PUBLISHED OPINION OF THE COURT
TELLER, Judge:
The appellant was convicted, pursuant to mixed pleas, by a military judge sitting alone, of being absent without leave, failing to obey a lawful general regulation, failing to obey a lawful order, dereliction of duty, making a fálse official statement, adultery, and obstructing justice in violation of Articles 86, [653]*65392, 107 and 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 886, 892, 907, 934. The court sentenced him to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 30 months, and reduction to E-l. The convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged.
The appellant argues: (1) his plea of guilty to Charge I, Specification 1, was improvident because the regulatory provision in question was not punitive; (2) that the finding of guilt as to the Second Additional Charge, Specification 1, was legally insufficient because the regulatory provision in question was not punitive; (3) that his sentence was inappropriately severe; and (4) that he is entitled to a new action because of errors in the staff judge advocate’s recommendation. We disagree and affirm.
Background
In November 2011, information came to light indicating the appellant, while serving as a basic military training (BMT) military training instructor (MTI), had sexual contact with a BMT trainee. Air Education and Training Command Instruction (AETCI) 36-2909, Professional and Unprofessional Relationships, (2 March 2007) (certified current 26 September 2011), prohibited MTIs from developing or conducting a personal, intimate or sexual relationship with a trainee.1 The prohibition included both BMT trainees and BMT graduates who had gone on to technical training.
This information led to an investigation that confirmed the initial allegations. In October 2012, the appellant and a fellow MTI, Airman Basic (AB), then-Staff Sergeant, Kwinton Estacio, convinced two BMT trainees to meet them in a physical training (PT) supply room. The two trainees had graduated from BMT earlier that week and were scheduled to leave within the next few hours for further training. The appellant had sex with one of the trainees2 while AB Estacio engaged in sexual relations with the other. The appellant bragged about the encounter to another trainee and some fellow MTIs.
To protect the ensuing investigation, the appellant wás ordered not to contact AB Estado or a third suspect. The appellant violated that order by meeting with them in person at his residence. In a further attempt to hinder the investigation, the appellant contacted the trainee he had sex with and told her not to tell anyone about it and to delete any text messages or pictures they had exchanged.
During the investigation, other misconduct also came to light. Investigators discovered the appellant had violated training standards by forcing trainees to eat cookies while performing PT after one of the trainees received the cookies in an unauthorized package from home. This caused one of the trainees to vomit. Investigators also discovered the appellant had sex with an Airman from the National Guard while he was still married.
While awaiting disposition of charges related to the prohibited relationship, the appellant engaged in further misconduct. After a civil arrest for public intoxication, he failed to report for duty and blamed his failure on a family emergency, an assertion he knew to be false. He also continued to contact the National Guard Airman with whom he committed adultery despite two separate no-contact orders. He also met a technical training student at a downtown bar, and in violation of an order not to talk to trainees, attempted to develop a personal relationship with her.3 He even flaunted his misconduct, asking her what she would do if he was one of the “bad [654]*654apples” she had seen on the news, and telling her he had sex with one of his trainees. In the pretrial confinement hearing that followed the discovery of that incident, the appellant lied again, saying he didn’t know she was a trainee.
Charges Brought Under AETCI 36-2909
For his conduct with the trainee in October 2012, the appellant pled guilty to violating Paragraph 4.3.3 of AETCI 36-2909, which states, in pertinent'part:
Faculty and staff will ... not establish, develop, attempt to develop, or conduct a personal, intimate, or sexual relationship with a trainee, cadet, [or] student. This includes, but is not limited to, dating, handholding, kissing, embracing, caressing, and engaging in sexual activities. Prohibited personal, intimate, or sexual relationships include unprofessional relationships conducted in person and/or via cards, letters, e-mails.
For his conduct with the student he met at a downtown bar, the appellant was convicted, contrary to his pleas, of violating Paragraph 4.3.10 of AETCI 36-2909, which stated “faculty and staff will ... not develop, attempt to develop, establish, or carry on a personal social relationship with a trainee, cadet, or student.”
The appellant now contends these paragraphs of AETCI 36-2909 are not punitive under Article 92(1) as it is not a lawful general regulation due to its noncomplianee with an instruction issued by’a superior authority. On that basis, the appellant argues that his guilty plea to Charge I, Specification 1 is improvident, and his conviction as to the Second Additional Charge, Specification 1 was legally insufficient.
Pure questions of law arising from a guilty plea are reviewed de novo. United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F.2008). Rejection of a guilty plea requires that the record show a substantial basis for questioning the providence of the plea. Id.; United States v. Prater, 32 M.J. 433, 436 (C.M.A.1991).
We review issues of legal sufficiency de novo. United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F.2002). “The test for legal sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable factfinder could have found all the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. Humpherys, 57 M.J. 83, 94 (C.A.A.F.2002) (quoting United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324 (C.M.A.1987)). The term reasonable doubt does not mean that the evidence must be • free from conflict. United States v. Lips, 22 M.J. 679, 684 (A.F.C.M.R.1986). “[I]n resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are bound to draw every reasonable inference from the evidence of record in favor of the prosecution.” United States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F.2001) (citations omitted). Our assessment of legal sufficiency is limited to the evidence produced at trial. United States v. Dykes, 38 M.J. 270, 272 (C.M.A.1993) (citations omitted).
Enforceability of Charged Provisions of AETCI 36-2909
a. Requirements for Punitive Regulations
Under both standards of review, we must first determine whether violations of the applicable provisions of AETCI 36-2909 may be punished under Article 92(1), UCMJ. “[I]f a regulation does not contain language establishing that it is a punitive regulation, a violation of the regulation is not a criminal offense under Article 92(1).” United States v. Shavrnoch, 49 M.J. 334, 336 (C.A.A.F.1998). Generally, the punitive nature of a regulation is ascertained by examining the regulation as a whole to see if it “regulate[s] conduct of individual members and that its direct application of sanctions for its violation is self-evident.” United States v. Blanchard, 19 M.J. 196, 197 (C.M.A.1985) (citations omitted).
Under that test, we find AETCI 36-2909 to be enforceable. The introductory section of the Instruction directs that “[m]ili-tary members who violate a prohibition in Paragraph 4, (or any subparagraph thereunder) of this instruction ... are subject to prosecution under Article 92 of the [UCMJ.]” Paragraph 4, which comprises four of the [655]*655nine pages of the Instruction, begins with the phrase “Specific Prohibitions and Responsibilities.” The following subparagraphs set out specific behavioral expectations for four specific classes of personnel: faculty and staff; trainees, cadets and students; recruiters; and Airmen participating in the Recruiter Assistance Program. In an unpublished opinion, this court previously affirmed the general punitive nature of a prior version of AETCI 36-2909 that set out similar prohibitions. See United States v. Crawford, ACM 34837 (A.F.Ct.Crim.App. 23 December 2002) (unpub. op.) (finding the operative paragraphs punitive, but not applicable to the appellant).
b. Air Force-Specific Regulatory Requirements for Punitive Instructions
The appellant’s assignment of error, however, points out that the Secretary of the Air Force has issued an instruction that includes more specific requirements for punitive Air Force instructions. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-360, Publications and Forms Management, (18 May 2006) (incorporating changes through 12 July 2007), was in force at the time AETCI 36-2909 was published and at the time of the alleged offense. AFI 33-360 states, “compliance with this publication is mandatory.” It governs the drafting of Air Force Instructions and contains specific guidance on drafting punitive provisions.4
In a section entitled “Specific Legal Requirements,” describing the requirements for a punitive regulation, AFI 33-360 states, in pertinent part:
2.17.1.2.Structure of a Punitive Publication. Generally, for a publication to be punitive, it must place obligations on individuals. The opening paragraph must specify which parts of the publication contain punitive provisions; a service member should be able to tell by looking in the introduction of the publication that it contains punitive provisions. Publications containing punitive provisions often provide nonpunitive information. Authors must, therefore, identify clearly those portions that are punitive in nature, or place punitive provisions in a separate publication.
