Appellate Case: 24-6253 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 4, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. Nos. 24-6253 & 24-6258 (D.C. Nos. 5:10-CR-00058-F-1 & JACOBY COLEMAN, 5:23-CR-00390-F-1) (W.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before HARTZ, EID, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Defendant Jacoby Coleman appeals two judgments of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma: (1) a judgment revoking a prior
supervised release (Appeal No. 24-6253) and (2) a judgment of conviction following
a guilty plea to one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition (Appeal No.
24-6258). He was sentenced to 15 years’ incarceration and a five-year term of
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-6253 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 2
supervised release on the firearm conviction, and a consecutive 18-month sentence on
the revocation judgment.
Defense counsel filed an Anders brief and moved to withdraw as counsel. See
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (stating that if after “conscientious
examination” of the record, counsel finds the appeal “wholly frivolous,” then counsel
may move to withdraw and contemporaneously file a “brief referring to anything in
the record that might arguably support the appeal”). Despite proper notice from this
court, Defendant did not file a response to the Anders brief; and the government
declined to file a brief. We have reviewed the Anders brief and the record to
determine whether Defendant’s appeals are wholly frivolous. See United States v.
Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 2005). Exercising jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we conclude that they are, so we dismiss the appeals and grant
defense counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
I. BACKGROUND
In January 2024 Defendant pleaded guilty to a superseding indictment
charging him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) with one count of being in possession of
ammunition after being convicted of seven felonies, including six counts of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Because
Defendant was on supervised release at the time of the offense, he also faced
revocation proceedings.
During sentencing, the government sought, over Defendant’s objection, an
enhanced penalty under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),
2 Appellate Case: 24-6253 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 3
for the felon-in-possession charge. The probation office concluded that Defendant
qualified for the enhanced sentence and calculated the advisory guideline range at 15
years’ incarceration—the statutory minimum—and two to five years of supervised
release. It also calculated the guideline range in the revocation proceeding at 18 to 24
months’ incarceration and up to life for supervised release. Defendant requested that
the felon-in-possession sentence run concurrently with his revocation sentence. But
the district court imposed consecutive sentences.
II. ANALYSIS
Anders requires this court to “conduct a full examination of the record to
determine whether defendant’s claims are wholly frivolous.” Calderon, 428 F.3d at
930 (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). If the claims are frivolous, we may grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. See id. The Anders brief
addressed whether there are any nonfrivolous arguments to challenge (1) the
application of the ACCA or (2) the substantive reasonableness of Defendant’s
sentences, including their being consecutive. After a careful review of the record, we
agree that no nonfrivolous arguments could be made.
To begin with, we see no error in the plea proceeding. Before accepting a plea
the district court must advise the defendant of certain rights and risks, ensure that the
plea is voluntary, and determine the factual basis for a plea. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b). That occurred here. We see nothing in the record to indicate an error in
accepting Defendant’s guilty plea.
3 Appellate Case: 24-6253 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 4
Nor was there any procedural error in sentencing. There was no error in
calculating the guideline range for Defendant’s firearm conviction, considering the
statutorily required factors, finding the facts, or explaining the sentence. See United
States v. Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d 1248, 1261 (10th Cir. 2014). In particular, there
was no error in applying the ACCA. The ACCA provides a sentencing enhancement
if a defendant is convicted under Section 922(g) and “has three previous
convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on
occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The district court
applied the ACCA enhancement only after Defendant acknowledged that his six prior
drug convictions specified in the superseding indictment “occurred on separate
occasions.” R. 24-6258, Vol. 3 at 23. Those prior convictions under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a) for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base are serious drug
offenses under the ACCA, so the court correctly applied the enhancement. See 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i) (A “‘serious drug offense’” includes “an offense under the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.).”). We need not consider whether
other convictions could sustain the enhancement because the district court did not
rely on other convictions.
Because the minimum sentence under the ACCA exceeded the guideline range
that otherwise would have applied, the 15-year statutory minimum became
Defendant’s guideline sentence for the firearm conviction. See USSG § 5G1.1(b).
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Appellate Case: 24-6253 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 4, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. Nos. 24-6253 & 24-6258 (D.C. Nos. 5:10-CR-00058-F-1 & JACOBY COLEMAN, 5:23-CR-00390-F-1) (W.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before HARTZ, EID, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Defendant Jacoby Coleman appeals two judgments of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma: (1) a judgment revoking a prior
supervised release (Appeal No. 24-6253) and (2) a judgment of conviction following
a guilty plea to one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition (Appeal No.
24-6258). He was sentenced to 15 years’ incarceration and a five-year term of
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-6253 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 2
supervised release on the firearm conviction, and a consecutive 18-month sentence on
the revocation judgment.
Defense counsel filed an Anders brief and moved to withdraw as counsel. See
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (stating that if after “conscientious
examination” of the record, counsel finds the appeal “wholly frivolous,” then counsel
may move to withdraw and contemporaneously file a “brief referring to anything in
the record that might arguably support the appeal”). Despite proper notice from this
court, Defendant did not file a response to the Anders brief; and the government
declined to file a brief. We have reviewed the Anders brief and the record to
determine whether Defendant’s appeals are wholly frivolous. See United States v.
Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 2005). Exercising jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we conclude that they are, so we dismiss the appeals and grant
defense counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
I. BACKGROUND
In January 2024 Defendant pleaded guilty to a superseding indictment
charging him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) with one count of being in possession of
ammunition after being convicted of seven felonies, including six counts of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Because
Defendant was on supervised release at the time of the offense, he also faced
revocation proceedings.
During sentencing, the government sought, over Defendant’s objection, an
enhanced penalty under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),
2 Appellate Case: 24-6253 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 3
for the felon-in-possession charge. The probation office concluded that Defendant
qualified for the enhanced sentence and calculated the advisory guideline range at 15
years’ incarceration—the statutory minimum—and two to five years of supervised
release. It also calculated the guideline range in the revocation proceeding at 18 to 24
months’ incarceration and up to life for supervised release. Defendant requested that
the felon-in-possession sentence run concurrently with his revocation sentence. But
the district court imposed consecutive sentences.
II. ANALYSIS
Anders requires this court to “conduct a full examination of the record to
determine whether defendant’s claims are wholly frivolous.” Calderon, 428 F.3d at
930 (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). If the claims are frivolous, we may grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. See id. The Anders brief
addressed whether there are any nonfrivolous arguments to challenge (1) the
application of the ACCA or (2) the substantive reasonableness of Defendant’s
sentences, including their being consecutive. After a careful review of the record, we
agree that no nonfrivolous arguments could be made.
To begin with, we see no error in the plea proceeding. Before accepting a plea
the district court must advise the defendant of certain rights and risks, ensure that the
plea is voluntary, and determine the factual basis for a plea. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b). That occurred here. We see nothing in the record to indicate an error in
accepting Defendant’s guilty plea.
3 Appellate Case: 24-6253 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 4
Nor was there any procedural error in sentencing. There was no error in
calculating the guideline range for Defendant’s firearm conviction, considering the
statutorily required factors, finding the facts, or explaining the sentence. See United
States v. Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d 1248, 1261 (10th Cir. 2014). In particular, there
was no error in applying the ACCA. The ACCA provides a sentencing enhancement
if a defendant is convicted under Section 922(g) and “has three previous
convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on
occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The district court
applied the ACCA enhancement only after Defendant acknowledged that his six prior
drug convictions specified in the superseding indictment “occurred on separate
occasions.” R. 24-6258, Vol. 3 at 23. Those prior convictions under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a) for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base are serious drug
offenses under the ACCA, so the court correctly applied the enhancement. See 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i) (A “‘serious drug offense’” includes “an offense under the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.).”). We need not consider whether
other convictions could sustain the enhancement because the district court did not
rely on other convictions.
Because the minimum sentence under the ACCA exceeded the guideline range
that otherwise would have applied, the 15-year statutory minimum became
Defendant’s guideline sentence for the firearm conviction. See USSG § 5G1.1(b).
And neither the Anders brief nor our review of the record suggests any error in the
4 Appellate Case: 24-6253 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 5
calculation of the guidelines range for the term of supervised release or the
revocation sentence.
Finally, we review the substantive reasonableness of Defendant's sentence. See
United States v. Chavez, 723 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 2013). “In considering
whether a defendant’s sentence is substantively reasonable, we examine whether the
length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of
the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
We apply the same test to review “a district court’s determination of whether to
impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence.” Id. at 1232. And we consider a
sentence within the guidelines to be presumptively reasonable. See id. at 1233.
The sentences were applied after consideration of the relevant circumstances
of the case, and the district court explicitly considered all the § 3553 factors. For the
felon-in-possession charge, the district court sentenced Defendant to a 180-month
period of incarceration, which was the statutory minimum, and a five-year term of
supervised release, which was within the guidelines range. It then sentenced
Defendant on the revocation charge to 18 months of custody to be run consecutively
to the sentence for the felon-in-possession conviction. This too was within the
guidelines. See USSG § 7B1.3(f). The Anders brief does not assert, nor do we see,
anything to rebut the presumptive reasonableness of these sentences.
The Anders brief also says that we may review the district court’s comments
regarding programming, which could be construed as impermissibly “‘lengthen[ing]
a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program.’” Aplt. Br.
5 Appellate Case: 24-6253 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 6
at 21 (quoting Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 335 (2011)). The district court
did “take into account the possible need to provide correctional treatment,” but it did
so with the appropriate caveat that it could do so only “as a potential mitigating
circumstance” or as a factual acknowledgment that some programming could reduce
Defendant’s overall sentence. R. 24-6258, Vol. 3 at 37.
III. CONCLUSION
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS Defendant’s
appeals.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge