United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 22-1947
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
RONALD YOEL MARTE CARMONA, a/k/a Alberto Gonzalez Carmona, a/k/a Guy
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Kayatta, Selya, and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.
Thomas J. Gleason and Gleason Law Offices, P.C. on brief for appellant. Joshua S. Levy, Acting United States Attorney, and Karen Eisenstadt, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
June 3, 2024 SELYA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Ronald Yoel
Marte Carmona was convicted on charges stemming from multiple
fentanyl sales. On appeal, he challenges the district court's
denial of his motions to suppress the fruits of a Terry stop. He
adds that the evidence supporting his six convictions was
insufficient. Concluding, as we do, that the Terry stop was
grounded in reasonable, articulable suspicion and that the
verdicts are supported by the record evidence, we affirm.
I
"We rehearse the relevant facts, recounting them 'in the
light most hospitable to the verdict, consistent with record
support.'" United States v. Concepcion-Guliam, 62 F.4th 26, 29
(1st Cir.) (quoting United States v. Tkhilaishvili, 926 F.3d 1, 8
(1st Cir. 2019)), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 171 (2023). We then
lay out the travel of the case.
A
In early 2019, Travis Roy bought about 150 to 200 grams
of fentanyl every two to three days from a seller, whom he knew as
"Guy." Roy communicated with Guy by text message. Roy texted Guy
the type and quantity of drugs he wanted, and Guy texted him the
location in Lawrence or Methuen, Massachusetts at which he could
pick up the drugs and make payment. When Roy reported to that
location on the specified date, a runner would give him the drugs
- 2 - and take his payment. Roy never met with Guy. Nor did he know
Guy's actual name.
In May of that year, Roy became a confidential informant,
and law enforcement began an investigation to uncover Guy's
identity. New Hampshire State Trooper Sergeant Shane Larkin —
assigned to a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) task force —
orchestrated several controlled buys between Roy and Guy. Before
each of the controlled buys, law enforcement agents met with Roy
to equip him with audio recording devices and provide him with the
money he needed to pay for the drugs. During each buy, the agents
conducted surveillance of the location where Roy would meet Guy's
runner. And after each buy, the agents met with Roy to retrieve
both the recording devices and the drugs obtained. Throughout the
investigation, Roy contacted Guy by text message to three different
phones.
The first controlled buy took place on May 21, 2019.
The day before, Roy texted Guy on Phone #1 to order twenty "sticks"
(about 200 grams) of fentanyl. On the day of the buy, Guy texted
Roy the address where he could meet Guy's runner to pick up the
fentanyl. The exchange between Roy and the runner took seconds.
Subsequent testing confirmed that the drugs consisted of 197.6
grams of fentanyl.
In early June, Guy texted Roy to inform Roy that he had
changed his phone number. The second controlled buy took place on
- 3 - July 10, 2019. The day before, Roy and Guy coordinated by text
messages to Phone #2 the purchase of another twenty sticks of
fentanyl. The exchange took place the next day: Roy and a runner
— who was later identified as Santo Andres Lara — met at a specified
location, the runner gave Roy the drugs, and Roy gave the runner
the payment.1 Subsequent testing confirmed that the drugs
consisted of 196.5 grams of fentanyl.
In July of 2019, law enforcement obtained a ping warrant
for Phone #2, which allowed them to obtain information from that
phone's service provider about that phone's location at regular
intervals. Location data revealed that Phone #2 was frequently at
a residential building (the Riverside residence) in Lawrence. The
data also revealed that Phone #2 was at another residential
building (the Alder residence) for a few hours each night. Based
on this information, the agents concluded that Guy resided at the
Riverside residence and maintained a stash house at the Alder
residence.
The third and fourth controlled buys took place on July
31, 2019 and August 6, 2019, respectively. The day before each
purchase, Roy texted Guy at Phone #2 to buy twenty sticks of
fentanyl. On the day of the exchange, Guy texted Roy from Phone
1Lara was arrested in October of 2019. He was subsequently indicted with the defendant and pleaded guilty to two counts related to the July 10 controlled buy.