2.17.1.3. Specifying Punitive Portions in the Opening Paragraph. The opening paragraph must clearly specify which parts of a publication contain mandatory provisions and prohibitions enforceable against the individual. While such language standing alone in the opening paragraph does not make a publication punitive, it becomes punitive when combined with punitive language in the body of the publication .... The opening paragraph must say that failure to observe the prohibitions and mandatory provisions in the publication is a violation of Article 92 of the UCMJ, or that noncompliance may result in punishment under Article 92 of the UCMJ.
2.17.1.4. Punitive Language. Most of the recommended language used in publications does not readily put the reader on notice that the publication is punitive in nature. Use language that expresses the mandatory nature of the provisions, such as “will,” “wifi not,” “shall,” “shall not,” “must,” “must not,” etc. Paragraphs containing mandatory provisions or prohibitions must state that a fafiure to obey is a violation of Article 92 of the UCMJ. This statement should accompany each mandatory provision or prohibition, or may, if clear, refer to a series of mandatory provisions or prohibitions listed within a specific paragraph.
Here, AETCI 36-2909’s opening paragraph does clearly specify which parts of the instruction contain mandatory provisions and prohibitions enforceable against the individual. It specifically states that military members who violate the prohibitions in Paragraph 4 or its subparagraphs are subject to prosecution under Article 92, UCMJ. The [656]*656appellant was charged with violating two sub-paragraphs of Paragraph 4.
The charged paragraphs and subpara-graphs of AETCI 36-2909, however, do not each state that a failure to obey those paragraphs is a violation of Article 92 of the UCMJ, as required by Paragraph 2.17.1.4 of AFI 33-360. The appellant contends that, without this language, the punitive language in the opening paragraph of AETCI 36-2909 is insufficient to make a violation of the paragraphs or subparagraphs chargeable under Article 92(1), UCMJ.
Accordingly, we interpret the appellant’s claim as going beyond the more general common law test for punitive regulations and invoking what is often referred to as the Accardi doctrine. See generally United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1954). Not all regulations are designed to create rights that may be enforced by an accused in an action under the UCMJ, but “[i]t is well-settled that a government agency must abide by its own rules and regulations where the underlying purpose of such regulations is the protection of personal liberties or interests.” United States v. Russo, 1 M.J. 134, 135 (C.M.A.1975) (citing Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 90 S.Ct. 1288, 25 L.Ed.2d 547 (1970); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1954)). The Accardi doctrine confers standing upon a criminal defendant to challenge an agency’s failure to follow its own regulations when the regulation was intended to protect individual liberty or personal interests.
c. Applicability of the Accardi Doctrine to AFI 33-360
In United States v. McGraner, 13 M.J. 408, 417-18 (C.M.A.1982), the Court of Military Appeals applied four factors in determining whether a regulation was intended to protect personal liberties or interests. Specifically, in considering whether evidence should be excluded due to regulatory violations, the court considered (1) the presence or absence of a specific remedy in the regulation, (2) the primary purpose of the provision in question, (3) the scope of the remedy necessary to protect the purported interest, and (4) the presence or absence of any due process considerations discussed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979). Id.; see also United States v. Manuel, 43 M.J. 282, 287 (C.A.A.F.1995) (upholding military judge’s exclusion of evidence where it was obtained contrary to the provisions of a regulation intended to confer a right on servicemembers); United States v. Foust, 17 M.J. 85, 87-88 (C.M.A.1983) (refusing to invoke an exclusionary rule when it was unclear that the military regulation on which the defense relied was intended to create a right personal to the accused); United States v. Kohut, 44 M.J. 245, 250 (C.M.A.1996) (finding violation of a directive establishing a policy as to when prosecution of an accused should take place does not constitute a bar to trial when the directive was not issued to protect rights of servicemembers).
We find this test to also be applicable in determining whether the Government’s failure to comply with AFI 33-360 prevents the Government from charging the appellant with a violation of Article 92(1), UCMJ.
1. Absence of a specific remedy in AFI 33-360
The first factor suggests that AFI 33-360 was not intended to protect personal liberties or interests. The instruction itself, and Paragraph 2.17, does not provide any remedy for individuals if agency officials do not comply with its terms. For example, contrast Paragraph 2.17 with the provision at issue in United States v. Dunks, 1 M.J. 254, (C.M.A.1976). There, United States Army Europe Supplement 1 to Army Regulation 27-10 (16 September 1971) allowed soldiers pending summary or special court-martial for more than 45 days from the earlier of preferral or the imposition of pretrial restraint to petition the general court-martial convening authority for a dismissal of charges. Id. The specific relief — the petition for dismissal — suggested that'the purpose of the provision was the protection of the individual rather than an institutional concern for prompt resolution of charges.
[657]*657Paragraph 2.17 has no similar avenue for relief. Instead, the language as a whole suggests the purpose of that section of the instruction is to provide guidance to officials intending to draft punitive provisions to aid them in meeting legal requirements for enforcement.
2. Primary purpose of AFI 33-360
The dissenting opinion argues the primary purpose of AFI 33-360, Paragraph 2.17, is to provide unambiguous notice to Airmen of provisions that are subject to punishment under Article 92(1), UCMJ. Paragraph 2.17 includes several references that support that notion. See AFI 33-360, ¶ 2.17.1.2 (“A service member should be able to tell by looking in the introduction of the publication that it contains punitive provisions.”); ¶ 2.17.1.3 (stating any publication that imposes punitive liability must “clearly specify” in the opening paragraph which parts of the publication contain mandatory provisions enforceable against the individual.); ¶ 2.17.1.4 (noting most of the language used in publications “does not readily put the reader on notice that the publication is punitive in nature”).
We find the notice argument unconvincing as it applies to the specific provision at issue in this case. The appellant cites that part of Paragraph 2.17.1.4 which requires each paragraph containing mandatory provisions to state a failure to obey is a violation of Article 92, UCMJ. With respect to providing notice of proscribed conduct, the requirement that boilerplate warnings appear with each provision or in each paragraph would likely detract from a layperson’s ability to know and understand what conduct is expected of them. Such rote and redundant repetition would make the regulation more difficult for the average reader to use, obscuring any plain statement of prohibited conduct in a sea of legal jargon.
• Furthermore, other provisions of AFI 33-360 already set effective standards for discriminating between language that establishes a code of conduct and more general guidance. Paragraph 2.17.1.3, for example, requires any publication that imposes punitive liability to “clearly specify” in the opening paragraph — a consistent, easy to find location — which parts of the publication contain mandatory provisions and prohibitions enforceable against the individual. AETCI 36-2909’s opening paragraph follows this requirement and expressly states that violations of Paragraph 4 subject military members to prosecution under Article 92, UCMJ. This language has been held sufficient to support an Article 92(1), UCMJ charge for violating a related AETCI. See United States v. Pope, 63 M.J. 68, 72 (C.A.A.F.2006) (upholding an Article 92(1), UCMJ conviction for violating the primary AETCI used to provide guidance to recruiters and outlining prohibited conduct which expressly stated that failure to observe the mandatory provisions may result in prosecution under Article 92, UCMJ).
Additionally, Paragraph 2.17.1.4, immediately prior to the provision cited by the appellant, requires drafters to “[u]se language that expresses the mandatory nature of the provisions, such as ‘will,’ “will not,’ ‘shall,’ ‘shall not,’ ‘must,’ ‘must not,’ etc.” These provisions accord with case law and could convincingly be argued to enhance the ability of Airmen to understand what conduct is expected of them, and Paragraph 4 of the AFI uses that language.
The point of this analysis is not for this court to pass judgment on the advisability of any particular provision in AFI 33-360. The point is to examine whether the provision was likely intended to protect one specific personal interest — notice—such that an instruction’s failure to comply makes that instruction unenforceable under Article 92, UCMJ. After considering the probable impact of the provision cited here on the useful functioning of instructions such as AETCI 36-2909, we find no basis to conclude that enhancing notice was the intended puipose of that provision.
3. The scope of the remedy necessary to protect the purported interest
Proceeding to the third McGraner factor, we find that the consequences of enforcing the requirements of AFI 33-360 would be disproportionate to any personal interest that provision seeks to protect. As the appellant noted in his brief, our superior court’s prece[658]*658dent suggesting that a court could find an accused guilty of the lesser-included offense of willful dereliction of duty under Article 92(3), see Shavrnoch, 49 M.J. at 339; United States v. Bivins, 49 M.J. 328, 332 (C.A.A.F.1998), may not have survived our superior court’s holding in United States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465 (C.A.A.F.2010). If not, then the only relief available to the trial court would have been to dismiss the specification, a remedy the McGraner court described as drastic. Even if dereliction of duty remains a lesser included offense, our superior court observed in Shavmoch that the difference between the offense of violating a general regulation under Article 92(1) and the offense of dereliction of duty under Article 92(3) is not a “mere technical distinction.” Shavrnoch, 49 M.J. at 337. The court noted the substantial difference between the maximum punishments for the two offenses. Id. So, like McGraner, the consequences of enforcing the language of the regulation cited by the appellant would be substantial and weigh against conferring standing on the appellant.
4. The presence or absence of any due process considerations
Finally, under the fourth McGraner factor, we find no due process concerns that suggest that the appellant should have standing to enforce Paragraph 2.17.1.4. In Caceres, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s exclusion of conversations which an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent had recorded without the supervisory authorization required under IRS regulations. Caceres, 440 U.S. at 743-44, 99 S.Ct. 1466. The Court specifically considered three factors: whether the regulation was mandated by the Constitution or federal law, whether the individual had reasonably and detrimentally relied on agency regulations promulgated for his guidance or benefit, and whether the Administrative Procedure Act would provide grounds for judicial enforcement of the regulation. Id., at 752-54, 99 S.Ct. 1465.
None of the due process concerns examined by the Court are implicated in this case. The Air Force is not required by the Constitution or statute to include punitive language with each punitive provision of a regulation. There is also no evidence that the appellant relied upon the absence of specific language in Chapter Four of AETCI 36-2909 in deciding whether personal relationships with trainees was permissible. On the contrary, the appellant admitted during the providence inquiry that he believed he was subject to the restrictions in Chapter Four. Finally, this is not a ease where the appellant seeks to invalidate the publication of AETCI 36-2909 because its publication was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law. While its publication, like the recording in Caceres, was deficient in certain respects, it was not arbitrary or capricious.
The dissent argues that treating AETCI 36-2909 as punitive despite its noncompliance construes AFI 33-360 to read “should” when it plainly says “must.” We disagree. Drafters of punitive instructions must abide by the requirements of AFI 33-360. The appellant in this case argues that they failed to do so. Where we part company with the dissent is not in whether the drafters may be held to account for any such failure, but whether the appellant has standing to use that failure to excuse his willful violation of a provision of which, by his own admission, he was completely aware and which he believed he had a duty to obey.
Accordingly, we find that although AETCI 36-2909 did not meet all requirements of AFI 33-360, the cited provisions were not intended to protect personal liberties or interests, and the appellant lacks standing to enforce them. Any challenge to the providence of his pleas or the legal sufficiency of his conviction on that basis does not constitute an error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant. See Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a).
Sentence Severity
The appellant argues his punishment was overly harsh, particularly in light of the sentence approved for AB Estacio, who received a bad conduct discharge, confinement for 12 months and reduction to E-l.
This court “may affirm only ... the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact [659]*659and determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved.” Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c). We review sentence appropriateness de novo, employing “a sweeping congressional mandate” to ensure “a fair and just punishment for every accused.” United States v. Baier, 60 M.J. 382, 384-85 (C.A.A.F.2005) (citations omitted). The appropriateness of a sentence generally should be determined without reference or comparison to sentences in other cases. United States v. Ballard, 20 M.J. 282, 283 (C.M.A.1985). We are not required to engage in comparison of specific cases “except in those rare instances in which sentence appropriateness can be fairly determined only by reference to disparate sentences adjudged in closely related cases.” United States v. Lacy, 50 M.J. 286, 288 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (quoting Ballard, 20 M.J. at 283). The “appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that, any cited eases are ‘closely related’ to his or her case and that the sentences are ‘highly disparate.’ ” Id. If the appellant satisfies his burden, the Government must then establish a rational basis for the disparity. Id.
Although the appellant and AB Es-tacio were co-actors in the October 2011 tryst with the trainees and the subsequent attempts to cover it up, the cases as a whole are not closely related. In addition to the misconduct he committed with AB Estacio, the appellant also maltreated trainees, engaged in a separate instance- of adultery, was absent without leave, violated numerous no-eontaet orders, pursued a prohibited relationship with a technical school trainee, and made two false official statements. When an appellant’s case includes substantial unrelated misconduct in addition to that related to a co-actor, the underlying fairness rationale for comparing the two sentences no longer exists. Cf. United States v. Wacha, 55 M.J. 266, 268 (C.A.A.F.2001) (finding eases not closely related when only 4 of the appellant’s 16 drug offenses involved co-actor). The appellant’s case is not one where the majority of the offenses were committed with the same co-actor, or where comparatively minor misconduct is being considered contemporaneously with a larger joint offense. Instead, the additional charges in the appellant’s case arose from serious and substantial misconduct completely unrelated to the events involving AB Estacio. In such circumstances, the cases are distinct and are not closely related for sentence comparison purposes.
Even if we were to hold the intersection of the appellant’s ease and AB Estacio’s case made them closely related, the appellant’s additional misconduct would constitute a rational basis for the disparity in the sentences. While awaiting court-martial on charges of engaging in sexual relations with a trainee and trying to cover it up, he attempted to initiate a prohibited relationship with another trainee and lied about it. This evidence of incorrigibility alone would justify the disparity in sentences.
We next consider whether the appellant’s sentence was appropriate “judged by ‘individualized consideration’ of the particular [appellant] ‘on the basis of the nature and seriousness of the offense[s] and the character of the offender.’ ” United States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 267, 268 (C.M.A.1982) (quoting United States v. Mamaluy, 27 C.M.R. 176, 180-81 (C.M.A.1959)). The appellant’s maltreatment of trainees, including the prohibited sexual relationship, directly undermined the BMT mission. He colluded with other MTIs in an attempt to escape accountability. While the disposition of those offenses was pending, his civil misconduct caused him to be absent from his unit and in another attempt to avoid accountability, he lied about it. Still undeterred, he attempted to develop a personal relationship with a technical school trainee, actually flaunting his own misconduct in the process. When confronted ■with this misconduct, he lied again. Such willful disregard for the training mission and unresponsiveness to disciplinary efforts clearly merit significant punishment, and we find the approved sentence to be appropriate.
We have given individualized consideration to this particular appellant, the nature and seriousness of the offenses, the appellant’s record of service, and all other matters contained in the record of trial. We find the approved sentence was clearly within the discretion of the convening authority, was [660]*660appropriate in this case, and was not inappropriately severe.
Errors in the Staff Judge Advocate’s Recommendation
The appellant argues two errors in the staff judge advocate’s recommendation (SJAR) materially prejudiced him and require return of the case for new post-trial processing. The appellant points out the SJAR misstates the adjudged sentence by stating the appellant was reduced to the grade of E-3, rather than the grade of E-l as actually adjudged. The SJAR also incorrectly stated the maximum sentence in this case was confinement for 15 years and 1 month rather than the correct maximum sentence, 22 years and 1 month.
Proper completion of post-trial processing is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. United States v. Sheffield, 60 M.J. 591, 593 (A.F.Ct.Crim.App. 2004) (citing United States v. Kho, 54 M.J. 63, 65 (C.A.A.F.2000)). Failure to timely comment on matters in the SJAR, or matters attached to the recommendation, forfeits any later claim of error in the absence of plain error. Rule for Courts-Martial 1106(f)(6); United States v. Scalo, 60 M.J. 435, 436 (C.A.A.F.2005). “To prevail under a plain error analysis, [the appellant bears the burden of showing] that: ‘(1) there was an error; (2) it was plain or obvious; and (3) the error materially prejudiced a substantial right.’” Scalo, 60 M.J. at 436 (quoting Kho, 54 M.J. at 65). Although the threshold for establishing prejudice in this context is low, the appellant must nonetheless make at least some “colorable showing of possible prejudice in terms of how the [perceived error] potentially affected [his] opportunity for clemency.” Id. at 437.
.We find no colorable showing of possible prejudice with regard to the misstatement of the reduction in grade. The convening authority’s action, in ordering appellate leave, accurately stated the appellant’s projected rank as Airman Basic. Accordingly, we find no basis to believe the error in the SJAR misled the convening authority on that aspect of the sentence.
The appellant also argues the convening authority might have “assumed” the appellant’s misconduct was more severe than it was because the SJAR incorrectly indicated the adjudged sentence was closer to the maximum sentence than it actually was. The record does not support that argument. The convening authority was provided a six-page-long report of result of trial setting out the charges, specifications, pleas, and findings. We are not persuaded that the convening authority relied on the maximum sentence rather than the specifications upon which the appellant was convicted in determining the severity of his misconduct. By the appellant’s logic, had the court adjudged a sentence of one month confinement and no punitive discharge, the convening authority might have blindly concluded his misconduct was minor and approved even less. We find that suggestion implausible. Indeed, clemency is usually considered more appropriate as an adjudged sentence approaches the maximum allowable sentence, rather than the other way around. In this case, the SJAR suggested that the adjudged confinement constituted seventeen percent of the maximum rather than the correct eleven percent. In light of the appellant’s persistent misconduct, we find the difference sufficiently small to foreclose the possibility that the convening authority would have granted any clemency on that basis had he been accurately advised. We find that the appellant’s contention does not raise a colorable showing of possible prejudice.
Unreasonable Delay
Though not raised as an issue on appeal, we note the overall delay of more than 18 months between the time of docketing and review by this court is facially unreasonable. See United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 142 (C.A.A.F.2006). Article 66(e), UCMJ, empowers the service courts to grant sentence relief for excessive posUtrial delay without the showing of actual prejudice required by A*ticle 59(a), UCMJ. United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219, 224 (C.A.A.F.2002). In this case, the appellant originally submitted an assignment of errors on 8 August 2014. While that assignment of errors was under consideration, on 7 October 2014, [661]*661the appellant sought leave to file a supplemental assignment of error, addressing the enforceability of AETCI 36-2909. The court granted leave to file the supplemental assignment of error.
Utilizing the four factor test adopted in Moreno, we find the delay did not violate the appellant’s due process rights. See 63 M.J. at 135. The supplemental assignment of error required substantial additional consideration of his case, and the appellant requested such consideration rather than demanding speedy resolution of the appeal. The delay, while presumptively unreasonable, did not exceed the Moreno standard by more than 90 days. We also note that the consideration of the supplemental assignment of error did not exceed the six months that our superior court found reasonable for the exercise of appellate decision-making in Moreno. See id. at 137-38. Finally, the appellant has not asserted he was prejudiced.
We have also considered whether, even in the absence of prejudice, sentence relief is justified based upon the delay. United States v. Harvey, 64 M.J. 13, 24 (C.A.A.F.2006); Tardif, 57 M.J. at 224. We find that because the appellant requested consideration of the supplemental issue well into the appellate processing of his ease, no Tardif relief is appropriate.
Conclusion
The approved findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant occurred. Articles 59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ. Accordingly, the approved findings and sentence are
AFFIRMED.
ALLRED, Chief Judge, HECKER, Senior Judge, and WEBER, Judge, concur.