BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
Appellant Jesus M. López-Gil was convicted by a jury of knowing and intentional possession, with intent to distribute, approximately 18 kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); of knowing and intentional importation of cocaine into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a); and of possession of cocaine on board an aircraft without the cocaine being entered on the cargo manifest or the official supply list, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 955.1 López-Gil appeals his conviction on the ground that there was insufficient evidence at trial to support a conviction for importation of cocaine. He appeals his sentence on two grounds: that the court erred in its determination of the type and quantity of the cocaine in calculating his base offense level under the sentencing guidelines; and that the court erred in failing to make a downward adjustment for his role as a courier of the cocaine.
We affirm the conviction but remand for resentencing.
BACKGROUND
On November 2, 1989, López-Gil, a Colombian national, arrived at the Luis Munoz Marin International Airport in San Juan, Puerto Rico aboard Iberia Flight Number 924. He was en route to Madrid, Spain from Quito, Ecuador. The flight made two stops, one in Bogotá, Columbia and another in San Juan. Upon routine inspection and interview of the flight’s passengers in the in-transit lounge,2 Customs Contraband Enforcement Team (CET) officials detained López-Gil because he appeared nervous and was perspiring when questioned.
During their inspection of the cargo, CET officials opened one of two black fiberglass suitcases and upon ripping the lining, discovered glue marks and bulges. CET field tested both suitcases and they reacted positive for cocaine. López-Gil’s name and address were on each suitcase. Claim tags attached to his plane ticket matched those on the suitcases.
A Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) chemist, Ivette Maria Vallejo, tested the suitcases under laboratory conditions and found cocaine secreted within the fiberglass. She weighed the suitcases without the metal trimming or metal parts and determined a net weight of approximately 14 kilograms. Vallejo extracted the controlled substance from the fiberglass and the resin with chloroform, and then ran methanol and ether through the controlled substance to clean it for testing. She conducted infrared and mass spectrometer tests on the controlled substance which tested positive for cocaine. She determined the net weight of the cocaine to be approximately 2.6 kilograms.
Pursuant to the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 (November 1990) (“Sentencing [1126]*1126Guidelines”) the district court assigned Ló-pez-Gil a base offense level of 40. The court based its calculation on its determination that the controlled substance was cocaine base and by using the net weight of the two suitcases and the cocaine substance. The court found that because Ló-pez-Gil “acted as a courier and apparently had no proprietary interest in the cocaine as such, a sentence in the lower end of the guideline range is warranted.” Sent. Tr. p. 14. The court refused to grant him a two-level reduction for minor involvement. The court sentenced López-Gil to a term of imprisonment of 292 months and to a term of supervised release of 5 years, as to each count, to be served concurrently. He now appeals from that judgment and sentence.
IMPORTATION OF COCAINE
López-Gil asserts that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to convict him of importing cocaine into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). He contends that because he was in-transit when arrested in San Juan, with his destination being Spain and not the United States, he cannot be convicted of a crime requiring the elements of knowledge of and intention to import cocaine into the United States. Our duty is to determine whether a reasonable jury could, after hearing all the evidence, conclude that the defendant was guilty of the specific crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Piedrahita-Santiago, 931 F.2d 127 (1st Cir.1991). We find that it could.
López-Gil acknowledges that this circuit interprets the crime of importation to mean that the defendant’s intended final destination for the controlled substance does not have to be the United States. In United States v. Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268 (1st Cir.1987), we sustained a conviction for importation of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). The defendant, who was en route to Switzerland, had disembarked into an in-transit holding area in San Juan. We found that 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) does not require that the accused form the specific intent to bring drugs into the country — or even that she be aware that her international flight would stop in the United States. We held that “the offense was complete the moment defendant, knowingly in possession of cocaine, landed in this country with the contraband, regardless of her knowledge of the aircraft’s itinerary or the planned terminus of her journey.” Id. at 272. In order to convict the defendant of importing drugs, “[i]t is sufficient that the defendant knowingly possessed the contraband, and brought it into the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. at 271. Accord United States v. Ortiz-Alarcon, 917 F.2d 651, 652 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. Franchi-Forlando, 838 F.2d 585 (1st Cir.1988); United States v. McKenzie, 818 F.2d 115 (1st Cir.1987). The holding in Mejia-Lozano controls. We affirm López-Gil’s conviction for importing cocaine into the United States.
SENTENCING
1. Weight
López-Gil argues that the district court erred in its determination of the weight of the controlled substance (14 kilograms) for sentencing purposes. The court included the net weight of the suitcases in its calculation of the defendant’s base offense level of 40. López-Gil contends that the correct weight for calculation purposes should have been the net weight of the cocaine mixture only (2.6 kilograms). The difference in terms of sentencing between the two calculations is substantial. Had the court used the 2.6 kilogram weight in calculating the base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines, López-Gil would have received a base offense level of 28, assuming that the substance is cocaine and not cocaine base as we will discuss next. Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(8). Based on the trial court’s findings, the defendant would probably have received 78 months for each count. Using 40 as the base offense level, the court sentenced the defendant to concurrent sentences of 292 months for each count.
In United States v. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d 623 (1st Cir.1991), we interpreted the recent Supreme Court holding in Chapman v. United States, — U.S.-, 111 [1127]*1127S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991), to require that in determining the weight of the cocaine for sentencing purposes, the weight of the suitcases should be included. The facts in Mahecha-Onofre are similar to the ones in the instant case. Mahecha-Onofre was a passenger on Iberia Airlines Flight 910, which stopped in San Juan on its way from Bogotá, Colombia, to Madrid, Spain. Customs officials found two suitcases emanating a strong chemical odor and upon conducting a field test on them found that the suitcases themselves were made of cocaine. Later testing revealed that the suitcases contained approximately 2.5 kilograms of cocaine bonded chemically with the acrylic suitcase material. Mahe-eha-Onofre appealed on the ground, inter alia, that the court committed a legal error, when, for sentencing purposes, it counted the total weight of the suitcases, minus all metal parts (about 12 kilograms), instead of the weight of the cocaine itself (about 2.5 kilograms).
We held that the court properly included the weight of the suitcases for sentencing purposes. Our analysis ascertained that “the suitcase/coeaine ‘mixture’ or ‘substance’ fits the statutory and Guideline definitions as the Supreme Court has recently interpreted them in Chapman.” Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d at 626. We interpreted Chapman to mean that,
Unlike blotter paper or cutting agents, the suitcase material obviously cannot be consumed; and the cocaine must be separated from the suitcase material before use. We do not believe, however, that this fact alone can make a difference to the outcome, for “ingestion” would not seem to play a critical role in the definition of “mixture” or “substance.”
Id.
In Chapman, the defendants were convicted of selling sheets of blotter paper containing LSD, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). The district court used the total weight of the paper and LSD together in calculating the sentences under the statute and the base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. The Supreme Court held that the statute requires the weight of the carrier medium to be included when determining the appropriate sentencing for trafficking in LSD. The Court found that “the blotter paper used in this case, and blotter paper customarily used to distribute LSD, is a ‘mixture or substance containing a detectable amount’ of LSD.” Chapman, 111 S.Ct. at 1925. The Court determined that “[n]either the statute nor the Sentencing Guidelines define the terms ‘mixture’ and ‘substance,’ nor do they have any established common law meaning. Those terms, therefore, must be given their ordinary meaning.” Id.
The Court reasoned that under the plain meaning of the term mixture, the blotter paper would be part of the LSD mixture.
Like heroin or cocaine mixed with cutting agents, the LSD cannot be distinguished from the blotter paper, nor easily separated from it. Like cutting agents used with other drugs that are ingested, the blotter paper, gel, or sugar cube carrying the LSD can be and often is ingested with the drug.
Id. Ill S.Ct. at 1926. Accounting for the likelihood of progeny with “absurd” interpretations, the Court differentiated between a carrier medium, like blotter paper which can be ingested, and containers.
The term [mixture] does not include LSD in a bottle, or LSD in a car, because the drug is easily distinguished from, and separated from, such a “container.” The drug is clearly not mixed with a glass vial or automobile; nor has the drug chemically bonded with the vial or car. It may be true that the weights of containers and packaging materials generally are not included in determining a sentence for drug distribution, but that is because those items are also clearly not mixed or otherwise combined with the drug.
In elucidating congressional intent, the Court determined that “Congress adopted a ‘market-oriented’ approach to punishing drug trafficking, under which the total quantity of what is distributed, rather than the amount of pure drug involved, is used to determine the length of the sentence.” [1128]*1128Id. 111 S.Ct. at 1925, citing H.R.Rep. No. 99-845, pt. 1, pp. 11-12, 17 (1986). The court concluded,
By measuring the quantity of the drugs according to the “street weight” of the drugs in the diluted form in which they are sold, rather than according to the net weight of the active component, the statute and the Sentencing Guidelines increase the penalty for persons who possess large quantities of drugs, regardless of their purity. This is a rational sentencing scheme.
Id. 111 S.Ct. at 1928.
We recognize that the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted Chapman differently from this circuit.3 See United States v. Jennings & Stepp, 945 F.2d 129 (6th Cir.1991), United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir.1991).
In Jennings & Stepp, the defendants were convicted of, inter alia, possession with intent to distribute over 100 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). In computing the base offense under the Sentencing Guidelines the district court weighed the total amount of the mixture in a crockpot (4 kilograms). The mixture included methamphetamine, along with unreacted chemicals and by-products, both of which are poisonous if ingested. The Sixth Circuit adopted Chapman’s “market-oriented” approach to punishing drug trafficking. The court held that the district court erred in including the poisonous and unusable parts of the mixture for sentencing purposes. Jennings & Stepp, 945 F.2d at 136-137. The court believed that the legislative intent underlying the sentencing scheme of both the statute and the Sentencing Guidelines compelled its conclusion. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Rolande-Ga-briel, held that the district court erred in using the weight of unusable non-drug liquid in calculating the base offense level (241.6 grams) under the Sentencing Guidelines. 938 F.2d at 1237. Like the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit in reaching its conclusion applied the Chapman standard of usability, consumability, and readiness for wholesale or retail distribution. The court determined that because the government chemist easily distinguished the unusable liquid from the drug powder and its cutting agent, the unusable liquid is similar to the “packaging” material referred to by the Supreme Court in Chapman. Id. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that its holding comported with the Sentencing Guidelines’ stated purpose of sentencing uniformity.4 See Sentencing Guidelines, ch. 1, pt. A, at 1.1-1.4. The court concluded that to weigh the unusable liquid mixture would result in an “absurd and glaringly unjust result.” 5 Id.
[1129]*1129We recognize that if this ease were before the Sixth or Eleventh Circuit today, the result would be different. We, however, follow First Circuit precedent and affirm the district court’s use of the suitcases’ weight in calculating López-Gil’s sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines.
2. Type of Substance
We examine next López-Gil’s assertion that the district court erred in its classification of the cocaine substance as cocaine base, instead of cocaine, for sentencing purposes. In reaching our conclusion, we must determine whether the substance at issue constitutes cocaine base or cocaine as defined by the statute and the Sentencing Guidelines. In prior cases interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), we have held that the use of the term “cocaine base” is not unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 890 F.2d 545 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019, 110 S.Ct. 1326, 108 L.Ed.2d 501 (1990). The issue before us today requires us to determine the correct definition of cocaine base as a matter of statutory interpretation. This issue is one of first impression for us. The interpretation of the term “cocaine base” is a legal question which we review de novo. See United States v. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412, 414 (9th Cir.1991).
The trial testimony of the DEA chemist, Vallejo, described the chemical processes she used to obtain a sample of the controlled substance. She testified that she found, as a result of the chemical analysis, “cocaine as the base.” Trial Tr. p. 107 (emphasis added). Trial counsel recalled Vallejo during the pre-sentencing hearing, Vallejo testified that the controlled substance was not crack.
Q Miss Vallejo, you were the person that analyzed the narcotic drug found in the luggage?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in the report that you submitted at the time of the trial you stated there that it was cocaine base, is that correct?
A Yes, sir....
Q Miss Vallejo, was the cocaine base found in the luggage crack?
A No, it was in the state it was received, no. It was not crack.
Q Most or some of the analysis made of cocaine base could be crack?
A Yes.
Q And in this case it was not?
A No.
THE COURT: It was not crack?
THE WITNESS: It was not crack.
Trial Tr., Vol. V, p. 5-6. Our analysis proceeds on the basis that the controlled substance was not crack.
In examining the statute and the Sentencing Guidelines, we find that neither defines the term “cocaine base.”6 The Guidelines’ drug equivalency table equates cocaine base with “crack.” Sentencing Guidelines, § 2D1.1 (“1 gm of Cocaine Base (‘Crack’) equals 100 gm of cocaine/20 gm of heroin”).
One other circuit has addressed the issue of defining the term “cocaine base.” The Ninth Circuit recently concluded that “Congress and the Commission must have intended ‘cocaine base’ to include ‘crack,’ or ‘rock cocaine,’ which we understand to mean cocaine that can be smoked, unlike cocaine hydrochloride.” United States v. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412, 416 (9th Cir.1991). The Ninth Circuit examined the legislative history of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). The court found that Congress when it used the term “cocaine base” meant “cocaine freebase,” which refers to cocaine that can be smoked. Id. at 416. The court cited to the following House report:
In the summer of 1986, the wave of cocaine abuse epidemic which had been [1130]*1130growing for a decade began to crash upon American cities in the form of “crack.” Crack, the street name for cocaine freebase, a preparation of cocaine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate, can be smoked and consequently produces intense moments of the cocaine “rush,”....
H.R.Rep. No. 99-846, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986) (emphasis added).
Both the House and the Senate each had a version of a bill to amend 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). The House bill, H.R. 5394, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1986), provided for tougher penalties for “cocaine freebase.” The Senate bill, S. 2878, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1002, 132 Cong.Rec. S13649 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1986), provided penalties for “cocaine base.” Congress ultimately enacted the Senate version. Nothing in the legislative history shows that the Senate version intended a different meaning for “cocaine base” from the House use of “cocaine freebase.” Rather, the legislative materials demonstrate that Congress, in passing the legislation, was concerned primarily with the crack epidemic, and it described crack as cocaine that is smoked rather than snorted. Shaw, 936 F.2d at 416 (citing to statements made by the legislation’s sponsors, Rep. Frank Annunzio, 132 Cong.Rec. H6544 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1986), Sen. Chic Hecht, Id. at S13770 (Sept. 26, 1986)). Our examination of the legislative history concurs with the findings reached by the Ninth Circuit.
We, as other circuits, have addressed this issue indirectly by ruling that the term “cocaine base” is not unconstitutionally vague. In. our discussion of the term, we have inferred that cocaine base means crack. In United States v. Barnes, the forensic chemist testified at trial that cocaine base differs from cocaine hydrochloride in its molecular structure. She said that “cocaine base is commonly called ‘crack’ cocaine which is generally smoked.” 890 F.2d at 548. We found that “[c]ocaine hydrochloride is water soluble, formed in crystals or flakes, and generally snorted by users. Cocaine base is not water soluble, concentrated in a hard rock-like form, and generally smoked.” Id. at 552. We also found that possession of the substance in question “is specifically what Congress intended to punish. The chunks seized were in the form of cocaine known as ‘crack,’ which was a primary target of the Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986.” Id. at 553. We held in Barnes that because the substance in issue was not a new form or derivative of cocaine which was not originally contemplated by Congress, the term “cocaine base” did not violate the defendant’s due process rights. Id. Accord United States v. Thomas, 932 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Pinto, 905 F.2d 47 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. Luster, 896 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir.1990).
The government contends that “cocaine base” as used in Barnes and Shaw is not equated with “crack,” but rather includes crack. We find the government’s contention to be unfounded for two reasons. First, both the Barnes and Shaw courts, along with the other courts cited above, did not distinguish between cocaine base and crack. While they may not have explicitly held that cocaine base equals crack, a complete, rather than selective, reading of the opinions compels the conclusion that that was indeed the courts’ meaning.
Second, the government has not introduced any evidence of the existence of a new derivative/form of cocaine base that is separate and distinct from crack, nor are we aware of any. Our understanding is that there are two forms of cocaine that people use: one is cocaine, which is generally snorted, and the other is crack, which is generally smoked. While there exists a wide variety of each type according to purity, quality, and grade, the cocaine user has the option of using either cocaine or crack, not a third variation.
We conclude that “cocaine base” means “crack” for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) and the Sentencing Guidelines. The trial evidence shows that the controlled substance was not crack. We hold, therefore, that the district court erred in using “cocaine base” as the standard for sentencing [1131]*1131the defendant. We must remand to the district court for a new sentencing determination.
3. Mitigating Role in Sentencing Process
López-Gil contends that the trial court erred in refusing to make a downward adjustment of two points after determining that he acted only as a courier. The Sentencing Guidelines in section 3B1.2(b) provides for a downward reduction by two points in the sentencing of a defendant whose role in the offense “makes him substantially less culpable than the average participant.” Id. § 3B1.2 (background commentary). A defendant has the burden of proving entitlement to such a downward adjustment, United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 332 (1st Cir.1990), and can only prevail on appeal by demonstrating that the district court’s determination as to his role in the offense was clearly erroneous. United States v. Rosado-Sierra, 938 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1991).
We have found that a defendant who is a drug courier is not entitled as of right to a reduction of the offense level as a minimal or minor participant. United States v. Paz Uribe, 891 F.2d 396, 399 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 951, 110 S.Ct. 2216, 109 L.Ed.2d 542 (1990) (“even if the court found that Paz was only a courier, he would not automatically be entitled to a reduction.”). The Sentencing Guidelines do not obligate a court to adjust for mitigating circumstances but rather permit such an adjustment. See Sentencing Guidelines, ch. 1, pt. A, 1.5-1.6. The district court, therefore, was within its discretionary powers in deciding not to reduce López-Gil’s base offense level.
We affirm the district court’s refusal to adjust downward.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further sentencing proceedings.