CURTIN, Chief Judge.
This is a motion for a protective order in the so-called “Love Canal” lawsuit, a massive environmental pollution action commenced by the United States in December 1979, in which plaintiffs seek in excess of $45 million in damages for violations of various anti-pollution laws and for common law nuisance in the City of Niagara Falls, New York. Plaintiff State of New York has served three sets of interrogatories and requests for documents on “Hooker.”1 Defendant Hooker petitions for a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hooker submits a proposed order which is set out in the margin 2 and which would require that, prior to [424]*424disclosure to a non-party of any material obtained through discovery, Hooker would be given 10 days’ notice. In addition, paragraph 3 of the proposed order would not allow disclosure of documents which Hooker labels “confidential” until after there is a court order permitting disclosure.
Hooker states that such an order is a “common protective device” often employed in complex litigation and not really a protective order but a procedure for dispute resolution. It maintains that the information sought, if disclosed, could hinder its business and prejudice Hooker as it prepares to defend in parallel-state litigation.3 Hooker also notes that a “volatile atmosphere” has developed in which a “fair and objective disposition of these cases will be difficult to achieve.” Finally, Hooker argues that the State’s opposition to a protective order “lacks foundation” because it has agreed to modify earlier subpoenas duces tecum so as to provide Hooker notice of any requests for information it has obtained through discovery.
The State vigorously opposes the motion on numerous grounds. Primarily, it takes the position that under Rules 26(c) and 34(b) Hooker may assert privilege and refuse to divulge certain information even to plaintiffs or seek a protective order for the particular documents which it believes properly should be withheld from public scrutiny. However, the State argues, a blanket order in the absence of any specific showing of privilege, trade secret material, or the like is not authorized by the rules. In support of its position, the State relies on the strong public policy, expressed both in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in the State’s own Freedom of Information Law, in favor of full, public disclosure of court business.
The New York Civil Liberties Union, appearing in this action as amicus curiae, joins [425]*425the State’s opposition to Hooker’s motion. They draw the court’s attention to the fact that it is the public’s business which we do. They argue that issues of great public import, having consequences beyond the mere litigants to the action, are often resolved by the courts in this country, and that this is another reason for maintaining full public scrutiny of the administration of justice. Finally, they note that enforcement of a protective order such as the one sought here raises many of the dangers of a prior restraint. In Re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C.Cir.1979).
The United States, the original plaintiff in this action, sided generally with the State in this proceeding, taking the position that Hooker’s application for a protective order is premature and over-broad.
The Law
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Upon motion by á party ... and for good cause shown, the court ... may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense .... (Emphasis added.)
I believe this language makes clear that there is a burden on the party seeking a protective order. The burden on the moving party constitutes a requirement for a threshold showing that there is “good cause” that the order issue. General Dynamics Corp. v. Self Manufacturing Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1162, 94 S.Ct. 926, 39 L.Ed.2d 116 (1974). It is not a mere balancing of equities. Once such a preliminary showing has been made, the court may then consider the countervailing considerations in determining whether to issue a protective order in the particular case and, if so, how broad it is to be. See generally, Note, Nonparty Access to Discovery Materials In the Federal Courts, 94(5) Harv.L.Rev. 1085 (March 1981).4
In many complex pieces of litigation, particularly those involving large corporate parties, the parties agree to the issuance of a broad protective order at the outset for their mutual protection, both from their competitors and waiting predatory third parties. In those cases, the issues which are present in the instant dispute are not generally addressed by the court. In those cases it is generally conceded that either party could demonstrate the needed “good cause” if put to the test. However, the fact that something may be the general practice does not mean that the practice must be adopted by an unwilling party. The State is certainly within its rights to demand that Hooker make the requisite showing if it believes the confidentiality claim would be used haphazardly like a “rubber stamp.”
In this case, movant Hooker has alleged in a most conclusory fashion that it will suffer certain injuries. No specific instances are cited where trade secrets will be disclosed or where Hooker will be put at a competitive disadvantage. Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724 (N.D.Ga.1980); United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y.1975). On this record, the court cannot evaluate these claims of particularized need, and the order cannot issue on this basis. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118, 85 S.Ct. 234, 242, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964).
[426]*426Hooker also argues that the disclosure of information garnered through discovery will be detrimental to its position in parallel lawsuits. This is unquestionably true. However, this is not a reason for a court to impose a protective order. Use of the discovery fruits disclosed in one lawsuit in connection with other litigation, and even in collaboration among plaintiffs’ attorneys, comes squarely within the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accord, Parsons v. General Motors Corporation, supra; Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152 (W.D.Tex.1980); Williams v. Johnson & Johnson, 50 F.R.D. 31, 32 (S.D.N.Y.1970). Such cooperation among litigants promotes the speedy and inexpensive determination of every action as well as conservation of judicial resources. Williams v. Johnson & Johnson, supra, at 32. This is particularly the case in lawsuits where the resources available to the parties are uneven.
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CURTIN, Chief Judge.
This is a motion for a protective order in the so-called “Love Canal” lawsuit, a massive environmental pollution action commenced by the United States in December 1979, in which plaintiffs seek in excess of $45 million in damages for violations of various anti-pollution laws and for common law nuisance in the City of Niagara Falls, New York. Plaintiff State of New York has served three sets of interrogatories and requests for documents on “Hooker.”1 Defendant Hooker petitions for a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hooker submits a proposed order which is set out in the margin 2 and which would require that, prior to [424]*424disclosure to a non-party of any material obtained through discovery, Hooker would be given 10 days’ notice. In addition, paragraph 3 of the proposed order would not allow disclosure of documents which Hooker labels “confidential” until after there is a court order permitting disclosure.
Hooker states that such an order is a “common protective device” often employed in complex litigation and not really a protective order but a procedure for dispute resolution. It maintains that the information sought, if disclosed, could hinder its business and prejudice Hooker as it prepares to defend in parallel-state litigation.3 Hooker also notes that a “volatile atmosphere” has developed in which a “fair and objective disposition of these cases will be difficult to achieve.” Finally, Hooker argues that the State’s opposition to a protective order “lacks foundation” because it has agreed to modify earlier subpoenas duces tecum so as to provide Hooker notice of any requests for information it has obtained through discovery.
The State vigorously opposes the motion on numerous grounds. Primarily, it takes the position that under Rules 26(c) and 34(b) Hooker may assert privilege and refuse to divulge certain information even to plaintiffs or seek a protective order for the particular documents which it believes properly should be withheld from public scrutiny. However, the State argues, a blanket order in the absence of any specific showing of privilege, trade secret material, or the like is not authorized by the rules. In support of its position, the State relies on the strong public policy, expressed both in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in the State’s own Freedom of Information Law, in favor of full, public disclosure of court business.
The New York Civil Liberties Union, appearing in this action as amicus curiae, joins [425]*425the State’s opposition to Hooker’s motion. They draw the court’s attention to the fact that it is the public’s business which we do. They argue that issues of great public import, having consequences beyond the mere litigants to the action, are often resolved by the courts in this country, and that this is another reason for maintaining full public scrutiny of the administration of justice. Finally, they note that enforcement of a protective order such as the one sought here raises many of the dangers of a prior restraint. In Re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C.Cir.1979).
The United States, the original plaintiff in this action, sided generally with the State in this proceeding, taking the position that Hooker’s application for a protective order is premature and over-broad.
The Law
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Upon motion by á party ... and for good cause shown, the court ... may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense .... (Emphasis added.)
I believe this language makes clear that there is a burden on the party seeking a protective order. The burden on the moving party constitutes a requirement for a threshold showing that there is “good cause” that the order issue. General Dynamics Corp. v. Self Manufacturing Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1162, 94 S.Ct. 926, 39 L.Ed.2d 116 (1974). It is not a mere balancing of equities. Once such a preliminary showing has been made, the court may then consider the countervailing considerations in determining whether to issue a protective order in the particular case and, if so, how broad it is to be. See generally, Note, Nonparty Access to Discovery Materials In the Federal Courts, 94(5) Harv.L.Rev. 1085 (March 1981).4
In many complex pieces of litigation, particularly those involving large corporate parties, the parties agree to the issuance of a broad protective order at the outset for their mutual protection, both from their competitors and waiting predatory third parties. In those cases, the issues which are present in the instant dispute are not generally addressed by the court. In those cases it is generally conceded that either party could demonstrate the needed “good cause” if put to the test. However, the fact that something may be the general practice does not mean that the practice must be adopted by an unwilling party. The State is certainly within its rights to demand that Hooker make the requisite showing if it believes the confidentiality claim would be used haphazardly like a “rubber stamp.”
