United States v. Lujan

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: March 3, 2022
• Docket: 21-6088
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 21-6088 Document: 010110652219 Date Filed: 03/03/2022 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 3, 2022 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 21-6088 (D.C. No. 5:10-CR-00053-PRW-1) JASON CHRISTOPHER LUJAN, (W.D. Okla.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before HOLMES, KELLY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.** _________________________________

Defendant-Appellant Jason Christopher Lujan, a federal inmate, appeals from

the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Lujan, No. CR-10-00053, 2021 WL 3204492

(W.D. Okla. July 28, 2021). On appeal, Mr. Lujan challenges the district court’s

conclusion that the waiver contained in his plea agreement is enforceable. Exercising

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. ** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Appellate Case: 21-6088 Document: 010110652219 Date Filed: 03/03/2022 Page: 2

Background

In June 2010, Mr. Lujan pled guilty to a two-count superseding information

charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm and conspiracy to

distribute a controlled substance. 1 R. 44–54. Mr. Lujan’s plea agreement contained

the following waiver: “[D]efendant . . . knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to

. . . [a]ppeal, collaterally challenge, or move to modify under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

or some other ground, his sentence as imposed by the Court . . . provided the

sentence is within or below the advisory guideline range . . . .” 1 R. 51–52. In

January 2011, the court sentenced Mr. Lujan within the guideline range to 324

months’ imprisonment with each count to be served concurrently. 1 R. 122–23.

In August 2019, Mr. Lujan filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to

§ 3582(c)(2). 1 R. 136. Mr. Lujan argued that his sentence should be reduced based

on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which applies retroactively and

reduces the base offense levels assigned to drug quantities under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. 1

R. 136. The government opposed the motion, conceding that Mr. Lujan was eligible

for a sentence reduction but arguing that the court must enforce the appeal waiver in

his plea agreement. 1 R. 138–52. The district court enforced the waiver and denied

the motion. Lujan, 2021 WL 3204492, at *1.

Discussion

We review de novo whether a defendant’s appeal waiver as stated in his plea

agreement is enforceable. United States v. Lonjose, 663 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir.

2011). This court uses the following three-factor test to determine an appeal waiver’s

2 Appellate Case: 21-6088 Document: 010110652219 Date Filed: 03/03/2022 Page: 3

enforceability: “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver

of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his

appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage

of justice.” United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc)

(per curiam). A miscarriage of justice results only in situations where: (1) the

sentencing court “relied on an impermissible factor”; (2) “ineffective assistance of

counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid”;

(3) “the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum”; or (4) “the waiver is otherwise

unlawful.” Id. at 1327 (quoting United States v. Elliot, 264 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th

Cir. 2001)). A waiver is “otherwise unlawful” where it “seriously affect[s] the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).

On appeal, Mr. Lujan argues that to enforce his waiver would result in a

miscarriage of justice. Aplt. Br. at 4. Mr. Lujan claims that the waiver is “otherwise

unlawful” because it “prevent[s] [him] from pursuing a statutory right consistent with

the Sentencing Commission’s goals of achieving consistency and uniformity.” Aplt.

Br. at 6. However, our precedent squarely rejects this argument, and one panel may

not overrule another. This court has enforced a nearly identical waiver in the context

of a § 3582(c)(2) motion based on Amendment 782. United States v. Amado, 841

F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 2016). “[A] defendant’s waiver of the legal consequences of

unknown future events are commonplace and enforceable. . . . To rule otherwise

would make Defendant’s promise not to seek relief under § 3582(c)(2) purely

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illusory.” Id. The district court correctly concluded that Mr. Lujan’s appeal waiver

is enforceable.

AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge