional) ; Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888).
In rejecting attempts to equate, for procedural purposes, contempt with crime, the courts have bottomed their decisions on a rationale that finds its roots in “[sjtark necessity.” Green v. United States, supra, 356 U.S. at 213, 78 S.Ct. at 658. The courts have not been unmindful of the dangers of abuse inherent in the contempt power, but have found sound justification for it, nevertheless: “Summary punishment always, and rightly, is regarded with disfavor ánd, if imposed in passion or pettiness, brings discredit to a court as certainly as the conduct it penalizes. But the very practical reasons which have led every system of law to vest a contempt power in one who presides over judicial proceedings also are the reasons which account for it being made summary. * * * The rights and immunities of accused persons would be exposed to serious and obvious abuse if the trial bench did not possess * * * power to curb prejudicial and excessive zeal * * *. The interests of society in the preservation of courtroom control by the judges are no more to be frustrated through unchecked improprieties by [defendants].” Sacher v. United States, supra, 343 U.S. at 8, 72 S.Ct. at 454. Without the contempt power, courts would find it most difficult to control the disorderly and the violent who respect neither the laws enacted for the vindication of public and
private rights nor the officers charged with the duty of administering them. Yates v. United States, supra, 355 U.S. at 70, 78 S.Ct. at 131; Ex parte Terry, supra, 128 U.S. at 313, 9 S.Ct. at 82.
Despite the efforts of court and counsel, they have been unsuccessful in finding a case directly dispositive of Mirra’s contention. However, the dicta in In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 17 S.Ct. 677, 41 L.Ed. 1154 (1897); Jurney v. MacCrac-ken, 294 U.S. 125, 55 S.Ct. 375, 79 L.Ed. 802 (1935); and Merchants Stock and Grain Co. v. Board of Trade, 201 F. 20 (8th Cir. 1912) lends support to the conclusion that Mirra is not entitled to the Double Jeopardy guarantee. In Chapman, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction under a Federal statute which made refusal to testify before a Senate committee punishable as a misdemeanor even though the contemnor was also subject to punishment for contempt of Congress. Mr. Justice Fuller, addressing himself to the problem of cumulative punishment resulting from the possibility that the United States Senate might still hold the convicted defendant in contempt, wrote:
“It is improbable that in any case cumulative penalties would be imposed, whether by way of punishment merely, or of eliciting the answers desired, but it is quite clear that the contumacious witness is not subjected to jeopardy twice for the same offence, since the same act may be an offence against one jurisdiction and also an offence against another; and indictable statutory of-fences may be punished as such, while the offenders may likewise be subjected to punishment for the same acts as contempts, the two being
diverso intuitu
and capable of standing together.” In re Chapman, supra, 166 U.S. at 672, 17 S.Ct. at 681.
In Jurney v. MacCracken, supra, 294 U.S. at 151, 55 S.Ct. at 380, the contemnor argued that his conviction for contempt of Congress was improper because his conduct was also subject to prosecution under a special Federal statute. The offense in MacCracken could have been punished twice — once for contempt and again under the statute which made a refusal to answer questions or t® produce papers before either House of Congress a misdemeanor. Mr. Justice Brandeis dismissed the argument that the defendant was immune from one punishment because of the existence of the other. He stated: “Punishment, purely as such, through contempt proceedings, legislative or judicial, is not precluded because punishment may also be inflicted for the same act as a statutory offense.” Ibid. But the most direct confrontation of the issue of whether conduct deemed contumacious may at a subsequent date be made the basis of a criminal prosecution finds expression in the Merchants’ Stock & Grain case, supra, 201 F. at 27: “An act which is a contempt of court and also a crime may b’e punished both by the summary provision and by indictment, and neither will bar the other. * * * In other words, the provision protecting him against being twice put in jeopardy does not protect him against being punished for contempt and under indictment for the same act. In view of these facts * * * it is not to be wondered that the Supreme Court has characterized contempt proceedings as
sui generis.”
Id.
201 F. at 27. The court finds the rationale of these dicta
to
be sound. It is undeniable that outrageous conduct destructive of the court’s decorum can be an offense against the court’s jurisdiction as well as an offense against the laws of the United States. To permit a defendant to escape the consequences of his contumacy via the Double Jeopardy route would be to
countenance a state of affairs where judges could become ineffectual in restoring judicial decorum for fear that a contempt conviction would raise a constitutional bar to a subsequent prosecution of the same act.
Let us consider by way of illustration the consequences of upholding Mirra’s claim in the context of an extreme but not wholly improbable case that could have arisen after, and out of, Mirra’s contempt, conviction. Assume that Mir-ra’s projectile had received more accurate a propulsion and had scored on its intended target — the Assistant United States Attorney. And assume further the grisly and morbid fact that the Assistant United States Attorney had sustained an injury which ultimately proved fatal. To sustain Mirra’s claim would, in effect, grant a summary con-temnor immunity from a homicide prosecution — an unconscionable result. Merely to state the case suffices to reveal what must perforce be the answer to Mirra’s theory.
Moreover, a criminal prosecution arising out of and subsequent to summary contempt conviction does not offend the policy underlying the protection against Double Jeopardy. As Mr. Justice Brennan has stated in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 199, 79 S. Ct. 666, 673, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959), “The basis of the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy is that a person shall not be harassed by successive trials; that an accused shall not have to marshal the resources and energies necessary to his defense more than once for the same alleged criminal acts.” Id. 359 U.S. at 198-199, 79 S.Ct. at 672-673. A person held in summary contempt and then subsequently indicted does not suffer the harassment of successive trials. The court recognizes, however, that to some extent this argument is circular. Successive trials are not involved because the effective remedy against a contempt committed in the court’s presence is for the court immediately and summarily to punish the contumacious conduct. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a). And since an adversary type proceeding does not precede the swift imposition of a summary contempt conviction, a criminal prosecution on a charge arising out of the contumacious conduct is the first trial-type-harassment to which the contemnor is. made subject. In the present posture of the law, a rebellious person does not have the option, and wisely so, of having the issue of his alleged contumacy determined by a trial-type hearing. Congress, has seen fit to protect the dignity and-decorum of the court by empowering the Federal courts to redress, spontaneously and summarily, an outrage or indignity committed in the court’s presence. 18. U.S.C. § 3691.
It is true, of course, that the alleged contemnor does not have-a choice in the matter of whether he is to be punished summarily or only after a hearing but it is the fact, nevertheless, that the summary contemnor is not subjected to the harassment which the-Double Jeopardy protection seeks to prevent.
Defendant’s reliance on United States, v. Sabella, 272 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1959) and Abbate v. United States, supra, is. clearly misplaced. Both those cases deal' with successive criminal prosecutions of
the same set of facts by the Federal government. Neither of those cases, nor any of the others cited by Mirra, support his position.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the indictment is denied. So ordered.