United States v. Field & Co.

10 Ct. Cust. 183, 1920 CCPA LEXIS 39
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedNovember 23, 1920
DocketNo. 2044
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 10 Ct. Cust. 183 (United States v. Field & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Field & Co., 10 Ct. Cust. 183, 1920 CCPA LEXIS 39 (ccpa 1920).

Opinion

Barber, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In Sloane v. United States (7 Ct. Cust. Appls. 463; T. D. 37049) we considered the proper classification of certain fabrics and held the same to be within the provision for “all manufactures of every description made, by any process, wholly or in chief value of wool, not specially provided for,” in paragraph 288 of the tariff act of 1913.

The merchandise had been classified by the collector under paragraph 358 of the same act under the provision for “embroideries”, or “articles or fabrics embroidered in any manner by hand or machinery * * * by whatever name known.” This classification had been upheld by the Board of General Appraisers. It was contended for by the Government here but refused.

The importations covered by the several protests in the case now before us are the same as those involved in the Sloane case, with the exception that there the articles were finished. Here they are unfinished, but, nevertheless, sufficiently completed, it is conceded, to raise the identical question passed upon in that case. The Government here contends that in the Sloane case the court was misled by the insufficiency of the record, and that upon the present record the collector’s classification should be sustained.

The typical official exhibit in this case is an unfinished textile fabric intended to be used on the seats or backs of pieces of furniture. It is produced by stitching by hand ornamental designs in colored wool yarns on a basic fabric or background of woven linen canvas. As already indicated, the difference between the exhibits in this and the Sloane case is that there the goods-were finished; here the ornamental stitching has proceeded only far enough to show the design and the color scheme that is to appear in the articles when completed. Small portions of the surface have been finished in order to illustrate the nature of the needlework. With each piece of this linen canvas [185]*185is imported a sufficient quantity of yarn of the proper colors to finish the article, and wool is the component material of chief value of each importation.

In the Sloane case we concluded that the merchandise was a form of tapestry, and not embroidery, and therefore that its assessment was incorrect. In that case the issue was fully discussed by counsel for .both the Government and importer. Importers here present no brief and make no argument, relying, it is presumed, upon the authority of the Sloane case. In the instant case the Board of General Appraisers, although evidently convinced that the merchandise should be classified as embroideries or embroidered articles, felt constrained, by our decision in the. Sloane case, to classify the merchandise under paragraph 288 as a manufacture wholly or in chief value of wool not specially provided for.

The Government contends:

1. That the merchandise is embroidered, independent of commercial designation.

2. That in commercial understanding it is regarded as an embroidery or an embroidered article.

If the second contention is supported by the record we think our judgment should be for the Government, and therefore first consider that phase of the case.

This issue was not raised in the Sloane case. Here the Board of General Appraisers disposed of that question by saying, in substance, that the evidence of commercial designation tended to show that the merchandise was known in the wholesale trade and commerce of this country as embroidered articles or embroideries, but did not conclude, so far as shown by its opinion, that this claim was established.

Commercial designation is a fact to be established by a fair balance of the testimony, and the burden of proof is upon the party making the claim. Therefore in this case the burden is upon the Government to show that this merchandise was, in the wholesale trade and commerce dealing therewith in this country, at the date of the passage of the act, definitely, uniformly, and generally known as embroideries, or an article or fabric embroidered. Maddock v. Magone (152 U. S. 368). Downing v. United States (1 Ct. Cust. Appls. 500; T. D. 31530). United States v. Goldberg (3 Ct. Cust. Appls. 282; T. D. 32573).

The rule is not satisfied if it appears that such claimed commercial designation was only partial, local, or personal. We think it is unnecessary to recite the evidence tending to support the claim of commercial designation further than to say that five or six witnesses testified upon that point that the merchandise was in the wholesale trade known as embroidery or as embroidered articles. [186]*186One, however, expressly stated that his knowledge was based upon local dealings with one firm in New York; another, prior to the enactment of the present tariff act, had had only one or two wholesale transactions involving merchandise similar to this; another, while saying the wholesale trade regarded merchandise like this as embroidery, referred to it also as likewise regarded as canvas tapestry embroidery, or a hand-embroidered canvas tapestry; another, that he would call a tapestry an embroidery; and another, that these importations were known, amongst other- things, as needlework tapestries.

Some of these witnesses gave expert testimony as to the methods of production, and substantially all indorsed the view that whether an article was tapestry or embroidery depended entirely upon its method of production; that -unless it was a woven fabric — that is, wov'en in a loom, generally by hand — -it could not be a tapestry.

A careful reading of the record satisfies us that the testimony given as to commercial designation by these witnesses was so far influenced, unconsciously no doubt, by their belief that in fact tapestry must always be woven, and was also so indefinite as to the trade usage, that we do not think it establishes, by a fair balance of evidence, that the . merchandise here was, at the date of the passage of the act, definitely, uniformly, and generally known as embroideries or as articles or fabrics embroidered.

We pass, therefore, to the consideration as to whether or not these importations are, within the common meaning .of the terms as employed in paragraph 368, either embroideries or articles- or fabrics embroidered in any manner.

As the Government points out, tapestry was first produced upon looms, and in such production there was not, as is the case with the official exhibit here, a foundation fabric designed to be completed by ornamental needlework placed thereon. .

In the development of the art of tapestry making, as was pointed out in the Sloane case, it was found that an open weave of canvas, or .other material, could be used, and that ornamental needlework applied thereto resulted in the production of something very like, in its appearance, the loom-woven tapestry, and to such extent was this carried that one of the most famous tapestries of history, the Bayetix tapestry, was in the eleventh century made in this manner. Doubtless it was in fact, as is testified here, in imitation of the tapestry that had theretofore been produced, and probably -was known to some as needlework tapestry, or, as the Government styles it in its brief, quoting from one of the authorities, a petit point or needle tapestry; but the fact remains, we think, that during all the centuries when much time and many artists were employed in its manufacture, it was known as tapestry.

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10 Ct. Cust. 183, 1920 CCPA LEXIS 39, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-field-co-ccpa-1920.