Washington International Insurance v. United States

27 Ct. Int'l Trade 1173, 2003 CIT 100
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedAugust 8, 2003
DocketConsol. 92-04-00252
StatusPublished

This text of 27 Ct. Int'l Trade 1173 (Washington International Insurance v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Washington International Insurance v. United States, 27 Ct. Int'l Trade 1173, 2003 CIT 100 (cit 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

AQUILINO, Judge:

This action consolidates claims by the plaintiff for refunds of duties assessed by the U.S. Customs Service on the full value of imports of stainless steel, as opposed to only on the value of its processing outside the United States per item 806.30 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (“TSUS”), which duty exemption applied to

[a]ny article of metal (except precious metal) manufactured in the United States or subjected to a process of manufacture in the United States, if exported for further processing, and if the exported article as processed outside the United States, or the *1174 article which results from processing outside of the United States, is returned to the United States for further processing^]

I

To be “manufactured in the United States”, there “must be transformation; a new and different article must emerge, ‘having a distinctive name, character, or use.’ ” Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass’n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908). An article may be “subjected to successive processes of manufacture, each one of which is complete in itself, but several of which may be required to make the final product.” Tide Water Oil Co. v. United States, 171 U.S. 210, 216 (1898). A “process of manufacture” advances an article in condition or value such that the article is more than it was in its original state. See, e.g., United States v. Oxford Int’l Corp., 62 CCPA 102, 106, 517 F.2d 1374, 1377-78 (1975); United States v. Flex Track Equip. Ltd., 59 CCPA 97, 101, 458 F.2d 148, 151-52 (1972); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 19 CCPA 69, 71, T.D. 44897 (1931). It is well-established, though, that certain processes are not manufacturing. See, e.g., Lackawanna Steel Co. v. United States, 10 Ct.Cust.Appls. 93, 94-95, T.D. 38359 (1920) (crushing rock such that it was “rendered into the imported sizes solely to facilitate and economize in transportation” not a manufacturing process); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 71 Cust.Ct. 63, 66, C.D. 4474, 364 F.Supp. 1394, 1397 (1973) (“mere cleansing of an article, or ‘getting it by itself, [ ] not a manufacturing process”). Morever, “[e]very application of labor is not a manufacturing process [,] and it has long been held that an operation which is necessary to get an article of commerce by itself is not such a process.” George Beurhaus Co. v. United States, 32 Cust.Ct. 269, 271, C.D. 1612 (1954), citing United States v. Sheldon & Co., 2 Ct.Cust.Appls. 485, T.D. 32245 (1912); Cone & Co. v. United States, 14 Ct.Cust.Appls. 133, T.D. 41672 (1926); United States v. U.S. Rubber Co., 31 CCPA 174, C.A.D. 269 (1944); V.W. Davis v. United States, 10 Cust.Ct. 189, C.D. 751 (1943); J.E. Bernard & Co. v. United States, 30 Cust.Ct. 122, C.D. 1509 (1953). In Beurhaus, for example, pumpkin seed kernels were held to have been imported unmanufactured where their foreign processing consisted of removing the kernels from whole seeds and drying them out:

* * * Defendant claims that the imported merchandise has been partially manufactured because shelling or peeling the seeds was one of the steps necessary to the development of the finished article. It might likewise be claimed that removing the seeds from the pumpkin and taking the pumpkin from the vine were such steps. All of those operations were, of course, necessary to the production of the finished article, but they were primarily required for the purpose of obtaining the seed kernels free from the pods.

*1175 32 Cust.Ct. at 271. Similarly, in United States v. Salomon, 1 Ct.Cust.Appls. 246, 249, T.D. 31277 (1911), the court held that cotton waste, which had been treated and bleached, was not “advanced in value by a [ ] * * * manufacturing process”.

II

In the light of this law long settled, come the parties to this action with a Stipulation of Material Facts in Lieu of Trial, which the court has reviewed and approved as having “be[en] submitted for decision in lieu of trial on” its contents. 1 They include the following:

4. Plaintiff * * * is the surety on the customs bonds for the entries subject to this action.
5. The importer of record on the subject entries during the relevant time period [ ] was either Newmet Corporation or Newmet Steel Corporation (collectively referred to as “Newmet”).* * *
6. Newmet was engaged in the business of selling in the United States! ] finished or semi-finished stainless and electrical steel products which were purchased from foreign steel mills on a scrap conversion basis, meaning that Newmet supplied scrap to the foreign steel mills and paid them for converting the scrap into the imported stainless steel sheets, plates and strips.
7. Newmet obtained orders for the imported semifinished or finished stainless steel sheets, plates or strips from steel fabricators in the United States, which such fabricators would further process by straightening, slitting and cutting to si2;e for further sale to manufacturers of a variety of stainless steel products.
* * * * * * *
9. The imported merchandise consists of stainless steel sheets, plates and strips and are articles of metal other than precious metal.
10. The merchandise covered by the subject entries * * * [was] processed abroad by foreign steel mills from stainless steel scrap that had been exported from the United States.
11. The exported scrap (hereinafter also referred to, for purposes of this stipulation, as “prepared scrap”) [ ] was the raw *1176 material from which the imported products were manufactured * * * by the foreign steel mills.
12. The subject imported stainless steel sheets, plates and strips were imported into the United States for further processing into various stainless steel products.
13. The subject entries were liquidated with duty assessed on the full value of the imported merchandise.
* * # * * * ❖
15. The “scrap” as it enters the * * * yard (hereinafter also referred to as “incoming scrap”) was not solely of U.S. origin but consisted of scrap of U.S. and foreign origin that were commingled.
# ‡ ifc
17.

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Related

Tide Water Oil Co. v. United States
171 U.S. 210 (Supreme Court, 1898)
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn. v. United States
207 U.S. 556 (Supreme Court, 1908)
Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. United States
364 F. Supp. 1394 (U.S. Customs Court, 1973)
United States v. Flex Track Equipment Ltd.
458 F.2d 148 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1972)
United States v. Oxford International Corp.
517 F.2d 1374 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1975)
United States v. Field & Co.
10 Ct. Cust. 183 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1920)

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27 Ct. Int'l Trade 1173, 2003 CIT 100, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/washington-international-insurance-v-united-states-cit-2003.