United States v. Carolyn Wade

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: February 18, 2026
• Docket: 25-11132
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-11132 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

CAROLYN DENISE WADE, TRACY D. WADE, a.k.a. Sealed Defendant 2, Defendants-Appellants. ____________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cr-60173-KMW-1 ____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LUCK and LAGOA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 2 of 17

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Carolyn and Tracy Wade appeal their convictions for wire fraud, making false statements to the Small Business Administra- tion, and conspiracy. They challenge an evidentiary ruling, the re- fusal to give a jury instruction, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Carolyn’s convictions. No reversible error occurred. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND A grand jury indicted the Wades for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, wire fraud, id. § 1343, and conspiracy to make false statements to the Administration, id. § 371. The in- dictment also charged Carolyn separately with making false state- ments to the Administration, 15 U.S.C. § 645(a), and Tracy with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and making false statements to the Administration, 15 U.S.C. § 645(a). The indictment alleged that the Wades conspired with Haydee Rivero to obtain fraudulent loans from the Paycheck Protection Program and to secure their later forgiveness by the Administration through the submission of ficti- tious tax forms and false payroll data. Before trial, the parties contested the admissibility of Tracy’s prior uncharged loan application and the propriety of the Wades’ request for a good-faith jury instruction. The government notified the Wades that it intended to introduce the application under Fed- eral Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove intent and absence of mis- take. The Wades argued that the uncharged application should be excluded as inadmissible character evidence, and they separately requested a good-faith jury instruction. The district court deferred USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 3 of 17

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ruling on the admissibility of the evidence until the government offered it at trial and explained that the giving of any good-faith jury instruction would depend on whether the evidence at trial sup- ported it. At trial, the government presented testimony about the Paycheck Protection Program, which was intended to help small businesses pay their employees during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Administration oversaw the program but allowed private lenders to manage the loan application and disbursement process. Applicants submitted proof of eligibility and certified the veracity of their application under penalty of fine or imprisonment. The government also presented evidence about the fraudu- lent nature of the Wades’ applications. Tracy and Carolyn each ap- plied for $20,833 loans as sole proprietors, reporting gross incomes of $112,430 and $113,560, respectively, based on 2019 Schedule C forms. They each sought forgiveness for the full amount of each loan and certified under penalty of perjury that they had used the loan proceeds exclusively on payroll. But Internal Revenue Service records proved that, although the Wades filed individual tax re- turns between 2018 and 2020, they never filed Schedule C returns for those sole proprietorships. Rivero—who pleaded guilty to the conspiracy—testified that she and her husband were “good friends” with the Wades through their work in the funeral home industry. Tracy owned Wade Funeral Home, and Rivero’s husband operated another fu- neral home where she worked as an administrative assistant. USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 4 of 17

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Rivero explained that she prepared and uploaded fraudulent Sched- ule C forms for both Tracy and Carolyn. She testified that the pur- pose of the conspiracy was to obtain money from the government based on false information and that she worked with Tracy and Carolyn. On cross-examination, the defense attacked Rivero’s credi- bility by highlighting her cooperation agreement and by probing her interactions with Tracy. The defense sought to portray Tracy as an unwitting participant who provided his personal identifiers to the Riveros in good faith with no knowledge that they would sub- mit fraudulent tax documents on his behalf. To rebut this theory, the government, on redirect of Rivero, introduced an email she re- ceived with the subject line “Wade Funeral Home.” Rivero testi- fied that the email contained an attachment that reported a “loan overview” for a loan estimated at $701,873. Although she stated that she did not work on that specific application, she printed the document and gave it to her husband. On recross, Rivero reiterated that she had received voided checks from both Tracy and Carolyn to facilitate the loan process, and that Carolyn paid her $1,000. Digital evidence from Womply, a platform used to process applications for the Program, established that the Wades person- ally reviewed and approved the fraudulent filings. Womply’s rec- ords linked the applications to the Wades’ phone numbers, email addresses, and internet protocol addresses, and confirmed that Car- olyn signed applications on May 18 and May 28, 2021, and that Tracy responded to one-time verification codes. Because the USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 5 of 17

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Wades signed their documents through DocuSign, the entire appli- cation—including the misrepresented gross income—was visible to them during the signing process. Additional evidence established the Wades’ direct involve- ment through identity verification and device tracking. Using Per- sona, an identity verification service, the Wades authenticated their applications with government-issued identification and “selfie” photographs taken from their mobile devices. Digital forensics fur- ther linked the Wades to the fraud by tracing their activity to spe- cific internet protocol addresses. Carolyn accessed the Womply portal from her home and employer networks, while Tracy used his smartphone and his business network at Wade Funeral Home to manage his accounts. Bank records and related testimony detailed the use of the loan proceeds for personal expenses. Tracy and Carolyn each re- ceived $20,833 in personal accounts and issued checks for “reim- bursement,” “payroll,” or “salary” to themselves and each other, despite never having made such payments previously. The Wades also used a portion of these funds to pay Rivero for her role in the scheme. After the government rested, the district court denied the Wades’ motion for a judgment of acquittal. The Wades introduced evidence that the Riveros—not the Wades—perpetrated the fraud and had a pattern of using false tax information without their clients’ knowledge. Tracy testified that he relied in good faith on the Riveros and was “puzzled” by the fraudulent information. But on cross-examination, he admitted USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 6 of 17

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that he performed activities in Carolyn’s Womply account and that the evidence “undeniably” established that Carolyn had logged into her account several times. The government also questioned Tracy regarding a separate, uncharged loan application for Wade Funeral Home, which sought over $700,000 in funds for pandemic assistance. On redirect examination, Tracy reaffirmed that he never saw the fraudulent Schedule C forms during the signing pro- cess and maintained that he never agreed with the Riveros to de- fraud the government. After they rested, the Wades renewed their motion for a judgment of acquittal on all counts. The district court again denied the motion. Although a good-faith instruction was included in the pro- posed jury instructions, the district court stated that it did not be- lieve that the instruction applied to the facts of the case and asked the Wades for supporting case law. When the Wades made no fur- ther argument, the district court removed the good-faith instruc- tion from the final charge. The district court instructed the jury on the elements of the offenses. As to the wire fraud counts, the district court explained that the government was required to prove the defendants acted with the “intent to defraud,” which meant acting knowingly and with the specific intent to use false pretenses to cause loss or injury. The district court defined “knowingly” as an act done voluntarily and not because of a mistake or accident, and “willfully” as an act committed purposely with the “specific intent to do something the USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 7 of 17

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law forbids.” Afterward, the Wades stated that they had no addi- tional requests for or objections to the instructions. The jury found the Wades guilty on all counts. The Wades then moved for a judgment of acquittal. The district court denied the motion and ruled that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to permit a rational jury to find the Wades guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all charges. It determined that the electronic data and Tracy’s own tes- timony established that the Wades knowingly and willingly partic- ipated in a scheme to obtain loans from the paycheck loan program based on fraudulent information with the intent to defraud. The district court sentenced Carolyn to three years of probation and Tracy to 90 days of imprisonment, followed by three years of su- pervised release. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW Two standards govern our review. “We review a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, but we view all evidence in the light most favor- able to the government, resolving any conflicts in favor of the gov- ernment’s case.” United States v. Brown, 125 F.4th 1043, 1052 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A jury’s verdict cannot be overturned if any reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation and internal quota- tion marks omitted). “We are bound by the jury’s credibility USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 8 of 17

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choices, and by its rejection of the inferences raised by the defend- ant.” United States v. Broughton, 689 F.3d 1260, 1277 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “We review evi- dentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.” Brown, 125 F.4th at 1052. The parties dispute which standard governs our review of the refusal to give a good-faith jury instruction. The Wades argue that we should review for abuse of discretion. The government ar- gues that we should review for plain error. Because the result is the same under either standard, we review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Daniels, 91 F.4th 1083, 1092 (11th Cir.), cert. de- nied, 144 S. Ct. 2592 (2024) (“We review a district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion.”). III. DISCUSSION We divide our discussion into three parts. First, we explain that any error in the admission of evidence regarding Tracy’s un- charged loan application was harmless. Second, we explain that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give a good-faith jury instruction. Third, we explain that sufficient evi- dence supported Carolyn’s convictions for wire fraud, making false statements, and conspiracy to commit both offenses. A. Any Error in the Admission of Evidence Regarding Tracy’s Uncharged Loan Application Was Harmless. The Wades argue that the district court erred by admitting evidence of an uncharged $700,000 loan application for Wade Fu- neral Home. They contend it was inadmissible character evidence USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 9 of 17

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when introduced during Rivero’s testimony on redirect and im- proper impeachment evidence during Tracy’s cross-examination. The government responds that the evidence was admissible to re- but Tracy’s claim of a mistake or, in the alternative, that any error was harmless. We agree that any error was harmless. “Even if a district court abuses its discretion in an evidentiary ruling, if the error is harmless, we won’t reverse on the basis of it.” United States v. Cremades, 160 F.4th 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2025). The government bears the burden of proving harmless error. Id. “A nonconstitutional evidentiary error is harmless and must be disre- garded unless it affected the defendant’s substantial rights at trial.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 1207, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020) (“If [we] can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the nonconstitutional error, [we] must affirm even if the district court erred.” (alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). “Overwhelming evidence of guilt may render an erroneous ruling harmless.” Cremades, 160 F.4th at 1304. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Any error in admitting evidence of Tracy’s uncharged $700,000 loan application was harmless. The government’s burden to prove harmlessness is met where overwhelming evidence of guilt exists. See id. The record contains extensive proof—including internet protocol addresses, correspondence, and identity verifica- tion data—linking Tracy to the fraud. The challenged testimony spanned only a few pages of a multi-day trial. The judgment was USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 10 of 17

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not substantially swayed by that evidence. See Pon, 963 F.3d at 1227

B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Declining to Give a Good-Faith Jury Instruction. The Wades argue that the district court committed reversi- ble error by refusing to provide a good-faith jury instruction on the counts for conspiracy and wire fraud—offenses that required the government to prove that the Wades acted with an intent to de- fraud. Relying on United States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), they contend that, because there was at least some evidence to support the instruction, the district court was required to give it. They contend that the other instructions did not ade- quately cover their good-faith defense. The lack of a standalone in- struction, they maintain, prevented the jury from considering whether they possessed the requisite mens rea to commit the of- fenses. We disagree. A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a theory of defense that has “any foundation in the evidence.” United States v. Martinelli, 454 F.3d 1300, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006). If “any evidentiary support” exists and the district court is “directed to the defense,” it must charge the jury. United States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. Unit A. 1981). Yet a district court’s refusal to do so is reversible error only when the instruction was “a correct statement of the law,” “not substantially covered by other instructions,” its refusal “seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to defend himself,” Mar- USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 11 of 17

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tinelli, 454 F.3d at 1309 (citation and internal quotation marks omit- ted), and it “dealt with an issue properly before the jury,” United States v. Bell, 112 F.4th 1318, 1336 (11th Cir. 2024). When we deter- mine whether an instruction was “substantially covered by other instructions,” we view the whole charge to ensure that it “fairly and correctly states the issues and the law.” Daniels, 91 F.4th at 1093. A district court does not abuse its discretion by refusing a good-faith instruction if the other instructions correctly defined “knowingly” and “willfully.” See Martinelli, 454 F.3d at 1315–16; United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 853–54 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Jordan, 582 F.3d 1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009). The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the good-faith instruction because the charge as a whole “fairly and correctly” stated the law. See Daniels, 91 F.4th at 1093. Because the district court correctly defined “knowingly” and “willfully,” the jury could not have convicted the Wades if it found that they acted in good faith. See Martinelli, 454 F.3d at 1316. The subject matter of the requested instruction was substantially covered by the defini- tions of the requisite mens rea. If the jury had concluded the Wades held an honestly formed belief, it could not have found that they acted with the “specific intent to do something the law forbids.” C. Sufficient Evidence Supported Carolyn’s Convictions. The Wades argue that the district court erred in denying Carolyn’s motion for a judgment of acquittal because there was in- sufficient evidence to prove that she knew of the falsified loan in- formation. They contend that the record established that Tracy USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 12 of 17

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submitted her information for a potential loan without evidence of Carolyn’s personal knowledge or participation. We again disagree. 1. Sufficient Evidence Supports Carolyn’s Convictions for Con- spiracy to Commit Wire Fraud and to Defraud the Government. To convict Carolyn of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, the government had to prove “(1) a conspiracy to commit [wire fraud]; (2) knowledge of the conspiracy; and (3) that [Carolyn] knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy.” United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1257 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To convict her of conspiracy to defraud the government, 18 U.S.C. § 371, it had to prove “(1) an agreement among two or more persons to achieve an unlawful ob- jective; (2) knowing and voluntary participation in the agreement; and (3) an overt act by a conspirator in furtherance of the agree- ment.” United States v. Gonzalez, 834 F.3d 1206, 1214 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may be convicted even if she “played only a minor role in the over- all scheme” or “did not have direct contact with other alleged co-conspirators.” United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1290 (11th Cir. 2015). Because an agreement may be proven “by inferences from the conduct of the alleged participants,“ it is sufficient for the gov- ernment to establish “that the defendant knew the essential nature of the conspiracy.” United States v. Vernon, 723 F.3d 1234, 1273 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Sufficient evidence supports Carolyn’s conspiracy convic- tions. A jury could reasonably have found that Carolyn agreed with USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 13 of 17

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Tracy and Rivero to submit fraudulent Schedule C documents to obtain a loan from the Paycheck Protection Program. The record reflects that Carolyn created a Womply account—reserved for sole proprietorships, which she did not possess—and verified her iden- tity through the Persona program. Carolyn’s repeated access to the Womply portal and her review of the loan applications through DocuSign established that she viewed the fraudulent materials be- fore signing them, and her payment of $1,000 to Rivero proved her knowing participation in the scheme. A jury could also reasonably have found that Carolyn con- spired to defraud the government. Carolyn agreed with Rivero and Tracy to achieve an unlawful objective—obtaining loan for- giveness—and knowingly participated in the scheme. See Gonzalez, 834 F.3d at 1214. Carolyn received over $20,000 through fraudulent means and applied for forgiveness by falsely asserting that the funds were used for a permitted purpose. As evidenced by Tracy’s testi- mony, Carolyn personally profited when the loans were forgiven based on this fraudulent information. We reject Carolyn’s argument that the evidence was insuffi- cient because Tracy’s testimony established that he was the catalyst of the scheme. The jury was free to—and did—discredit that testi- mony. See Broughton, 689 F.3d at 1277. A jury could convict Carolyn even if her participation was “slight” compared to that of her co-conspirators. See Sosa, 777 F.3d at 1290. That she did not com- municate directly with Rivero is immaterial. See id. The evidence USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 14 of 17

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proved that she understood the overarching goal of the conspiracy and acted to further it. See id.; Vernon, 723 F.3d at 1273. 2. Sufficient Evidence Supports Carolyn’s Conviction for Wire Fraud. To convict her of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the govern- ment had to prove that Carolyn “(1) intentionally participate[d] in a scheme or artifice to defraud another of money or property, and (2) use[d] or cause[d] the use of the mails or wires for the purpose of executing the scheme or artifice.” United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1238 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To support a finding of willfulness, the govern- ment must present evidence that the defendant intended to de- fraud by attempting to obtain something she was not entitled to through deceptive means. United States v. Horn, 129 F.4th 1273, 1287 (11th Cir. 2025). This intent may be established through cir- cumstantial evidence. For example, “[e]vidence that a defendant personally profited from a fraud may provide circumstantial evi- dence of an intent to participate in that fraud.” Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1239 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Sufficient evidence supports Carolyn’s convictions for wire fraud. To convict, the government had to prove that Carolyn in- tentionally participated in a scheme to defraud another of money and used wires to execute that scheme. See id. Because the parties stipulated to the use of interstate wires, the only issue is Carolyn’s intent to defraud. USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 15 of 17

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A jury could reasonably have found that Carolyn knowingly made material misrepresentations to obtain the loan. The record reflects that the Schedule C form used to obtain the loan was fraud- ulent. No “Carolyn Wade” sole proprietorship existed, and Rivero testified to fabricating the data. By affirming that this information was “true and correct,” Carolyn made a material misrepresenta- tion. See id. Carolyn also personally and actively participated in the scheme. Internet protocol address data established that she repeat- edly accessed her Womply account. Carolyn’s identity was further verified through the Persona program, which required her to up- load photographs of her driver’s license and “selfie” images from her mobile device. Forensic data confirmed that Carolyn used her phone to upload documents and viewed the fraudulent application on multiple occasions after it had been signed. We reject Carolyn’s arguments regarding her lack of intent. Although the Wades presented testimony that the DocuSign soft- ware did not display the full fraudulent form, the jury was free to— and did—discredit that testimony in favor of government witnesses who testified to the contrary. See Broughton, 689 F.3d at 1277. The jury was also entitled to reject Tracy’s testimony that he was the sole actor, as internet protocol address data connected Carolyn— not Tracy—to the signing of the second loan. See id. Because Car- olyn personally profited from the scheme, the jury had ample cir- cumstantial evidence to find an intent to defraud. See Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1239; Horn, 129 F.4th at 1287. USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 16 of 17

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3. Sufficient Evidence Supports Carolyn’s Convictions for Making False Statements. Sufficient evidence supports Carolyn’s convictions for mak- ing false statements to the Administration. It is unlawful to know- ingly make a false statement to obtain a loan from the Administra- tion. See 15 U.S.C. § 645(a). A jury could reasonably have found that Carolyn made false statements in both her loan and forgiveness ap- plications. Carolyn’s May 18 and May 28 loan applications contained material misrepresentations. Although the underlying Schedule C forms were fraudulent, Carolyn affirmed—under penalty of per- jury—that the information was true and correct. Her initials and signature on these documents, confirmed by Tracy’s testimony and independent internet protocol address data, established her personal participation. To be sure, Tracy stated that he acted on Carolyn’s behalf, but the jury was free to discredit this testimony. See Broughton, 689 F.3d at 1277. Carolyn also made false statements to obtain loan for- giveness. To qualify for forgiveness, Carolyn was required to use the funds for specific, permitted purposes. The jury heard testi- mony that Carolyn wrote checks to herself to create the appear- ance of proper use, while instead using the proceeds to pay Rivero for the fraudulent Schedule C forms. Although Tracy maintained that the forgiveness process was “automatic,” the government pre- sented evidence that it required several affirmative steps. To secure forgiveness, the Wades submitted applications certifying under USCA11 Case: 25-11132 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 02/18/2026 Page: 17 of 17

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penalty of perjury that they had used the proceeds for payroll. The jury was entitled to reject Tracy’s testimony and find that Carolyn knowingly submitted fraudulent information to profit from the scheme. See id. Because a reasonable construction of the evidence supports the verdict, the district court correctly denied the motion for a judgment of acquittal. See Brown, 125 F.4th at 1052. IV. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the Wades’ convictions.