DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
On July 18, 2003, Jose Guadalupe Gonzalez-Chavez (“Gonzalez-Chavez”) pled guilty to illegal reentry after deportation
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and 6 U.S.C. §§ 202 and 557. The district court, adopting in part the presentence report’s sentencing recommendations, which included a sixteen-level enhancement for a prior conviction under Florida state law, sentenced Gonzalez-Chavez to a term of fifty-seven months in prison.
He now appeals the judgment of the district court, arguing that the district court plainly erred by (1) characterizing his prior conviction under Florida law for aggravated battery as a crime of violence under § 2L1.2 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) and (2) imposing a sixteen-level enhancement based on that characterization. For the reasons stated below, we vacate Gonzalez-Chavez’s sentence and remand for development of the record and re-sentencing.
I.
Gonzalez-Chavez argues that his prior conviction for aggravated battery does not fall within the definition of “crime of violence” as it appears in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) and that the district court therefore improperly enhanced his offense level by sixteen levels under that section. Because Gonzalez-Chavez raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error.
United States v. Bonilla-Mungia,
422 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir.2005). When reviewing for plain error, we will find reversible error only if “(1) there was an error; (2) the error was clear and obvious; and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.”
United States v. Gracia-Cantu,
302 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir.2002) (citing
United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). If these elements are present, “we may exercise our discretion
to correct the error only if it ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”
Id.
(alteration in original) (citing
Olano,
507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770).
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) provides for a sixteen-level enhancement of a defendant’s offense level “[i]f the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after a conviction for a felony that is ... a crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2002).
The commentary to that section defines a “crime of violence” as “an offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii), cmt. l(B)(ii)(I), and states that the term “crime of violence” includes “murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses (including sexual abuse of a minor), robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling,” § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii), cmt. l(B)(ii)(II). The government does not contend that aggravated battery is an enumerated offense under subpart II of the commentary;
thus, the only issue on appeal is whether, under subpart I of the commentary, the district court properly held that Gonzalez-Chavez’s prior conviction has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.
The Fifth Circuit has had several opportunities now to examine the “use of force” requirement in subpart I of the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii), and the following is the current method of evaluating whether a prior offense is a crime of violence under that subpart:
When determining whether a prior offense is a crime of violence because it has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force, district courts must employ the categorical approach established in
Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990).
Calderon-Pena,
383 F.3d [254,] 257-58 [(5th Cir. 2004)];
see also United States v. Alfaro,
408 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir.2005);
United States v. Gracia-Cantu,
302 F.3d 308, 309 (5th Cir.2002). Under that approach, courts determine the elements to which a defendant pleaded guilty by analyzing the statutory definition of the defense, not the defendant’s underlying conduct.
Calderon-Pena,
383 F.3d at 257 (citing
United States v. Vargas-Duran,
356 F.3d 598, 606 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc)). If a statute contains multiple, disjunctive subsections, courts may look beyond the statute to certain “conclusive records made or used in adjudicating guilt” in order to determine which particular statutory alternative applies to the defendant’s conviction.
See United States v. Garza-Lopez,
410 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir.2005) (discussing the parameters of our review under
Taylor).
These records are generally limited to the “charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of the plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the
trial judge to which the defendant assented.”
Shepard v. United States,
544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1257, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005).
Thus, to decide whether the district court’s crime-of-violence enhancement was proper, we must answer the following questions: First what particular offense was [the defendant] convicted of? Second, does that offense require proof of the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force ... ?
Bonilla-Mungia,
422 F.3d at 320,
Gonzalez-Chavez was convicted of aggravated battery under section 784.045 of the 1998 Florida Statutes, which provides three distinct ways to commit aggravated battery.
Unfortunately, the record does not indicate under which subsection of section 784.045 Gonzalez-Chavez was convicted. Although the presentence report (“PSR”) contains facts relating to Gonzalez-Chavez’s alleged conduct in committing the aggravated battery, this Court will not consider those facts because they are not explicit findings the Florida court made or used in adjudicating Gonzalez-Chavez’s guilt.
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DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
On July 18, 2003, Jose Guadalupe Gonzalez-Chavez (“Gonzalez-Chavez”) pled guilty to illegal reentry after deportation
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and 6 U.S.C. §§ 202 and 557. The district court, adopting in part the presentence report’s sentencing recommendations, which included a sixteen-level enhancement for a prior conviction under Florida state law, sentenced Gonzalez-Chavez to a term of fifty-seven months in prison.
He now appeals the judgment of the district court, arguing that the district court plainly erred by (1) characterizing his prior conviction under Florida law for aggravated battery as a crime of violence under § 2L1.2 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) and (2) imposing a sixteen-level enhancement based on that characterization. For the reasons stated below, we vacate Gonzalez-Chavez’s sentence and remand for development of the record and re-sentencing.
I.
Gonzalez-Chavez argues that his prior conviction for aggravated battery does not fall within the definition of “crime of violence” as it appears in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) and that the district court therefore improperly enhanced his offense level by sixteen levels under that section. Because Gonzalez-Chavez raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error.
United States v. Bonilla-Mungia,
422 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir.2005). When reviewing for plain error, we will find reversible error only if “(1) there was an error; (2) the error was clear and obvious; and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.”
United States v. Gracia-Cantu,
302 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir.2002) (citing
United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). If these elements are present, “we may exercise our discretion
to correct the error only if it ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”
Id.
(alteration in original) (citing
Olano,
507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770).
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) provides for a sixteen-level enhancement of a defendant’s offense level “[i]f the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after a conviction for a felony that is ... a crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2002).
The commentary to that section defines a “crime of violence” as “an offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii), cmt. l(B)(ii)(I), and states that the term “crime of violence” includes “murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses (including sexual abuse of a minor), robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling,” § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii), cmt. l(B)(ii)(II). The government does not contend that aggravated battery is an enumerated offense under subpart II of the commentary;
thus, the only issue on appeal is whether, under subpart I of the commentary, the district court properly held that Gonzalez-Chavez’s prior conviction has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.
The Fifth Circuit has had several opportunities now to examine the “use of force” requirement in subpart I of the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii), and the following is the current method of evaluating whether a prior offense is a crime of violence under that subpart:
When determining whether a prior offense is a crime of violence because it has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force, district courts must employ the categorical approach established in
Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990).
Calderon-Pena,
383 F.3d [254,] 257-58 [(5th Cir. 2004)];
see also United States v. Alfaro,
408 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir.2005);
United States v. Gracia-Cantu,
302 F.3d 308, 309 (5th Cir.2002). Under that approach, courts determine the elements to which a defendant pleaded guilty by analyzing the statutory definition of the defense, not the defendant’s underlying conduct.
Calderon-Pena,
383 F.3d at 257 (citing
United States v. Vargas-Duran,
356 F.3d 598, 606 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc)). If a statute contains multiple, disjunctive subsections, courts may look beyond the statute to certain “conclusive records made or used in adjudicating guilt” in order to determine which particular statutory alternative applies to the defendant’s conviction.
See United States v. Garza-Lopez,
410 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir.2005) (discussing the parameters of our review under
Taylor).
These records are generally limited to the “charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of the plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the
trial judge to which the defendant assented.”
Shepard v. United States,
544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1257, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005).
Thus, to decide whether the district court’s crime-of-violence enhancement was proper, we must answer the following questions: First what particular offense was [the defendant] convicted of? Second, does that offense require proof of the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force ... ?
Bonilla-Mungia,
422 F.3d at 320,
Gonzalez-Chavez was convicted of aggravated battery under section 784.045 of the 1998 Florida Statutes, which provides three distinct ways to commit aggravated battery.
Unfortunately, the record does not indicate under which subsection of section 784.045 Gonzalez-Chavez was convicted. Although the presentence report (“PSR”) contains facts relating to Gonzalez-Chavez’s alleged conduct in committing the aggravated battery, this Court will not consider those facts because they are not explicit findings the Florida court made or used in adjudicating Gonzalez-Chavez’s guilt.
Bonilla-Mungia,
422 F.3d at 321;
see also Garza-Lopez,
410 F.3d at 274 (“[A] district court is not permitted to rely on a PSR’s characterization of a defendant’s prior offense for enhancement purposes.”). And the record contains no other documents on which this Court may rely to determine whether Gonzalez-Chavez’s conviction fits under the definition of crime of violence. Where we cannot identify with legal certainty under which portion of a statute a defendant was convicted, we cannot determine whether a crime of violence enhancement was proper.
Bonilla-Mungia,
422 F.3d at 321. In such a case, we remand to the district court for supplementation of the record and re-sentencing.
Id.
We reiterate the rule of
Bonilla-Mungia
here to emphasize that in cases in which, as here, it is not clear (1) under which portion of a multipart statute the defendant was previously convicted and (2) whether the subsections of that statute qualify as crimes of violence, district courts must ensure that the appropriate documentation
is included in the record before imposing a sixteen-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii). Reliance on a PSR will not suffice in these cases. We do not address on these facts the case in which a statute’s subsections are all clearly crimes of violence. In such a case, remand might not be required.
Accordingly, we VACATE the sentence imposed on Gonzalez-Chavez and REMAND for development of the record and re-sentencing.
n.
On remand, the district court should order the government to supplement the record with documents that might establish to which elements of aggravated battery Gonzalez-Chavez pled guilty. Once the government has supplemented the record, the district court should reconsider whether a sixteen-level enhancement is warranted under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, taking into consideration whether Gonzalez-Chavez’s conviction for aggravated battery qualifies as a crime of violence under either subpart of the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii).