BARRETT, Circuit Judge.
Duane Watts (Watts) appeals from the Trial Court’s judgment finding him [6]*6guilty of involuntary manslaughter and adjudging him to be a Juvenile Delinquent under the provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5037.
Watts, an Indian and a minor aged 17 at the time of the alleged offense, was initially charged by complaint with the offense of murder arising from the stabbing death of his brother, Calvert Watts. He was thereafter indicted for voluntary manslaughter. Subsequently, upon failure of the United States Department of Justice to consent to Watts’ being charged as an adult, and with the consent of Watts and his counsel, the prior indictment was dismissed and an Information, charging Juvenile Delinquency-Manslaughter, was filed. At trial Watts attempted, unsuccessfully, to establish that he had acted in self defense in stabbing his brother during an altercation.
On this appeal Watts contends: (1) that his right to due process was violated by reason of the failure of adequate notice being provided to his parents; and (2) that the Trial Court erred in allowing the prosecution to make use of grand jury proceedings against him.
I.
Watts’ chief allegation, i. e., that he was denied due process because his parents were not given notice of the charges against him, nor were they advised of his right to counsel, etc., is premised solely upon the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). While Watts baldly claims that the federal courts have consistently followed the Supreme Court’s mandate in this regard, he has cited no cases squarely holding on this point, nor have we, through our own research, uncovered any such authority. The question of whether the failure of notice to a juvenile’s parents, standing alone, constitutes sufficient grounds for the reversal of a determination of juvenile delinquency under the Federal Act, we find to be of first impression before this court.
In establishing standards for the type of notice which would comport with due process requirements for juvenile delinquency proceedings, the Court in Gault held:
Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must “set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity.” . . . even if there were a conceivable purpose served by the deferral proposed by the court below, it would have to yield to the requirements that the child and his parents or guardian be notified, in writing, of the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing, and that such written notice be given at the earliest practicable time, and in any event sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation. Due process of law requires notice of the sort we have described— that is, notice which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding. It does not allow a hearing to be held in which a youth’s freedom and his parents’ right to his custody are at stake without giving them timely notice, in advance of the hearing, of the specific issues that they must meet. (Emphasis supplied). 387 U.S. at 33-34, 87 S.Ct. at 1446.
While Gault, supra, dealt specifically with the constitutionality of a state scheme for juvenile proceedings, the rights enumerated by that decision are based upon protections afforded by the United States Constitution and, consequently, we view them to be equally applicable to federal proceedings dealing with juvenile offenders under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act.1
[7]*7Although the express language in Gault requiring that notice be given to both the juvenile and his parents is unequivocal, we are not convinced that the failure of such notice to the parents must lead in all cases to the automatic reversal of the juvenile’s adjudication as a delinquent.
Our review of the decision in Gault and our search of other authorities does not convince us that there exists a separate and independent due process right to notice of delinquency proceedings belonging to the parents of the juvenile defendant, Watts.2 However,, because the parents are not parties to the present action we need not now decide whether such a right exists, and if so whether it has been violated. Further, we do not and need not decide what remedy may be available or appropriate.
Instead, our concern on this appeal is solely with whether a violation of the standard established in Gault requiring that notice be given to a juvenile’s parents constitutes such a deprivation of the juvenile’s right to due process as to, per se, require a reversal of the determination of his delinquency.
Preliminarily, we note the following language from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 [8]*8(1975), which concerned the type of due process notice which must be given students prior to their suspension:
. the interpretation and application of the Due Process Clause are intensely practical matters and “the very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 [81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230] (1961). (Emphasis added).
419 U.S. at 578, 95 S.Ct. at 738.
Similarly, we find applicable the Court’s statement in Gault that the due process standards established therein are to be “intelligently and not ruthlessly administered.” 387 U.S. at 21, 87 S.Ct. 1428.
In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), the Supreme Court recognized that certain procedural safeguards (in that case the Miranda warnings) were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were, instead, prophylactic measures laid down to insure that basic rights were not violated. This being so, where only the prophylactic safeguard has been violated but the basic right has not, reversal is not necessarily required.