- 4 - #2 to tell him where he should meet the runner. Once there, an
individual approached Roy's vehicle to give him the fentanyl and
retrieve the payment. Subsequent testing confirmed that the drugs
exchanged during the third purchase consisted of 194.4 grams of
fentanyl; the drugs exchanged during the fourth purchase consisted
of 197.3 grams of fentanyl.
On August 15, 2019, Braintree Police Sergeant Matthew
Heslam and another agent were surveilling the Riverside residence
when Sergeant Heslam received information — pursuant to the ping
warrant — that Phone #2 was at the residence. At about 6:00 PM,
the agents observed a taxicab arrive and the defendant (carrying
a cell phone) exited a rear-side door of the residence and climbed
into the taxicab. Suspecting that the defendant was Guy, Sergeant
Heslam stopped the taxicab, falsely claiming that the driver had
committed a traffic violation, in order to investigate the
defendant's identity. As a result of the stop, Sergeant Heslam
learned the defendant's name and that he lived at the third-floor
apartment in the Riverside residence. The defendant was not
arrested.
The fifth controlled buy took place on September 19,
2019. The objective for that buy, though, was to locate Guy's
stash house. For that reason, Sergeant Larkin planned a "double
deal." Roy requested his usual twenty sticks of fentanyl, and
upon receiving them, he requested an additional ten sticks of
- 5 - fentanyl (presumably to give law enforcement the opportunity to
follow the runner to the stash house). Although the runner
delivered the additional fentanyl that day, law enforcement was
unable to locate the stash house. Subsequent testing confirmed
that the drugs exchanged that day consisted of 297.3 grams of
fentanyl.
Less than one week later, Guy texted Roy to let Roy know
that he had changed his phone number. Law enforcement then
obtained a ping warrant for Phone #3. On October 3, 2019, Lawrence
Police Officer David Moynihan, Jr., received information that
Phone #3 was located at a multifamily home (the Butler residence)
in Lawrence, and he set up surveillance. At about 11:30 AM,
Officer Moynihan observed the defendant exit the house, hand
something to the driver of a vehicle that had pulled up in front
of the house, and return to the house. Because the house had two
floors and it was unknown which floor the defendant was on, two
uniformed agents were tasked with entering the house and
investigating which apartment the defendant was occupying.
Lawrence Police Officer Eduardo De La Cruz went up to
the second floor. When the defendant answered the door, Officer
De La Cruz told him that he was looking for a fictitious
individual. The defendant stated that the individual sought did
not live there. After Officer De La Cruz asked the defendant if
- 6 - he was sure, the defendant stated, "I'm the only person that lives
here. No one lives here. Only me."
On October 11, 2019, law enforcement agents executed a
search warrant of the second-floor apartment in the Butler
residence. The defendant was present at the time. In the one
furnished bedroom, the agents found $1,555 in cash, Phone #3, and
two jewelry receipts. One receipt identified the defendant as the
buyer and listed Phone #3 as his telephone number. The defendant
was arrested.
B
In due course, a federal grand jury sitting in the
District of Massachusetts returned a six-count indictment against
the defendant and Lara. As relevant here, the indictment charged
the defendant with one count of conspiracy to distribute and to
possess with intent to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl
(count one), see 21 U.S.C. § 846, and five counts of distribution
and possession with intent to distribute forty grams or more of
fentanyl (counts two through six), see 21 U.S.C. § 841. Each of
the distribution counts corresponded with a particular controlled
buy.
In May of 2020, the defendant moved to suppress the
fruits of the August 15 traffic stop, arguing that the stop was
unconstitutional because it was not supported by probable cause or
reasonable suspicion. In December of 2020, the defendant filed an
- 7 - amended motion to suppress not only the fruits of the traffic stop
but also the fruits of the October 11 search of the Butler
apartment. The government opposed both motions, and the court
heard argument on August 4, 2021. The court denied the defendant's
motions, finding that the agents possessed reasonable suspicion to
effectuate the August 15 stop.
The defendant's trial began on July 12, 2022. The
government presented testimony from Sergeant Larkin, Sergeant
Heslam, Officer Moynihan, Officer De La Cruz, Massachusetts State
Trooper Ryan Dolan, Roy, and Lara. It also introduced, among other
things, recordings of each of the sales, photographs of the
fentanyl, and an extraction report linking all three phones to the
same user. At the close of the government's case in chief, the
defendant moved for judgment of acquittal. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
29(a). The district court deferred decision. The defendant then
presented the testimony of FBI Agent Evan Kalaher in order to
highlight to the jury an inconsistency in Lara's testimony. At
the close of all the evidence, the defendant again moved for
judgment of acquittal, see id., and the court again deferred
decision.
On July 18, 2022, the jury returned guilty verdicts on
all counts. Following the filing of the defendant's memorandum in
support of the motions for judgment of acquittal and the
government's opposition, the district court denied the motions.
- 8 - Although the court acknowledged that the government's case was
circumstantial, it observed that "the circumstances weave together
in a fashion that lea[ve] me fully satisfied that a reasonable
jury under these circumstances could reach the verdict that the
jury did in this case." The court subsequently imposed a sentence
of 120 months' imprisonment. This timely appeal ensued.
II
In this venue, the defendant challenges both the denial
of his motions to suppress and the denial of his motions for
judgment of acquittal. We address each challenge in turn.
We turn first to the district court's denial of the
defendant's motions to suppress the fruits of the August 15 traffic
stop. In examining the denial of a motion to suppress, "we
scrutinize the district court's factual findings for clear error
and evaluate its conclusions of law . . . de novo." United States
v. Ruidíaz, 529 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2008).
In this case, the defendant argues that the district
court erred in denying his motions to suppress because the
"government failed to establish that law enforcement possessed
reasonable suspicion for the warrantless stop of [the] taxi." We
review this claim of error de novo. See United States v. Pontoo,
666 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2011) (stating that "district court's
conclusions of law, including its ultimate conclusion as to whether
- 9 - the facts as found show reasonable suspicion, engender de novo
review"); see also United States v. Arnott, 758 F.3d 40, 43 (1st
Cir. 2014).
We begin with constitutional bedrock. The Fourth
Amendment's proscription against "unreasonable searches and
seizures," U.S. Const. amend. IV, "does not prohibit all searches
and seizures but, rather, only those that are unreasonable,"
Pontoo, 666 F.3d at 27; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment "extend[s] to
brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short
of traditional arrest." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
273 (2002). All evidence seized in contravention of the Fourth
Amendment is subject to exclusion. See United States v. Camacho,
661 F.3d 718, 724 (1st Cir. 2011); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 12
(explaining that exclusionary rule "has been recognized as a
principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct").
To determine whether a brief investigatory stop — a Terry
stop — passes constitutional muster, we must first ascertain
whether the officer possessed "reasonable, articulable suspicion
of an individual's involvement in some criminal activity."
Ruidíaz, 529 F.3d at 28. We then ascertain whether the "actions
undertaken pursuant to that stop [were] reasonably related in scope
to the stop itself 'unless the [officer had] a basis for expanding
[his] investigation.'" Id. at 28-29 (quoting United States v.
- 10 - Henderson, 463 F.3d 27, 45 (1st Cir. 2006)). The defendant here
does not challenge the scope of the stop. We thus limit our review
to ascertaining whether the Terry stop was supported by
"reasonable, articulable suspicion." Id. at 28.
Reasonable suspicion is a "protean" concept, Arnott, 758
F.3d at 44, and it demands that a reviewing court "look at the
'totality of the circumstances' of each case," Arvizu, 534 U.S. at
273 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
Reasonable suspicion "deals with degrees of likelihood, not with
certainties or near certainties." Arnott, 758 F.3d at 44. But it
"requires more than a naked hunch." Id.; see United States v.
Arthur, 764 F.3d 92, 97 (1st Cir. 2014). In the last analysis, to
be deemed reasonable, the officer's suspicion of an individual's
involvement in criminal conduct must be "particularized and
objective." Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417; see Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the agents
who stopped the defendant on August 15 knew the following facts
prior to the Terry stop:
• Guy — an unidentified fentanyl seller — coordinated
(by way of text message) fentanyl sales with Roy on
May 21, 2019 from Phone #1 and on July 10, 2019
from Phone #2.
- 11 - • Location data from a ping warrant of Phone #2 showed
that Phone #2 was frequently located at the
Riverside residence.
• On July 30, an agent surveilling the Riverside
residence observed the defendant there.
• On August 6, Guy coordinated (by way of text
message) another fentanyl sale with Roy from Phone
#2.
• On August 15 (the day of the stop), the agents
surveilling the Riverside residence — pursuant to
information that Phone #2 was there — observed the
defendant leaving the residence with a phone in his
hand and entering a taxi.
Considering the totality of these circumstances and
giving due weight to the inferences drawn by the agents, see
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996), we hold that
the agents who stopped the defendant possessed a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the defendant was Guy — the unidentified
fentanyl seller. This suspicion was "particular, that is,
specific" to the defendant, United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1,
7 (1st Cir. 2000), and it was reasonable: "[a] reasonably prudent
police officer standing in [these agents'] shoes and knowing what
[they] knew would certainly have harbored such suspicion[]."
Pontoo, 666 F.3d at 28; see Arthur, 764 F.3d at 98.
- 12 - The defendant demurs, arguing that there was no evidence
that he "was involved in any criminal activity . . . on the date
the taxi was stopped." The case law is clear, though, that an
officer's reasonable, articulable suspicion of a defendant's
involvement in past criminal activity may ground a permissible
Terry stop. See United States v. McCarthy, 77 F.3d 522, 529 (1st
Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226-29
(1985)). So it was here: the agents who stopped the defendant on
August 15 possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
defendant had engaged in past criminal conduct and, thus, the Terry
stop was permissible.
That ends this aspect of the matter. Because the agents
who stopped the defendant on August 15 possessed a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that he was Guy and that he had engaged in
at least three fentanyl sales, the district court did not err in
denying the defendant's motions to suppress the fruits of that
stop.
We turn last to the district court's denial of the
defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal. We review the
denial of a defendant's timely motions for judgment of acquittal
de novo. See United States v. De La Cruz, 835 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.
2016). "In the course of that review, we take the evidence, both
direct and circumstantial, in the light most hospitable to the
- 13 - government and draw all reasonable inferences in the government's
favor." Id. And we ask whether that evidence "enables a rational
factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the charged crime[s]." United States v. Kilmartin, 944
F.3d 315, 325 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Gomez, 255
F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2001)); De La Cruz, 835 F.3d at 9. In the
end, we "need not be convinced that the verdict is correct; [we]
need only be satisfied that the verdict is supported by the
record." Kilmartin, 944 F.3d at 325.
To sustain a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B)(vi) in this case, the evidence present at trial must
have enabled the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed or possessed
with the intent to distribute forty grams or more of a substance
containing fentanyl. In addition, to sustain a conviction under
21 U.S.C. § 846 in this case, the evidence adduced at trial must
have enabled the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, both
that a conspiracy to distribute or to possess with an intent to
distribute fentanyl existed and "that the defendant knowingly and
willfully joined in that conspiracy." United States v. Ramos-
Baez, 86 F.4th 28, 55 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v.
Millán-Machuca, 991 F.3d 7, 19 (1st Cir. 2021)).
The defendant here challenges all six of his
convictions, that is, the five convictions under section 841 for
- 14 - five controlled buys and the one conviction under section 846 for
conspiracy. We examine each conviction below, grouping any that
are supported by overlapping evidence.
1. Count six. With respect to the conviction stemming
from the September 19, 2019, controlled buy coordinated through
Phone #3, the defendant argues that there was no evidence proving
that Phone #3 belonged to him. This is so, the defendant says,
because he was arrested in an unknown location in the Butler
apartment, it is unknown where exactly (in the only furnished
bedroom) Phone #3 was found, and the receipt linking the phone to
him proves at most that the defendant "may have possessed Phone #3
at an earlier time." This is more cry than wool.
At trial, the government put forth sufficient evidence
from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Phone #3
belonged to the defendant. For one thing, Officer De La Cruz
testified that — when he went to the second-floor apartment of the
Butler residence — the defendant "identified himself as Ronald
Carmona" and stated that he was "the only person" that lived there.
For another thing, Sergeant Heslam testified that when law
enforcement executed the search warrant in that apartment, the
defendant alone was home and only one bedroom was furnished. In
that bedroom, the officers retrieved Phone #3 and a jewelry receipt
identifying the defendant as the buyer and listing Phone #3 as his
phone number.
- 15 - Given all this evidence, a rational factfinder could
have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Phone #3 belonged to
the defendant and, thus, that the defendant was Guy — the fentanyl
seller who coordinated the September 19 controlled buy. Because
the verdict on this count is supported by the record, the evidence
was sufficient to convict the defendant on count six.
2. Counts two, four, and five. With respect to the
convictions stemming from the May 21, July 31, and August 6
controlled buys arranged through Phones #1 and #2, the defendant
argues that there was "no direct evidence" proving that he
possessed either phone. He points out that neither phone was
recovered and that the "mere fact" that Phone #3 was found in the
apartment where he was arrested is insufficient to establish that
he possessed Phones #1 and #2. We do not agree.
"Direct evidence . . . is not essential to ground a
conviction; circumstantial evidence alone may suffice."
Concepcion-Guliam, 62 F.4th at 34. The circumstantial evidence
that the government adduced here was multifaceted and sufficient
to lead a rational factfinder to conclude, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Phones #1 and #2 belonged to the defendant and, as
such, that the defendant was the fentanyl seller who coordinated
the three controlled buys by way of these phones.
At trial, the government proffered testimony from both
Sergeant Larkin and Roy that the controlled buy for May 21 was
- 16 - coordinated using Phone #1 and the buys for July 31 and August 6
were coordinated using Phone #2. The government also introduced
into evidence an extraction report linking those two phones to
Phone #3 and showing that all three phones were used by the same
individual.
There was more. The government introduced evidence of
surveillance observations and ping location data which placed the
defendant and Phone #2 at the same location on August 15. The
defendant's argument that the area that Sergeant Heslam surveilled
that day was "densely populated" is unavailing. Defense counsel
twice asked Sergeant Heslam — in cross-examination — whether he
agreed that the area surveilled "is a densely populated residential
area." Sergeant Heslam responded in the affirmative both times.
The jury thus knew that the area surveilled, indeed all of Lawrence
(as per Sergeant Heslam's own testimony), was densely populated.
And it was their "responsibility to weigh the evidence in its
totality, resolve contradictions in the facts, and gauge the
credibility of the witnesses." United States v. Didonna, 866 F.3d
40, 48 (1st Cir. 2017).
The defendant attempts to blunt the force of the evidence
by arguing that the government did not "prove that [he] possessed
the phones and used them on the dates of offense." But the evidence
proved precisely that — albeit through circumstantial evidence.
Sergeant Larkin's testimony, Roy's testimony, and the extraction
- 17 - report linked the three phones. Sergeant Heslam's testimony pinned
the defendant to Phone #2. Other testimony — namely, Officer
Moynihan's testimony, the recovery of Phone #3, and the jewelry
receipt — pinned the defendant to Phone #3. Based on this
evidence, a rational factfinder could conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant possessed Phones #1 and #2 on
the dates in question and that the defendant was Guy, the
unidentified fentanyl seller.
3. Count three. With respect to the conviction stemming
from the July 10 controlled buy, the defendant argues that the
evidence is insufficient to ground his conviction on count three
because Lara's testimony is "deeply flawed." The defendant asserts
that Lara's testimony is "deeply flawed" due to inconsistent
statements he allegedly made about "core facts."
At trial, Lara testified that — on July 10 — the
defendant called him to meet the defendant outside a store. There,
the defendant (Lara stated) gave him fentanyl to deliver to a
buyer, Roy. After completing the sale, he — Lara testified — met
the defendant to give the defendant Roy's payment. Lara also
testified that prior to that, the defendant called him about six
times to pick up smaller quantities of fentanyl from another
individual (Gordo). However, on November 20, 2019, Lara met with
law enforcement agents to give a proffer, and there, he made no
- 18 - mention of Gordo. The defendant argues that this inconsistency
renders the totality of Lara's testimony "deeply flawed."
It is well-settled, though, that in examining a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, an appellate court is to
refrain from making any credibility judgments. See United States
v. Chan, 981 F.3d 39, 55 (1st Cir. 2020); United States v. Negrón-
Sostre, 790 F.3d 295, 307 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v.
Sherman, 551 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2008). We have stated that "a
defendant cannot win a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge by
claiming . . . the witnesses against him were not credible."
United States v. Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th 1, 54 (1st Cir. 2021).
"[I]t is not our prerogative to make independent assessments of
witness credibility. Rather, we must 'resolve[] all credibility
issues in favor of the verdict.'" United States v. Oliver, 19
F.4th 512, 516 (1st Cir. 2021) (second alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Andújar, 49 F.3d 16,
20 (1st Cir. 1995)).
Here, the alleged inconsistency did not relate to the
July 10 controlled buy. It related to fentanyl sales before July
10, and the jury was made aware of the contradiction. The jury
may have chosen either to disregard Lara's testimony entirely and
to rely only on the remainder of the evidence or to consider some
portions of Lara's testimony credible and to disregard
contradictory parts. There was no error in either approach:
- 19 - "credibility determinations are for the jury." United States v.
Alicea, 205 F.3d 480, 483 (1st Cir. 2000). And the "jury has the
prerogative to credit some parts of a witness's testimony and
disregard other potentially contradictory portions." Id.
Considering the totality of the evidence as to count
three — that is, Sergeant Larkin's testimony, Roy's testimony,
Sergeant Heslam's testimony, the extraction report, and Lara's
testimony — we hold that the evidence presented at trial
established that a rational factfinder could conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty of count three.
In other words, the record supports the jury's verdict as to count
three.
4. Count one. We turn last to the conspiracy conviction.
The defendant's principal argument here is that the government
failed to identify the runners and to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that they possessed the intent both to agree to the
conspiracy and to commit the underlying crime. It is possible,
the defendant says, that the runners did not even know that they
were delivering drugs to Roy. Without proving the runners' intent,
the defendant continues, the government is unable to prove that
the defendant engaged in a conspiracy.
To begin, the government did not have to identify all
the runners in order to prove a conspiracy. See United States v.
Nason, 9 F.3d 155, 159 (1st Cir. 1993). "The essence of a
- 20 - conspiracy is the existence of the conspiracy agreement, not the
identity of those who agree." Id. To prove the existence of a
conspiracy agreement, the government may rely on inferences based
on the unidentified runners' actions. See United States v. Santos-
Soto, 799 F.3d 49, 57-58 (1st Cir. 2015).
In this case, the government adduced evidence that could
support a reasonable inference that the unidentified runners
possessed the requisite intent: the surreptitious nature of the
deliveries, the locations of the deliveries, the defendant's
willingness to pay for each delivery, the size, weight, and
packaging of the drugs, and the payment given in exchange for the
packages. Roy testified at trial that he picked up all the
fentanyl purchases in the Methuen, Lawrence area. He stated that
the exchanges were "quick handoff[s]" to ensure that "everybody
[gets] in and out safely" and that law enforcement (or residents
who may call the police) do not notice. In addition, several of
the exhibits introduced during Sergeant Larkin's testimony were
photographs of the drugs retrieved from the runners. The
photographs show small cylinders packed in clear plastic bags,
which Roy testified were "rock hard."
"[J]uries are not required to examine the evidence in
isolation, for 'individual pieces of evidence, insufficient in
themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it. The sum
of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its
- 21 - constituent parts.'" United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 711
(1st Cir. 1992) (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,
179-80 (1987)). So it was here: the totality of the evidence
presented at trial established that a rational factfinder could
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty
of conspiracy.
III
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
the district court's denial of the defendant's motions to suppress
and denial of his motions for judgment of acquittal are
Affirmed.
- 22 -