United States v. Hassen

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: July 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-3136
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-3136 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 07/15/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 15, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 24-3136 (D.C. No. 2:07-CR-20099-JWL-4) YEHIA HASSEN, (D. Kan.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before BACHARACH, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

This appeal involves an effort to reduce a criminal sentence. The

sentence was imposed in 2016 for offenses involving distribution of drugs

and attempted money laundering. Roughly 8 years later, the defendant

moved to reduce the sentence. The district court denied the motion, and the

defendant appeals.

* Oral argument would not help us decide the appeal, so we have decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Appellate Case: 24-3136 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 07/15/2025 Page: 2

In this appeal, we consider two grounds to reduce a sentence. The

first ground exists if there are extraordinary and compelling reasons to

reduce the sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The second ground

exists when the Sentencing Commission retroactively amends the

guidelines in a way that would have reduced the defendant’s guideline

range. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court didn’t err in rejecting the

defendant’s reliance on both grounds.

1. Extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction

On appeal, the defendant characterizes four of his circumstances as

extraordinary and compelling: (1) his age when he committed the crime,

(2) a threat to his mother if he stopped selling drugs, (3) the relative

harshness of his sentence in comparison with the sentences imposed on

coconspirators bearing greater fault, and (4) a basis to sentence below the

statutory minimum. We review the district court’s rejection of these

arguments for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15

F.4th 1027, 20131 (10th Cir. 2021).

First, the defendant points out that he was just 25 when he committed

the offenses. The district court concluded that the defendant had been

mature and had developed a sense of responsibility by the time that he was

sentenced because he

• had been a manager in the conspiracy, and

• had failed to turn himself in after roughly 10 years.

2 Appellate Case: 24-3136 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 07/15/2025 Page: 3

The defendant denies that he was a manager of the conspiracy. But his plea

agreement acknowledged that his role justified an increase in the offense

level, so the district court didn’t commit clear factual error by describing

his role as managerial. In addition, the defendant doesn’t deny that he

chose to remain a fugitive until his arrest. By then, he was in his mid-30s,

so the district court didn’t abuse its discretion in rejecting the defendant’s

arguments about his youth.

Second, the defendant argues that he continued selling drugs because

of a threat to his mother. But in district court, the defendant referred to

this threat only in passing, arguing that the leader of the conspiracy had

greater culpability. Now the defendant appears to link the alleged threat to

his youth and the reasons he continued selling drugs. But the district court

couldn’t abuse its discretion by failing to consider an argument that hadn’t

been made. See United States v. Herrera, 51 F.4th 1226, 1277 (10th Cir.

2022) (stating that “we evaluate the district court’s exercise of discretion

based on the information presented at the time of the ruling”); see also

United States v. Hernandez, 104 F.4th 755, 762 (10th Cir. 2024) (stating

that “the district court had to exercise its discretion based on the

contentions and information presented”). As a result, the district court

didn’t abuse its discretion by declining to reduce the sentence based on the

alleged threat to the defendant’s mother.

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Third, the defendant argues that other co-conspirators with greater

culpability obtained lighter sentences. The district court acknowledged the

disparity, but attributed it to the fact that the defendant had fled. This

reasoning didn’t reflect an abuse of discretion.

Finally, the defendant argues that he should have been exempt from a

10-year minimum sentence. But the district court rejected this argument,

reasoning that the 10-year minimum hadn’t ever been “at play.” R. at 255.

After all, the district court imposed a sentence exceeding the statutory

minimum by 17 years. The defendant doesn’t say why it would matter if

the district court could have imposed a sentence below 10 years.

* * *

Because the defendant’s four arguments don’t reflect an abuse of

discretion, we reject his reliance on the first ground for a sentence

reduction.

2. Reduction in the guideline range

The defendant also invokes the second ground, arguing that the

district court should have reduced the offense level based on Amendment

821 to the guidelines. But this amendment wouldn’t have applied to the

defendant. The amendment applies only if an offender had no criminal-

history points, U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a)(1), and the defendant had one such

point.

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Acknowledging this point, the defendant argues that it shouldn’t

matter because (1) it was for an old misdemeanor and (2) he took a class to

clear the misdemeanor from his record. But the district court had counted

this criminal-history point at the initial sentencing, and the court needed to

use the same calculation of criminal history points when determining

whether Amendment 821 applied. United States v. Washington, 759 F.3d

1175, 1182 (10th Cir. 2014); U.S.S.G. § 1B.10(b)(1). Because the

defendant had at least one criminal-history point, the district court acted

correctly in declining to apply Amendment 821.

We conclude that the district court didn’t err or abuse its discretion

when denying the motion for a sentence reduction. Based on that

conclusion, we affirm the ruling.

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge