Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 23-1868
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER BEAUCAGE,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Lance E. Walker, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Montecalvo, Kayatta, and Aframe, Circuit Judges.
Gene D. Vorobyov for appellant.
Brian S. Kleinbord, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Darcie N. McElwee, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
April 15, 2025 AFRAME, Circuit Judge. This is a single-issue
sentencing appeal in which Christopher Beaucage contends that his
within-guidelines sentence for participating in a drug
distribution conspiracy was substantively unreasonable. We
affirm.
Beaucage's offense conduct was as follows. In October
2021, the police stopped a car driven by Heather Mitchell,
Beaucage's girlfriend. Beaucage and Mitchell's minor son were
passengers. During the stop, the police arrested Beaucage on
outstanding warrants. While searching Beaucage incident to
arrest, the police found a wad of cash in his wallet and a small
amount of fentanyl in his pocket. The police then searched the
car and uncovered fifty grams of fentanyl under the passenger seat.
Beaucage admitted that the fentanyl belonged to him.
Beaucage's arrest led to his detention. While detained,
Beaucage spoke frequently with Mitchell to give her instructions
on how to continue managing his drug business. By monitoring
Beaucage's telephone calls, the police learned about Mitchell's
drug dealing activities and conducted surveillance to verify the
information Beaucage was providing to Mitchell.
After one such call, the police followed Mitchell as she
traveled to Lawrence, Massachusetts, at Beaucage's instruction,
and watched her receive an apparent drug delivery. On Mitchell's
return to Maine, the police stopped her car and found 510 grams of
- 2 - fentanyl. Mitchell was released but continued to take drug dealing
direction from Beaucage. Based on additional intelligence from
the Beaucage-Mitchell calls, the police stopped Mitchell a second
time and seized approximately 200 grams of fentanyl and 200 grams
of a fentanyl analog.
For this conduct, a grand jury indicted Beaucage for
conspiring with Mitchell to distribute and possess with the intent
to distribute forty or more grams of fentanyl, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). In due course, Beaucage
pleaded guilty. Accounting for applicable drug weight, his
leadership role, and his acceptance of responsibility, Beaucage's
presentence report calculated his total offense level at 31 under
the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Beaucage also has a
substantial criminal history, including multiple convictions for
prior drug offenses, which placed him in a criminal history
category of V. As a result, Beaucage faced an advisory sentencing
guideline range of 168 to 210 months of imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearing, the parties offered no
objections to the presentence report. The government advocated
for a sentence at the "low end" of the advisory guideline range.
The government's sentencing argument highlighted Beaucage's
"lengthy criminal history" and his continued participation in
fentanyl trafficking activity from jail, but also noted that his
"childhood was marked by . . . trauma and abuse."
- 3 - Beaucage sought a sentence of eighty-four months. In
support of his variance request, Beaucage relied primarily on his
difficult background. From an early age, Beaucage had a
challenging homelife marked by abuse and periodic separation from
his parents. Beaucage began using hard drugs around age fourteen.
He has also suffered from symptoms of
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder, anxiety, and depression. As a minor, Beaucage spent
time in juvenile detention and resided in several group homes.
As an adult, Beaucage suffers from untreated seizures
and Hepatitis C. He has also been in several car accidents that
have resulted in head and neck pain. Beaucage is a mason by trade
and has a history of working construction jobs for cash. Beaucage
has a biological daughter with his ex-wife, Briana, and has also
formed a father-like relationship with Briana's other daughter,
Destiny. Beaucage has a decades-long substance use disorder, and
has teetered between operating at a "functioning level" and being
"out of control."
At the sentencing hearing, Beaucage offered an
allocution in which he accepted responsibility and indicated that
he was "sick of ruining people's lives." Destiny and her boyfriend
made statements commenting positively on their relationship with
Beaucage.
- 4 - The district court imposed a 180-month sentence, which
was in the middle of the advisory guideline range and twelve months
above the government's request. The court focused on Beaucage's
"significant role in [the] morbid marketplace" of fentanyl
trafficking and the harm that fentanyl has caused to the Maine
community. The court further commented that Beaucage seemed
"supernaturally dedicated" to his drug trafficking enterprise
given that he continued to manage this activity "while in jail."
In addition, the court emphasized Beaucage's "robust criminal
history that seems devoted in a singular fashion" to drug
trafficking. In reaching its determination, the court indicated
that it gave weight to Beaucage's substance use disorder and
personal history "involv[ing] trauma." Ultimately, the district
court explained that "the key sentencing factors" supporting a
180-month sentence were "the seriousness of [Beaucage's] offense,"
the "importance of providing some level of deterrence," and
"protecting the public."
On appeal, Beaucage contends that the 180-month sentence
imposed was substantively unreasonable. Beaucage criticizes the
district court's sentencing decision in three respects. He
contends that the sentence: (1) did not give adequate weight to
the mitigating circumstances of his difficult upbringing, present
familial support, and prospects for rehabilitation; (2) improperly
emphasized the devastating effect of fentanyl trafficking on the
- 5 - Maine community; and (3) punished him disproportionately to
Mitchell, who received a twenty-four-month sentence.
Substantive reasonableness challenges are reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. United States v. Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d 145,
157 (1st Cir. 2020). That is because "there is not a single
reasonable sentence in any given case but, rather, an expansive
'universe of reasonable sentencing outcomes.'" Id. (quoting
United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 2011)).
Our task is to determine only whether the sentence imposed falls
"within that expansive universe." Id. In so doing, we do not
substitute our judgment for the district court's; rather "we look
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Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 23-1868
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER BEAUCAGE,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Lance E. Walker, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Montecalvo, Kayatta, and Aframe, Circuit Judges.
Gene D. Vorobyov for appellant.
Brian S. Kleinbord, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Darcie N. McElwee, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
April 15, 2025 AFRAME, Circuit Judge. This is a single-issue
sentencing appeal in which Christopher Beaucage contends that his
within-guidelines sentence for participating in a drug
distribution conspiracy was substantively unreasonable. We
affirm.
Beaucage's offense conduct was as follows. In October
2021, the police stopped a car driven by Heather Mitchell,
Beaucage's girlfriend. Beaucage and Mitchell's minor son were
passengers. During the stop, the police arrested Beaucage on
outstanding warrants. While searching Beaucage incident to
arrest, the police found a wad of cash in his wallet and a small
amount of fentanyl in his pocket. The police then searched the
car and uncovered fifty grams of fentanyl under the passenger seat.
Beaucage admitted that the fentanyl belonged to him.
Beaucage's arrest led to his detention. While detained,
Beaucage spoke frequently with Mitchell to give her instructions
on how to continue managing his drug business. By monitoring
Beaucage's telephone calls, the police learned about Mitchell's
drug dealing activities and conducted surveillance to verify the
information Beaucage was providing to Mitchell.
After one such call, the police followed Mitchell as she
traveled to Lawrence, Massachusetts, at Beaucage's instruction,
and watched her receive an apparent drug delivery. On Mitchell's
return to Maine, the police stopped her car and found 510 grams of
- 2 - fentanyl. Mitchell was released but continued to take drug dealing
direction from Beaucage. Based on additional intelligence from
the Beaucage-Mitchell calls, the police stopped Mitchell a second
time and seized approximately 200 grams of fentanyl and 200 grams
of a fentanyl analog.
For this conduct, a grand jury indicted Beaucage for
conspiring with Mitchell to distribute and possess with the intent
to distribute forty or more grams of fentanyl, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). In due course, Beaucage
pleaded guilty. Accounting for applicable drug weight, his
leadership role, and his acceptance of responsibility, Beaucage's
presentence report calculated his total offense level at 31 under
the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Beaucage also has a
substantial criminal history, including multiple convictions for
prior drug offenses, which placed him in a criminal history
category of V. As a result, Beaucage faced an advisory sentencing
guideline range of 168 to 210 months of imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearing, the parties offered no
objections to the presentence report. The government advocated
for a sentence at the "low end" of the advisory guideline range.
The government's sentencing argument highlighted Beaucage's
"lengthy criminal history" and his continued participation in
fentanyl trafficking activity from jail, but also noted that his
"childhood was marked by . . . trauma and abuse."
- 3 - Beaucage sought a sentence of eighty-four months. In
support of his variance request, Beaucage relied primarily on his
difficult background. From an early age, Beaucage had a
challenging homelife marked by abuse and periodic separation from
his parents. Beaucage began using hard drugs around age fourteen.
He has also suffered from symptoms of
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder, anxiety, and depression. As a minor, Beaucage spent
time in juvenile detention and resided in several group homes.
As an adult, Beaucage suffers from untreated seizures
and Hepatitis C. He has also been in several car accidents that
have resulted in head and neck pain. Beaucage is a mason by trade
and has a history of working construction jobs for cash. Beaucage
has a biological daughter with his ex-wife, Briana, and has also
formed a father-like relationship with Briana's other daughter,
Destiny. Beaucage has a decades-long substance use disorder, and
has teetered between operating at a "functioning level" and being
"out of control."
At the sentencing hearing, Beaucage offered an
allocution in which he accepted responsibility and indicated that
he was "sick of ruining people's lives." Destiny and her boyfriend
made statements commenting positively on their relationship with
Beaucage.
- 4 - The district court imposed a 180-month sentence, which
was in the middle of the advisory guideline range and twelve months
above the government's request. The court focused on Beaucage's
"significant role in [the] morbid marketplace" of fentanyl
trafficking and the harm that fentanyl has caused to the Maine
community. The court further commented that Beaucage seemed
"supernaturally dedicated" to his drug trafficking enterprise
given that he continued to manage this activity "while in jail."
In addition, the court emphasized Beaucage's "robust criminal
history that seems devoted in a singular fashion" to drug
trafficking. In reaching its determination, the court indicated
that it gave weight to Beaucage's substance use disorder and
personal history "involv[ing] trauma." Ultimately, the district
court explained that "the key sentencing factors" supporting a
180-month sentence were "the seriousness of [Beaucage's] offense,"
the "importance of providing some level of deterrence," and
"protecting the public."
On appeal, Beaucage contends that the 180-month sentence
imposed was substantively unreasonable. Beaucage criticizes the
district court's sentencing decision in three respects. He
contends that the sentence: (1) did not give adequate weight to
the mitigating circumstances of his difficult upbringing, present
familial support, and prospects for rehabilitation; (2) improperly
emphasized the devastating effect of fentanyl trafficking on the
- 5 - Maine community; and (3) punished him disproportionately to
Mitchell, who received a twenty-four-month sentence.
Substantive reasonableness challenges are reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. United States v. Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d 145,
157 (1st Cir. 2020). That is because "there is not a single
reasonable sentence in any given case but, rather, an expansive
'universe of reasonable sentencing outcomes.'" Id. (quoting
United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 2011)).
Our task is to determine only whether the sentence imposed falls
"within that expansive universe." Id. In so doing, we do not
substitute our judgment for the district court's; rather "we look
for the hallmarks of a substantively reasonable sentence: 'a
plausible sentencing rationale and a defensible result.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008)).
Vacating a sentence as unreasonable is "particularly unlikely
when," as here, "the sentence imposed [fell] within the compass of
a properly calculated [guideline sentencing range]." United
States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 228-29 (1st Cir. 2015)
(second alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Vega-
Salgado, 769 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir. 2014)).
We reject Beaucage's lead argument that the sentence
imposed was unreasonable on the ground that the district court
failed to provide adequate weight to his mitigating factors. The
court stated that it had prepared for Beaucage's sentencing by
- 6 - "carefully review[ing]" the presentence report, which set forth
all the mitigating information that Beaucage highlights on appeal.
The court also stated that it had considered the statements of
support from Destiny and her boyfriend as well as Beaucage's
statement in which he had indicated his desire for change. The
court further acknowledged that Beaucage "had a difficult row to
hoe" and that it was "taking that into account" in considering the
"appropriate sentence."
We have stressed often that "a sentence is not
substantively unreasonable simply because the court chose not to
attach to certain of the mitigating factors the significance that
the defendant thinks they deserve." United States v.
Santiago-Lozada, 75 F.4th 285, 296 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting United
States v. Serrano-Delgado, 29 F.4th 16, 30 (1st Cir. 2022)); see
also United States v. Elliott, 113 F.4th 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2024)
(stating the same). That principle controls here. The district
court pointed to aggravating factors warranting the imposition of
a substantial sentence, including (1) Beaucage's continued
participation in the dangerous fentanyl trade even after his
detention and (2) his significant criminal history, including
other drug offenses, which demonstrated a substantial possibility
of recidivism. Given these significant aggravating factors, the
court's selection of a mid-guideline range sentence was consistent
with the court's statements that it was considering mitigating
- 7 - circumstances as part of its sentencing determination. To be sure,
Beaucage hoped that the court would conclude that the mitigating
circumstances supported additional leniency. But the district
court's conclusion otherwise did not make the sentence
unreasonable.
Beaucage is also incorrect that the sentence was
unreasonable because the district court commented on the
significant negative effect that Beaucage's crime -- fentanyl
trafficking -- was having in Maine. "We have held . . . that 'the
incidence of particular crimes in the relevant community
appropriately informs and contextualizes the relevant need for
deterrence' and, thus, a sentencing court may consider 'the
incidence and trend lines of particular types of crime in the
affected community,'" United States v. Díaz-Rivera, 957 F.3d 20,
29 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706
F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2013)), so long as the court fulfills "its
obligation to base its sentencing determination on case- and
offense-specific factors," id. The court followed this approach
here.
While the district court did comment on the consequences
of the fentanyl epidemic in Maine as part of its explanation about
the seriousness of Beaucage's offense, the court's sentencing
explanation did not rely exclusively or even primarily on this
consideration. Rather, as already explained, the court's primary
- 8 - foci in selecting the sentence were factors about Beaucage and his
crime, namely, his poor criminal record and his decision to
continue his drug trafficking activity even after his arrest and
detention. See United States v. Rosario-Merced, 109 F.4th 77,
84-86 (1st Cir. 2024) (discerning no error in the district court's
consideration of community characteristics alongside individual
characteristics in selecting the appropriate sentence).
Finally, the district court did not act unreasonably by
imposing a longer sentence on Beaucage than on Mitchell. "A
sentence can be substantively unreasonable where the same judge
imposes different sentences on 'two identically situated
defendants.'" United States v. Bruno-Cotto, 119 F.4th 201, 207-08
(1st Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Diaz-Serrano, 77 F.4th
41, 48 (1st Cir. 2023)). "But, for a sentence to be unreasonable
on this basis, the two defendants must be indistinguishable in
every meaningful respect that could influence the court's
sentencing decision." Id. at 208.
There are significant distinctions between Beaucage and
Mitchell for sentencing purposes. For starters, Beaucage had a
higher offense level based on the undisputed determination that he
occupied a leadership role over Mitchell in the conspiracy. See
id. (stating that codefendants are not similarly situated when one
occupied a leadership role over the other). In addition, Beaucage
had a substantial criminal history that placed him near the top of
- 9 - the guideline classification, while Mitchell fell into the lowest
criminal history category. See United States v. Grullon, 996 F.3d
21, 35 (1st Cir. 2021) (stating that divergent sentences may be
justified where the more severely punished defendant has a more
substantial criminal history). Based on these meaningful
differences between Beaucage and Mitchell, the district court's
decision to sentence Beaucage more harshly than Mitchell was
reasonable.
Affirmed.
- 10 -