SNEED, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Mary Floyd challenges the district court’s denial of her request for specific performance of her plea agreement which required the government to move for a downward departure if she complied with the agreement. We vacate her sentence and remand for further proceedings.
I.
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
In December of 1989, undercover government agents met with Mary Floyd and her companion, Anthony Myers, to conduct negotiations for the sale of ephedrine, a precursor ingredient for methamphetamine. Floyd and Myers were acting as brokers for a customer that manufactured methamphetamine and were interested in purchasing ephedrine over a one or two year period. At this meeting, Floyd and Myers provided the agents with a twelve gram sample of methamphetamine produced by their customer. The agents reciprocally displayed a barrel of the ephedrine, which Myers taste-tested. The meeting ended with Floyd and Myers agreeing to contact the agents with information about the quantity and price desired by their customer.
On December 19, 1989, the undercover officers and their informant met with Floyd and Myers, as well as the customer and his aide, to consummate the sale. After the customer displayed $270,000 in cash, Myers, the customer, and an agent proceeded to an area where 825 pounds of ephedrine was stored. Floyd and the customer’s aide remained at the meeting place. The parties loaded the ephedrine onto a vehicle at the storage area, and then the government agents arrested all the defendants, including Floyd and the customer’s aide at the meeting place.
On January 3, 1990, the government filed an indictment charging Floyd and Myers with violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, possession with intent to distribute approximately twelve grams of methamphetamine and aiding and abetting.
In October of 1990, Floyd and Myers pled guilty to the §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) count pursuant to a written plea agreement. The district court accepted the guilty pleas and the plea agreement after following the strictures of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the plea agreement, Floyd agreed to submit to interviews and testify fully and truthfully concerning her case and any knowledge she had of narcotics trafficking. She also agreed to commit no further crimes. If she complied with the agreement’s terms, the government agreed to move for a downward departure.1
[869]*869After her release from custody, Floyd supplied the government with the names of approximately twenty potential drug trafficking suspects. None of these individuals were arrested. Floyd allegedly attempted to set up various undercover drug busts for the government as well. No arrests came from these activities either.
On April 15,1991, Floyd and Myers signed an acknowledgment which stated that no results had been achieved from the information they had provided and that it was their responsibility to use their best efforts to provide substantial assistance to the government.2
Myers’ bail was revoked after his brother told the government that Myers was planning to leave the country. Floyd asked that Myers be released to finish an undercover deal they were working on, and then she disappeared. She did not appear for her July 1, 1991 sentencing hearing, and a bench warrant was issued for her arrest. Floyd was not heard from again until her arrest on November 11, 1991.
Concluding that she had not fulfilled her obligations, the government did not move for a downward departure. Floyd disagreed and asked the court for specific performance of the plea agreement. In construing the plea agreement, the court determined that it was not integrated and that Floyd had agreed to “cooperate” with the government. The court concluded that Floyd had not fulfilled her obligation to “cooperate” under the plea agreement, did not depart downward, and sentenced her to 235 months.
II.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district court’s interpretation of a plea agreement is a finding of fact and is reviewed for clear error, United States v. Read, 778 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835, 107 S.Ct. 131, 93 L.Ed.2d 75 (1986), but its application of the legal principles is a question of law reviewed de novo, L.K. Comstock & Co. [870]*870v. United Eng’r & Constructors Inc., 880 F.2d 219, 221 (9th Cir.1989).
III.
DISCUSSION
This appeal concerns Mary Floyd’s obligations under the plea agreement she entered into with the government. Floyd claims she complied with the plea agreement and the government breached it by not moving for a downward departure. The government contends that Floyd did not comply with the agreement and was therefore sentenced properly.
To fix Floyd’s obligation, a court must determine what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement. Read, 778 F.2d at 1441. A plea agreement is contractual in nature and is subject to contract law standards. United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir.1979).
The district court found that Floyd had agreed to “cooperate” in exchange for the motion for downward departure and that she had failed to maintain her end of the bargain. The court arrived at this conclusion by finding that the agreement was not integrated. That is, the court found that the parties did not intend the agreement to be the sole source of its meaning. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 209 (1979) (hereafter Restatement). Therefore, under the parol evidence rule, extrinsic evidence was admissible to show the parties’ true intent.
The district court erred in finding the original plea agreement not integrated. At the time it was signed, it clearly purported to be a complete and final embodiment of the agreement. See Restatement § 210. The first paragraph of the plea agreement clearly states that the agreement “sets forth the full and complete plea agreement between the parties.” The last paragraph says that no additional promises, agreements, representations, or conditions were entered into with respect to Floyd’s criminal liability.3
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
SNEED, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Mary Floyd challenges the district court’s denial of her request for specific performance of her plea agreement which required the government to move for a downward departure if she complied with the agreement. We vacate her sentence and remand for further proceedings.
I.
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
In December of 1989, undercover government agents met with Mary Floyd and her companion, Anthony Myers, to conduct negotiations for the sale of ephedrine, a precursor ingredient for methamphetamine. Floyd and Myers were acting as brokers for a customer that manufactured methamphetamine and were interested in purchasing ephedrine over a one or two year period. At this meeting, Floyd and Myers provided the agents with a twelve gram sample of methamphetamine produced by their customer. The agents reciprocally displayed a barrel of the ephedrine, which Myers taste-tested. The meeting ended with Floyd and Myers agreeing to contact the agents with information about the quantity and price desired by their customer.
On December 19, 1989, the undercover officers and their informant met with Floyd and Myers, as well as the customer and his aide, to consummate the sale. After the customer displayed $270,000 in cash, Myers, the customer, and an agent proceeded to an area where 825 pounds of ephedrine was stored. Floyd and the customer’s aide remained at the meeting place. The parties loaded the ephedrine onto a vehicle at the storage area, and then the government agents arrested all the defendants, including Floyd and the customer’s aide at the meeting place.
On January 3, 1990, the government filed an indictment charging Floyd and Myers with violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, possession with intent to distribute approximately twelve grams of methamphetamine and aiding and abetting.
In October of 1990, Floyd and Myers pled guilty to the §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) count pursuant to a written plea agreement. The district court accepted the guilty pleas and the plea agreement after following the strictures of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the plea agreement, Floyd agreed to submit to interviews and testify fully and truthfully concerning her case and any knowledge she had of narcotics trafficking. She also agreed to commit no further crimes. If she complied with the agreement’s terms, the government agreed to move for a downward departure.1
[869]*869After her release from custody, Floyd supplied the government with the names of approximately twenty potential drug trafficking suspects. None of these individuals were arrested. Floyd allegedly attempted to set up various undercover drug busts for the government as well. No arrests came from these activities either.
On April 15,1991, Floyd and Myers signed an acknowledgment which stated that no results had been achieved from the information they had provided and that it was their responsibility to use their best efforts to provide substantial assistance to the government.2
Myers’ bail was revoked after his brother told the government that Myers was planning to leave the country. Floyd asked that Myers be released to finish an undercover deal they were working on, and then she disappeared. She did not appear for her July 1, 1991 sentencing hearing, and a bench warrant was issued for her arrest. Floyd was not heard from again until her arrest on November 11, 1991.
Concluding that she had not fulfilled her obligations, the government did not move for a downward departure. Floyd disagreed and asked the court for specific performance of the plea agreement. In construing the plea agreement, the court determined that it was not integrated and that Floyd had agreed to “cooperate” with the government. The court concluded that Floyd had not fulfilled her obligation to “cooperate” under the plea agreement, did not depart downward, and sentenced her to 235 months.
II.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district court’s interpretation of a plea agreement is a finding of fact and is reviewed for clear error, United States v. Read, 778 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835, 107 S.Ct. 131, 93 L.Ed.2d 75 (1986), but its application of the legal principles is a question of law reviewed de novo, L.K. Comstock & Co. [870]*870v. United Eng’r & Constructors Inc., 880 F.2d 219, 221 (9th Cir.1989).
III.
DISCUSSION
This appeal concerns Mary Floyd’s obligations under the plea agreement she entered into with the government. Floyd claims she complied with the plea agreement and the government breached it by not moving for a downward departure. The government contends that Floyd did not comply with the agreement and was therefore sentenced properly.
To fix Floyd’s obligation, a court must determine what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement. Read, 778 F.2d at 1441. A plea agreement is contractual in nature and is subject to contract law standards. United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir.1979).
The district court found that Floyd had agreed to “cooperate” in exchange for the motion for downward departure and that she had failed to maintain her end of the bargain. The court arrived at this conclusion by finding that the agreement was not integrated. That is, the court found that the parties did not intend the agreement to be the sole source of its meaning. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 209 (1979) (hereafter Restatement). Therefore, under the parol evidence rule, extrinsic evidence was admissible to show the parties’ true intent.
The district court erred in finding the original plea agreement not integrated. At the time it was signed, it clearly purported to be a complete and final embodiment of the agreement. See Restatement § 210. The first paragraph of the plea agreement clearly states that the agreement “sets forth the full and complete plea agreement between the parties.” The last paragraph says that no additional promises, agreements, representations, or conditions were entered into with respect to Floyd’s criminal liability.3 The court, to the extent it looked to prior or contemporaneous negotiations or agreements, violated the parol evidence rule when it incorporated “cooperation,” an inconsistent and additional term, into the completely integrated plea agreement. Restatement §§ 216, 216. The terms of the original plea agreement did not require Floyd to provide substantial assistance to the government.
The parol evidence rule does not preclude subsequent modifications of completely integrated agreements, however. See Shatto v. Evans, 728 F.2d 1224, 1227 n. 1 (9th Cir.1984). It appears that the district court looked to the acknowledgment’s “substantial assistance” language in arriving at its “cooperation” interpretation of Floyd’s obligation under the agreement. The court basically treated the acknowledgment as a modification of the original plea agreement.
But Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 must be observed when dealing with plea agreements. A plea agreement, and therefore any modification of a plea agreement, must be accepted by the court before it is binding. United States v. Savage, 978 F.2d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1613, 123 L.Ed.2d 174 (1993). Rule 11 requires the district judge, in open court, to determine that the agreement is voluntary and not the result of threats or of promises apart from the plea agreement. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d). The judge can either accept, reject, or defer a decision concerning the plea in his or her discretion. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(2). “[S]ub-division (e) is designed to prevent abuse of plea discussions and agreements by providing appropriate and adequate safeguards.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 adv. comm, notes (1974), reprinted in 18 U.S.C.App. (1988).
Although the parties might have intended to modify the plea agreement with the acknowledgment and bind Floyd to “cooperation” or “substantial assistance,” the district judge never held a Rule 11 hearing to determine whether the acknowledgment was a proper modification of the plea agreement. Without such a hearing, Floyd was deprived of the safeguards Rule 11 was enacted to impose. We vacate Floyd’s sentence and instruct the district court to hold a Rule 11 [871]*871hearing to determine whether the acknowledgment was a valid modification of the plea agreement. Once this determination is made, the court should make a factual determination whether each party has complied with the then settled terms of the plea agreement and sentence accordingly.
VACATED AND REMANDED.