OPINION OF THE COURT ON REMAND
SCHENCK, Judge:
A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of aggravated assault with intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm, assault consummated by a battery, and leaving the scene of a collision, in violation of Articles 128 and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 928 and 934 [hereinafter UCMJ]. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for four years and 134 days, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to Private El. The convening authority ordered 134 days of confinement credit.1 In our decision dated 29 June 2004, [677]*677we discussed seven issues and affirmed the findings of guilty. We otherwise affirmed the sentence, but reduced “appellant’s confinement by thirty days to moot appellant’s claim of prejudice resulting from the staff judge advocate’s (SJA’s) misstatement of the maximum possible sentence in his post-trial recommendation (SJAR) to the convening authority.” United States v. Hammond, 60 M.J. 512, 514 (Army Ct.Crim.App.2004). Today we reaffirm our previous decision. However, we now order that appellant receive thirty days of pay and allowances because the government failed to comply with our previous order requiring release of appellant from confinement. See id. at 514, 520.
On 12 July 2004, appellant received a copy of this court’s original decision. On 19 July 2004, appellant filed a petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces for grant of review. On 14 September 2004, appellant completed his sentence to confinement and was released from confinement. On 8 October 2004, appellate defense counsel requested that the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces remand this case to our court for an appropriate remedy because the confinement facility failed to reduce appellant’s confinement by thirty days as ordered in our 29 June 2004 decision. On 10 January 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces granted review of the following modified issue:
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS SUBJECT TO ILLEGAL POST-TRIAL CONFINEMENT IF, IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE DECISION OF THE ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS, HE WAS NOT CREDITED WITH THIRTY DAYS OF CONFINEMENT CREDIT.
United States v. Hammond, 60 M.J. 457 (C.A.A.F.2005).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces affirmed the findings of guilty, reversed the sentence, and remanded appellant’s ease to this court “for consideration of the granted issue,” and “to determine whether relief is warranted as to sentence, and if so, what relief should be granted.” Id. The case is again before this court for review under Article 66, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866.
Appellate counsel agree that appellant remained in confinement longer than he should have because he did not receive the thirty-day reduction in his sentence to confinement previously ordered by this court. Post-trial affidavits established that a copy of our decision was served upon appellant; however, the leadership at the confinement facility did not receive a copy of our court’s decision in a timely fashion. Remedial action in the processing of appellate decisions at the confinement facility has been taken so that this mistake will not recur.
We agree with appellate counsel that appellant was subjected to illegal post-trial confinement. Appellate counsel, however, do not agree on an appropriate remedy. Appellate defense counsel urge this court to set aside appellant’s dishonorable discharge, or, in the alternative, to upgrade it to a bad-conduct discharge. Appellate government counsel ask us to disapprove two months of appellant’s already-served confinement, “which would allow appellant to collect financial remuneration from other [forums] pursuant to Article 75, UCMJ.” We are reluctant to change the character of appellant’s discharge2 from a dishonorable to a bad-conduct discharge because the facts and circumstances of the offenses clearly warrant a dishonorable discharge. However, “[w]hen an appellant is held in confinement past what should have been his release date, this court may fashion an appropriate remedy.” United States v. Nicholas, 53 M.J. 656, 658 (Army Ct.Crim.App.2000) (citing United States v. Keith, 36 M.J. 518, 519 (A.C.M.R.1992)); see also United States v. Phelps, 40 M.J. 550 (A.C.M.R.1994).
[678]*678Appellate government counsel support a grant of meaningful relief for appellant. They assert that reducing appellant’s sentence to confinement by two months will allow appellant to financially benefit from a restoration of pay under Article 75(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 875(a). Appellate government counsel explain:
While there are no provisions discussing how to calculate the appropriate amount of financial compensation for a period of confinement which has been set aside, there is no reason to believe that the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) would not respect the decision of this Court in determining an appropriate remedy in accordance with Article 75, UCMJ,3 and paragraph 480901 of the [Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (DoDFMR) ].4
Brief for Appellee 4-5.
Four factors suggest that DFAS may be unable to provide the relief contained in the government’s proposed remedy, i.e., “financial remuneration” resulting from a reduction in appellant’s already-served period of confinement. First, appellant was past his expiration of term of service date5 prior to trial. Appellant was placed into pretrial confinement on 12 April 2001. On 3 June 2001, while appellant was in pretrial confinement, his term of service expired. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service stopped appellant’s pay and allowances on his ETS date. A servieemember is not entitled to receive pay and allowances while in confinement and past his or her ETS date, unless he or she is returned to duty status.6 Appellate counsel “agree that, under the applicable finance regulation, DFAS had no duty to pay appellant after his ETS date.” Hammond, 60 M.J. at 514. Furthermore, the record lacks any indication that appellant was returned to duty status after his trial. Therefore, adjudged and automatic forfeitures would not have been collected after their execution because after appellant’s ETS date he was not due any pay and allowances against which the forfeitures could operate.7 We doubt appellant would be entitled to a return of forfeitures not collected after his ETS date.
Second, appellant’s adjudged forfeiture of all pay and allowances began fourteen days [679]*679after appellant was sentenced.8 Third, even if we disapprove a portion of the adjudged forfeitures, appellant would still be subject to the automatic or mandatory forfeiture of all pay and allowances during his confinement.9
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OPINION OF THE COURT ON REMAND
SCHENCK, Judge:
A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of aggravated assault with intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm, assault consummated by a battery, and leaving the scene of a collision, in violation of Articles 128 and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 928 and 934 [hereinafter UCMJ]. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for four years and 134 days, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to Private El. The convening authority ordered 134 days of confinement credit.1 In our decision dated 29 June 2004, [677]*677we discussed seven issues and affirmed the findings of guilty. We otherwise affirmed the sentence, but reduced “appellant’s confinement by thirty days to moot appellant’s claim of prejudice resulting from the staff judge advocate’s (SJA’s) misstatement of the maximum possible sentence in his post-trial recommendation (SJAR) to the convening authority.” United States v. Hammond, 60 M.J. 512, 514 (Army Ct.Crim.App.2004). Today we reaffirm our previous decision. However, we now order that appellant receive thirty days of pay and allowances because the government failed to comply with our previous order requiring release of appellant from confinement. See id. at 514, 520.
On 12 July 2004, appellant received a copy of this court’s original decision. On 19 July 2004, appellant filed a petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces for grant of review. On 14 September 2004, appellant completed his sentence to confinement and was released from confinement. On 8 October 2004, appellate defense counsel requested that the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces remand this case to our court for an appropriate remedy because the confinement facility failed to reduce appellant’s confinement by thirty days as ordered in our 29 June 2004 decision. On 10 January 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces granted review of the following modified issue:
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS SUBJECT TO ILLEGAL POST-TRIAL CONFINEMENT IF, IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE DECISION OF THE ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS, HE WAS NOT CREDITED WITH THIRTY DAYS OF CONFINEMENT CREDIT.
United States v. Hammond, 60 M.J. 457 (C.A.A.F.2005).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces affirmed the findings of guilty, reversed the sentence, and remanded appellant’s ease to this court “for consideration of the granted issue,” and “to determine whether relief is warranted as to sentence, and if so, what relief should be granted.” Id. The case is again before this court for review under Article 66, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866.
Appellate counsel agree that appellant remained in confinement longer than he should have because he did not receive the thirty-day reduction in his sentence to confinement previously ordered by this court. Post-trial affidavits established that a copy of our decision was served upon appellant; however, the leadership at the confinement facility did not receive a copy of our court’s decision in a timely fashion. Remedial action in the processing of appellate decisions at the confinement facility has been taken so that this mistake will not recur.
We agree with appellate counsel that appellant was subjected to illegal post-trial confinement. Appellate counsel, however, do not agree on an appropriate remedy. Appellate defense counsel urge this court to set aside appellant’s dishonorable discharge, or, in the alternative, to upgrade it to a bad-conduct discharge. Appellate government counsel ask us to disapprove two months of appellant’s already-served confinement, “which would allow appellant to collect financial remuneration from other [forums] pursuant to Article 75, UCMJ.” We are reluctant to change the character of appellant’s discharge2 from a dishonorable to a bad-conduct discharge because the facts and circumstances of the offenses clearly warrant a dishonorable discharge. However, “[w]hen an appellant is held in confinement past what should have been his release date, this court may fashion an appropriate remedy.” United States v. Nicholas, 53 M.J. 656, 658 (Army Ct.Crim.App.2000) (citing United States v. Keith, 36 M.J. 518, 519 (A.C.M.R.1992)); see also United States v. Phelps, 40 M.J. 550 (A.C.M.R.1994).
[678]*678Appellate government counsel support a grant of meaningful relief for appellant. They assert that reducing appellant’s sentence to confinement by two months will allow appellant to financially benefit from a restoration of pay under Article 75(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 875(a). Appellate government counsel explain:
While there are no provisions discussing how to calculate the appropriate amount of financial compensation for a period of confinement which has been set aside, there is no reason to believe that the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) would not respect the decision of this Court in determining an appropriate remedy in accordance with Article 75, UCMJ,3 and paragraph 480901 of the [Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (DoDFMR) ].4
Brief for Appellee 4-5.
Four factors suggest that DFAS may be unable to provide the relief contained in the government’s proposed remedy, i.e., “financial remuneration” resulting from a reduction in appellant’s already-served period of confinement. First, appellant was past his expiration of term of service date5 prior to trial. Appellant was placed into pretrial confinement on 12 April 2001. On 3 June 2001, while appellant was in pretrial confinement, his term of service expired. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service stopped appellant’s pay and allowances on his ETS date. A servieemember is not entitled to receive pay and allowances while in confinement and past his or her ETS date, unless he or she is returned to duty status.6 Appellate counsel “agree that, under the applicable finance regulation, DFAS had no duty to pay appellant after his ETS date.” Hammond, 60 M.J. at 514. Furthermore, the record lacks any indication that appellant was returned to duty status after his trial. Therefore, adjudged and automatic forfeitures would not have been collected after their execution because after appellant’s ETS date he was not due any pay and allowances against which the forfeitures could operate.7 We doubt appellant would be entitled to a return of forfeitures not collected after his ETS date.
Second, appellant’s adjudged forfeiture of all pay and allowances began fourteen days [679]*679after appellant was sentenced.8 Third, even if we disapprove a portion of the adjudged forfeitures, appellant would still be subject to the automatic or mandatory forfeiture of all pay and allowances during his confinement.9 On 8 August 2001, appellant was tried and sentenced at court-martial, and thereafter, placed into post-trial confinement. Fourth, after appellant was released from confinement he went on excess leave10 and was not entitled to pay and allowances.11
Appellate government counsel address the issue of appellant being held past his ETS date for court-martial, without an entitlement to receive pay and allowances, by asserting that appellant may be paid because he was held past his ETS date on active duty “for the convenience of the government.” Appellate government counsel reason: confinement related to his court-martial and that this situation does not appear to have been contemplated by the DoDFMR, his additional period of confinement would likely be considered as being for the convenience of the Government, in addition to constituting relief under Article 75, UCMJ.
Given the fact that there was no lawful purpose to hold appellant in [post-trial]
Brief for Appellee at 6.
We find that a R.C.M. 305(k) punishment equivalency provides the best mechanism for granting appropriate relief for the excess confinement that appellant served. Although R.C.M. 305 enumerates procedures for imposing pretrial confinement upon service-members, and for reviewing the necessity of continued confinement until trial, it provides a mechanism for selecting a remedy for unlawful pretrial confinement. Rule for Courts-Martial 305(k) provides, “1 day of confinement [credit] shall be equal to 1 day [680]*680of total forfeiture12 or a like amount of fine. The credit shall not be applied against any other form of punishment.” We agree with the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals’ use of R.C.M. 305(k) punishment equivalencies in fashioning appropriate remedies for excess confinement served. See United States v. Sherman, 56 M.J. 900, 902 (A.F.Ct.Crim.App.2002) (citing United States v. Gazurian, 46 M.J. 299 (C.A.A.F.1997) (summary disposition)). We choose to order a monetary credit of thirty days of pay and allowances at the grade of E4 to compensate appellant for thirty days of illegal post-trial confinement.13
The decision of this court in this case dated 29 June 2004 is reaffirmed and remains in effect. We order that appellant receive thirty days of pay and' allowances at the grade of E4 to compensate appellant for thirty days of illegal post-trial confinement. See Sherman, 56 M.J. at 903 (affirming sentence and ordering five days of pay to compensate service-member for five days of illegal confinement served despite servicemember’s excess leave or no-pay-due status).
Senior Judge HARVEY
Senior Judge Harvey took final action in this case prior to his retirement.