Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge MacKINNON.
[819]*819Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge J. SKELLY WRIGHT.
MacKINNON, Circuit Judge:
Appellants Jones and Bryant were indicted for possession of heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (Count 1), possession of heroin in violation of D.C.Code § 33-402 (Count 2), destruction of evidence in violation of D.C.Code § 23-591(d) (Count 3), and maintaining a common nuisance in violation of D.C.Code § 33-416 (Count 4). All counts of the indictment were tried in a single proceeding in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as authorized by D.C.Code § 11-502(3). The fourth count was dismissed by the Government at the close of its evidence (Tr. 306). The remaining counts were submitted to the jury which returned verdicts of not guilty on Count 1 and guilty on Counts 2 and 3 with respect to each appellant. Each was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 20 months to five years for possession of heroin and one to three years for destruction of evidence (Tr. 468, 473). We affirm.
I.
On August 3, 1973, two Metropolitan Police officers were conducting a covert surveillance on a locked and boarded-up building located in Northeast Washington. They observed several persons approach the front door, ring a buzzer, place a quantity of money through a hole in the door, wait a few seconds, put a hand through the door again, and receive something which was placed in a pocket (Tr. 68-69, 126-27). The officers then went back to their station and returned with several other officers to execute a search warrant. Groups of officers approached the front and rear of the building, announced their purpose, and upon receiving no response, forced their way inside. Appellant Bryant was arrested in a hallway, and appellant Jones was found in a locked room containing a toilet and several buckets of acid.
While the raid was taking place, two other officers entered the basement of the building, located the drain pipe leading to the toilet and removed a section of the pipe. Shortly' thereafter, a stream of water and acid, 108 tissue paper rolls sealed in cellophane and containing powder, and approximately $131 in torn currency emerged from the pipe (Tr. 73, 83). Tests on the powder in the rolls disclosed that they contained heroin (Tr. 177) with an estimated street value of $10 each (Tr. 291).
II.
For the first time, appellants argue on this appeal that their prosecution and sentence in the United States District Court under D.C.Code § 33-402 denied them equal protection and is forbidden by D.C.Code § 33-424. The Government urges us not to consider appellants’ claim since they failed to make a record by raising the point in the District Court.1 However, the issue raised presents solely a question of law which would not be materially illuminated by the development of a further record in the trial court.2 We therefore turn to the merits of appellants’ argument.
The indictment joined charges against appellants for violations of both the federal narcotics statutes and the District of Columbia Code. Possession of heroin with intent to distribute is prohibited by 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)3 and is punishable by [820]*820imprisonment for not more than 15 years, a fine of up to $25,000 and a mandatory special parole term of three years. These penalties are doubled in the event of a prior felony conviction under any law of the United States relating to narcotics. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). Simple possession is made unlawful under federal law by 21 U.S.C. § 8444 and is punishable by imprisonment of not more than one year and a fine of up to $5,000. Once again the maximum penalties are doubled in the case of repeat offenders.
In contrast, the D.C.Code establishes only a single generalized crime of possession of narcotics. D.C.Code § 33-402(a). provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess, have under his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense, or compound any narcotic drug, except as authorized in this chapter.
Section 33-423 makes this offense punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year. In the case of anyone who has previously been convicted of a violation of the federal or D.C. narcotics laws, the maximum penalty is increased to $5,000 or 10 years. Both appellants had been convicted of prior narcotics offenses under the D.C.Code and thus were subject to the increased maximum penalties.
Appellants are correct in pointing out that the inclusion in the indictment of charges under the D.C.Code allowed a considerably greater maximum penalty for simple possession following a prior conviction than would have been available had they been charged and convicted (following a prior conviction) of simple possession under the federal statute. However, we have held that Congress, in the exercise of its powers over the District of Columbia, can enact laws which are substantially identical to national legislation but which provide different penalties. See United States v. McDonald, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 338, 343, 348, 481 F.2d 513, 518, 523 (1973). The United States Attorney has discretion to determine which of the applicable statutes will form the basis for the prosecution. United States v. Greene, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 27, 489 F.2d 1145, 1151 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977, 95 S.Ct. 239, 42 L.Ed.2d 190 (1975); Hutcherson v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 277, 345 F.2d 964, 967, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894, 86 S.Ct. 188, 15 L.Ed.2d 151 (1965).
The joinder of charges under federal and D.C. statutes in a single indictment to be tried in the U.S. District Court is specifically authorized by D.C. Code § ll-502(3).5 We have held on sev•eral occasions that in the absence of a specific federal statute superseding prosecution on the local offenses, a defend[821]*821ant whose acts constitute violations of both statutory schemes can, under the statute, properly be the subject of a single trial in the District Court under a joint indictment. United States v. Shepard, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 353, 515 F.2d 1324 (1975); United States v. Caldwell (No. 72-1513, Dec. 31, 1974) (Slip op. at 65 n. 176); United States v. Knight, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 509 F.2d 354 (1974). The only constraint on such a prosecution is that where the federal and local offenses are identical or where one would be a lesser included offense of the other, the defendant may ultimately be sentenced under only one statutory scheme. See Shepard, supra; Knight, supra (“What is impermissible is not the joinder of offense for trial . but the joinder of judgments even with concurrent sentences.” 509 F.2d at 363); United States v. Canty, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 103, 469 F.2d 114 (1972). The offenses charged in Counts 1 (the U.S.Code offense) and 2 (the D.C.Code offense) of the instant indictment fall within this latter restriction; but appellants were convicted and sentenced only under Counts 2 and 3, both of which were charged under the D.C.Code, so there was no “impermissible . . . joinder of judgments” in this case.
Appellants’ equal protection arguments can be readily dismissed on the basis of our opinion in Shepard, see 169 U.S.App.D.C. at 365 n.25, 515 F.2d at 1335 n.25. Since successive prosecutions on identical or lesser included D.C. and federal offenses emanate from the same sovereignty, they are precluded by double jeopardy considerations. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970); United States v. Knight, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 27, 509 F.2d 354, 360 (1974). Appellants were thus subject to only a single trial on Counts 1 and 2 and were required to conduct only one defense; such proceedings did not violate due process or equal protection.
The equal protection argument advanced by the dissent overlooks this capacity of federal courts in the District of Columbia to join violations of federal law and the D.C.Code in one trial. • See D.C.Code § 11-502(3) (1973). The dissent’s argument is that a defendant in the District of Columbia is denied the equal protection of the law by being subjected to the risk of a heavier penalty than offenders in other federal jurisdictions6; that is, while a defendant in the [822]*822District may be prosecuted on both local and federal charges arising from the same offense and thereby conceivably receive a lengthier sentence than if he were prosecuted on federal charges alone, a double prosecution on state and federal charges is unlikely to occur in other federal jurisdictions. We must disagree with this conclusion.
Initially, we observe that, even assuming that the situation is as the dissent has described it, no violation of equal protection exists. Such a classification based on location is proper: in United States v. Antelope, 528 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3281 (Nov. 3, 1975) (No. 75-661), the Ninth Circuit recently found that it was permissible for Congress to provide by statute that crimes on Indian reservations which encompass several states may be punished under the differing laws of the separate states. Thus, different offenders committing the same crime on different parts of the same federal reservation might be punished unequally, since Congress has the power to make the definition and punishment of certain . . . crimes .
wholly dependent upon state law, [and] thus ... to risk possible inconsistency within multi-state reservations in order to secure equal treatment in the prosecution of Indians and non-Indians [in each state] [W]e view a possible legal fortuity based on location to be much less onerous than one based on the inherently suspect classification of race.
523 F.2d at 406 (emphasis added). In citing this case for a minor point, see dissent at note 6, the dissent fails to recognize that it supports our disposition of the instant case in this respect.
Beyond this, however, we disagree strongly with the contention that dual prosecutions are not possible in federal jurisdictions other than the District of Columbia; the authority cited by the dissent for this proposition is less than persuasive. The holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959), and Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959), teach that successive prosecutions by different sovereignties do not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment and are therefore constitutionally permissible. Despite the unhappiness of some with the result in these cases, they remain the law. The dissent attempts to evade the force of the rule by citing Justice Department policy and the working papers of a congressional commission to show that, whatever the law might permit, a federal prosecution will not in practice follow a conviction or acquittal in state court. This present practice and background, however, is not sufficient to establish a violation of equal protection here. The policy of the Justice Department is but an internal policy, without the force of law and subject to change or suspension at any time. Furthermore, as discussed below, the Attorney General’s policy is against successive prosecutions only, is equally as ap[823]*823plicable in the District as in other jurisdictions, and does not apply to simultaneous prosecutions within the District. If it were construed to be otherwise it would exceed the intent of the Attorney General and would contravene the expressed will of Congress. See D.C.Code § 11-502(3) (1973). The other authority that the dissent claims supports its argument — the working papers — was merely background discussion for proposed sections of a revised federal criminal code. The sections involved have since been dropped. Compare Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws §§ 707, 708 (1971) with S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See also Hearings on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws Before the Sub-comm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm, on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., part Y, at 4812 (1973). Even had those sections not been deleted, they would not apply to dual prosecutions in the District of Columbia. See discussion infra.
The dissent also notes that, whatever the decisions of the Supreme Court might allow, a state prosecution following a federal conviction or acquittal in a case such as we have here would contravene the dual prosecutions bar of the uniform narcotics legislation* enacted by most states. We are unable to agree, however, that a denial of equal protection could be found solely from the fact that courts in the District of Columbia interpret a uniform statute differently than do courts in other jurisdictions. Cf. Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U.S. 730, 732, 23 S.Ct. 401, 402, 47 L.Ed. 669 (1903) (“The state of Alabama is not bound to make its laws harmonize in principle with those of other states.”) In the present case, the dissent’s argument is further weakened by our construction of that uniform bar to dual prosecutions, D.C. Code § 33^424 (1973), by which we interpret it to prohibit only successive prosecutions and not simultaneous ones. See-text at 828-830 infra. Because of the unique situation created by the dual jurisdiction of federal courts in the District of Columbia — a situation forseen by the Constitutional Convention when it conferred plenary jurisdiction in Congress over the District of Columbia, U.S. Const, art. I, § 8 — it is our opinion that a statute enacted pursuant to this povfpr and so construed raises no equal protection issue, since the concerns that underlie the prohibition against successive prosecutions have no application to the simultaneous trial of District and federal charges in the District of Columbia. This fundamental difference justifies a unique interpretation of the uniform statute.
The prohibition against successive prosecutions embodied in federal departmental policy and in the statutes of some states appears to find its roots in two main concerns. First, there is the lingering feeling that, despite the Bartkus line of cases, “[t]he spirit of the rule against double jeopardy ... is certainly violated.” 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 296d (1961) (emphasis added). See also Handbook of the National Con7 ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 323 (1932) (Commissioners’ Prefatory Note to Uniform Narcotic Drug Act); I Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 343-50 (1970) (criticizing the soundness of the Bartkus line of decisions but not their doctrinal validity as a statement of the constitutional rules of double jeopardy); Fisher, Double Jeopardy and Federalism, 50 Minn.L.Rev. 607 (1966); Comment, 5 Cal.W.Int’l L.J. 399 (1975); Comment, 44 Minn.L.Rev. 534, 537 (1960). By asserting the “dubious vitality” of the Bartkus doctrine, the dissent impliedly endorses this view.
The second concern which appears to have prompted prohibitions against successive prosecutions is one of fundamental fairness — i. e., that, completely apart from any constitutional limitation, a defendant should not be subjected to the harassment of a double prosecution for the same offense. See Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Press Release at 3 (April 6, 1959) (establishing federal policy not to prosecute following state [824]*824prosecution); Comment, 5 Cal.W.Int’l L.J. 399, 409-11 (1975); Comment, 44 Minn.L.Rev. 534, 539 (I960). A moment’s reflection leads to the conclusion that both these reasons for barring successive prosecutions have no application to simultaneous prosecutions. When federal and District of Columbia offenses are charged in one indictment and prosecuted in one trial, there is no additional harassment of the defendant; and, since jeopardy does not attach until the jury is sworn in, see United States v. Shepard, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 353, 358 n.7, 515 F.2d 1324, 1329 n.7 (1975), no claim of double jeopardy could attach when two charges are brought at the same time, even assuming the demise of the Bartkus rule. See United States v. Knight, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 28, 509 F.2d 354, 361 (1974). This interpretation is analogous to that which, state law permitting, allows violations of both state statutes and municipal ordinances to be joined in a single indictment, see, e. g., State v. Clark, 291 Minn. 79, 189 N.W.2d 167 (1971) (construing Minn.Stat. § 609.035), despite the fact that successive prosecutions under those laws by the respective governments is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970).
It is therefore our conclusion that the capacity of federal courts in the District of Columbia to join federal and District charges which emanate from the same sovereign in a single prosecution creates an adequate distinction between the District and those other federal jurisdictions that may be barred by policy considerations from prosecuting offenses previously tried by the states. This distinction was recognized by the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, which, in promulgating proposed revisions to the United States Code [later dropped, see discussion above] that would prohibit successive prosecutions by “local” and federal governments (or vice versa), stated:
“Local” is specifically defined here . in order to exclude those entities, such as the District of Columbia, which are treated as states for other purposes . . . . For double jeopardy purposes, those entities are part of the same sovereign.
Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 63 (1971) (emphasis added) (comment to section 707). See also id. at 64 (comment to section 708). Thus, even an authority expressly relied on by the dissent has recognized that there is a rational basis for distinguishing between the District of Columbia and other jurisdictions for the purposes of a ban on dual prosecutions.
There then really is no equal protection issue in this case. The District is as much bound by the successive prosecutions bar of section 33-424 as in any state bound by similar legislation. It is only when we consider the matter of simultaneous prosecutions that a different result occurs in the District, and for good reason.
The simultaneous prosecution statute, D.C.Code § 11-502(3) (1973), is a normal response to the co-existence of two statutory schemes enacted by the same sovereign, and provides a reasonable basis for distinguishing the District from other federal jurisdictions. “The Constitution does riot require situations ‘which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.’ ” Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466, 69 S.Ct. 198, 199, 93 L.Ed. 163 (1948), quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147, 60 S.Ct. 879, 84 L.Ed. 1124 (1940). See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920). Congress is not barred from enacting legislation. for the District of Columbia merely because the situation which prompts it does not occur in other jurisdictions. It has plenary jurisdiction over the District of Columbia. U.S.Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Palmore v. United States, [825]*825411 U.S. 389, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954); Gudmundson v. Cardillo, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 230, 126 F.2d 521 (1942); Sablowsky v. United States, 101 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1938).
Furthermore, appellants have no valid present complaint arising from their exposure to the risk of jury verdicts on both federal and D.C. charges since they were only found guilty on the D.C. offenses and since the ultimate sentence was imposed only on the D.C. counts which involved only one statutory scheme.7 Actually, when D.C.Code § 11-502(3) is considered in conjunction with the decisional law in this jurisdiction, forbidding the imposition of sentences according to more than one statutory scheme, see note 12 infra, the two rules together assure that punishment under both federal and local District statutes for the same offense will never be imposed. In some respects this favors D.C. offenders over offenders in other jurisdictions, since the latter may occasionally be subjected to dual prosecutions.
Appellants rely primarily on United States v. Thompson, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 452 F.2d 1333 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 467 (1972), where this court held that the post-conviction bail provisions of the District of Columbia Court Reform Act8 applied only to persons convicted of local offenses and did not apply to persons convicted in the U.S. District Court under federal, statutes when such bail would otherwise be available under the federal Bail Reform Act.9 Thompson thus involved the proposed application of a D.C. statute to a federal offender. In contrast, the present case involves the application of D.C. statutes to persons who have committed offenses under D.C. law. On this basis Thompson is readily distinguishable from the instant case.
Having concluded that it is constitutional for the prosecution to join federal and District offenses, it only remains for us to determine whether the particular statutes in this case preclude such joinder for trial.
The federal narcotics statute under which appellants were indicted was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970.10 That Act was designed to deal with the problem of drug abuse “by providing for an overall balanced scheme of criminal penalties for offenses involving drugs.” H.R.Rep.No.91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1970, p. 4567. Appellants argue that prosecution jointly under federal and D.C. law frustrated this balanced scheme of penalties. However, there is no evidence that Congress intended this language to mean anything other than that the Act itself was internally consistent. The dissent’s argument that Congress intended to establish a “carefully crafted hierarchy of penalties” is correct as far as it goes; but the legislative history makes it quite clear that this was a hierarchy of federal penalties:
The purpose of this bill is to consolidate and rationalize the patchwork of existing legislation and to bring about some needed changes so that our basic Federal statutory tool is as effective and as up to date as possible. The bill represents a codification, a modernization, and a simplification of existing Federal narcotic and dangerous drug laws. But we are not merely redeco[826]*826rating the existing legal structure. Rather, we have laid a new foundation; enacted thereon a sound framework within which a firm but sensible Federal drug policy may be carried out, and we have topped it all with long-needed law enforcement tools.
116 Cong.Rec. 1633 (Jan. 28, 1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska during debate on S. 3246) (emphasis added). Sen. Dole also held this view:
S. 3246 is not the entire answer to the problems and promise of drugs in America, but it provides a sound regu-. latory and law-enforcement basis for dealing with a matter of significant human concern.
Other developments must be pursued in the fields of uniform State laws and international conventions, but we can provide valuable leadership by enacting this bill and establish the Federal Government as an enlightened example for our States and other members of the community of nations.
116 Cong.Rec. 1183 (Jan. 26, 1970) (debate on S. 3246) (emphasis added). Statements by other Senators and Congressmen confirm that the Act was intended to be comprehensive only insofar as the U.S.Code offenses were concerned. See, e. g., H.R.Rep.No.91 — 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., part I, at 6 (1970); 116 Cong.Rec. 1322 (Jan. 27, 1970) (statement of Sen. Montoya); 116 Cong.Rec. 33304, 33313, 33314 (Sept. 23, 1970) (statements of Reps. Rogers, Beall and Bush); 116 Cong.Rec. 33604 (Sept. 24, 1970) (statement of Rep. Robison). That this scheme of penalties does not prohibit a dual prosecution under local law as well as federal was perceived by Rep. Robison, who voiced his concern during floor debate on H.R. 18583:
Although I am not familiar with all State laws dealing with penalties for the manufacture of drugs, I am familiar with the laws of a number of States that make the possession of drugs, and particularly marihuana, a felony.. The pending legislation, in contrast, reduces penalties for possession to misdemeanors and, as I read through the bill, I do not find any clear provision indicating the intention of the Congress as to whether the State laws on possession will be preempted. If they are not preempted, the situation could arise where a young person could be apprehended by Federal officials and charged with possession.
Under the provisions of section 504, that individual could be placed on probation and, perhaps, have his record of conviction expunged. Enter the State — let us say on the next day, when this defendant still had one marihuana cigarette in his possession. Now, this young person could be subjected to the provisions of the State law making such possession a felony, with no provision for the expunging of the records. Not only would such subsequent — or prior — State prosecution defeat the purpose of the Federal law in expunging the records, but it would also be at variance with the new attitude of the Federal Government that we ought to lessen penalties for mere use of these controlled drugs.
Thus, Mr. Chairman, if we do not preempt this field of dangerous drugs in its entirety — civil and criminal— much of the praiseworthy intent of this legislation, as it relates to possession and use of drugs, will be but an empty gesture, with possible State prosecution lurking just around the corner from every Federal prosecution. The concept of what not only amounts to a possible double prosecution, but also the frustration of the new Federal purpose, warrants such preemption being applied in these instances.
116 Cong.Rec. 33307 (Sept. 23, 1970). Mr. Robison’s concern on this point was later answered by Rep. Springer in the following exchange:
MR. ROBINSON:
However, I think it ought to be made more clear than it has been, so far during this debate, that this more humane and realistic approach to the [827]*827question of penalties for mere use or possession of drugs, including marihuana, will have a very limited effect across the Nation. This is because we are revising and modernizing only the existing Federal laws in this regard and — if section 708 means what it seems to say — we have no intention of preempting existing State laws in this same regard. To this limited intent, then, has to be added the fact that, although there is an overlapping of jurisdiction, it is very rare that drug or marihuana use and possession cases come into Federal purview.
Now, then, let me ask the ranking member on the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, the distinguished and able gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Springer), if consideration was given in committee to this aspect of the bill’s actual effect and, specifically, what problems would be involved if Congress were to seek to preempt State penal laws involving mere use or possession of controlled drugs.
MR. SPRINGER. May I say to the distinguished gentleman from New York that we did not seek to preempt State laws and I think very wisely so.
It is not possible for the Federal Government to have an agent in every community. . . . Enforcement for the most part at the local level will take place through the local law-enforcement agencies.
116 Cong.Rec. 33605 (Sept. 24, 1970) (emphasis added). Mr. Robison went on to conclude that the new penalty scheme did not • preempt state penalties but served as an example to states to encourage them to reform their own drug laws in similar fashion. This specific preservation of state penalties is expressed in section 708 of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 903:
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.
(Emphasis added.) Since Congress has indicated that it considers the District of Columbia to be the analogue of a state for certain purposes,11 it is reasonable to conclude that the Act was also not intended to occupy the field, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of the D.C.Code. That conclusion is also buttressed by the refusal of Congress, despite its well recognized authority to do so, to legislate any restrictions on the application of the existing D.C. statutes on the same subject. While the Act specifically repealed or amended numerous prior federal statutes dealing with narcotics (see Act, section 701), no mention was ever made of the D.C. narcotics statutes. Finally, it is of considerable significance that the same session of Congress which adopted the revision of the federal narcotics statutes also revised D.C.Code § 33-423, the penalty provision of the D.C. Uniform Narcotics Drug Act. See Pub.L.No.91-358, § 208, 84 Stat. 603 (1970).
[828]*828In light of the legislative history and in the absence of any express statement of Congress to the contrary, we conclude that passage of the federal Drug Control Act did not prohibit prosecution of local narcotics offenders under the D.C.Code, even when both federal and local offenses are joined in the same indictment returned in the U.S. District Court.12
Appellants’ final argument is that D.C.Code § 33-424 precludes conviction on the local narcotics count once the jury acquitted them on the federal charge. That section provides:
§ 33-424. Effect of acquittal or conviction under Federal narcotic laws.
No person shall be prosecuted for a violation of any provision of this chapter if such person has been acquitted or convicted under any United States statute governing the sale or distribution of narcotic drugs, of the same act or omission which, it is alleged, constitutes a violation of this chapter.
We conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of this language13 is that it [829]*829precludes prosecution under D.C. statutes only where a defendant has been acquitted or convicted of the same narcotics offense at a prior federal trial. The statute does not prohibit the joinder of offenses under both federal and D.C. statutory schemes which are simultaneously prosecuted in a joint indictment14 and where two different offenses (possession with intent to distribute under the U.S.Code and simple possession under the D.C.Code) were involved.15
[830]*830III.
Neither appellant returned to the courtroom at the time set by the trial court after the luncheon recess on the first day of the trial (Tr. 106), and the court informed the jury that the case would continue in their absence (Tr. 108). Appellant Jones reappeared shortly thereafter (Tr. Ill), but. appellant Bryant did not return and the trial continued in his absence without objection from counsel for either appellant. Bryant surrendered to the Marshal’s office on the third day of trial and was brought into the courtroom immediately after the jury retired to consider its verdict (Tr. 442-43). In its instructions to the jury, the court stated that they were not to be prejudiced against either Bryant or Jones because of Bryant’s failure promptly to return for trial and that they were not to draw any inferences as to Bryant’s guilt from his absence (Tr. 427).
Jones now argues that he was unduly prejudiced by the continuation of the trial in the absence of his codefendant. However, the instructions given by the trial court were adequate to eliminate any prejudicial consequences to Jones. See United States v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1973). In addition, any prejudice was waived by his counsel’s failure to raise an objection at trial.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is Affirmed.