BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
After filing an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence, appellant Monsisvais entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of more than 100 kilograms of marijuana with intent to distribute. Mr. Monsisvais asserts on appeal that the discovery of the marijuana in his vehicle was the result of an illegal search and seizure.
I
On February 17, 1989, Bruce Goad, an agent with the United States Border Patrol, was operating a Border Patrol checkpoint station on northbound Interstate 25 near Truth or Consequences, New Mexico. Agent Goad testified that at approximately 7:30 p.m. a sensor alarm alerted the checkpoint’s officers to the presence of a vehicle traveling northbound on Highway 85, a route by which it is possible to bypass the checkpoint and which is commonly used to bypass the checkpoint. Agent Goad then looked over to Highway 85 and saw the headlights of appellant’s northbound vehicle.
Accompanied by another agent, Goad drove north on 1-25 in a marked Border Patrol car to Exit 83 in order to intercept the vehicle. Exit 83 was described by Goad as the point “where State Road 52 and Highway 85 meet, ... there’s an on-ramp for 1-25 north, or if they’re going up the road or turning from 52 they can catch 1-25 south.” Goad elaborated that “there’s three ways you can go right there at the intersection” and that the intersection is “somewhat” confusing and “[pjeople have gotten lost there.”
Agent Goad testified that he stopped his patrol car at the intersection with his lights off and turned his headlights on again as appellant’s vehicle drew near. Goad described the vehicle as a small Chevrolet S — 10 pickup with a camper shell and noted that he could see two occupants in the cab. He said the vehicle was “riding extremely heavy. The rear end was real low on the vehicle, and the front of the vehicle was raised like there was a lot of weight in the rear_” Goad stated that he had previously found aliens concealed in pickup trucks with camper shells, and that the pickup had Arizona plates and “we don’t get many Arizona vehicles on the old highway there.”
[989]*989According to Goad, appellant’s vehicle slowed as it approached the intersection, and it
appeared to [Agent Goad] that he [appellant] was going to take the on-ramp on to 1-25 north, and I believe that when he saw the border patrol vehicle and the headlights, he corrected his turn. Instead of going on 1-25 north he continued on up the old highway, and eventually took the on-ramp to 1-25 south_
Goad added:
It’s not an uncommon practice for aliens or alien smugglers, either case may be, if they see the border patrol vehicle, they will sometimes instead of entering the freeway northbound in the direction they were going, they will continue up the old highway, if they are using Old Highway 85, and enter the freeway southbound, sometimes they will just continue on up Old Highway 85 ’til it ends.”
Goad further testified that, after noticing “the weight and the two occupants and the out-of-state plates, it kind of aroused my suspicions and we stopped the vehicle on 1-25 southbound, pretty close to the exit.” After questioning appellant as to his citizenship, Goad smelled “a very strong odor of marijuana” emanating from the camper shell. Goad then placed appellant and his passenger under arrest for possession of marijuana. After another agent arrived at the scene with a dog to verify the marijuana odor, the agents opened the camper shell and discovered the marijuana inside.
At the conclusion of the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, the district court announced its findings and conclusions from the bench:
The Court finds that Agent Goad was working the T or C fixed checkpoint when they had a sensor alert on Highway 85, which is the old Highway 85 which now parallels 1-25.
That he observed a car proceeding north on 85. That he stationed himself at the intersection of 85, 52 and 1-25.
That — at least he perceived that when the vehicle noticed his presence, the vehicle continued on 85 and then proceeded to the ramp, which then placed the defendant’s car traveling south on 1-25.
I should state that the reason why the sensor on 85 was placed was an attempt to alert the checkpoint to vehicles which normally were using 85 to circumvent the fixed checkpoint.
Upon noticing the vehicle he noticed that it was riding extremely heavy, using his words. That it had Arizona plates and that it was not common to see an automobile with Arizona plates in that vicinity.
And so he then proceeded to follow the vehicle and then he suspected that it might contain illegal aliens, as there was a camper on the pickup, and so therefore he stopped the vehicle.
[T]hat this is an appropriate and proper Terry stop....
Additionally, the district court held that the subsequent search was proper. Appellant now challenges the legality of both the stop of the vehicle and the resulting search. Because we reverse the district court on the issue of the investigatory stop, we do not address the propriety of the search.
II
This case returns the court to familiar geographic and legal territory; we have frequently been called upon to assess the legality of investigatory stops made by the Border Patrol near the New Mexico-Mexico border. See, e.g., United States v. Pollack, 895 F.2d 686 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Merryman, 630 F.2d 780 (10th Cir.1980); United States v. Leyba, 627 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987, 101 S.Ct. 406, 66 L.Ed.2d 250 (1980); United States v. Sperow, 551 F.2d 808 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977).
An investigatory stop need not be supported by probable cause. United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888 (10th Cir.1986). However, Border Patrol “officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, [990]*990that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2581, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (extending Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), to the border context). Stated alternatively, an investigatory stop is justified when an officer “observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry, 392 U.S.
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BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
After filing an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence, appellant Monsisvais entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of more than 100 kilograms of marijuana with intent to distribute. Mr. Monsisvais asserts on appeal that the discovery of the marijuana in his vehicle was the result of an illegal search and seizure.
I
On February 17, 1989, Bruce Goad, an agent with the United States Border Patrol, was operating a Border Patrol checkpoint station on northbound Interstate 25 near Truth or Consequences, New Mexico. Agent Goad testified that at approximately 7:30 p.m. a sensor alarm alerted the checkpoint’s officers to the presence of a vehicle traveling northbound on Highway 85, a route by which it is possible to bypass the checkpoint and which is commonly used to bypass the checkpoint. Agent Goad then looked over to Highway 85 and saw the headlights of appellant’s northbound vehicle.
Accompanied by another agent, Goad drove north on 1-25 in a marked Border Patrol car to Exit 83 in order to intercept the vehicle. Exit 83 was described by Goad as the point “where State Road 52 and Highway 85 meet, ... there’s an on-ramp for 1-25 north, or if they’re going up the road or turning from 52 they can catch 1-25 south.” Goad elaborated that “there’s three ways you can go right there at the intersection” and that the intersection is “somewhat” confusing and “[pjeople have gotten lost there.”
Agent Goad testified that he stopped his patrol car at the intersection with his lights off and turned his headlights on again as appellant’s vehicle drew near. Goad described the vehicle as a small Chevrolet S — 10 pickup with a camper shell and noted that he could see two occupants in the cab. He said the vehicle was “riding extremely heavy. The rear end was real low on the vehicle, and the front of the vehicle was raised like there was a lot of weight in the rear_” Goad stated that he had previously found aliens concealed in pickup trucks with camper shells, and that the pickup had Arizona plates and “we don’t get many Arizona vehicles on the old highway there.”
[989]*989According to Goad, appellant’s vehicle slowed as it approached the intersection, and it
appeared to [Agent Goad] that he [appellant] was going to take the on-ramp on to 1-25 north, and I believe that when he saw the border patrol vehicle and the headlights, he corrected his turn. Instead of going on 1-25 north he continued on up the old highway, and eventually took the on-ramp to 1-25 south_
Goad added:
It’s not an uncommon practice for aliens or alien smugglers, either case may be, if they see the border patrol vehicle, they will sometimes instead of entering the freeway northbound in the direction they were going, they will continue up the old highway, if they are using Old Highway 85, and enter the freeway southbound, sometimes they will just continue on up Old Highway 85 ’til it ends.”
Goad further testified that, after noticing “the weight and the two occupants and the out-of-state plates, it kind of aroused my suspicions and we stopped the vehicle on 1-25 southbound, pretty close to the exit.” After questioning appellant as to his citizenship, Goad smelled “a very strong odor of marijuana” emanating from the camper shell. Goad then placed appellant and his passenger under arrest for possession of marijuana. After another agent arrived at the scene with a dog to verify the marijuana odor, the agents opened the camper shell and discovered the marijuana inside.
At the conclusion of the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, the district court announced its findings and conclusions from the bench:
The Court finds that Agent Goad was working the T or C fixed checkpoint when they had a sensor alert on Highway 85, which is the old Highway 85 which now parallels 1-25.
That he observed a car proceeding north on 85. That he stationed himself at the intersection of 85, 52 and 1-25.
That — at least he perceived that when the vehicle noticed his presence, the vehicle continued on 85 and then proceeded to the ramp, which then placed the defendant’s car traveling south on 1-25.
I should state that the reason why the sensor on 85 was placed was an attempt to alert the checkpoint to vehicles which normally were using 85 to circumvent the fixed checkpoint.
Upon noticing the vehicle he noticed that it was riding extremely heavy, using his words. That it had Arizona plates and that it was not common to see an automobile with Arizona plates in that vicinity.
And so he then proceeded to follow the vehicle and then he suspected that it might contain illegal aliens, as there was a camper on the pickup, and so therefore he stopped the vehicle.
[T]hat this is an appropriate and proper Terry stop....
Additionally, the district court held that the subsequent search was proper. Appellant now challenges the legality of both the stop of the vehicle and the resulting search. Because we reverse the district court on the issue of the investigatory stop, we do not address the propriety of the search.
II
This case returns the court to familiar geographic and legal territory; we have frequently been called upon to assess the legality of investigatory stops made by the Border Patrol near the New Mexico-Mexico border. See, e.g., United States v. Pollack, 895 F.2d 686 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Merryman, 630 F.2d 780 (10th Cir.1980); United States v. Leyba, 627 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987, 101 S.Ct. 406, 66 L.Ed.2d 250 (1980); United States v. Sperow, 551 F.2d 808 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977).
An investigatory stop need not be supported by probable cause. United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888 (10th Cir.1986). However, Border Patrol “officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, [990]*990that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2581, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (extending Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), to the border context). Stated alternatively, an investigatory stop is justified when an officer “observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884.
In determining whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop a car in the border area, officers may consider any number of factors, including: (1) characteristics of the area in which the vehicle is encountered; (2) the proximity of the area to the border; (3) the usual patterns of traffic on the particular road; (4) the previous experience of the agent with alien traffic; (5) information about recent illegal border crossings in the area; (6) the driver’s behavior, including any obvious attempts to evade officers; (7) aspects of the vehicle, such as a station wagon with concealed compartments; and (8) the appearance that the vehicle is heavily loaded. 422 U.S. at 884-85, 95 S.Ct. at 2581-82. Additionally, an “officer is entitled to assess the facts in light of his experience in detecting illegal entry and smuggling.” Id. at 885, 95 S.Ct. at 2582 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883).
In United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981), the Supreme Court provided further direction for applying the Terry/Brignoni-Ponce standard:
Terms like “articulable reasons” and “founded suspicion” are not self-defining; they fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual situations that arise. But the essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture — must be taken into account. Based upon that whole picture the de-taming officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.
449 U.S. at 417-18,101 S.Ct. at 695 (emphasis added).
Incorporating the “totality of the circumstances” relied upon by appellees in support of the instant stop, we fashion the reasonable-suspicion question before us as follows: Whether the Border Patrol agents operating the Truth or Consequences checkpoint may stop every heavily loaded pickup truck bearing a camper shell and out-of-state license plates that travels northbound on this stretch of Highway 85 at 7:30 p.m. For the reasons outlined below, we believe the question must be answered in the negative.
Appellee places considerable significance on the fact that appellant was intercepted while traveling northbound on Highway 85. To be sure, all parties agree that it is possible to bypass the permanent checkpoint by traveling Highway 85. However, due to the state of the record before us, this fact represents the sum total of our knowledge about this stretch of highway. The record is barren of information describing the origins of Highway 85 in this area and thus fails to instruct us as to the types of legitimate traffic that might be expected to make use of the road at this time of day.
For all the record reveals, this stretch of Highway 85 might be the sole artery connecting the city of Truth or Consequences to northbound 1-25, or it may represent a primary means of access from 1-25 to Elephant Butte Reservoir.1 We certainly are not willing to assume without some evidence that “old” Highway 85 is some decaying dirt road or that checkpoint circumvention is its lone practical utility. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Highway 85 has no significant legitimate traffic during the early evening hours. In short, the record does not provide us a basis for concluding that a vehicle’s presence on Highway 85 at 7:30 p.m. is at all unusual, much [991]*991less that it is suggestive of criminal conduct.2
Similarly, the record does not enable us to attach any particular significance to the appearance of Arizona license plates in this area. Although Arizona cars must certainly be less common on this stretch of road than those bearing New Mexico plates, we cannot find any basis in the record from which to conclude that Arizona-plated vehicles are any more likely to be transporting aliens near Truth or Consequences than are vehicles bearing the license plates of New Mexico or, for that matter, Texas or Colorado.
We are also unable to ascribe any significance whatsoever to the driving maneuvers of appellant as he approached Highway 85’s intersection with 1-25. As Agent Goad testified, three highways — Highway 85, 1-25 and state road 52 — converge at this point. He admitted that the intersection is confusing and that “[pjeople have gotten lost” there. Thus, any out-of-state traveler might well appear confused approaching the intersection, slow down to determine which exit to take or even make a wrong turn.
Appellee argues that “the truck ... turned south rather than North on [1-25] after spotting the border patrol. This action was considered evasive by the border patrolman.” However, appellant’s driving behavior simply does not elicit the same types of logical inferences and suspicions as do other “evasive” maneuvers encountered by this court in similar cases. For example in Pollack, the appellant’s vehicle first approached the Truth or Consequences checkpoint and turned back south on Interstate 25 after asking for directions to the nearest gas station. After responding to two sensor alerts on northbound Highway 85, agents then discovered the appellant’s vehicle leading a second vehicle that later was found to be carrying contraband. Based on the record before it, the Pollack court referred to the use of a “scout” car in this fashion as “a classic alien smuggling pattern.” 895 F.2d at 687, 689. Similarly, in Merryman the Border Patrol officer made an investigatory stop after observing a pickup truck make a direct U-turn just prior to reaching a permanent checkpoint. 630 F.2d at 781.
More importantly however, we find that the inferences drawn here by Agent Goad from the fact that appellant turned south at the intersection cannot withstand rational analysis. Revisiting Goad’s testimony, he asserted:
It’s not an uncommon practice for aliens or alien smugglers, either case may be, if they see the border patrol vehicle, they will sometimes instead of entering the freeway northbound in the direction they were going, they will continue up the old highway, if they are using Old Highway 85, and enter the freeway southbound, sometimes they will just continue on up Old Highway 85 ’til it ends.
[992]*992... [I]f they see the border patrol vehicle ... [aliens or alien smugglers] do a little bit of everything.
In other words, no matter which direction appellant might have traveled upon reaching the intersection — north on 1-25, south on 1-25 or straight ahead on Highway 85— his actions would have been “suspicious” to Agent Goad. Plainly, not every suspicion that is “articulable” is reasonable.
We are left to consider the fact that appellant was traveling in a pickup truck with a camper shell and that the vehicle was “riding heavy.” While these facts represent two significant factors detailed in Brignoni-Ponce, they are not automatic indicia of criminal conduct. A pickup truck with a camper shell has any number of legitimate uses — commercial, agricultural and recreational — that may periodically require the transportation of heavy cargo.
Accordingly, we consider it fatal to the legality of the instant stop that the evidence as to these particular aspects of the vehicle has not been supplemented by record evidence of any other salient factors tending to support a reasonable suspicion. As we have demonstrated, the record is silent as to the characteristics of the area in which the vehicle was encountered, the proximity of the area to the border, the usual patterns of traffic on the particular road and information about recent or expected illegal immigrant activity in the area. Additionally, the record does not provide details of the agent’s previous experience with alien traffic beyond Agent Goad’s suggestions that “sometimes” alien smugglers use pickups with camper shells and “sometimes” they travel Highway 85. As such, the record fails to provide the “whole picture” necessary to justify the stopping of this heavily loaded pickup truck on this road at this time of day.3 Were we to conclude otherwise based on this record, we would effectively emasculate the Terry/Brignoni-Ponce standard in this circuit and render suspect and subject to stop every heavily loaded out-of-state vehicle traveling this stretch of roadway that is capable of transporting and concealing human beings.
Accordingly, we hold that the totality of the specific articulable facts presented in this case, together with the rational inferences to be drawn therefrom, do not reasonably warrant suspicion that appellant’s vehicle contained persons illegally in the country.
The decision of the district court is REVERSED.