United States Securities & Exchange Commission v. Kearns

691 F. Supp. 2d 601, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15897
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedFebruary 23, 2010
DocketCivil 09-3599 (JBS/KMW)
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 691 F. Supp. 2d 601 (United States Securities & Exchange Commission v. Kearns) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States Securities & Exchange Commission v. Kearns, 691 F. Supp. 2d 601, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15897 (D.N.J. 2010).

Opinion

OPINION

SIMANDLE, District Judge:

This action is presently before the Court a motion to dismiss by Defendants Brian J. Kearns [Docket Item 15]. 1 In response to this securities fraud action brought by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), Defendant Kearns argues that the complaint is untimely and that the SEC fails to state a claim for securities fraud. The Court, for the reasons expressed below, finds that this action was timely commenced and it will deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss, except as to any claims arising out of the statements constituting mere “puffery” made during the quarterly meetings and again in various Forms 8-K, because these statements are not actionable misrepresentations under the securities statutes.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

1. MedQuist Billing Scheme

Underlying this action is an alleged fraudulent scheme by MedQuist Inc., a medical transcription company based in New Jersey, to improve financial performance by “systematically and secretly in-flat[ing] its bills to customers in order to increase revenues and profit margins” from 1999 to 2004. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Accord *604 ing to the complaint, MedQuist took advantage of the opaque quality of the billing arrangements in many of its customer contracts, in which the bill was to be calculated by using a unit of measure called an “AAMT line.” (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) The AAMT line was any line of 65 “characters,” with characters being functions that were not all visible to a reviewer, so that it was impossible for clients to confirm that they had been correctly billed. (Id. ¶¶ 10-13.) Beginning in 1999, MedQuist began to deviate from the billing method outlined in many contracts, first by ceasing to actually count AAMT lines, but instead calculating AAMT lines by simply multiplying the payroll line count (the measure MedQuist used to pay transcriptionists and not equal to the AAMT line) by two. (Id. ¶¶ 13-16.) This policy was known at MedQuist as “2-to-1 ratio” or the “2-to-l Bill to Pay [BFP]” ratio. (Id. ¶16.) MedQuist adopted a second billing policy, in which clients were billed $3 for every $1 paid to a transcriptionist, known as the “3-to-l ratio.” (Id ¶ 18.)

“MedQuist continued to secretly adjust line count ratios until 2004 or later,” using an internal unit called the Financial Operational Audit (“FOPA”) to implement the billing scheme. (Id. IT 20.) The FOPA prepared reports that documented the billing strategies and recommended “secretly or gradually” increasing line count ratios and creating AAMT accounts to allow for manipulative billing practices. (Id.) In order to disguise these artificial billing increases, MedQuist would sometimes time the increases to period of heavy work volume, so that the increases would go unnoticed. (Id. ¶ 22.)

2. Defendant Kearns’ Knowledge and Participation in MedQuist’s Billing Scheme

The SEC alleges that Defendant Kearns, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) of MedQuist from October 2000 through July 2004, “knew about this billing scheme and, instead of stopping the fraud, took steps to further and conceal the scheme.” (Id. ¶¶ 2, 7-8.)

On October 16, 2000, Defendant Kearns joined MedQuist as its Treasurer and CFO, and on October 18, 2000, Defendant Kearns attended a meeting during which the Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) “discussed MedQuist’s 2-to-l BTP ratio and the 3-to-l gross margin policies.” (Compl. ¶ 31.) Defendant Kearns’ discussions with the COO continued, as did similar discussions with the director of the FOPA, until early 2002, and included talk of “the revenue and gross margin targets established by the 3-to-l margin ratio policy,” the lack of uniformity in application of the 2-to-l BTP ratio, and the content of FOPA reports. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 34.) In addition, the FOPA director and Defendant Kearns “discussed [MedQuist’s] adjustments to ratios to increase line counts and revenue.” (Id. ¶ 34.) During this period Defendant Kearns also received reports and emails from FOPA that recommended gradually and secretly increasing the line count ratios to increase profits. (Id ¶¶ 35-37.) From October 2000 through 2001, Defendant Kearns discussed with Defendant Van Fossen, MedQuist’s Controller, “the 2-to-l BTP ratio policy and the use of ratios instead of counting AAMT lines” and both regularly saw “management reports that presented customer billed AAMT line totals in terms of ratios rather than counts.” (Id. ¶ 33.)

3. Defendant Kearns’ Failure to Respond to Employee and Customer Complaints Regarding Fraudulent Billing Practices

In February 2003, Defendant Kearns, along with Van Fossen, learned of another employee complaint regarding secret billing adjustments (“I [ ] was encouraged to and I quote ‘play the game’ and !>over *605 charged there [sic] clients. I was told that ‘everyone else does it’ ... ”) in the Pennsylvania office. (Compl. ¶ 51.) Kearns and Van Fossen directed a review of the office, but the review was ineffective because it did not examine line count accuracy or arrange for audit trails, even though the employee performing the review told Defendant Kearns “that a January 2002 internal FOPA review of the Pennsylvania office had recommended secret changes to line count ratios to increase revenue and profit margins and that line count ratios at that office had in fact been increased without any audit trails or documentary support.” (Compl. ¶¶ 51-54.) Van Fossen saw that of all the line ratios at the Pennsylvania office, approximately 37% of customers had ratios higher than 2 to 1. (Id. ¶ 53.) Nevertheless, on February 21, 2003, Defendant Kearns told the Audit Committee of MedQuist’s Board of Directors and the external auditors that the review of the Pennsylvania office did not show any billing irregularities. (Id. ¶ 55.)

Again, in March 2003, Kearns learned of an employee complaint about “suspicious billing” in the Ohio MedQuist office. (Id. ¶ 56.) An FOPA report, dated April 3, 2004, stated that the office “routinely changed line count ratios after contracts were in place” to manipulate profit margins and found “multiple control weaknesses, including no record of ratio changes.” (Id.) Van Fossen received a copy of this report and Kearns knew of its content. (Id.)

On September 10, 2001, Kearns received a report from a senior staff meeting detailing why customers had left MedQuist for other services. (Compl. ¶ 44; Van Fossen Exh. J.) Sixteen former customers gave reasons for leaving and of those, nine 2 complained of a lack of transparency in billing or a billing problem, noting “fraudulent billing practices,” “no verification of lines billing; could not justify bills,” “could not justify billing,” “concerned with inability to reconcile line counts,” “pricing and billing issues,” “unable to reconcile billing ...

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691 F. Supp. 2d 601, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15897, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-securities-exchange-commission-v-kearns-njd-2010.