In Holloway v. Wain wright, supra, the Court stated that the purpose underlying statutes requiring notice to parents is to “furnish a safeguard to minors accused of crimes by requiring that the opportunity be made available for consultation and advice with the individuals, who, society must assume, are those most vitally concerned with the minor’s best interests.” 451 F.2d at 151. The basic right protected by such safeguards is that of the child to be made aware of the charges against him and to be assured a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense. Kemplen v. State of Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970). In this regard, the parents’ function would seem to be similar to that of legal counsel.
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BARRETT, Circuit Judge.
Duane Watts (Watts) appeals from the Trial Court’s judgment finding him [6]*6guilty of involuntary manslaughter and adjudging him to be a Juvenile Delinquent under the provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5037.
Watts, an Indian and a minor aged 17 at the time of the alleged offense, was initially charged by complaint with the offense of murder arising from the stabbing death of his brother, Calvert Watts. He was thereafter indicted for voluntary manslaughter. Subsequently, upon failure of the United States Department of Justice to consent to Watts’ being charged as an adult, and with the consent of Watts and his counsel, the prior indictment was dismissed and an Information, charging Juvenile Delinquency-Manslaughter, was filed. At trial Watts attempted, unsuccessfully, to establish that he had acted in self defense in stabbing his brother during an altercation.
On this appeal Watts contends: (1) that his right to due process was violated by reason of the failure of adequate notice being provided to his parents; and (2) that the Trial Court erred in allowing the prosecution to make use of grand jury proceedings against him.
I.
Watts’ chief allegation, i. e., that he was denied due process because his parents were not given notice of the charges against him, nor were they advised of his right to counsel, etc., is premised solely upon the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). While Watts baldly claims that the federal courts have consistently followed the Supreme Court’s mandate in this regard, he has cited no cases squarely holding on this point, nor have we, through our own research, uncovered any such authority. The question of whether the failure of notice to a juvenile’s parents, standing alone, constitutes sufficient grounds for the reversal of a determination of juvenile delinquency under the Federal Act, we find to be of first impression before this court.
In establishing standards for the type of notice which would comport with due process requirements for juvenile delinquency proceedings, the Court in Gault held:
Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must “set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity.” . . . even if there were a conceivable purpose served by the deferral proposed by the court below, it would have to yield to the requirements that the child and his parents or guardian be notified, in writing, of the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing, and that such written notice be given at the earliest practicable time, and in any event sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation. Due process of law requires notice of the sort we have described— that is, notice which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding. It does not allow a hearing to be held in which a youth’s freedom and his parents’ right to his custody are at stake without giving them timely notice, in advance of the hearing, of the specific issues that they must meet. (Emphasis supplied). 387 U.S. at 33-34, 87 S.Ct. at 1446.
While Gault, supra, dealt specifically with the constitutionality of a state scheme for juvenile proceedings, the rights enumerated by that decision are based upon protections afforded by the United States Constitution and, consequently, we view them to be equally applicable to federal proceedings dealing with juvenile offenders under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act.1
[7]*7Although the express language in Gault requiring that notice be given to both the juvenile and his parents is unequivocal, we are not convinced that the failure of such notice to the parents must lead in all cases to the automatic reversal of the juvenile’s adjudication as a delinquent.
Our review of the decision in Gault and our search of other authorities does not convince us that there exists a separate and independent due process right to notice of delinquency proceedings belonging to the parents of the juvenile defendant, Watts.2 However,, because the parents are not parties to the present action we need not now decide whether such a right exists, and if so whether it has been violated. Further, we do not and need not decide what remedy may be available or appropriate.
Instead, our concern on this appeal is solely with whether a violation of the standard established in Gault requiring that notice be given to a juvenile’s parents constitutes such a deprivation of the juvenile’s right to due process as to, per se, require a reversal of the determination of his delinquency.
Preliminarily, we note the following language from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 [8]*8(1975), which concerned the type of due process notice which must be given students prior to their suspension:
. the interpretation and application of the Due Process Clause are intensely practical matters and “the very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 [81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230] (1961). (Emphasis added).
419 U.S. at 578, 95 S.Ct. at 738.
Similarly, we find applicable the Court’s statement in Gault that the due process standards established therein are to be “intelligently and not ruthlessly administered.” 387 U.S. at 21, 87 S.Ct. 1428.
In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), the Supreme Court recognized that certain procedural safeguards (in that case the Miranda warnings) were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were, instead, prophylactic measures laid down to insure that basic rights were not violated. This being so, where only the prophylactic safeguard has been violated but the basic right has not, reversal is not necessarily required.
In Holloway v. Wain wright, supra, the Court stated that the purpose underlying statutes requiring notice to parents is to “furnish a safeguard to minors accused of crimes by requiring that the opportunity be made available for consultation and advice with the individuals, who, society must assume, are those most vitally concerned with the minor’s best interests.” 451 F.2d at 151. The basic right protected by such safeguards is that of the child to be made aware of the charges against him and to be assured a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense. Kemplen v. State of Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970). In this regard, the parents’ function would seem to be similar to that of legal counsel.
Watts has made no contention that he was not made fully aware of the charges against him or that he was in any way prejudiced in preparing his case due to the failure of notice being given to his parents. There is no allegation here that Watts was denied the opportunity to confront and cross-examine all adverse witnesses or to secure the presence of favorable witnesses or present evidence in his own defense. Unlike the factual situation in Gault, the record here reveals that Watts himself had adequate written notice of the precise charges against him well in advance of the hearing and was at all material times represented by competent counsel.3 Furthermore, Watts’ mother and his stepfather were obviously available to assist him with his defense, as evidenced by the fact that they were present at trial and testified in his behalf.
We do not intend hereby to condone the Government’s failure to notify, or even attempt to notify, the juvenile’s parents. Such notification may often be the only practical method of insuring that a juvenile is accorded fundamental due process rights mandated by In Re Gault. Where, as here, however, it is clear that the juvenile has not, in fact, been denied due process (even though there has been a technical violation of a prophylactic safeguard established to protect that right), we see no need for a per se rule requiring reversal. Cf., In Re State in Interest of Harrell, 254 La. 963, 229 So.2d 63 (1969).
The law cannot realistically require that officers investigating serious crimes make no errors whatsoever, and before such error will be penalized it must be determined that such sanction serves a valid and useful purpose. Michigan v. Tucker, supra. There is no allegation here that the investigating officers’ fail[9]*9ure to notify Watts’ parents was willful.4 Further, there has been no showing made that the Government’s case was in any way enhanced by its failure to supply such notice. A “deterrence” argument is not, therefore, applicable here. Nor are we convinced that a reversal, under the circumstances presented by this case, would in anywise enhance the “fact finding process.” See, MeKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971).
Finally, we agree with the conclusion of the District Court in Walker v. State of Florida, 328 F.Supp. 620 (S.D.Fla. 1971), aff’d. 466 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1972):
Gault established that in “loss of liberty proceedings” the juvenile, with respect to certain constitutional rights, is to be treated as an adult. No more was required, no less was offered.
328 F.Supp. at 624.
Under the total circumstances of this ease, we agree with the conclusion of the trial court and hold that Watts was not denied the fundamental “fair treatment” mandated by In Re Gault.
II.
Watts next asserts error in that the trial court permitted the prosecutor to use grand jury proceedings against him. The basis of this allegation rests upon Watts’ unsupported contention that the Government, in attempting to impeach two of its witnesses, may have relied upon transcripts of their prior testimony before the grand jury. He asserts that such use amounted to a subversion of criminal procedure and requires reversal, citing United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 78 S.Ct. 983, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958).
The Government contends that it did not use grand jury transcripts to impeach these witnesses, but rather relied upon statements made by these witnesses to the investigating authorities on the night of the incident. Suffice it to say that if such statements were made to- the investigating officers (which Watts does not dispute), they could have been properly used to impeach these witnesses’ testimony. In light of this, we see no possibility of prejudicial error to Watts even if these same, or similar, statements were also transcribed during the grand jury proceedings and hence thereby were independently available to the Government from another, perhaps tainted, source. Rule 52(a) Fed.R. Crim.P., 18 U.S.C.; Jennings v. United States, 364 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 1030, 87 S.Ct. 760, 17 L.Ed.2d 677 (1967); Gay v. United States, 322 F.2d 208 (10th Cir. 1963).
We affirm.