In this case, movant Hooker has alleged in a most conclusory fashion that it will suffer certain injuries. No specific instances are cited where trade secrets will be disclosed or where Hooker will be put at a competitive disadvantage. Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724 (N.D.Ga.1980); United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y.1975). On this record, the court cannot evaluate these claims of particularized need, and the order cannot issue on this basis. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118, 85 S.Ct. 234, 242, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964).
[426]*426Hooker also argues that the disclosure of information garnered through discovery will be detrimental to its position in parallel lawsuits. This is unquestionably true. However, this is not a reason for a court to impose a protective order. Use of the discovery fruits disclosed in one lawsuit in connection with other litigation, and even in collaboration among plaintiffs’ attorneys, comes squarely within the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accord, Parsons v. General Motors Corporation, supra; Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152 (W.D.Tex.1980); Williams v. Johnson & Johnson, 50 F.R.D. 31, 32 (S.D.N.Y.1970). Such cooperation among litigants promotes the speedy and inexpensive determination of every action as well as conservation of judicial resources. Williams v. Johnson & Johnson, supra, at 32. This is particularly the case in lawsuits where the resources available to the parties are uneven. Individuals who are plaintiffs might have a most difficult time extracting information, whereas powerful litigants such as the United States and the State might find it relatively easier to compel production. Nor is it especially significant that the other litigants who might try to “piggy-back” their disclosure proceedings on top of federal discovery are litigants in state court. We perceive no intention in the Federal Rules that incidental benefits of liberal federal discovery should not accrue to litigants in state courts who áre pursuing ancillary lawsuits, provided there is no attempt to exploit the federal litigation discovery process solely to assist litigation in a foreign forum. Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405, 410 (N.D.N.Y.1973). See generally P. A. Mathy, supra.
Hooker’s other argument, that a fair and objective disposition of these cases will be difficult because of the volatile atmosphere which has developed, is also unavailing. First, there is no question but that this lawsuit will be tried by the court as finder-of-fact. The danger of poisoning a jury’s judgment simply does not arise. In addition, the mere fact that a case has gained some notoriety certainly cannot be sufficient reason to conceal the discovery process. On the contrary, it may well be reason to issue a protective order only most reluctantly.
Finally, this brings us to the prescient observations of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case of In Re Halkin, brought to our attention by amicus New York Civil Liberties Union. In that case the Court of Appeals struck down an order issued by the district court which would have restricted disclosures by counsel to nonparties of CIA activities learned of in the discovery process. In that case the district court had issued an order prohibiting parties and counsel from disclosing information revealed to them in discovery. The Court of Appeals refused to enjoin the attorneys from disclosing what they had uncovered in part because of “the First Amendment interest in discovery materials.” The court said that:
Generally speaking, when a party obtains documents or information through the discovery process, he can “use that information in any way which the law permits.” (Citations omitted.)
In Re Halkin, 598 F.2d supra at 188. While it is true that that case dealt with a restraining order in the absence of an earlier protective order, I apprehend no meaningful difference from the instant case. On the other hand, on the current state of the record, we are not yet at the stage where an order must issue silencing attorneys and sealing court records.
The knowledge that a protective order may, under appropriate circumstances, constitute an improper “prior restraint” must, however, give the court pause even at this stage of the discovery proceedings. Cf., International Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1963); In Re Halkin, 598 F.2d supra at 188. If there is need to renew the instant motion at a point later in this or related litigation,5 the parties may [427]*427well wish to take up this problem at that time.
The motion for a protective order is denied. Discovery shall continue forthwith.
So ordered.